| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Now that the retrieval operation may be disposed of by fscache_put_operation()
before we actually set the context, the retrieval-specific cleanup operation
can produce a NULL-pointer dereference when it tries to unconditionally clean
up the netfs context.
Given that it is expected that we'll get at least as far as the place where we
currently set the context pointer and it is unlikely we'll go through the
error handling paths prior to that point, retain the context right from the
point that the retrieval op is allocated.
Concomitant to this, we need to retain the cookie pointer in the retrieval op
also so that we can call the netfs to release its context in the release
method.
In addition, we might now get into fscache_release_retrieval_op() with the op
only initialised. To this end, set the operation to DEAD only after the
release method has been called and skip the n_pages test upon cleanup if the
op is still in the INITIALISED state.
Without these changes, the following oops might be seen:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000b8
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0089c98>] fscache_release_retrieval_op+0xae/0x100
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa0088560>] fscache_put_operation+0x117/0x2e0
[<ffffffffa008b8f5>] __fscache_read_or_alloc_pages+0x351/0x3ac
[<ffffffffa00b761f>] __nfs_readpages_from_fscache+0x59/0xbf [nfs]
[<ffffffffa00b06c5>] nfs_readpages+0x10c/0x185 [nfs]
[<ffffffff81124925>] ? alloc_pages_current+0x119/0x13e
[<ffffffff810ee5fd>] ? __page_cache_alloc+0xfb/0x10a
[<ffffffff810f87f8>] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x188/0x22c
[<ffffffff810f8b3a>] ondemand_readahead+0x29e/0x2af
[<ffffffff810f8c92>] page_cache_sync_readahead+0x38/0x3a
[<ffffffff810ef337>] generic_file_read_iter+0x1a2/0x55a
[<ffffffffa00a9dff>] ? nfs_revalidate_mapping+0xd6/0x288 [nfs]
[<ffffffffa00a6a23>] nfs_file_read+0x49/0x70 [nfs]
[<ffffffff811363be>] new_sync_read+0x78/0x9c
[<ffffffff81137164>] __vfs_read+0x13/0x38
[<ffffffff8113721e>] vfs_read+0x95/0x121
[<ffffffff811372f6>] SyS_read+0x4c/0x8a
[<ffffffff81557a52>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
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Any time an incomplete operation is cancelled, the operation cancellation
function needs to be called to clean up. This is currently being passed
directly to some of the functions that might want to call it, but not all.
Instead, pass the cancellation method pointer to the fscache_operation_init()
and have that cache it in the operation struct. Further, plug in a dummy
cancellation handler if the caller declines to set one as this allows us to
call the function unconditionally (the extra overhead isn't worth bothering
about as we don't expect to be calling this typically).
The cancellation method must thence be called everywhere the CANCELLED state
is set. Note that we call it *before* setting the CANCELLED state such that
the method can use the old state value to guide its operation.
fscache_do_cancel_retrieval() needs moving higher up in the sources so that
the init function can use it now.
Without this, the following oops may be seen:
FS-Cache: Assertion failed
FS-Cache: 3 == 0 is false
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at ../fs/fscache/page.c:261!
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0089c1b>] fscache_release_retrieval_op+0x77/0x100
[<ffffffffa008853d>] fscache_put_operation+0x114/0x2da
[<ffffffffa008b8c2>] __fscache_read_or_alloc_pages+0x358/0x3b3
[<ffffffffa00b761f>] __nfs_readpages_from_fscache+0x59/0xbf [nfs]
[<ffffffffa00b06c5>] nfs_readpages+0x10c/0x185 [nfs]
[<ffffffff81124925>] ? alloc_pages_current+0x119/0x13e
[<ffffffff810ee5fd>] ? __page_cache_alloc+0xfb/0x10a
[<ffffffff810f87f8>] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x188/0x22c
[<ffffffff810f8b3a>] ondemand_readahead+0x29e/0x2af
[<ffffffff810f8c92>] page_cache_sync_readahead+0x38/0x3a
[<ffffffff810ef337>] generic_file_read_iter+0x1a2/0x55a
[<ffffffffa00a9dff>] ? nfs_revalidate_mapping+0xd6/0x288 [nfs]
[<ffffffffa00a6a23>] nfs_file_read+0x49/0x70 [nfs]
[<ffffffff811363be>] new_sync_read+0x78/0x9c
[<ffffffff81137164>] __vfs_read+0x13/0x38
[<ffffffff8113721e>] vfs_read+0x95/0x121
[<ffffffff811372f6>] SyS_read+0x4c/0x8a
[<ffffffff81557a52>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17
The assertion is showing that the remaining number of pages (n_pages) is not 0
when the operation is being released.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
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Call fscache_put_operation() or a wrapper on any op that has gone through
fscache_operation_init() so that the accounting shown in /proc is done
correctly, specifically fscache_n_op_release.
