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* Make do_execve() take a const filename pointerDavid Howells2010-08-171-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make do_execve() take a const filename pointer so that kernel_execve() compiles correctly on ARM: arch/arm/kernel/sys_arm.c:88: warning: passing argument 1 of 'do_execve' discards qualifiers from pointer target type This also requires the argv and envp arguments to be consted twice, once for the pointer array and once for the strings the array points to. This is because do_execve() passes a pointer to the filename (now const) to copy_strings_kernel(). A simpler alternative would be to cast the filename pointer in do_execve() when it's passed to copy_strings_kernel(). do_execve() may not change any of the strings it is passed as part of the argv or envp lists as they are some of them in .rodata, so marking these strings as const should be fine. Further kernel_execve() and sys_execve() need to be changed to match. This has been test built on x86_64, frv, arm and mips. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* coredump: pass mm->flags as a coredump parameter for consistencyMasami Hiramatsu2010-03-061-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pass mm->flags as a coredump parameter for consistency. --- 1787 if (mm->core_state || !get_dumpable(mm)) { <- (1) 1788 up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); 1789 put_cred(cred); 1790 goto fail; 1791 } 1792 [...] 1798 if (get_dumpable(mm) == 2) { /* Setuid core dump mode */ <-(2) 1799 flag = O_EXCL; /* Stop rewrite attacks */ 1800 cred->fsuid = 0; /* Dump root private */ 1801 } --- Since dumpable bits are not protected by lock, there is a chance to change these bits between (1) and (2). To solve this issue, this patch copies mm->flags to coredump_params.mm_flags at the beginning of do_coredump() and uses it instead of get_dumpable() while dumping core. This copy is also passed to binfmt->core_dump, since elf*_core_dump() uses dump_filter bits in mm->flags. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix merge] Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Split 'flush_old_exec' into two functionsLinus Torvalds2010-01-291-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 'flush_old_exec()' is the point of no return when doing an execve(), and it is pretty badly misnamed. It doesn't just flush the old executable environment, it also starts up the new one. Which is very inconvenient for things like setting up the new personality, because we want the new personality to affect the starting of the new environment, but at the same time we do _not_ want the new personality to take effect if flushing the old one fails. As a result, the x86-64 '32-bit' personality is actually done using this insane "I'm going to change the ABI, but I haven't done it yet" bit (TIF_ABI_PENDING), with SET_PERSONALITY() not actually setting the personality, but just the "pending" bit, so that "flush_thread()" can do the actual personality magic. This patch in no way changes any of that insanity, but it does split the 'flush_old_exec()' function up into a preparatory part that can fail (still called flush_old_exec()), and a new part that will actually set up the new exec environment (setup_new_exec()). All callers are changed to trivially comply with the new world order. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: introduce coredump parameter structureMasami Hiramatsu2009-12-171-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce coredump parameter data structure (struct coredump_params) to simplify binfmt->core_dump() arguments. Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* exec: fix set_binfmt() vs sys_delete_module() raceOleg Nesterov2009-09-241-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | sys_delete_module() can set MODULE_STATE_GOING after search_binary_handler() does try_module_get(). In this case set_binfmt()->try_module_get() fails but since none of the callers check the returned error, the task will run with the wrong old ->binfmt. The proper fix should change all ->load_binary() methods, but we can rely on fact that the caller must hold a reference to binfmt->module and use __module_get() which never fails. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* exec: do not sleep in TASK_TRACED under ->cred_guard_mutexOleg Nesterov2009-09-051-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Tom Horsley reports that his debugger hangs when it tries to read /proc/pid_of_tracee/maps, this happens since "mm_for_maps: take ->cred_guard_mutex to fix the race with exec" 04b836cbf19e885f8366bccb2e4b0474346c02d commit in 2.6.31. But the root of the problem lies in the fact that do_execve() path calls tracehook_report_exec() which can stop if the tracer sets PT_TRACE_EXEC. The tracee must not sleep in TASK_TRACED holding this mutex. Even if we remove ->cred_guard_mutex from mm_for_maps() and proc_pid_attr_write(), another task doing PTRACE_ATTACH should not hang until it is killed or the tracee resumes. With this patch do_execve() does not use ->cred_guard_mutex directly and we do not hold it throughout, instead: - introduce prepare_bprm_creds() helper, it locks the mutex and calls prepare_exec_creds() to initialize bprm->cred. - install_exec_creds() drops the mutex after commit_creds(), and thus before tracehook_report_exec()->ptrace_stop(). or, if exec fails, free_bprm() drops this mutex when bprm->cred != NULL which indicates install_exec_creds() was not called. Reported-by: Tom Horsley <tom.horsley@att.net> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* alpha: binfmt_aout fixIvan Kokshaysky2009-05-021-1/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fixes the problem introduced by commit 3bfacef412 (get rid of special-casing the /sbin/loader on alpha): osf/1 ecoff binary segfaults when binfmt_aout built as module. That happens because aout binary handler gets on the top of the binfmt list due to late registration, and kernel attempts to execute the binary without preparatory work that must be done by binfmt_loader. Fixed by changing the registration order of the default binfmt handlers using list_add_tail() and introducing insert_binfmt() function which places new handler on the top of the binfmt list. This might be generally useful for installing arch-specific frontends for default handlers or just for overriding them. Signed-off-by: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* struct linux_binprm: drop unused fieldsKirill A. Shutemov2009-04-021-2/+1
