| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> found a nasty little bug in
the permissions of setns. With unprivileged user namespaces it
became possible to create new namespaces without privilege.
However the setns calls were relaxed to only require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in
the user nameapce of the targed namespace.
Which made the following nasty sequence possible.
pid = clone(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS);
if (pid == 0) { /* child */
system("mount --bind /home/me/passwd /etc/passwd");
}
else if (pid != 0) { /* parent */
char path[PATH_MAX];
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%u/ns/mnt");
fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
setns(fd, 0);
system("su -");
}
Prevent this possibility by requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in the current user namespace when joing all but the user namespace.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Assign a unique proc inode to each namespace, and use that
inode number to ensure we only allocate at most one proc
inode for every namespace in proc.
A single proc inode per namespace allows userspace to test
to see if two processes are in the same namespace.
This has been a long requested feature and only blocked because
a naive implementation would put the id in a global space and
would ultimately require having a namespace for the names of
namespaces, making migration and certain virtualization tricks
impossible.
We still don't have per superblock inode numbers for proc, which
appears necessary for application unaware checkpoint/restart and
migrations (if the application is using namespace file descriptors)
but that is now allowd by the design if it becomes important.
I have preallocated the ipc and uts initial proc inode numbers so
their structures can be statically initialized.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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file
To keep things sane in the context of file descriptor passing derive the
user namespace that uids are mapped into from the opener of the file
instead of from current.
When writing to the maps file the lower user namespace must always
be the parent user namespace, or setting the mapping simply does
not make sense. Enforce that the opener of the file was in
the parent user namespace or the user namespace whose mapping
is being set.
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- Add CLONE_THREAD to the unshare flags if CLONE_NEWUSER is selected
As changing user namespaces is only valid if all there is only
a single thread.
- Restore the code to add CLONE_VM if CLONE_THREAD is selected and
the code to addCLONE_SIGHAND if CLONE_VM is selected.
Making the constraints in the code clear.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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This allows entering a user namespace, and the ability
to store a reference to a user namespace with a bind
mount.
Addition of missing userns_ns_put in userns_install
from Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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The task_user_ns function hides the fact that it is getting the user
namespace from struct cred on the task. struct cred may go away as
soon as the rcu lock is released. This leads to a race where we
can dereference a stale user namespace pointer.
To make it obvious a struct cred is involved kill task_user_ns.
To kill the race modify the users of task_user_ns to only
reference the user namespace while the rcu lock is held.
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Modify create_new_namespaces to explicitly take a user namespace
parameter, instead of implicitly through the task_struct.
This allows an implementation of unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) where
the new user namespace is not stored onto the current task_struct
until after all of the namespaces are created.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- Push the permission check from the core setns syscall into
the setns install methods where the user namespace of the
target namespace can be determined, and used in a ns_capable
call.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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If an unprivileged user has the appropriate capabilities in their
current user namespace allow the creation of new namespaces.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Now that we have been through every permission check in the kernel
having uid == 0 and gid == 0 in your local user namespace no
longer adds any special privileges. Even having a full set
of caps in your local user namespace is safe because capabilies
are relative to your local user namespace, and do not confer
unexpected privileges.
Over the long term this should allow much more of the kernels
functionality to be safely used by non-root users. Functionality
like unsharing the mount namespace that is only unsafe because
it can fool applications whose privileges are raised when they
are executed. Since those applications have no privileges in
a user namespaces it becomes safe to spoof and confuse those
applications all you want.
Those capabilities will still need to be enabled carefully because
we may still need things like rlimits on the number of unprivileged
mounts but that is to avoid DOS attacks not to avoid fooling root
owned processes.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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This will allow for support for unprivileged mounts in a new user namespace.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Unsharing of the pid namespace unlike unsharing of other namespaces
does not take affect immediately. Instead it affects the children
created with fork and clone. The first of these children becomes the init
process of the new pid namespace, the rest become oddball children
of pid 0. From the point of view of the new pid namespace the process
that created it is pid 0, as it's pid does not map.
A couple of different semantics were considered but this one was
settled on because it is easy to implement and it is usable from
pam modules. The core reasons for the existence of unshare.
I took a survey of the callers of pam modules and the following
appears to be a representative sample of their logic.