fscache_put_operation() therefore now allows an op in the INITIALISED state as
well as in the CANCELLED and COMPLETE states.
Note that this means that an operation can get put that doesn't have its
->object pointer filled in, so anything that depends on the object needs to be
conditional in fscache_put_operation().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
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Cancellation of an in-progress operation needs to update the relevant counters
and start any operations that are pending waiting on this one.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
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Count and display through /proc/fs/fscache/stats the number of initialised
operations.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
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Out of line fscache_operation_init() so that it can access internal FS-Cache
features, such as stats, in a later commit.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
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Currently, fscache_cancel_op() only cancels pending operations - attempts to
cancel in-progress operations are ignored. This leads to a problem in
fscache_wait_for_operation_activation() whereby the wait is terminated, but
the object has been killed.
The check at the end of the function now triggers because it's no longer
contingent on the cache having produced an I/O error since the commit that
fixed the logic error in fscache_object_is_dead().
The result of the check is that it tries to cancel the operation - but since
the object may not be pending by this point, the cancellation request may be
ignored - with the result that the the object is just put by the caller and
fscache_put_operation has an assertion failure because the operation isn't in
either the COMPLETE or the CANCELLED states.
To fix this, we permit in-progress ops to be cancelled under some
circumstances.
The bug results in an oops that looks something like this:
FS-Cache: fscache_wait_for_operation_activation() = -ENOBUFS [obj dead 3]
FS-Cache:
FS-Cache: Assertion failed
FS-Cache: 3 == 5 is false
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at ../fs/fscache/operation.c:432!
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0088574>] fscache_put_operation+0xf2/0x2cd
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa008b92a>] __fscache_read_or_alloc_pages+0x2ec/0x3b3
[<ffffffffa00b761f>] __nfs_readpages_from_fscache+0x59/0xbf [nfs]
[<ffffffffa00b06c5>] nfs_readpages+0x10c/0x185 [nfs]
[<ffffffff81124925>] ? alloc_pages_current+0x119/0x13e
[<ffffffff810ee5fd>] ? __page_cache_alloc+0xfb/0x10a
[<ffffffff810f87f8>] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x188/0x22c
[<ffffffff810f8b3a>] ondemand_readahead+0x29e/0x2af
[<ffffffff810f8c92>] page_cache_sync_readahead+0x38/0x3a
[<ffffffff810ef337>] generic_file_read_iter+0x1a2/0x55a
[<ffffffffa00a9dff>] ? nfs_revalidate_mapping+0xd6/0x288 [nfs]
[<ffffffffa00a6a23>] nfs_file_read+0x49/0x70 [nfs]
[<ffffffff811363be>] new_sync_read+0x78/0x9c
[<ffffffff81137164>] __vfs_read+0x13/0x38
[<ffffffff8113721e>] vfs_read+0x95/0x121
[<ffffffff811372f6>] SyS_read+0x4c/0x8a
[<ffffffff81557a52>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
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fscache_object_is_dead() returns true only if the object is marked dead and
the cache got an I/O error. This should be a logical OR instead. Since two
of the callers got split up into handling for separate subcases, expand the
other callers and kill the function. This is probably the right thing to do
anyway since one of the subcases isn't about the object at all, but rather
about the cache.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
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When an object is being marked as no longer live, do this under the object
spinlock to prevent a race with operation submission targeted on that object.