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs/exec.c: make do_coredump() voidWANG Cong2009-01-061-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | No one cares do_coredump()'s return value, and also it seems that it is also not necessary. So make it void. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: WANG Cong <wangcong@zeuux.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* binfmts.h: include list.hHiroshi Shimamoto2009-01-061-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | linux_binfmt uses list_head, so list.h is needed. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix `make headerscheck'] Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentialsDavid Howells2008-11-141-6/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Allow recursion in binfmt_script and binfmt_miscKirill A. Shutemov2008-10-161-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | binfmt_script and binfmt_misc disallow recursion to avoid stack overflow using sh_bang and misc_bang. It causes problem in some cases: $ echo '#!/bin/ls' > /tmp/t0 $ echo '#!/tmp/t0' > /tmp/t1 $ echo '#!/tmp/t1' > /tmp/t2 $ chmod +x /tmp/t* $ /tmp/t2 zsh: exec format error: /tmp/t2 Similar problem with binfmt_misc. This patch introduces field 'recursion_depth' into struct linux_binprm to track recursion level in binfmt_misc and binfmt_script. If recursion level more then BINPRM_MAX_RECURSION it generates -ENOEXEC. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make linux_binprm.recursion_depth a uint] Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* alpha: introduce field 'taso' into struct linux_binprmKirill A. Shutemov2008-10-161-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This change is Alpha-specific. It adds field 'taso' into struct linux_binprm to remember if the application is TASO. Previously, field sh_bang was used for this purpose. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* security: protect legacy applications from executing with insufficient privilegeAndrew G. Morgan2008-07-241-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When cap_bset suppresses some of the forced (fP) capabilities of a file, it is generally only safe to execute the program if it understands how to recognize it doesn't have enough privilege to work correctly. For legacy applications (fE!=0), which have no non-destructive way to determine that they are missing privilege, we fail to execute (EPERM) any executable that requires fP capabilities, but would otherwise get pP' < fP. This is a fail-safe permission check. For some discussion of why it is problematic for (legacy) privileged applications to run with less than the set of capabilities requested for them, see: http://userweb.kernel.org/~morgan/sendmail-capabilities-war-story.html With this iteration of this support, we do not include setuid-0 based privilege protection from the bounding set. That is, the admin can still (ab)use the bounding set to suppress the privileges of a setuid-0 program. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanup] Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] get rid of leak in compat_execve()Al Viro2008-05-161-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | Even though copy_compat_strings() doesn't cache the pages, copy_strings_kernel() and stuff indirectly called by e.g. ->load_binary() is doing that, so we need to drop the cache contents in the end. [found by WANG Cong <wangcong@zeuux.org>] Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* binfmt_misc.c: avoid potential kernel stack overflowPavel Emelyanov2008-04-291-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This can be triggered with root help only, but... Register the ":text:E::txt::/root/cat.txt:' rule in binfmt_misc (by root) and try launching the cat.txt file (by anyone) :) The result is - the endless recursion in the load_misc_binary -> open_exec -> load_misc_binary chain and stack overflow. There's a similar problem with binfmt_script, and there's a sh_bang memner on linux_binprm structure to handle this, but simply raising this in binfmt_misc may break some setups when the interpreter of some misc binaries is a script. So the proposal is to turn sh_bang into a bit, add a new one (the misc_bang) and raise it in load_misc_binary. After this, even if we set up the misc -> script -> misc loop for binfmts one of them will step on its own bang and exit. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* exec: remove argv_len from struct linux_binprmTetsuo Handa2008-04-291-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I noticed that 2.6.24.2 calculates bprm->argv_len at do_execve(). But it doesn't update bprm->argv_len after "remove_arg_zero() + copy_strings_kernel()" at load_script() etc. audit_bprm() is called from search_binary_handler() and search_binary_handler() is called from load_script() etc. Thus, I think the condition check if (bprm->argv_len > (audit_argv_kb << 10)) return -E2BIG; in audit_bprm() might return wrong result when strlen(removed_arg) != strlen(spliced_args). Why not update bprm->argv_len at load_script() etc. ? By the way, 2.6.25-rc3 seems to not doing the condition check. Is the field bprm->argv_len no longer needed? Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Ollie Wild <aaw@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Implement file posix capabilitiesSerge E. Hallyn2007-10-171-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers. This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Changelog: Nov 27: Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton (security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix) Fix Kconfig dependency. Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in. Nov 13: Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t. Nov 13: Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey Dobriyan. Nov 09: Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper function. Nov 08: For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Nov 07: Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in check_cap_sanity(). Nov 07: Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since capabilities are the default. Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY. Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce audit messages. Nov 05: Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file cap support can be stacked. Sep 05: As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place for capability code. Sep 01: Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which they called a program with some fscaps. One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a cpuset? It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check, fixing it might be tough. task_setscheduler note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset? task_setioprio task_setnice sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another process. Need same checks as setrlimit Aug 21: Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process might still have elevated caps. Aug 15: Handle endianness of xattrs. Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk. Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are set, else return -EPERM. With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than d_instantiate. Aug 10: Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than caching it at d_instantiate. [morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h] [bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* core_pattern: ignore RLIMIT_CORE if core_pattern is a pipeNeil Horman2007-10-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For some time /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern has been able to set its output destination as a pipe, allowing a user space helper to receive and intellegently process a core. This infrastructure however has some shortcommings which can be enhanced. Specifically: 1) The coredump code in the kernel should ignore RLIMIT_CORE limitation when core_pattern is a pipe, since file system resources are not being consumed in this case, unless the user application wishes to save the core, at which point the app is restricted by usual file system limits and restrictions. 2) The core_pattern code should be able to parse and pass options to the user space helper as an argv array. The real core limit of the uid of the crashing proces should also be passable to the user space helper (since it is overridden to zero when called). 3) Some miscellaneous bugs need to be cleaned up (specifically the recognition of a recursive core dump, should the user mode helper itself crash. Also, the core dump code in the kernel should not wait for the user mode helper to exit, since the same context is responsible for writing to the pipe, and a read of the pipe by the user mode helper will result in a deadlock. This patch: Remove the check of RLIMIT_CORE if core_pattern is a pipe. In the event that core_pattern is a pipe, the entire core will be fed to the user mode helper. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Cc: <martin.pitt@ubuntu.com> Cc: <wwoods@redhat.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Make unregister_binfmt() return voidAlexey Dobriyan2007-10-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | list_del() hardly can fail, so checking for return value is pointless (and current code always return 0). Nobody really cared that return value anyway. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Use list_head in binfmt handlingAlexey Dobriyan2007-10-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Switch single-linked binfmt formats list to usual list_head's. This leads to one-liners in register_binfmt() and unregister_binfmt(). The downside is one pointer more in struct linux_binfmt. This is not a problem, since the set of registered binfmts on typical box is very small -- (ELF + something distro enabled for you). Test-booted, played with executable .txt files, modprobe/rmmod binfmt_misc. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: variable length argument supportOllie Wild2007-07-191-5/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove the arg+env limit of MAX_ARG_PAGES by copying the strings directly from the old mm into the new mm. We create the new mm before the binfmt code runs, and place the new stack at the very top of the address space. Once the binfmt code runs and figures out where the stack should be, we move it downwards. It is a bit peculiar in that we have one task with two mm's, one of which is inactive. [a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl: limit stack size] Signed-off-by: Ollie Wild <aaw@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> [bunk@stusta.de: unexport bprm_mm_init] Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* audit: rework execve auditPeter Zijlstra2007-07-191-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The purpose of audit_bprm() is to log the argv array to a userspace daemon at the end of the execve system call. Since user-space hasn't had time to run, this array is still in pristine state on the process' stack; so no need to copy it, we can just grab it from there. In order to minimize the damage to audit_log_*() copy each string into a temporary kernel buffer first. Currently the audit code requires that the full argument vector fits in a single packet. So currently it does clip the argv size to a (sysctl) limit, but only when execve auditing is enabled. If the audit protocol gets extended to allow for multiple packets this check can be removed. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Ollie Wild <aaw@google.com> Cc: <linux-audit@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* make sysctl/kernel/core_pattern and fs/exec.c agree on maximum core filename ↵Dan Aloni2007-05-171-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | size Make sysctl/kernel/core_pattern and fs/exec.c agree on maximum core filename size and change it to 128, so that extensive patterns such as '/local/cores/%e-%h-%s-%t-%p.core' won't result in truncated filename generation. Signed-off-by: Dan Aloni <da-x@monatomic.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] x86: Don't require the vDSO for handling a.out signalsAndi Kleen2007-02-131-0/+1
| | | | | | and in other strange binfmts. vDSO is not necessarily mapped there. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
* [PATCH] setuid core dumpAlan Cox2005-06-231-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new `suid_dumpable' sysctl: This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are 0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped 1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is intended for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked. 2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove such a dump but not access it directly. For security reasons core dumps in this mode will not overwrite one another or other files. This mode is appropriate when adminstrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal environment. (akpm: > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable); > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL? No problem to me. > > if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid) > > current->mm->dumpable = 1; > > Should this be SUID_DUMP_USER? Actually the feedback I had from last time was that the SUID_ defines should go because its clearer to follow the numbers. They can go everywhere (and there are lots of places where dumpable is tested/used as a bool in untouched code) > Maybe this should be renamed to `dump_policy' or something. Doing that > would help us catch any code which isn't using the #defines, too. Fair comment. The patch was designed to be easy to maintain for Red Hat rather than for merging. Changing that field would create a gigantic diff because it is used all over the place. ) Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] make some things staticAdrian Bunk2005-05-051-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | This patch makes some needlessly global identifiers static. Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjanv@infradead.org> Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* Linux-2.6.12-rc2v2.6.12-rc2Linus Torvalds2005-04-161-0/+87
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
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