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* Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-01-223-5/+19
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu: "This fixes the following issues: API: - A large number of bug fixes for the af_alg interface, credit goes to Dmitry Vyukov for discovering and reporting these issues. Algorithms: - sw842 needs to select crc32. - The soft dependency on crc32c is now in the correct spot. Drivers: - The atmel AES driver needs HAS_DMA. - The atmel AES driver was a missing break statement, fortunately it's only a debug function. - A number of bug fixes for the Intel qat driver" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (24 commits) crypto: algif_skcipher - sendmsg SG marking is off by one crypto: crc32c - Fix crc32c soft dependency crypto: algif_skcipher - Load TX SG list after waiting crypto: atmel-aes - Add missing break to atmel_aes_reg_name crypto: algif_skcipher - Fix race condition in skcipher_check_key crypto: algif_hash - Fix race condition in hash_check_key crypto: CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_AES should depend on HAS_DMA lib: sw842: select crc32 crypto: af_alg - Forbid bind(2) when nokey child sockets are present crypto: algif_skcipher - Remove custom release parent function crypto: algif_hash - Remove custom release parent function crypto: af_alg - Allow af_af_alg_release_parent to be called on nokey path crypto: qat - update init_esram for C3xxx dev type crypto: qat - fix timeout issues crypto: qat - remove to call get_sram_bar_id for qat_c3xxx crypto: algif_skcipher - Add key check exception for cipher_null crypto: skcipher - Add crypto_skcipher_has_setkey crypto: algif_hash - Require setkey before accept(2) crypto: hash - Add crypto_ahash_has_setkey crypto: algif_skcipher - Add nokey compatibility path ...
| * crypto: af_alg - Allow af_af_alg_release_parent to be called on nokey pathHerbert Xu2016-01-181-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch allows af_alg_release_parent to be called even for nokey sockets. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: skcipher - Add crypto_skcipher_has_setkeyHerbert Xu2016-01-181-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds a way for skcipher users to determine whether a key is required by a transform. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: hash - Add crypto_ahash_has_setkeyHerbert Xu2016-01-181-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds a way for ahash users to determine whether a key is required by a crypto_ahash transform. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: af_alg - Add nokey compatibility pathHerbert Xu2016-01-181-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds a compatibility path to support old applications that do acept(2) before setkey. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: af_alg - Disallow bind/setkey/... after accept(2)Herbert Xu2016-01-181-5/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Each af_alg parent socket obtained by socket(2) corresponds to a tfm object once bind(2) has succeeded. An accept(2) call on that parent socket creates a context which then uses the tfm object. Therefore as long as any child sockets created by accept(2) exist the parent socket must not be modified or freed. This patch guarantees this by using locks and a reference count on the parent socket. Any attempt to modify the parent socket will fail with EBUSY. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-01-171-0/+3
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: - EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel (EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring. - Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks. - Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2. - Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA. * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits) selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix KEYS: refcount bug fix ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking IMA: policy can be updated zero times selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm() selinux: export validatetrans decisions gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code ...
| * keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chipsJarkko Sakkinen2015-12-201-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Added 'hash=' option for selecting the hash algorithm for add_key() syscall and documentation for it. Added entry for sm3-256 to the following tables in order to support TPM_ALG_SM3_256: * hash_algo_name * hash_digest_size Includes support for the following hash algorithms: * sha1 * sha256 * sha384 * sha512 * sm3-256 Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