The problem occurs due to the following pair of intertwined sequences when the
cache tries to create an object that would take it over the hard available
space limit:
NETFS INTERFACE
===============
(A) The netfs calls fscache_acquire_cookie(). object creation is deferred to
the object state machine and the netfs is allowed to continue.
OBJECT STATE MACHINE KTHREAD
============================
(1) The object is looked up on disk by fscache_look_up_object()
calling cachefiles_walk_to_object(). The latter finds that the
object is not yet represented on disk and calls
fscache_object_lookup_negative().
(2) fscache_object_lookup_negative() sets FSCACHE_COOKIE_NO_DATA_YET
and clears FSCACHE_COOKIE_LOOKING_UP, thus allowing the netfs to
start queuing read operations.
(B) The netfs calls fscache_read_or_alloc_pages(). This calls
fscache_wait_for_deferred_lookup() which sees FSCACHE_COOKIE_LOOKING_UP
become clear, allowing the read to begin.
(C) A read operation is set up and passed to fscache_submit_op() to deal
with.
(3) cachefiles_walk_to_object() calls cachefiles_has_space(), which
fails (or one of the file operations to create stuff fails).
cachefiles returns an error to fscache.
(4) fscache_look_up_object() transits to the LOOKUP_FAILURE state,
(5) fscache_lookup_failure() sets FSCACHE_OBJECT_LOOKED_UP and
FSCACHE_COOKIE_UNAVAILABLE and clears FSCACHE_COOKIE_LOOKING_UP
then transits to the KILL_OBJECT state.
(6) fscache_kill_object() clears FSCACHE_OBJECT_IS_LIVE in an attempt
to reject any further requests from the netfs.
(7) object->n_ops is examined and found to be 0.
fscache_kill_object() transits to the DROP_OBJECT state.
(D) fscache_submit_op() locks the object spinlock, sees if it can dispatch
the op immediately by calling fscache_object_is_active() - which fails
since FSCACHE_OBJECT_IS_AVAILABLE has not yet been set.
(E) fscache_submit_op() then tests FSCACHE_OBJECT_LOOKED_UP - which is set.
It then queues the object and increments object->n_ops.
(8) fscache_drop_object() releases the object and eventually
fscache_put_object() calls cachefiles_put_object() which suffers
an assertion failure here:
ASSERTCMP(object->fscache.n_ops, ==, 0);
Locking the object spinlock in step (6) around the clearance of
FSCACHE_OBJECT_IS_LIVE ensures that the the decision trees in
fscache_submit_op() and fscache_submit_exclusive_op() don't see the IS_LIVE
flag being cleared mid-decision: either the op is queued before step (7) - in
which case fscache_kill_object() will see n_ops>0 and will deal with the op -
or the op will be rejected.
This, combined with rejecting op submission if the target object is dying, fix
the problem.
The problem shows up as the following oops:
CacheFiles: Assertion failed
CacheFiles: 1 == 0 is false
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at ../fs/cachefiles/interface.c:339!
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa014fd9c>] [<ffffffffa014fd9c>] cachefiles_put_object+0x2a4/0x301 [cachefiles]
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa008674b>] fscache_put_object+0x18/0x21 [fscache]
[<ffffffffa00883e6>] fscache_object_work_func+0x3ba/0x3c9 [fscache]
[<ffffffff81054dad>] process_one_work+0x226/0x441
[<ffffffff81055d91>] worker_thread+0x273/0x36b
[<ffffffff81055b1e>] ? rescuer_thread+0x2e1/0x2e1
[<ffffffff81059b9d>] kthread+0x10e/0x116
[<ffffffff81059a8f>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1bb/0x1bb
[<ffffffff815579ac>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[<ffffffff81059a8f>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1bb/0x1bb
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
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Reject new operations that are being submitted against an object if that
object has failed its lookup or creation states or has been killed by the
cache backend for some other reason, such as having been culled.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
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When submitting an operation, prefer to cancel the operation immediately
rather than queuing it for later processing if the object is marked as dying
(ie. the object state machine has reached the KILL_OBJECT state).
Whilst we're at it, change the series of related test_bit() calls into a
READ_ONCE() and bitwise-AND operators to reduce the number of load
instructions (test_bit() has a volatile address).
