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* Switch open_exec() and sys_uselib() to do_open_filp()Al Viro2009-05-091-1/+1
| | | | | | ... and make path_lookup_open() static Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Get rid of indirect include of fs_struct.hAl Viro2009-03-311-0/+1
| | | | | | | | Don't pull it in sched.h; very few files actually need it and those can include directly. sched.h itself only needs forward declaration of struct fs_struct; Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* vfs: Use lowercase names of quota functionsJan Kara2009-03-261-1/+1
| | | | | | | Use lowercase names of quota functions instead of old uppercase ones. Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> CC: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 30Heiko Carstens2009-01-141-7/+6
| | | | Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
* [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 20Heiko Carstens2009-01-141-2/+2
| | | | Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
* [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 17Heiko Carstens2009-01-141-9/+7
| | | | Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
* [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 16Heiko Carstens2009-01-141-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
* [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 15Heiko Carstens2009-01-141-2/+2
| | | | Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
* [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 14Heiko Carstens2009-01-141-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
* [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 11Heiko Carstens2009-01-141-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
* [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 10Heiko Carstens2009-01-141-7/+5
| | | | Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
* [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrapper special casesHeiko Carstens2009-01-141-3/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | System calls with an unsigned long long argument can't be converted with the standard wrappers since that would include a cast to long, which in turn means that we would lose the upper 32 bit on 32 bit architectures. Also semctl can't use the standard wrapper since it has a 'union' parameter. So we handle them as special case and add some extra wrappers instead. Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
* inode->i_op is never NULLAl Viro2009-01-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | We used to have rather schizophrenic set of checks for NULL ->i_op even though it had been eliminated years ago. You'd need to go out of your way to set it to NULL explicitly _and_ a bunch of code would die on such inodes anyway. After killing two remaining places that still did that bogosity, all that crap can go away. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.Kentaro Takeda2008-12-311-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* CRED: Inaugurate COW credentialsDavid Howells2008-11-141-16/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* CRED: Pass credentials through dentry_open()David Howells2008-11-141-6/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself when it opens its null chardev. The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the dentry_open hook in struct security_operations. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* CRED: Separate task security context from task_structDavid Howells2008-11-141-8/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers pointing to it. Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in entry.S via asm-offsets. With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* CRED: Neuter sys_capset()David Howells2008-11-141-11/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Take away the ability for sys_capset() to affect processes other than current. This means that current will not need to lock its own credentials when reading them against interference by other processes. This has effectively been the case for a while anyway, since: (1) Without LSM enabled, sys_capset() is disallowed. (2) With file-based capabilities, sys_capset() is neutered. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* [PATCH] introduce fmode_t, do annotationsAl Viro2008-10-211-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* tty: the vhangup syscall is racyAlan Cox2008-10-131-2/+1
| | | | | | | | We now have the infrastructure to sort this out but rather than teaching the syscall tty lock rules we move the hard work into a tty helper Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] merge locate_fd() and get_unused_fd()Al Viro2008-08-011-56/+0
| | | | | | | New primitive: alloc_fd(start, flags). get_unused_fd() and get_unused_fd_flags() become wrappers on top of it. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] fix RLIM_NOFILE handlingAl Viro2008-07-261-9/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | * dup2() should return -EBADF on exceeded sysctl_nr_open * dup() should *not* return -EINVAL even if you have rlimit set to 0; it should get -EMFILE instead. Check for orig_start exceeding rlimit taken to sys_fcntl(). Failing expand_files() in dup{2,3}() now gets -EMFILE remapped to -EBADF. Consequently, remaining checks for rlimit are taken to expand_files(). Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] sanitize __user_walk_fd() et.al.Al Viro2008-07-261-62/+62
| | | | | | | | | | | | | * do not pass nameidata; struct path is all the callers want. * switch to new helpers: user_path_at(dfd, pathname, flags, &path) user_path(pathname, &path) user_lpath(pathname, &path) user_path_dir(pathname, &path) (fail if not a directory) The last 3 are trivial macro wrappers for the first one. * remove nameidata in callers. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] preparation to __user_walk_fd cleanupAl Viro2008-07-261-8/+10