* | crypto: hash - add zero length message hash for shax and md5LABBE Corentin2015-12-222-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some crypto drivers cannot process empty data message and return a precalculated hash for md5/sha1/sha224/sha256. This patch add thoses precalculated hash in include/crypto. Signed-off-by: LABBE Corentin <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: akcipher - fix typos in include/crypto/akcipher.hLABBE Corentin2015-12-111-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix numerous spelling error in include/crypto/akcipher.h Signed-off-by: LABBE Corentin <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: rsa - RSA padding algorithmAndrzej Zaborowski2015-12-091-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds PKCS#1 v1.5 standard RSA padding as a separate template. This way an RSA cipher with padding can be obtained by instantiating "pkcs1pad(rsa)". The reason for adding this is that RSA is almost never used without this padding (or OAEP) so it will be needed for either certificate work in the kernel or the userspace, and I also hear that it is likely implemented by hardware RSA in which case hardware implementations of the whole of pkcs1pad(rsa) can be provided. Signed-off-by: Andrew Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: akcipher - add akcipher declarations needed by templates.Andrzej Zaborowski2015-12-091-0/+78
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a struct akcipher_instance and struct akcipher_spawn similar to how AEAD declares them and the macros for converting to/from crypto_instance/crypto_spawn. Also add register functions to avoid exposing crypto_akcipher_type. Signed-off-by: Andrew Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: aead - fix kernel-doc warnings in crypto/aead.hRandy Dunlap2015-12-091-0/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | Fix 21 occurrences of this kernel-doc warning in <crypto/aead.h>: ..//include/crypto/aead.h:149: warning: No description found for parameter 'base' Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-11-051-1/+0
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem update from James Morris: "This is mostly maintenance updates across the subsystem, with a notable update for TPM 2.0, and addition of Jarkko Sakkinen as a maintainer of that" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (40 commits) apparmor: clarify CRYPTO dependency selinux: Use a kmem_cache for allocation struct file_security_struct selinux: ioctl_has_perm should be static selinux: use sprintf return value selinux: use kstrdup() in security_get_bools() selinux: use kmemdup in security_sid_to_context_core() selinux: remove pointless cast in selinux_inode_setsecurity() selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sid selinux: do not check open perm on ftruncate call selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data KEYS: Provide a script to extract a module signature KEYS: Provide a script to extract the sys cert list from a vmlinux file keys: Be more consistent in selection of union members used certs: add .gitignore to stop git nagging about x509_certificate_list KEYS: use kvfree() in add_key Smack: limited capability for changing process label TPM: remove unnecessary little endian conversion vTPM: support little endian guests char: Drop owner assignment from i2c_driver ...
| * KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload dataDavid Howells2015-10-211-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk as it seems pointless to keep them separate. Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded user-defined keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
* | crypto: ahash - Add crypto_ahash_blocksizeHerbert Xu2015-10-201-0/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds the missing helper crypto_ahash_blocksize which returns the block size of an ahash algorithm. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: akcipher - Changes to asymmetric key APITadeusz Struk2015-10-142-24/+73
|/ | | | | | | | | | Setkey function has been split into set_priv_key and set_pub_key. Akcipher requests takes sgl for src and dst instead of void *. Users of the API i.e. two existing RSA implementation and test mgr code have been updated accordingly. Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-09-082-2/+29
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - PKCS#7 support added to support signed kexec, also utilized for module signing. See comments in 3f1e1bea. ** NOTE: this requires linking against the OpenSSL library, which must be installed, e.g. the openssl-devel on Fedora ** - Smack - add IPv6 host labeling; ignore labels on kernel threads - support smack labeling mounts which use binary mount data - SELinux: - add ioctl whitelisting (see http://kernsec.org/files/lss2015/vanderstoep.pdf) - fix mprotect PROT_EXEC regression caused by mm change - Seccomp: - add ptrace options for suspend/resume" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (57 commits) PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them Documentation/Changes: Now need OpenSSL devel packages for module signing scripts: add extract-cert and sign-file to .gitignore modsign: Handle signing key in source tree modsign: Use if_changed rule for extracting cert from module signing key Move certificate handling to its own directory sign-file: Fix warning about BIO_reset() return value PKCS#7: Add MODULE_LICENSE() to test module Smack - Fix build error with bringup unconfigured sign-file: Document dependency on OpenSSL devel libraries PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7 PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder modsign: Use extract-cert to process CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS extract-cert: Cope with multiple X.509 certificates in a single file sign-file: Generate CMS message as signature instead of PKCS#7 PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652] X.509: Change recorded SKID & AKID to not include Subject or Issuer PKCS#7: Check content type and versions MAINTAINERS: The keyrings mailing list has moved ...
| * PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content typeDavid Howells2015-08-122-1/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A PKCS#7 or CMS message can have per-signature authenticated attributes that are digested as a lump and signed by the authorising key for that signature. If such attributes exist, the content digest isn't itself signed, but rather it is included in a special authattr which then contributes to the signature. Further, we already require the master message content type to be pkcs7_signedData - but there's also a separate content type for the data itself within the SignedData object and this must be repeated inside the authattrs for each signer [RFC2315 9.2, RFC5652 11.1]. We should really validate the authattrs if they exist or forbid them entirely as appropriate. To this end: (1) Alter the PKCS#7 parser to reject any message that has more than one signature where at least one signature has authattrs and at least one that does not. (2) Validate authattrs if they are present and strongly restrict them. Only the following authattrs are permitted and all others are rejected: (a) contentType. This is checked to be an OID that matches the content type in the SignedData object. (b) messageDigest. This must match the crypto digest of the data. (c) signingTime. If present, we check that this is a valid, parseable UTCTime or GeneralTime and that the date it encodes fits within the validity window of the matching X.509 cert. (d) S/MIME capabilities. We don't check the contents. (e) Authenticode SP Opus Info. We don't check the contents. (f) Authenticode Statement Type. We don't check the contents. The message is rejected if (a) or (b) are missing. If the message is an Authenticode type, the message is rejected if (e) is missing; if not Authenticode, the message is rejected if (d) - (f) are present. The S/MIME capabilities authattr (d) unfortunately has to be allowed to support kernels already signed by the pesign program. This only affects kexec. sign-file suppresses them (CMS_NOSMIMECAP). The message is also rejected if an authattr is given more than once or if it contains more than one element in its set of values. (3) Add a parameter to pkcs7_verify() to select one of the following restrictions and pass in the appropriate option from the callers: (*) VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and forbids authattrs. sign-file sets CMS_NOATTR. We could be more flexible and permit authattrs optionally, but only permit minimal content. (*) VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and requires authattrs. In future, this will require an attribute holding the target firmware name in addition to the minimal set. (*) VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data but allows either no authattrs or only permits the minimal set. (*) VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE This only supports the Authenticode SPC_INDIRECT_DATA content type and requires at least an SpcSpOpusInfo authattr in addition to the minimal set. It also permits an SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE authattr (and an S/MIME capabilities authattr because the pesign program doesn't remove these). (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE These are invalid in this context but are included for later use when limiting the use of X.509 certs. (4) The pkcs7_test key type is given a module parameter to select between the above options for testing purposes. For example: echo 1 >/sys/module/pkcs7_test_key/parameters/usage keyctl padd pkcs7_test foo @s </tmp/stuff.pkcs7 will attempt to check the signature on stuff.pkcs7 as if it contains a firmware blob (1 being VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE). Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
| * MODSIGN: Provide a utility to append a PKCS#7 signature to a moduleDavid Howells2015-08-071-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Provide a utility that: (1) Digests a module using the specified hash algorithm (typically sha256). [The digest can be dumped into a file by passing the '-d' flag] (2) Generates a PKCS#7 message that: (a) Has detached data (ie. the module content). (b) Is signed with the specified private key. (c) Refers to the specified X.509 certificate. (d) Has an empty X.509 certificate list. [The PKCS#7 message can be dumped into a file by passing the '-p' flag] (3) Generates a signed module by concatenating the old module, the PKCS#7 message, a descriptor and a magic string. The descriptor contains the size of the PKCS#7 message and indicates the id_type as PKEY_ID_PKCS7. (4) Either writes the signed module to the specified destination or renames it over the source module. This allows module signing to reuse the PKCS#7 handling code that was added for PE file parsing for signed kexec. Note that the utility is written in C and must be linked against the OpenSSL crypto library. Note further that I have temporarily dropped support for handling externally created signatures until we can work out the best way to do those. Hopefully, whoever creates the signature can give me a PKCS#7 certificate. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
| * PKCS#7: Allow detached data to be supplied for signature checking purposesDavid Howells2015-08-071-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It is possible for a PKCS#7 message to have detached data. However, to verify the signatures on a PKCS#7 message, we have to be able to digest the data. Provide a function to supply that data. An error is given if the PKCS#7 message included embedded data. This is used in a subsequent patch to supply the data to module signing where the signature is in the form of a PKCS#7 message with detached data, whereby the detached data is the module content that is signed. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
| * X.509: Support X.509 lookup by Issuer+Serial form AuthorityKeyIdentifierDavid Howells2015-08-071-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If an X.509 certificate has an AuthorityKeyIdentifier extension that provides an issuer and serialNumber, then make it so that these are used in preference to the keyIdentifier field also held therein for searching for the signing certificate. If both the issuer+serialNumber and the keyIdentifier are supplied, then the certificate is looked up by the former but the latter is checked as well. If the latter doesn't match the subjectKeyIdentifier of the parent certificate, EKEYREJECTED is returned. This makes it possible to chain X.509 certificates based on the issuer and serialNumber fields rather than on subjectKeyIdentifier. This is necessary as we are having to deal with keys that are represented by X.509 certificates that lack a subjectKeyIdentifier. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