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
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Move fscache_report_unexpected_submission() up within operation.c so that it
can be called from fscache_submit_exclusive_op() too.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
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Count the number of objects that get culled by the cache backend and the
number of objects that the cache backend declines to instantiate due to lack
of space in the cache.
These numbers are made available through /proc/fs/fscache/stats
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
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Currently XFS calls file_remove_privs() without holding i_mutex. This is
wrong because that function can end up messing with file permissions and
file capabilities stored in xattrs for which we need i_mutex held.
Fix the problem by grabbing iolock exclusively when we will need to
change anything in permissions / xattrs.
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Comment in include/linux/security.h says that ->inode_killpriv() should
be called when setuid bit is being removed and that similar security
labels (in fact this applies only to file capabilities) should be
removed at this time as well. However we don't call ->inode_killpriv()
when we remove suid bit on truncate.
We fix the problem by calling ->inode_need_killpriv() and subsequently
->inode_killpriv() on truncate the same way as we do it on file write.
After this patch there's only one user of should_remove_suid() - ocfs2 -
and indeed it's buggy because it doesn't call ->inode_killpriv() on
write. However fixing it is difficult because of special locking
constraints.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Provide function telling whether file_remove_privs() will do anything.
Currently we only have should_remove_suid() and that does something
slightly different.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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file_remove_suid() is a misnomer since it removes also file capabilities
stored in xattrs and sets S_NOSEC flag. Also should_remove_suid() tells
something else than whether file_remove_suid() call is necessary which
leads to bugs.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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file_remove_suid() could mistakenly set S_NOSEC inode bit when root was
modifying the file. As a result following writes to the file by ordinary
user would avoid clearing suid or sgid bits.
Fix the bug by checking actual mode bits before setting S_NOSEC.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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If posix_acl_create() returns an error code then "*acl" and "*default_acl"
can be uninitialized or point to freed memory. This is a dangerous thing
to do. For example, it causes a problem in ocfs2_reflink():
fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:4327 ocfs2_reflink()
error: potentially using uninitialized 'default_acl'.
I've re-written this so we set the pointers to NULL at the start. I've
added a temporary "clone" variable to hold the value of "*acl" until end.
Setting them to NULL means means we don't need the "no_acl" label. We may
as well remove the "apply_umask" stuff forward and remove that label as
well.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Turn
seq_path(..., &file->f_path, ...);
into
seq_file_path(..., file, ...);
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Turn
d_path(&file->f_path, ...);
into
file_path(file, ...);
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Make file->f_path always point to the overlay dentry so that the path in
/proc/pid/fd is correct and to ensure that label-based LSMs have access to the
overlay as well as the underlay (path-based LSMs probably don't need it).
Using my union testsuite to set things up, before the patch I see:
[root@andromeda union-testsuite]# bash 5</mnt/a/foo107
[root@andromeda union-testsuite]# ls -l /proc/$$/fd/
...
lr-x------. 1 root root 64 Jun 5 14:38 5 -> /a/foo107
[root@andromeda union-testsuite]# stat /mnt/a/foo107
...
Device: 23h/35d Inode: 13381 Links: 1
...
[root@andromeda union-testsuite]# stat -L /proc/$$/fd/5
...
Device: 23h/35d Inode: 13381 Links: 1
...
After the patch:
[root@andromeda union-testsuite]# bash 5</mnt/a/foo107
[root@andromeda union-testsuite]# ls -l /proc/$$/fd/
...
lr-x------. 1 root root 64 Jun 5 14:22 5 -> /mnt/a/foo107
[root@andromeda union-testsuite]# stat /mnt/a/foo107
...
Device: 23h/35d Inode: 40346 Links: 1
...
[root@andromeda union-testsuite]# stat -L /proc/$$/fd/5
...
Device: 23h/35d Inode: 40346 Links: 1
...
Note the change in where /proc/$$/fd/5 points to in the ls command. It was
pointing to /a/foo107 (which doesn't exist) and now points to /mnt/a/foo107
(which is correct).
