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* KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signingDavid Howells2013-09-251-2/+0
| | | | | | | Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing so that it can be used by code other than the module-signing code. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* MODSIGN: Move the magic string to the end of a module and eliminate the searchDavid Howells2012-10-191-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Emit the magic string that indicates a module has a signature after the signature data instead of before it. This allows module_sig_check() to be made simpler and faster by the elimination of the search for the magic string. Instead we just need to do a single memcmp(). This works because at the end of the signature data there is the fixed-length signature information block. This block then falls immediately prior to the magic number. From the contents of the information block, it is trivial to calculate the size of the signature data and thus the size of the actual module data. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* MODSIGN: Provide module signing public keys to the kernelDavid Howells2012-10-101-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Include a PGP keyring containing the public keys required to perform module verification in the kernel image during build and create a special keyring during boot which is then populated with keys of crypto type holding the public keys found in the PGP keyring. These can be seen by root: [root@andromeda ~]# cat /proc/keys 07ad4ee0 I----- 1 perm 3f010000 0 0 crypto modsign.0: RSA 87b9b3bd [] 15c7f8c3 I----- 1 perm 1f030000 0 0 keyring .module_sign: 1/4 ... It is probably worth permitting root to invalidate these keys, resulting in their removal and preventing further modules from being loaded with that key. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
* module: signature checking hookRusty Russell2012-10-101-0/+13
We do a very simple search for a particular string appended to the module (which is cache-hot and about to be SHA'd anyway). There's both a config option and a boot parameter which control whether we accept or fail with unsigned modules and modules that are signed with an unknown key. If module signing is enabled, the kernel will be tainted if a module is loaded that is unsigned or has a signature for which we don't have the key. (Useful feedback and tweaks by David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>) Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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