{
setup stuff include pam
child = fork();
if (!child) {
setuid()
exec /bin/bash
}
waitpid(child);
pam and other cleanup
}
As you can see there is a fork to create the unprivileged user
space process. Which means that the unprivileged user space
process will appear as pid 1 in the new pid namespace. Further
most login processes do not cope with extraneous children which
means shifting the duty of reaping extraneous child process to
the creator of those extraneous children makes the system more
comprehensible.
The practical reason for this set of pid namespace semantics is
that it is simple to implement and verify they work correctly.
Whereas an implementation that requres changing the struct
pid on a process comes with a lot more races and pain. Not
the least of which is that glibc caches getpid().
These semantics are implemented by having two notions
of the pid namespace of a proces. There is task_active_pid_ns
which is the pid namspace the process was created with
and the pid namespace that all pids are presented to
that process in. The task_active_pid_ns is stored
in the struct pid of the task.
Then there is the pid namespace that will be used for children
that pid namespace is stored in task->nsproxy->pid_ns.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Instead of setting child_reaper and SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE one way
for the system init process, and another way for pid namespace
init processes test pid->nr == 1 and use the same code for both.
For the global init this results in SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE being set
much earlier in the initialization process.
This is a small cleanup and it paves the way for allowing unshare and
enter of the pid namespace as that path like our global init also will
not set CLONE_NEWPID.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- Pid namespaces are designed to be inescapable so verify that the
passed in pid namespace is a child of the currently active
pid namespace or the currently active pid namespace itself.
Allowing the currently active pid namespace is important so
the effects of an earlier setns can be cancelled.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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task_active_pid_ns(current) != current->ns_proxy->pid_ns will
soon be allowed to support unshare and setns.
The definition of creating a child pid namespace when
task_active_pid_ns(current) != current->ns_proxy->pid_ns could be that
we create a child pid namespace of current->ns_proxy->pid_ns. However
that leads to strange cases like trying to have a single process be
init in multiple pid namespaces, which is racy and hard to think
about.
The definition of creating a child pid namespace when
task_active_pid_ns(current) != current->ns_proxy->pid_ns could be that
we create a child pid namespace of task_active_pid_ns(current). While
that seems less racy it does not provide any utility.
Therefore define the semantics of creating a child pid namespace when
task_active_pid_ns(current) != current->ns_proxy->pid_ns to be that the
pid namespace creation fails. That is easy to implement and easy
to think about.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Looking at pid_ns->nr_hashed is a bit simpler and it works for
disjoint process trees that an unshare or a join of a pid_namespace
may create.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Set nr_hashed to -1 just before we schedule the work to cleanup proc.
Test nr_hashed just before we hash a new pid and if nr_hashed is < 0
fail.
This guaranteees that processes never enter a pid namespaces after we
have cleaned up the state to support processes in a pid namespace.
Currently sending SIGKILL to all of the process in a pid namespace as
init exists gives us this guarantee but we need something a little
stronger to support unsharing and joining a pid namespace.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Track the number of pids in the proc hash table. When the number of
pids goes to 0 schedule work to unmount the kernel mount of proc.
Move the mount of proc into alloc_pid when we allocate the pid for
init.
Remove the surprising calls of pid_ns_release proc in fork and
proc_flush_task. Those code paths really shouldn't know about proc
namespace implementation details and people have demonstrated several
times that finding and understanding those code paths is difficult and
non-obvious.
Because of the call path detach pid is alwasy called with the
rtnl_lock held free_pid is not allowed to sleep, so the work to
unmounting proc is moved to a work queue. This has the side benefit
of not blocking the entire world waiting for the unnecessary
rcu_barrier in deactivate_locked_super.
In the process of making the code clear and obvious this fixes a bug
reported by Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> where we would leak a
mount of proc during clone(CLONE_NEWPID|CLONE_NEWNET) if copy_pid_ns
succeeded and copy_net_ns failed.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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The expressions tsk->nsproxy->pid_ns and task_active_pid_ns
aka ns_of_pid(task_pid(tsk)) should have the same number of
cache line misses with the practical difference that
ns_of_pid(task_pid(tsk)) is released later in a processes life.
Furthermore by using task_active_pid_ns it becomes trivial
to write an unshare implementation for the the pid namespace.
So I have used task_active_pid_ns everywhere I can.