* | Merge branch 'for-4.3/sg' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-blockLinus Torvalds2015-09-021-9/+1
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull SG updates from Jens Axboe: "This contains a set of scatter-gather related changes/fixes for 4.3: - Add support for limited chaining of sg tables even for architectures that do not set ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN. From Christoph. - Add sg chain support to target_rd. From Christoph. - Fixup open coded sg->page_link in crypto/omap-sham. From Christoph. - Fixup open coded crypto ->page_link manipulation. From Dan. - Also from Dan, automated fixup of manual sg_unmark_end() manipulations. - Also from Dan, automated fixup of open coded sg_phys() implementations. - From Robert Jarzmik, addition of an sg table splitting helper that drivers can use" * 'for-4.3/sg' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: lib: scatterlist: add sg splitting function scatterlist: use sg_phys() crypto/omap-sham: remove an open coded access to ->page_link scatterlist: remove open coded sg_unmark_end instances crypto: replace scatterwalk_sg_chain with sg_chain target/rd: always chain S/G list scatterlist: allow limited chaining without ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
| * | crypto: replace scatterwalk_sg_chain with sg_chainDan Williams2015-08-171-9/+1
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> [hch: split from a larger patch by Dan] Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
* | crypto: hash - Add AHASH_REQUEST_ON_STACKHerbert Xu2015-08-211-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds the helper AHASH_REQUEST_ON_STACK for those users of ahash that are synchronous only. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: skcipher - Add top-level skcipher interfaceHerbert Xu2015-08-212-1/+405
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch introduces the crypto skcipher interface which aims to replace both blkcipher and ablkcipher. It's very similar to the existing ablkcipher interface. The main difference is the removal of the givcrypt interface. In order to make the transition easier for blkcipher users, there is a helper SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK which can be used to place a request on the stack for synchronous transforms. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: aead - Remove old AEAD interfacesHerbert Xu2015-08-173-174/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the AEAD conversion is complete we can rip out the old AEAD interafce and associated code. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: aead - Add type-safe geniv init/exit helpersHerbert Xu2015-08-172-6/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds the helpers aead_init_geniv and aead_exit_geniv which are type-safe and intended the replace the existing geniv init/exit helpers. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: doc - AEAD API conversionStephan Mueller2015-08-041-0/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The AEAD API changes are now reflected in the crypto API doc book. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: poly1305 - Export common Poly1305 helpersMartin Willi2015-07-171-0/+41
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As architecture specific drivers need a software fallback, export Poly1305 init/update/final functions together with some helpers in a header file. Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: chacha20 - Export common ChaCha20 helpersMartin Willi2015-07-171-0/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As architecture specific drivers need a software fallback, export a ChaCha20 en-/decryption function together with some helpers in a header file. Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: aead - Add type-safe function for freeing instancesHerbert Xu2015-07-141-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds a type-safe function for freeing AEAD instances to struct aead_instance. This replaces the existing free function in struct crypto_template which does not know the type of the instance that it's freeing. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: api - Add instance free function to crypto_typeHerbert Xu2015-07-141-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently the task of freeing an instance is given to the crypto template. However, it has no type information on the instance so we have to resort to checking type information at runtime. This patch introduces a free function to crypto_type that will be used to free an instance. This can then be used to free an instance in a type-safe manner. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: aead - Add aead_queue interfaceHerbert Xu2015-07-141-0/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds a type-safe queueing interface for AEAD. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: api - Remove unused __crypto_dequeue_requestHerbert Xu2015-07-141-1/+0
|/ | | | | | The function __crypto_dequeue_request is completely unused. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: rng - Do not free default RNG when it becomes unusedHerbert Xu2015-06-221-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently we free the default RNG when its use count hits zero. This was OK when the IV generators would latch onto the RNG at instance creation time and keep it until the instance is torn down. Now that IV generators only keep the RNG reference during init time this scheme causes the default RNG to come and go at a high frequencey. This is highly undesirable as we want to keep a single RNG in use unless the admin wants it to be removed. This patch changes the scheme so that the system RNG once allocated is never removed unless a specifically requested. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: aead - Fix aead_instance struct sizeHerbert Xu2015-06-191-1/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The struct aead_instance is meant to extend struct crypto_instance by incorporating the extra members of struct aead_alg. However, the current layout which is copied from shash/ahash does not specify the struct fully. In particular only aead_alg is present. For shash/ahash this works because users there add extra headroom to sizeof(struct crypto_instance) when allocating the instance. Unfortunately for aead, this bit was lost when the new aead_instance was added. Rather than fixing it like shash/ahash, this patch simply expands struct aead_instance to contain what is supposed to be there, i.e., adding struct crypto_instance. In order to not break existing AEAD users, this is done through an anonymous union. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: rsa - add a new rsa generic implementationTadeusz Struk2015-06-171-0/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | Add a new rsa generic SW implementation. This implements only cryptographic primitives. Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Added select on ASN1. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: akcipher - add PKE APITadeusz Struk2015-06-172-0/+400