The inode accessed, however, is the lower layer. The union layer is on device
25h/37d and the upper layer on 24h/36d.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Call ovl_drop_write() earlier in ovl_dentry_open() before we call vfs_open()
as we've done the copy up for which we needed the freeze-write lock by that
point.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Add last missing line in commit "cdd9eefdf905"
("fs/ufs: restore s_lock mutex")
Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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See "ext2: Do not update mtime of a moved directory" (and followup in
"ext2: fix unbalanced kmap()/kunmap()") for background; this is UFS
equivalent - the same problem exists here.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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We are already serialized by ->i_mutex and operations on different
directories are independent. These calls are just rudiments of
blind BKL conversion and they should've been removed back then.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Commit e4502c63f56aeca88 (ufs: deal with nfsd/iget races) made ufs
create inodes with I_NEW flag set. However ufs_mkdir() never cleared
this flag. Thus if someone ever tried to lookup the directory by inode
number, he would deadlock waiting for I_NEW to be cleared. Luckily this
mostly happens only if the filesystem is exported over NFS since
otherwise we have the inode attached to dentry and don't look it up by
inode number. In rare cases dentry can get freed without inode being
freed and then we'd hit the deadlock even without NFS export.
Fix the problem by clearing I_NEW before instantiating new directory
inode.
Fixes: e4502c63f56aeca887ced37f24e0def1ef11cec8
Reported-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Commit e4502c63f56aeca88 (ufs: deal with nfsd/iget races) introduced
unlock_new_inode() call into ufs_add_nondir(). However that function
gets called also from ufs_link() which hands it already initialized
inode and thus unlock_new_inode() complains. The problem is harmless but
annoying.
Fix the problem by opencoding necessary stuff in ufs_link()
Fixes: e4502c63f56aeca887ced37f24e0def1ef11cec8
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Commit 0244756edc4b98c ("ufs: sb mutex merge + mutex_destroy") generated
deadlocks in read/write mode on mkdir.
This patch partially reverts it keeping fixes by Andrew Morton and
mutex_destroy()
[AV: fixed a missing bit in ufs_remount()]
Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Reported-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Evgeniy Dushistov <dushistov@mail.ru>
Cc: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Cc: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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This reverts commit 9ef7db7f38d0 ("ufs: fix deadlocks introduced by sb
mutex merge") That patch tried to solve commit 0244756edc4b98c ("ufs: sb
mutex merge + mutex_destroy") which is itself partially reverted due to
multiple deadlocks.
Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Evgeniy Dushistov <dushistov@mail.ru>
Cc: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Cc: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull scheduler fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Debug info and other statistics fixes and related enhancements"
* 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
sched/numa: Fix numa balancing stats in /proc/pid/sched
sched/numa: Show numa_group ID in /proc/sched_debug task listings
sched/debug: Move print_cfs_rq() declaration to kernel/sched/sched.h
sched/stat: Expose /proc/pid/schedstat if CONFIG_SCHED_INFO=y
sched/stat: Simplify the sched_info accounting dependency
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Expand /proc/pid/schedstat output:
- enable it on CONFIG_TASK_DELAY_ACCT=y && !CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS kernels.
- dump all zeroes on kernels that are booted with the 'nodelayacct'
option, which boot option disables delay accounting on
CONFIG_TASK_DELAY_ACCT=y kernels.
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl
Cc: ricklind@us.ibm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5ccbef17d4bc841084ea6e6421d4e4a23b7b806f.1435654789.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"Long ago and far away when user namespaces where young it was realized
that allowing fresh mounts of proc and sysfs with only user namespace
permissions could violate the basic rule that only root gets to decide
if proc or sysfs should be mounted at all.
Some hacks were put in place to reduce the worst of the damage could
be done, and the common sense rule was adopted that fresh mounts of
proc and sysfs should allow no more than bind mounts of proc and
sysfs. Unfortunately that rule has not been fully enforced.
There are two kinds of gaps in that enforcement. Only filesystems
mounted on empty directories of proc and sysfs should be ignored but
the test for empty directories was insufficient. So in my tree
directories on proc, sysctl and sysfs that will always be empty are
created specially. Every other technique is imperfect as an ordinary
directory can have entries added even after a readdir returns and
shows that the directory is empty. Special creation of directories
for mount points makes the code in the kernel a smidge clearer about
it's purpose. I asked container developers from the various container
projects to help test this and no holes were found in the set of mount
points on proc and sysfs that are created specially.