In fork since the pid has not yet been attached to the
process I use ns_of_pid, to achieve the same effect.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- Capture the the user namespace that creates the pid namespace
- Use that user namespace to test if it is ok to write to
/proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid.
Zhao Hongjiang <zhaohongjiang@huawei.com> noticed I was missing a put_user_ns
in when destroying a pid_ns. I have foloded his patch into this one
so that bisects will work properly.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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The user namespace which creates a new network namespace owns that
namespace and all resources created in it. This way we can target
capability checks for privileged operations against network resources to
the user_ns which created the network namespace in which the resource
lives. Privilege to the user namespace which owns the network
namespace, or any parent user namespace thereof, provides the same
privilege to the network resource.
This patch is reworked from a version originally by
Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Merge misc fixes from Andrew Morton:
"18 total. 15 fixes and some updates to a device_cgroup patchset which
bring it up to date with the version which I should have merged in the
first place."
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (18 patches)
fs/compat_ioctl.c: VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE missing error check
gen_init_cpio: avoid stack overflow when expanding
drivers/rtc/rtc-imxdi.c: add missing spin lock initialization
mm, numa: avoid setting zone_reclaim_mode unless a node is sufficiently distant
pidns: limit the nesting depth of pid namespaces
drivers/dma/dw_dmac: make driver's endianness configurable
mm/mmu_notifier: allocate mmu_notifier in advance
tools/testing/selftests/epoll/test_epoll.c: fix build
UAPI: fix tools/vm/page-types.c
mm/page_alloc.c:alloc_contig_range(): return early for err path
rbtree: include linux/compiler.h for definition of __always_inline
genalloc: stop crashing the system when destroying a pool
backlight: ili9320: add missing SPI dependency
device_cgroup: add proper checking when changing default behavior
device_cgroup: stop using simple_strtoul()
device_cgroup: rename deny_all to behavior
cgroup: fix invalid rcu dereference
mm: fix XFS oops due to dirty pages without buffers on s390
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'struct pid' is a "variable sized struct" - a header with an array of
upids at the end.
The size of the array depends on a level (depth) of pid namespaces. Now a
level of pidns is not limited, so 'struct pid' can be more than one page.
Looks reasonable, that it should be less than a page. MAX_PIS_NS_LEVEL is
not calculated from PAGE_SIZE, because in this case it depends on
architectures, config options and it will be reduced, if someone adds a
new fields in struct pid or struct upid.
I suggest to set MAX_PIS_NS_LEVEL = 32, because it saves ability to expand
"struct pid" and it's more than enough for all known for me use-cases.
When someone finds a reasonable use case, we can add a config option or a
sysctl parameter.
In addition it will reduce the effect of another problem, when we have
many nested namespaces and the oldest one starts dying.
zap_pid_ns_processe will be called for each namespace and find_vpid will
be called for each process in a namespace. find_vpid will be called
minimum max_level^2 / 2 times. The reason of that is that when we found a
bit in pidmap, we can't determine this pidns is top for this process or it
isn't.
vpid is a heavy operation, so a fork bomb, which create many nested
namespace, can make a system inaccessible for a long time. For example my
system becomes inaccessible for a few minutes with 4000 processes.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: return -EINVAL in response to excessive nesting, not -ENOMEM]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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If one includes documentation for an external tool, it should be
correct. This is not:
1. Overriding the input to rngd should typically be neither
necessary nor desired. This is especially so since newer
versions of rngd support a number of different *types* of sources.
2. The default kernel-exported device is called /dev/hwrng not
/dev/hwrandom nor /dev/hw_random (both of which were used in the
past; however, kernel and udev seem to have converged on
/dev/hwrng.)
Overall it is better if the documentation for rngd is kept with rngd
rather than in a kernel Makefile.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup
Pull cgroup fixes from Tejun Heo:
"This pull request contains three fixes.
Two are reverts of task_lock() removal in cgroup fork path. The
optimizations incorrectly assumed that threadgroup_lock can protect
process forks (as opposed to thread creations) too. Further cleanup
of cgroup fork path is scheduled.
The third fixes cgroup emptiness notification loss."
* 'for-3.7-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
Revert "cgroup: Remove task_lock() from cgroup_post_fork()"
Revert "cgroup: Drop task_lock(parent) on cgroup_fork()"
cgroup: notify_on_release may not be triggered in some cases
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This reverts commit 7e3aa30ac8c904a706518b725c451bb486daaae9.
