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* [NETLINK]: Add "groups" argument to netlink_kernel_createPatrick McHardy2005-08-291-1/+1
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NETLINK]: Add properly module refcounting for kernel netlink sockets.Harald Welte2005-08-291-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | - Remove bogus code for compiling netlink as module - Add module refcounting support for modules implementing a netlink protocol - Add support for autoloading modules that implement a netlink protocol as soon as someone opens a socket for that protocol Signed-off-by: Harald Welte <laforge@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* AUDIT: Unify auid reporting, put arch before syscall numberDavid Woodhouse2005-05-231-5/+5
| | | | | | | These changes make processing of audit logs easier. Based on a patch from Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* AUDIT: Assign serial number to non-syscall messagesDavid Woodhouse2005-05-211-4/+42
| | | | | | | | | | | | Move audit_serial() into audit.c and use it to generate serial numbers on messages even when there is no audit context from syscall auditing. This allows us to disambiguate audit records when more than one is generated in the same millisecond. Based on a patch by Steve Grubb after he observed the problem. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* AUDIT: Fix inconsistent use of loginuid vs. auid, signed vs. unsigned Steve Grubb2005-05-211-5/+2
| | | | | | | | The attached patch changes all occurrences of loginuid to auid. It also changes everything to %u that is an unsigned type. Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* AUDIT: Fix AVC_USER message passing.Steve Grubb2005-05-211-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | The original AVC_USER message wasn't consolidated with the new range of user messages. The attached patch fixes the kernel so the old messages work again. Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* AUDIT: Honour audit_backlog_limit again.David Woodhouse2005-05-191-0/+12
| | | | | | | | The limit on the number of outstanding audit messages was inadvertently removed with the switch to queuing skbs directly for sending by a kernel thread. Put it back again. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* AUDIT: Send netlink messages from a separate kernel threadDavid Woodhouse2005-05-191-121/+70
| | | | | | | | | netlink_unicast() will attempt to reallocate and will free messages if the socket's rcvbuf limit is reached unless we give it an infinite timeout. So do that, from a kernel thread which is dedicated to spewing stuff up the netlink socket. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* AUDIT: Clean up logging of untrusted stringsSteve Grubb2005-05-191-23/+48
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * If vsnprintf returns -1, it will mess up the sk buffer space accounting. This is fixed by not calling skb_put with bogus len values. * audit_log_hex was a loop that called audit_log_vformat with %02X for each character. This is very inefficient since conversion from unsigned character to Ascii representation is essentially masking, shifting, and byte lookups. Also, the length of the converted string is well known - it's twice the original. Fixed by rewriting the function. * audit_log_untrustedstring had no comments. This makes it hard for someone to understand what the string format will be. * audit_log_d_path was never fixed to use untrustedstring. This could mess up user space parsers. This was fixed to make a temp buffer, call d_path, and log temp buffer using untrustedstring. From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* AUDIT: Treat all user messages identically.David Woodhouse2005-05-181-18/+2
| | | | | | | It's silly to have to add explicit entries for new userspace messages as we invent them. Just treat all messages in the user range the same. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* AUDIT: fix max_t thinko.David Woodhouse2005-05-131-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | Der... if you use max_t it helps if you give it a type. Note to self: Always just apply the tested patches, don't try to port them by hand. You're not clever enough. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* AUDIT: Fix some spelling errorsSteve Grubb2005-05-131-2/+2
| | | | | | | | I'm going through the kernel code and have a patch that corrects several spelling errors in comments. From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* AUDIT: Add message types to audit recordsSteve Grubb2005-05-131-23/+55
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds more messages types to the audit subsystem so that audit analysis is quicker, intuitive, and more useful. Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> --- I forgot one type in the big patch. I need to add one for user space originating SE Linux avc messages. This is used by dbus and nscd. -Steve --- Updated to 2.6.12-rc4-mm1. -dwmw2 Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* AUDIT: Round up audit skb expansion to AUDIT_BUFSIZ.David Woodhouse2005-05-131-1/+1
