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* UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate include/linuxDavid Howells2012-10-131-53/+1
| | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
* Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-10-021-0/+3
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - Integrity: add local fs integrity verification to detect offline attacks - Integrity: add digital signature verification - Simple stacking of Yama with other LSMs (per LSS discussions) - IBM vTPM support on ppc64 - Add new driver for Infineon I2C TIS TPM - Smack: add rule revocation for subject labels" Fixed conflicts with the user namespace support in kernel/auditsc.c and security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c. * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits) Documentation: Update git repository URL for Smack userland tools ima: change flags container data type Smack: setprocattr memory leak fix Smack: implement revoking all rules for a subject label Smack: remove task_wait() hook. ima: audit log hashes ima: generic IMA action flag handling ima: rename ima_must_appraise_or_measure audit: export audit_log_task_info tpm: fix tpm_acpi sparse warning on different address spaces samples/seccomp: fix 31 bit build on s390 ima: digital signature verification support ima: add support for different security.ima data types ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls ima: add inode_post_setattr call ima: replace iint spinblock with rwlock/read_lock ima: allocating iint improvements ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules ima: integrity appraisal extension vfs: move ima_file_free before releasing the file ...
| * ima: integrity appraisal extensionMimi Zohar2012-09-071-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute 'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides authenticity. This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by EVM, if enabled and configured. Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'. Changelov v4: - changed iint cache flags to hex values Changelog v3: - change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail Changelog v2: - fix audit msg 'res' value - removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values Changelog v1: - removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin) - setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin) - evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr (INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the 'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS). - replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin) - re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin) - include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA - merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin) - removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin) - use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured (moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c) - make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file Changelog: - add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin) - fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin) - cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin) - changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those measured/appraised. - don't try to appraise new/empty files - expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig - IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled - add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub - unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status, not before. (Found by Joe Perches) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
* | xattr: extract simple_xattr code from tmpfsAristeu Rozanski2012-08-241-0/+48
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Extract in-memory xattr APIs from tmpfs. Will be used by cgroup. $ size vmlinux.o text data bss dec hex filename 4658782 880729 5195032 10734543 a3cbcf vmlinux.o $ size vmlinux.o text data bss dec hex filename 4658957 880729 5195032 10734718 a3cc7e vmlinux.o v7: - checkpatch warnings fixed - Implement the changes requested by Hugh Dickins: - make simple_xattrs_init and simple_xattrs_free inline - get rid of locking and list reinitialization in simple_xattrs_free, they're not needed v6: - no changes v5: - no changes v4: - move simple_xattrs_free() to fs/xattr.c v3: - in kmem_xattrs_free(), reinitialize the list - use simple_xattr_* prefix - introduce simple_xattr_add() to prevent direct list usage Original-patch-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com> Cc: Lennart Poettering <lpoetter@redhat.com> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
* evm: posix acls modify i_modeMimi Zohar2011-09-141-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not affect security.evm. An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm. This patch updates security.evm when posix xattr acls are written. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
* evm: re-releaseMimi Zohar2011-07-181-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity attacks. This patchset provides the framework and an initial method. The initial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security extended attributes, storing the HMAC value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. Other methods of validating the integrity of a file's metadata will be posted separately (eg. EVM-digital-signatures). While this patchset does authenticate the security xattrs, and cryptographically binds them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. To help simplify the review and upstreaming process, each extension will be posted separately (eg. IMA-appraisal, IMA-appraisal-directory). For a general overview of the proposed Linux integrity subsystem, refer to Dave Safford's whitepaper: http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf. EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl. Until EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. Loading the key and signaling EVM should be done as early as possible. Normally this is done in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part of the trusted boot. For more information on creating and loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. A sample dracut patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables EVM, is available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM. Based on the LSMs enabled, the set of EVM protected security xattrs is defined at compile. EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks: evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr. To initialize and update the 'security.evm' extended attribute, EVM defines three calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and evm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks. To verify the integrity of a security xattr, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr(). Changelog v7: - Fixed URL in EVM ABI documentation Changelog v6: (based on Serge Hallyn's review) - fix URL in patch description - remove evm_hmac_size definition - use SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE (removed both MAX_DIGEST_SIZE and evm_hmac_size) - moved linux include before other includes - test for crypto_hash_setkey failure - fail earlier for invalid key - clear entire encrypted key, even on failure - check xattr name length before comparing xattr names Changelog: - locking based on i_mutex, remove evm_mutex - using trusted/encrypted keys for storing the EVM key used in the HMAC-sha1 operation. - replaced crypto hash with shash (Dmitry Kasatkin) - support for additional methods of verifying the security xattrs (Dmitry Kasatkin) - iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those appraised - Use cap_sys_admin in lieu of cap_mac_admin - Use __vfs_setxattr_noperm(), without permission checks, from EVM Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