The commit incorrectly assumed that fork path always performed
threadgroup_change_begin/end() and depended on that for
synchronization against task exit and cgroup migration paths instead
of explicitly grabbing task_lock().
threadgroup_change is not locked when forking a new process (as
opposed to a new thread in the same process) and even if it were it
wouldn't be effective as different processes use different threadgroup
locks.
Revert the incorrect optimization.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
LKML-Reference: <20121008020000.GB2575@localhost>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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This reverts commit 7e381b0eb1e1a9805c37335562e8dc02e7d7848c.
The commit incorrectly assumed that fork path always performed
threadgroup_change_begin/end() and depended on that for
synchronization against task exit and cgroup migration paths instead
of explicitly grabbing task_lock().
threadgroup_change is not locked when forking a new process (as
opposed to a new thread in the same process) and even if it were it
wouldn't be effective as different processes use different threadgroup
locks.
Revert the incorrect optimization.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
LKML-Reference: <20121008020000.GB2575@localhost>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Bitterly-Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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notify_on_release must be triggered when the last process in a cgroup is
move to another. But if the first(and only) process in a cgroup is moved to
another, notify_on_release is not triggered.
# mkdir /cgroup/cpu/SRC
# mkdir /cgroup/cpu/DST
#
# echo 1 >/cgroup/cpu/SRC/notify_on_release
# echo 1 >/cgroup/cpu/DST/notify_on_release
#
# sleep 300 &
[1] 8629
#
# echo 8629 >/cgroup/cpu/SRC/tasks
# echo 8629 >/cgroup/cpu/DST/tasks
-> notify_on_release for /SRC must be triggered at this point,
but it isn't.
This is because put_css_set() is called before setting CGRP_RELEASABLE
in cgroup_task_migrate(), and is a regression introduce by the
commit:74a1166d(cgroups: make procs file writable), which was merged
into v3.0.
Cc: Ben Blum <bblum@andrew.cmu.edu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.0.x and later
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Daisuke Nishimura <nishimura@mxp.nes.nec.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/wq
Pull workqueue fix from Tejun Heo:
"This pull request contains one patch from Dan Magenheimer to fix
cancel_delayed_work() regression introduced by its reimplementation
using try_to_grab_pending(). The reimplementation made it incorrectly
return %true when the work item is idle.
There aren't too many consumers of the return value but it broke at
least ramster."
* 'for-3.7-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/wq:
workqueue: cancel_delayed_work() should return %false if work item is idle
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57b30ae77b ("workqueue: reimplement cancel_delayed_work() using
try_to_grab_pending()") made cancel_delayed_work() always return %true
unless someone else is also trying to cancel the work item, which is
broken - if the target work item is idle, the return value should be
%false.
try_to_grab_pending() indicates that the target work item was idle by
zero return value. Use it for return. Note that this brings
cancel_delayed_work() in line with __cancel_work_timer() in return
value handling.
Signed-off-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
LKML-Reference: <444a6439-b1a4-4740-9e7e-bc37267cfe73@default>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Most of these are uprobes race fixes from Oleg, and their preparatory
cleanups. (It's larger than what I'd normally send for an -rc kernel,
but they looked significant enough to not delay them.)
There's also an oprofile fix and an uncore PMU fix."
* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (22 commits)
perf/x86: Disable uncore on virtualized CPUs
oprofile, x86: Fix wrapping bug in op_x86_get_ctrl()
ring-buffer: Check for uninitialized cpu buffer before resizing
uprobes: Fix the racy uprobe->flags manipulation
uprobes: Fix prepare_uprobe() race with itself
uprobes: Introduce prepare_uprobe()
uprobes: Fix handle_swbp() vs unregister() + register() race
uprobes: Do not delete uprobe if uprobe_unregister() fails
uprobes: Don't return success if alloc_uprobe() fails
uprobes/x86: Only rep+nop can be emulated correctly
uprobes: Simplify is_swbp_at_addr(), remove stale comments
uprobes: Kill set_orig_insn()->is_swbp_at_addr()
uprobes: Introduce copy_opcode(), kill read_opcode()
uprobes: Kill set_swbp()->is_swbp_at_addr()
uprobes: Restrict valid_vma(false) to skip VM_SHARED vmas
uprobes: Change valid_vma() to demand VM_MAYEXEC rather than VM_EXEC
uprobes: Change write_opcode() to use FOLL_FORCE
uprobes: Move clear_thread_flag(TIF_UPROBE) to uprobe_notify_resume()
uprobes: Kill UTASK_BP_HIT state
uprobes: Fix UPROBE_SKIP_SSTEP checks in handle_swbp()
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace into perf/urgent
Pull ftrace ring-buffer resizing fix from Steve Rostedt.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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With a system where, num_present_cpus < num_possible_cpus, even if all
CPUs are online, non-present CPUs don't have per_cpu buffers allocated.