This set of changes also starts enforcing the mount flags of fresh
mounts of proc and sysfs are consistent with the existing mount of
proc and sysfs. I expected this to be the boring part of the work but
unfortunately unprivileged userspace winds up mounting fresh copies of
proc and sysfs with noexec and nosuid clear when root set those flags
on the previous mount of proc and sysfs. So for now only the atime,
read-only and nodev attributes which userspace happens to keep
consistent are enforced. Dealing with the noexec and nosuid
attributes remains for another time.
This set of changes also addresses an issue with how open file
descriptors from /proc/<pid>/ns/* are displayed. Recently readlink of
/proc/<pid>/fd has been triggering a WARN_ON that has not been
meaningful since it was added (as all of the code in the kernel was
converted) and is not now actively wrong.
There is also a short list of issues that have not been fixed yet that
I will mention briefly.
It is possible to rename a directory from below to above a bind mount.
At which point any directory pointers below the renamed directory can
be walked up to the root directory of the filesystem. With user
namespaces enabled a bind mount of the bind mount can be created
allowing the user to pick a directory whose children they can rename
to outside of the bind mount. This is challenging to fix and doubly
so because all obvious solutions must touch code that is in the
performance part of pathname resolution.
As mentioned above there is also a question of how to ensure that
developers by accident or with purpose do not introduce exectuable
files on sysfs and proc and in doing so introduce security regressions
in the current userspace that will not be immediately obvious and as
such are likely to require breaking userspace in painful ways once
they are recognized"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
vfs: Remove incorrect debugging WARN in prepend_path
mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories
sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point
sysfs: Add support for permanently empty directories to serve as mount points.
kernfs: Add support for always empty directories.
proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points
sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints.
fs: Add helper functions for permanently empty directories.
vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible
mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime
mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace
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The warning message in prepend_path is unclear and outdated. It was
added as a warning that the mechanism for generating names of pseudo
files had been removed from prepend_path and d_dname should be used
instead. Unfortunately the warning reads like a general warning,
making it unclear what to do with it.
Remove the warning. The transition it was added to warn about is long
over, and I added code several years ago which in rare cases causes
the warning to fire on legitimate code, and the warning is now firing
and scaring people for no good reason.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ivan Delalande <colona@arista.com>
Reported-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@osandov.com>
Fixes: f48cfddc6729e ("vfs: In d_path don't call d_dname on a mount point")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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fs_fully_visible attempts to make fresh mounts of proc and sysfs give
the mounter no more access to proc and sysfs than if they could have
by creating a bind mount. One aspect of proc and sysfs that makes
this particularly tricky is that there are other filesystems that
typically mount on top of proc and sysfs. As those filesystems are
mounted on empty directories in practice it is safe to ignore them.
However testing to ensure filesystems are mounted on empty directories
has not been something the in kernel data structures have supported so
the current test for an empty directory which checks to see
if nlink <= 2 is a bit lacking.
proc and sysfs have recently been modified to use the new empty_dir
infrastructure to create all of their dedicated mount points. Instead
of testing for S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && i_nlink <= 2 to see if a
directory is empty, test for is_empty_dir_inode(inode). That small
change guaranteess mounts found on proc and sysfs really are safe to
ignore, because the directories are not only empty but nothing can
ever be added to them. This guarantees there is nothing to worry
about when mounting proc and sysfs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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This allows for better documentation in the code and
it allows for a simpler and fully correct version of
fs_fully_visible to be written.
The mount points converted and their filesystems are:
/sys/hypervisor/s390/ s390_hypfs
/sys/kernel/config/ configfs
/sys/kernel/debug/ debugfs
/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/ efivarfs
/sys/fs/fuse/connections/ fusectl
/sys/fs/pstore/ pstore
/sys/kernel/tracing/ tracefs
/sys/fs/cgroup/ cgroup
/sys/kernel/security/ securityfs
/sys/fs/selinux/ selinuxfs
/sys/fs/smackfs/ smackfs
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Add two functions sysfs_create_mount_point and
sysfs_remove_mount_point that hang a permanently empty directory off
of a kobject or remove a permanently emptpy directory hanging from a
kobject. Export these new functions so modular filesystems can use
them.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Add a new function kernfs_create_empty_dir that can be used to create
directory that can not be modified.