| | | | | | | Otherwise, we will be repeatedly reallocating, even if we're only adding a few bytes at a time. Pointed out by Steve Grubb. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* Add audit_log_typeChris Wright2005-05-111-33/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add audit_log_type to allow callers to specify type and pid when logging. Convert audit_log to wrapper around audit_log_type. Could have converted all audit_log callers directly, but common case is default of type AUDIT_KERNEL and pid 0. Update audit_log_start to take type and pid values when creating a new audit_buffer. Move sequences that did audit_log_start, audit_log_format, audit_set_type, audit_log_end, to simply call audit_log_type directly. This obsoletes audit_set_type and audit_set_pid, so remove them. Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* Move ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to headerChris Wright2005-05-111-10/+2
| | | | | | | | Remove code conditionally dependent on CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL from audit.c. Move these dependencies to audit.h with the rest. Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* Audit requires CONFIG_NETChris Wright2005-05-111-30/+0
| | | | | | | | Audit now actually requires netlink. So make it depend on CONFIG_NET, and remove the inline dependencies on CONFIG_NET. Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* AUDIT: Properly account for alignment difference in nlmsg_len.Chris Wright2005-05-111-1/+1
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* AUDIT: Fix abuse of va_args. David Woodhouse2005-05-101-1/+3
| | | | | | We're not allowed to use args twice; we need to use va_copy. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* AUDIT: pass size argument to audit_expand().David Woodhouse2005-05-101-4/+4
| | | | | | | Let audit_expand() know how much it's expected to grow the buffer, in the case that we have that information to hand. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* AUDIT: Fix reported length of audit messages.Steve Grubb2005-05-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | We were setting nlmsg_len to skb->len, but we should be subtracting the size of the header. From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* AUDIT: Honour gfp_mask in audit_buffer_alloc()David Woodhouse2005-05-061-2/+2
| | | | Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* AUDIT: buffer audit msgs directly to skbChris Wright2005-05-061-76/+46
| | | | | | | | | | | Drop the use of a tmp buffer in the audit_buffer, and just buffer directly to the skb. All header data that was temporarily stored in the audit_buffer can now be stored directly in the netlink header in the skb. Resize skb as needed. This eliminates the extra copy (and the audit_log_move function which was responsible for copying). Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* AUDIT: expand audit tmp buffer as neededChris Wright2005-05-061-60/+79
| | | | | | | | | | | Introduce audit_expand and make the audit_buffer use a dynamic buffer which can be resized. When audit buffer is moved to skb it will not be fragmented across skb's, so we can eliminate the sklist in the audit_buffer. During audit_log_move, we simply copy the full buffer into a single skb, and then audit_log_drain sends it on. Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* AUDIT: Add helper functions to allocate and free audit_buffers.Chris Wright2005-05-061-23/+38
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* The attached patch addresses the problem with getting the audit daemon Steve Grubb2005-05-061-1/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | shutdown credential information. It creates a new message type AUDIT_TERM_INFO, which is used by the audit daemon to query who issued the shutdown. It requires the placement of a hook function that gathers the information. The hook is after the DAC & MAC checks and before the function returns. Racing threads could overwrite the uid & pid - but they would have to be root and have policy that allows signalling the audit daemon. That should be a manageable risk. The userspace component will be released later in audit 0.7.2. When it receives the TERM signal, it queries the kernel for shutdown information. When it receives it, it writes the message and exits. The message looks like this: type=DAEMON msg=auditd(1114551182.000) auditd normal halt, sending pid=2650 uid=525, auditd pid=1685 Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* Merge with master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.gitDavid Woodhouse2005-05-051-11/+8