If per_cpu/<cpu>/buffer_size_kb is modified for such a CPU, it can cause
a panic due to NULL dereference in ring_buffer_resize().
To fix this, resize operation is allowed only if the per-cpu buffer has
been initialized.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1349912427-6486-1-git-send-email-vnagarnaik@google.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Nagarnaik <vnagarnaik@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/oleg/misc into perf/urgent
Pull various uprobes bugfixes from Oleg Nesterov - mostly race and
failure path fixes.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Multiple threads can manipulate uprobe->flags, this is obviously
unsafe. For example mmap can set UPROBE_COPY_INSN while register
tries to set UPROBE_RUN_HANDLER, the latter can also race with
can_skip_sstep() which clears UPROBE_SKIP_SSTEP.
Change this code to use bitops.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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install_breakpoint() is called under mm->mmap_sem, this protects
set_swbp() but not prepare_uprobe(). Two or more different tasks
can call install_breakpoint()->prepare_uprobe() at the same time,
this leads to numerous problems if UPROBE_COPY_INSN is not set.
Just for example, the second copy_insn() can corrupt the already
analyzed/fixuped uprobe->arch.insn and race with handle_swbp().
This patch simply adds uprobe->copy_mutex to serialize this code.
We could probably reuse ->consumer_rwsem, but this would mean that
consumer->handler() can not use mm->mmap_sem, not good.
Note: this is another temporary ugly hack until we move this logic
into uprobe_register().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Preparation. Extract the copy_insn/arch_uprobe_analyze_insn code
from install_breakpoint() into the new helper, prepare_uprobe().
And move uprobe->flags defines from uprobes.h to uprobes.c, nobody
else can use them anyway.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Strictly speaking this race was added by me in 56bb4cf6. However
I think that this bug is just another indication that we should
move copy_insn/uprobe_analyze_insn code from install_breakpoint()
to uprobe_register(), there are a lot of other reasons for that.
Until then, add a hack to close the race.
A task can hit uprobe U1, but before it calls find_uprobe() this
uprobe can be unregistered *AND* another uprobe U2 can be added to
uprobes_tree at the same inode/offset. In this case handle_swbp()
will use the not-fully-initialized U2, in particular its arch.insn
for xol.
Add the additional !UPROBE_COPY_INSN check into handle_swbp(),
if this flag is not set we simply restart as if the new uprobe was
not inserted yet. This is not very nice, we need barriers, but we
will remove this hack when we change uprobe_register().
Note: with or without this patch install_breakpoint() can race with
itself, yet another reson to kill UPROBE_COPY_INSN altogether. And
even the usage of uprobe->flags is not safe. See the next patches.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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delete_uprobe() must not be called if register_for_each_vma(false)
fails to remove all breakpoints, __uprobe_unregister() is correct.
The problem is that register_for_each_vma(false) always returns 0
and thus this logic does not work.
1. Change verify_opcode() to return 0 rather than -EINVAL when
unregister detects the !is_swbp insn, we can treat this case
as success and currently unregister paths ignore the error
code anyway.
2. Change remove_breakpoint() to propagate the error code from
write_opcode().
3. Change register_for_each_vma(is_register => false) to remove
as much breakpoints as possible but return non-zero if
remove_breakpoint() fails at least once.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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If alloc_uprobe() fails uprobe_register() should return ENOMEM, not 0.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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After the previous change is_swbp_at_addr() is always called with
current->mm. Remove this check and move it close to its single caller.
Also, remove the obsolete comment about is_swbp_at_addr() and
uprobe_state.count.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Unlike set_swbp(), set_orig_insn()->is_swbp_at_addr() makes sense,
although it can't prevent all confusions.