Update the code to use make_empty_dir_inode when reporting a
permanently empty directory to the vfs.
Update the code to not allow adding to permanently empty directories.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Add a new function proc_create_mount_point that when used to creates a
directory that can not be added to.
Add a new function is_empty_pde to test if a function is a mount
point.
Update the code to use make_empty_dir_inode when reporting
a permanently empty directory to the vfs.
Update the code to not allow adding to permanently empty directories.
Update /proc/openprom and /proc/fs/nfsd to be permanently empty directories.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Add a magic sysctl table sysctl_mount_point that when used to
create a directory forces that directory to be permanently empty.
Update the code to use make_empty_dir_inode when accessing permanently
empty directories.
Update the code to not allow adding to permanently empty directories.
Update /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc to be a permanently empty directory.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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To ensure it is safe to mount proc and sysfs I need to check if
filesystems that are mounted on top of them are mounted on truly empty
directories. Given that some directories can gain entries over time,
knowing that a directory is empty right now is insufficient.
Therefore add supporting infrastructure for permantently empty
directories that proc and sysfs can use when they create mount points
for filesystems and fs_fully_visible can use to test for permanently
empty directories to ensure that nothing will be gained by mounting a
fresh copy of proc or sysfs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Limit the mounts fs_fully_visible considers to locked mounts.
Unlocked can always be unmounted so considering them adds hassle
but no security benefit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Ignore an existing mount if the locked readonly, nodev or atime
attributes are less permissive than the desired attributes
of the new mount.
On success ensure the new mount locks all of the same readonly, nodev and
atime attributes as the old mount.
The nosuid and noexec attributes are not checked here as this change
is destined for stable and enforcing those attributes causes a
regression in lxc and libvirt-lxc where those applications will not
start and there are no known executables on sysfs or proc and no known
way to create exectuables without code modifications
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e51db73532955 ("userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Fresh mounts of proc and sysfs are a very special case that works very
much like a bind mount. Unfortunately the current structure can not
preserve the MNT_LOCK... mount flags. Therefore refactor the logic
into a form that can be modified to preserve those lock bits.
Add a new filesystem flag FS_USERNS_VISIBLE that requires some mount
of the filesystem be fully visible in the current mount namespace,
before the filesystem may be mounted.
Move the logic for calling fs_fully_visible from proc and sysfs into
fs/namespace.c where it has greater access to mount namespace state.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sage/ceph-client
Pull Ceph updates from Sage Weil:
"We have a pile of bug fixes from Ilya, including a few patches that
sync up the CRUSH code with the latest from userspace.
There is also a long series from Zheng that fixes various issues with
snapshots, inline data, and directory fsync, some simplification and
improvement in the cap release code, and a rework of the caching of
directory contents.
To top it off there are a few small fixes and cleanups from Benoit and
Hong"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sage/ceph-client: (40 commits)
rbd: use GFP_NOIO in rbd_obj_request_create()
crush: fix a bug in tree bucket decode
libceph: Fix ceph_tcp_sendpage()'s more boolean usage
libceph: Remove spurious kunmap() of the zero page
rbd: queue_depth map option
rbd: store rbd_options in rbd_device
rbd: terminate rbd_opts_tokens with Opt_err
ceph: fix ceph_writepages_start()
rbd: bump queue_max_segments
ceph: rework dcache readdir
crush: sync up with userspace
crush: fix crash from invalid 'take' argument
ceph: switch some GFP_NOFS memory allocation to GFP_KERNEL
ceph: pre-allocate data structure that tracks caps flushing
ceph: re-send flushing caps (which are revoked) in reconnect stage
ceph: send TID of the oldest pending caps flush to MDS
ceph: track pending caps flushing globally
ceph: track pending caps flushing accurately
libceph: fix wrong name "Ceph filesystem for Linux"
ceph: fix directory fsync
...
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Before a page get locked, someone else can write data to the page
and increase the i_size. So we should re-check the i_size after
pages are locked.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
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