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| * [NETLINK]: Synchronous message processing.Herbert Xu2005-05-031-11/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Let's recap the problem. The current asynchronous netlink kernel message processing is vulnerable to these attacks: 1) Hit and run: Attacker sends one or more messages and then exits before they're processed. This may confuse/disable the next netlink user that gets the netlink address of the attacker since it may receive the responses to the attacker's messages. Proposed solutions: a) Synchronous processing. b) Stream mode socket. c) Restrict/prohibit binding. 2) Starvation: Because various netlink rcv functions were written to not return until all messages have been processed on a socket, it is possible for these functions to execute for an arbitrarily long period of time. If this is successfully exploited it could also be used to hold rtnl forever. Proposed solutions: a) Synchronous processing. b) Stream mode socket. Firstly let's cross off solution c). It only solves the first problem and it has user-visible impacts. In particular, it'll break user space applications that expect to bind or communicate with specific netlink addresses (pid's). So we're left with a choice of synchronous processing versus SOCK_STREAM for netlink. For the moment I'm sticking with the synchronous approach as suggested by Alexey since it's simpler and I'd rather spend my time working on other things. However, it does have a number of deficiencies compared to the stream mode solution: 1) User-space to user-space netlink communication is still vulnerable. 2) Inefficient use of resources. This is especially true for rtnetlink since the lock is shared with other users such as networking drivers. The latter could hold the rtnl while communicating with hardware which causes the rtnetlink user to wait when it could be doing other things. 3) It is still possible to DoS all netlink users by flooding the kernel netlink receive queue. The attacker simply fills the receive socket with a single netlink message that fills up the entire queue. The attacker then continues to call sendmsg with the same message in a loop. Point 3) can be countered by retransmissions in user-space code, however it is pretty messy. In light of these problems (in particular, point 3), we should implement stream mode netlink at some point. In the mean time, here is a patch that implements synchronous processing. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | [PATCH] add new audit data to last skbChris Wright2005-05-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When adding more formatted audit data to an skb for delivery to userspace, the kernel will attempt to reuse an skb that has spare room. However, if the audit message has already been fragmented to multiple skb's, the search for spare room in the skb uses the head of the list. This will corrupt the audit message with trailing bytes being placed midway through the stream. Fix is to look at the end of the list. Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* | [AUDIT] Requeue messages at head of queue, up to audit_backlogChris Wright2005-04-291-5/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If netlink_unicast() fails, requeue the skb back at the head of the queue it just came from, instead of the tail. And do so unless we've exceeded the audit_backlog limit; not according to some other arbitrary limit. From: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* | Add audit uid to netlink credentialsSerge Hallyn2005-04-291-21/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Most audit control messages are sent over netlink.In order to properly log the identity of the sender of audit control messages, we would like to add the loginuid to the netlink_creds structure, as per the attached patch. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* | audit: update pointer to userspace tools, remove emacs mode tags2005-04-291-2/+2
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* | [AUDIT] Avoid using %*.*s format strings.Peter Martuccelli2005-04-291-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | They don't seem to work correctly (investigation ongoing), but we don't actually need to do it anyway. Patch from Peter Martuccelli <peterm@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* | [AUDIT] Fix signedness of 'serial' in various routines.Steve Grubb2005-04-291-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Attached is a patch that corrects a signed/unsigned warning. I also noticed that we needlessly init serial to 0. That only needs to occur if the kernel was compiled without the audit system. -Steve Grubb Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* | audit_log_untrustedstring() warning fixAndrew Morton2005-04-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | kernel/audit.c: In function `audit_log_untrustedstring': kernel/audit.c:736: warning: comparison is always false due to limited range of data type Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* | AUDIT: Avoid log pollution by untrusted strings.2005-04-291-0/+23
|/ | | | | | | | | | We log strings from userspace, such as arguments to open(). These could be formatted to contain \n followed by fake audit log entries. Provide a function for logging such strings, which gives a hex dump when the string contains anything but basic printable ASCII characters. Use it for logging filenames. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* Linux-2.6.12-rc2v2.6.12-rc2Linus Torvalds2005-04-161-0/+839
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
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