But the usage of is_swbp_at_addr() is equally confusing, and it adds
the extra get_user_pages() we can avoid.
This patch removes set_orig_insn()->is_swbp_at_addr() but changes
write_opcode() to do the necessary checks before replace_page().
Perhaps it also makes sense to ensure PAGE_MAPPING_ANON in unregister
case.
find_active_uprobe() becomes the only user of is_swbp_at_addr(),
we can change its semantics.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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No functional changes, preparations.
1. Extract the kmap-and-memcpy code from read_opcode() into the
new trivial helper, copy_opcode(). The next patch will add
another user.
2. read_opcode() becomes really trivial, fold it into its single
caller, is_swbp_at_addr().
3. Remove "auprobe" argument from write_opcode(), it is not used
since f403072c6.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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A separate patch for better documentation.
set_swbp()->is_swbp_at_addr() is not needed for correctness, it is
harmless to do the unnecessary __replace_page(old_page, new_page)
when these 2 pages are identical.
And it can not be counted as optimization. mmap/register races are
very unlikely, while in the likely case is_swbp_at_addr() adds the
extra get_user_pages() even if the caller is uprobe_mmap(current->mm)
and returns false.
Note also that the semantics/usage of is_swbp_at_addr() in uprobe.c
is confusing. set_swbp() uses it to detect the case when this insn
was already modified by uprobes, that is why it should always compare
the opcode with UPROBE_SWBP_INSN even if the hardware (like powerpc)
has other trap insns. It doesn't matter if this breakpoint was in fact
installed by gdb or application itself, we are going to "steal" this
breakpoint anyway and execute the original insn from vm_file even if
it no longer matches the memory.
OTOH, handle_swbp()->find_active_uprobe() uses is_swbp_at_addr() to
figure out whether we need to send SIGTRAP or not if we can not find
uprobe, so in this case it should return true for all trap variants,
not only for UPROBE_SWBP_INSN.
This patch removes set_swbp()->is_swbp_at_addr(), the next patches
will remove it from set_orig_insn() which is similar to set_swbp()
in this respect. So the only caller will be handle_swbp() and we
can make its semantics clear.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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valid_vma(false) ignores ->vm_flags, this is not actually right.
We should never try to write into MAP_SHARED mapping, this can
confuse an apllication which actually writes to ->vm_file.
With this patch valid_vma(false) ignores VM_WRITE only but checks
other (immutable) bits checked by valid_vma(true). This can also
speedup uprobe_munmap() and uprobe_unregister().
Note: even after this patch _unregister can confuse the probed
application if it does mprotect(PROT_WRITE) after _register and
installs "int3", but this is hardly possible to avoid and this
doesn't differ from gdb case.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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uprobe_register() or uprobe_mmap() requires VM_READ | VM_EXEC, this
is not right. An apllication can do mprotect(PROT_EXEC) later and
execute this code.
Change valid_vma(is_register => true) to check VM_MAYEXEC instead.
No need to check VM_MAYREAD, it is always set.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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write_opcode()->get_user_pages() needs FOLL_FORCE to ensure we can
read the page even if the probed task did mprotect(PROT_NONE) after
uprobe_register(). Without FOLL_WRITE, FOLL_FORCE doesn't have any
side effect but allows to read the !VM_READ memory.
Otherwiese the subsequent uprobe_unregister()->set_orig_insn() fails
and we leak "int3". If that task does mprotect(PROT_READ | EXEC) and
execute the probed insn later it will be killed.
Note: in fact this is also needed for _register, see the next patch.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Move clear_thread_flag(TIF_UPROBE) from do_notify_resume() to
uprobe_notify_resume() for !CONFIG_UPROBES case.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Kill UTASK_BP_HIT state, it buys nothing but complicates the code.
It is only used in uprobe_notify_resume() to decide who should be
called, we can check utask->active_uprobe != NULL instead. And this
allows us to simplify handle_swbp(), no need to clear utask->state.
Likewise we could kill UTASK_SSTEP, but UTASK_BP_HIT is worse and
imho should die. The problem is, it creates the special case when
task->utask is NULL, we can't distinguish RUNNING and BP_HIT. With
this patch utask == NULL always means RUNNING.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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