* xattr: define vfs_getxattr_alloc and vfs_xattr_cmpMimi Zohar2011-07-181-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | vfs_getxattr_alloc() and vfs_xattr_cmp() are two new kernel xattr helper functions. vfs_getxattr_alloc() first allocates memory for the requested xattr and then retrieves it. vfs_xattr_cmp() compares a given value with the contents of an extended attribute. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
* security: new security_inode_init_security API adds function callbackMimi Zohar2011-07-181-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch changes the security_inode_init_security API by adding a filesystem specific callback to write security extended attributes. This change is in preparation for supporting the initialization of multiple LSM xattrs and the EVM xattr. Initially the callback function walks an array of xattrs, writing each xattr separately, but could be optimized to write multiple xattrs at once. For existing security_inode_init_security() calls, which have not yet been converted to use the new callback function, such as those in reiserfs and ocfs2, this patch defines security_old_inode_init_security(). Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
* xattr.h: expose string defines to userspaceEric Paris2011-05-251-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | af4f136056c9 ("security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h") moved the XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX define from capability.h to xattr.h. This makes sense except it was previously exports to userspace but xattr.h does not export it to userspace. This patch exports these headers to userspace to fix the ABI regression. There is some slight possibility that this will cause problems in other applications which used these #defines differently (wrongly) and I could JUST export the capabilities xattr name that we broke. Does anyonehave an idea how exposing these headers could cause a problem? Below is what is being exposed to userspace, included here since it isn't clear exactly what is going to be made available from the patch. /* Namespaces */ #define XATTR_OS2_PREFIX "os2." #define XATTR_OS2_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_OS2_PREFIX) - 1) #define XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX "security." #define XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) #define XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX "system." #define XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX) - 1) #define XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX "trusted." #define XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX) - 1) #define XATTR_USER_PREFIX "user." #define XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1) /* Security namespace */ #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX #define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64" #define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN "SMACK64IPIN" #define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT" #define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT #define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" #define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX Reported-by: Ozan Çaglayan <ozan@pardus.org.tr> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Subject: [PATCH] Smack: mmap controls for library containmentCasey Schaufler2011-01-171-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In the embedded world there are often situations where libraries are updated from a variety of sources, for a variety of reasons, and with any number of security characteristics. These differences might include privilege required for a given library provided interface to function properly, as occurs from time to time in graphics libraries. There are also cases where it is important to limit use of libraries based on the provider of the library and the security aware application may make choices based on that criteria. These issues are addressed by providing an additional Smack label that may optionally be assigned to an object, the SMACK64MMAP attribute. An mmap operation is allowed if there is no such attribute. If there is a SMACK64MMAP attribute the mmap is permitted only if a subject with that label has all of the access permitted a subject with the current task label. Security aware applications may from time to time wish to reduce their "privilege" to avoid accidental use of privilege. One case where this arises is the environment in which multiple sources provide libraries to perform the same functions. An application may know that it should eschew services made available from a particular vendor, or of a particular version. In support of this a secondary list of Smack rules has been added that is local to the task. This list is consulted only in the case where the global list has approved access. It can only further restrict access. Unlike the global last, if no entry is found on the local list access is granted. An application can add entries to its own list by writing to /smack/load-self. The changes appear large as they involve refactoring the list handling to accomodate there being more than one rule list. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* Smack: Transmute labels on specified directoriesJarkko Sakkinen2010-12-071-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In a situation where Smack access rules allow processes with multiple labels to write to a directory it is easy to get into a situation where the directory gets cluttered with files that the owner can't deal with because while they could be written to the directory a process at the label of the directory can't write them. This is generally the desired behavior, but when it isn't it is a real issue. This patch introduces a new attribute SMACK64TRANSMUTE that instructs Smack to create the file with the label of the directory under certain circumstances. A new access mode, "t" for transmute, is made available to Smack access rules, which are expanded from "rwxa" to "rwxat". If a file is created in a directory marked as transmutable and if access was granted to perform the operation by a rule that included the transmute mode, then the file gets the Smack label of the directory instead of the Smack label of the creating process. Note that this is equivalent to creating an empty file at the label of the directory and then having the other process write to it. The transmute scheme requires that both the access rule allows transmutation and that the directory be explicitly marked. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <ext-jarkko.2.sakkinen@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* This patch adds a new security attribute to Smack calledCasey Schaufler2010-12-021-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SMACK64EXEC. It defines label that is used while task is running. Exception: in smack_task_wait() child task is checked for write access to parent task using label inherited from the task that forked it. Fixed issues from previous submit: - SMACK64EXEC was not read when SMACK64 was not set. - inode security blob was not updated after setting SMACK64EXEC - inode security blob was not updated when removing SMACK64EXEC
* security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.hMimi Zohar2010-08-021-0/+14
| | | | | | | | | Make the security extended attributes names global. Updated to move the remaining Smack xattrs. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* fs: xattr_handler table should be constStephen Hemminger2010-05-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | The entries in xattr handler table should be immutable (ie const) like other operation tables. Later patches convert common filesystems. Uncoverted filesystems will still work, but will generate a compiler warning. Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* sanitize xattr handler prototypesChristoph Hellwig2009-12-161-6/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a flags argument to struct xattr_handler and pass it to all xattr handler methods. This allows using the same methods for multiple handlers, e.g. for the ACL methods which perform exactly the same action for the access and default ACLs, just using a different underlying attribute. With a little more groundwork it'll also allow sharing the methods for the regular user/trusted/secure handlers in extN, ocfs2 and jffs2 like it's already done for xfs in this patch. Also change the inode argument to the handlers to a dentry to allow using the handlers mechnism for filesystems that require it later, e.g. cifs. [with GFS2 bits updated by Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>] Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* VFS: Factor out part of vfs_setxattr so it can be called from the SELinux ↵David P. Quigley2009-09-101-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | hook for inode_setsecctx. This factors out the part of the vfs_setxattr function that performs the setting of the xattr and its notification. This is needed so the SELinux implementation of inode_setsecctx can handle the setting of the xattr while maintaining the proper separation of layers. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* xattr: add missing consts to function argumentsDavid Howells2008-04-291-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | Add missing consts to xattr function arguments. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* VFS/Security: Rework inode_getsecurity and callers to return resulting bufferDavid P. Quigley2008-02-051-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch modifies the interface to inode_getsecurity to have the function return a buffer containing the security blob and its length via parameters instead of relying on the calling function to give it an appropriately sized buffer. Security blobs obtained with this function should be freed using the release_secctx LSM hook. This alleviates the problem of the caller having to guess a length and preallocate a buffer for this function allowing it to be used elsewhere for Labeled NFS. The patch also removed the unused err parameter. The conversion is similar to the one performed by Al Viro for the security_getprocattr hook. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] cleanup include/linux/xattr.hAdrian Bunk2007-02-111-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | - reduce the userspace visible part - fix the in-kernel compilation Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] Introduce vfs_listxattrBill Nottingham2006-10-091-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch moves code out of fs/xattr.c:listxattr into a new function - vfs_listxattr. The code for vfs_listxattr was originally submitted by Bill Nottingham <notting@redhat.com> to Unionfs. Sorry about that. The reason for this submission is to make the listxattr code in fs/xattr.c a little cleaner (as well as to clean up some code in Unionfs.) Currently, Unionfs has vfs_listxattr defined in its code. I think that's very ugly, and I'd like to see it (re)moved. The logical place to put it, is along side of all the other vfs_*xattr functions. Overall, I think this patch is benefitial for both kernel.org kernel and Unionfs. Signed-off-by: Josef "Jeff" Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] move xattr permission checks into the VFSakpm@osdl.org2006-01-101-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ) From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> The xattr code has rather complex permission checks because the rules are very different for different attribute namespaces. This patch moves as much as we can into the generic code. Currently all the major disk based filesystems duplicate these checks, while many minor filesystems or network filesystems lack some or all of them. To do this we need defines for the extended attribute names in common code, I moved them up from JFS which had the nicest defintions. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] add vfs_* helpers for xattr operationsChristoph Hellwig2006-01-101-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add vfs_getxattr, vfs_setxattr and vfs_removexattr helpers for common checks around invocation of the xattr methods. NFSD already was missing some of the checks and there will be more soon. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> (James, I haven't touched selinux yet because it's doing various odd things and I'm not sure how it would interact with the security attribute fallbacks you added. Could you investigate whether it could use vfs_getxattr or if not add a __vfs_getxattr helper to share the bits it is fine with?) For NFSv4: instead of just converting it add an nfsd_getxattr helper for the code shared by NFSv2/3 and NFSv4 ACLs. In fact that code isn't even NFS-specific, but I'll wait for more users to pop up first before moving it to common code. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* Linux-2.6.12-rc2v2.6.12-rc2Linus Torvalds2005-04-161-0/+33
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
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