| | | | | | | | | | Add Public Key Encryption API. Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Made CRYPTO_AKCIPHER invisible like other type config options. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: drbg - reseed often if seedsource is degradedStephan Mueller2015-06-101-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As required by SP800-90A, the DRBG implements are reseeding threshold. This threshold is at 2**48 (64 bit) and 2**32 bit (32 bit) as implemented in drbg_max_requests. With the recently introduced changes, the DRBG is now always used as a stdrng which is initialized very early in the boot cycle. To ensure that sufficient entropy is present, the Jitter RNG is added to even provide entropy at early boot time. However, the 2nd seed source, the nonblocking pool, is usually degraded at that time. Therefore, the DRBG is seeded with the Jitter RNG (which I believe contains good entropy, which however is questioned by others) and is seeded with a degradded nonblocking pool. This seed is now used for quasi the lifetime of the system (2**48 requests is a lot). The patch now changes the reseed threshold as follows: up until the time the DRBG obtains a seed from a fully iniitialized nonblocking pool, the reseeding threshold is lowered such that the DRBG is forced to reseed itself resonably often. Once it obtains the seed from a fully initialized nonblocking pool, the reseed threshold is set to the value required by SP800-90A. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: drbg - Use callback API for random readinessStephan Mueller2015-06-101-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The get_blocking_random_bytes API is broken because the wait can be arbitrarily long (potentially forever) so there is no safe way of calling it from within the kernel. This patch replaces it with the new callback API which does not have this problem. The patch also removes the entropy buffer registered with the DRBG handle in favor of stack variables to hold the seed data. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: doc - Fix typo in crypto-API.xmlMasanari Iida2015-06-043-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | This patch fix some typos found in crypto-API.xml. It is because the file is generated from comments in sources, so I had to fix typo in sources. Signed-off-by: Masanari Iida <standby24x7@gmail.com> Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: aead - Add multiple algorithm registration interfaceHerbert Xu2015-06-031-0/+2
| | | | | | | This patch adds the helpers that allow the registration and removal of multiple algorithms. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: aead - Ignore return value from crypto_unregister_algHerbert Xu2015-06-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | No new code should be using the return value of crypto_unregister_alg as it will become void soon. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: aead - Add aead_alg_instanceHerbert Xu2015-06-031-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | Now that type-safe init/exit functions exist, they often need to access the underlying aead_instance. So this patch adds the helper aead_alg_instance to access aead_instance from a crypto_aead object. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: aead - Add type-safe init/exit functionsHerbert Xu2015-06-031-0/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | As it stands the only non-type safe functions left in the new AEAD interface are the cra_init/cra_exit functions. It means exposing the ugly __crypto_aead_cast to every AEAD implementor. This patch adds type-safe init/exit functions to AEAD. Existing algorithms are unaffected while new implementations can simply fill in these two instead of cra_init/cra_exit. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: doc - cover new AEAD interfaceStephan Mueller2015-06-031-1/+4
| | | | | | | | The patch updates the DocBook to cover the new AEAD interface implementation. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: aead - Add common IV generation codeHerbert Xu2015-05-281-0/+24
| | | | | | | | This patch adds some common IV generation code currently duplicated by seqiv and echainiv. For example, the setkey and setauthsize functions are completely identical. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: aead - Document behaviour of AD in destination bufferHerbert Xu2015-05-281-4/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch defines the behaviour of AD in the new interface more clearly. In particular, it specifies that if the user must copy the AD to the destination manually when src != dst if they wish to guarantee that the destination buffer contains a copy of the AD. The reason for this is that otherwise every AEAD implementation would have to perform such a copy when src != dst. In reality most users do in-place processing where src == dst so this is not an issue. This patch also kills some remaining references to cryptoff. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: drbg - use Jitter RNG to obtain seedStephan Mueller2015-05-271-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | During initialization, the DRBG now tries to allocate a handle of the Jitter RNG. If such a Jitter RNG is available during seeding, the DRBG pulls the required entropy/nonce string from get_random_bytes and concatenates it with a string of equal size from the Jitter RNG. That combined string is now the seed for the DRBG. Written differently, the initial seed of the DRBG is now: get_random_bytes(entropy/nonce) || jitterentropy (entropy/nonce) If the Jitter RNG is not available, the DRBG only seeds from get_random_bytes. CC: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org> CC: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> CC: Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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