| | | | | | | Almost all users __user_walk_fd() and friends care only about struct path. Get rid of the few that do not. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] take noexec checks to very few callers that careAl Viro2008-07-261-0/+10
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [patch 4/4] vfs: immutable inode checking cleanupMiklos Szeredi2008-07-261-22/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the immutable and append-only checks from chmod, chown and utimes into notify_change(). Checks for immutable and append-only files are always performed by the VFS and not by the filesystem (see permission() and may_...() in namei.c), so these belong in notify_change(), and not in inode_change_ok(). This should be completely equivalent. CC: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> CC: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] fix MAY_CHDIR/MAY_ACCESS/LOOKUP_ACCESS messAl Viro2008-07-261-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | * MAY_CHDIR is redundant - it's an equivalent of MAY_ACCESS * MAY_ACCESS on fuse should affect only the last step of pathname resolution * fchdir() and chroot() should pass MAY_ACCESS, for the same reason why chdir() needs that. * now that we pass MAY_ACCESS explicitly in all cases, LOOKUP_ACCESS can be removed; it has no business being in nameidata. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] kill altrootAl Viro2008-07-261-2/+1
| | | | | | long overdue... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] permission checks for chdir need special treatment only on the last stepAl Viro2008-07-261-3/+2
| | | | | | | | ... so we ought to pass MAY_CHDIR to vfs_permission() instead of having it triggered on every step of preceding pathname resolution. LOOKUP_CHDIR is killed by that. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [patch 1/5] vfs: truncate: dont check immutable twiceMiklos Szeredi2008-07-261-1/+1
| | | | | | | | vfs_permission(MAY_WRITE) already checked for the inode being immutable, so no need to repeat it. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
* fs: check for statfs overflowJon Tollefson2008-07-241-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | Adds a check for an overflow in the filesystem size so if someone is checking with statfs() on a 16G blocksize hugetlbfs in a 32bit binary that it will report back EOVERFLOW instead of a size of 0. Acked-by: Nishanth Aravamudan <nacc@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Tollefson <kniht@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* security: filesystem capabilities: fix fragile setuid fixup codeAndrew G. Morgan2008-07-041-15/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This commit includes a bugfix for the fragile setuid fixup code in the case that filesystem capabilities are supported (in access()). The effect of this fix is gated on filesystem capability support because changing securebits is only supported when filesystem capabilities support is configured.) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] split linux/file.hAl Viro2008-05-011-0/+1
| | | | | | Initial splitoff of the low-level stuff; taken to fdtable.h Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* xip: support non-struct page backed memoryNick Piggin2008-04-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert XIP to support non-struct page backed memory, using VM_MIXEDMAP for the user mappings. This requires the get_xip_page API to be changed to an address based one. Improve the API layering a little bit too, while we're here. This is required in order to support XIP filesystems on memory that isn't backed with struct page (but memory with struct page is still supported too). Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Acked-by: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com> Cc: Jared Hulbert <jaredeh@gmail.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] r/o bind mounts: debugging for missed callsDave Hansen2008-04-191-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There have been a few oopses caused by 'struct file's with NULL f_vfsmnts. There was also a set of potentially missed mnt_want_write()s from dentry_open() calls. This patch provides a very simple debugging framework to catch these kinds of bugs. It will WARN_ON() them, but should stop us from having any oopses or mnt_writer count imbalances. I'm quite convinced that this is a good thing because it found bugs in the stuff I was working on as soon as I wrote it. [hch: made it conditional on a debug option. But it's still a little bit too ugly] [hch: merged forced remount r/o fix from Dave and akpm's fix for the fix] Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] r/o bind mounts: make access() use new r/o helperDave Hansen2008-04-191-2/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | It is OK to let access() go without using a mnt_want/drop_write() pair because it doesn't actually do writes to the filesystem, and it is inherently racy anyway. This is a rare case when it is OK to use __mnt_is_readonly() directly. Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] r/o bind mounts: write counts for truncate()Dave Hansen2008-04-191-6/+8
| | | | | | | Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] r/o bind mounts: elevate write count for chmod/chown callersDave Hansen2008-04-191-9/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | chown/chmod,etc... don't call permission in the same way that the normal "open for write" calls do. They still write to the filesystem, so bump the write count during these operations. Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] r/o bind mounts: elevate write count for open()sDave Hansen2008-04-191-2/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is the first really tricky patch in the series. It elevates the writer count on a mount each time a non-special file is opened for write. We used to do this in may_open(), but Miklos pointed out that __dentry_open() is used as well to create filps. This will cover even those cases, while a call in may_open() would not have. There is also an elevated count around the vfs_create() call in open_namei(). See the comments for more details, but we need this to fix a 'create, remount, fail r/w open()' race. Some filesystems forego the use of normal vfs calls to create struct files. Make sure that these users elevate the mnt writer count because they will get __fput(), and we need to make sure they're balanced. Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] merge open_namei() and do_filp_open()Christoph Hellwig2008-04-191-19/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | open_namei() will, in the future, need to take mount write counts over its creation and truncation (via may_open()) operations. It needs to keep these write counts until any potential filp that is created gets __fput()'d. This gets complicated in the error handling and becomes very murky as to how far open_namei() actually got, and whether or not that mount write count was taken. That makes it a bad interface. All that the current do_filp_open() really does is allocate the nameidata on the stack, then call open_namei(). So, this merges those two functions and moves filp_open() over to namei.c so it can be close to its buddy: do_filp_open(). It also gets a kerneldoc comment in the process. Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] do namei_flags calculation inside open_namei()Dave Hansen2008-04-191-20/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | My end goal here is to make sure all users of may_open() return filps. This will ensure that we properly release mount write counts which were taken for the filp in may_open(). This patch moves the sys_open flags to namei flags calculation into fs/namei.c. We'll shortly be moving the nameidata_to_filp() calls into namei.c, and this gets the sys_open flags to a place where we can get at them when we need them. Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* asmlinkage_protect replaces prevent_tail_callRoland McGrath2008-04-101-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The prevent_tail_call() macro works around the problem of the compiler clobbering argument words on the stack, which for asmlinkage functions is the caller's (user's) struct pt_regs. The tail/sibling-call optimization is not the only way that the compiler can decide to use stack argument words as scratch space, which we have to prevent. Other optimizations can do it too. Until we have new compiler support to make "asmlinkage" binding on the compiler's own use of the stack argument frame, we have work around all the manifestations of this issue that crop up. More cases seem to be prevented by also keeping the incoming argument variables live at the end of the function. This makes their original stack slots attractive places to leave those variables, so the compiler tends not clobber them for something else. It's still no guarantee, but it handles some observed cases that prevent_tail_call() did not. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] check for null vfsmount in dentry_open()Christoph Hellwig2008-03-191-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make sure no-one calls dentry_open with a NULL vfsmount argument and crap out with a stacktrace otherwise. A NULL file->f_vfsmnt has always been problematic, but with the per-mount r/o tracking we can't accept anymore at all. [AV] the last place that passed NULL had been eliminated by the previous patch (reiserfs xattr stuff) Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Make set_fs_{root,pwd} take a struct pathJan Blunck2008-02-141-8/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | In nearly all cases the set_fs_{root,pwd}() calls work on a struct path. Change the function to reflect this and use path_get() here. Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Introduce path_put()Jan Blunck2008-02-141-11/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * Add path_put() functions for releasing a reference to the dentry and vfsmount of a struct path in the right order * Switch from path_release(nd) to path_put(&nd->path) * Rename dput_path() to path_put_conditional() [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs] Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Embed a struct path into struct nameidata instead of nd->{dentry,mnt}Jan Blunck2008-02-141-15/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata. Together with the other patches of this series - it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on <dentry,vfsmount> pairs - it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed - it reduces the overall code size: without patch series: text data bss dec hex filename 5321639 858418 715768 6895825 6938d1 vmlinux with patch series: text data bss dec hex filename 5320026 858418 715768 6894212 693284 vmlinux This patch: Switch from nd->{dentry,mnt} to nd->path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack] Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* remove the unused exports of sys_open/sys_readArjan van de Ven2008-02-081-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | These exports (which aren't used and which are in fact dangerous to use because they pretty much form a security hole to use) have been marked _UNUSED since 2.6.24 with removal in 2.6.25. This patch is their final departure from the Linux kernel tree. Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs: remove fastcall, it is always emptyHarvey Harrison2008-02-081-2/+2
| | | | | | | [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mark sys_open/sys_read exports unusedArjan van de Ven2007-11-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | sys_open / sys_read were used in the early 1.2 days to load firmware from disk inside drivers. Since 2.0 or so this was deprecated behavior, but several drivers still were using this. Since a few years we have a request_firmware() API that implements this in a nice, consistent way. Only some old ISA sound drivers (pre-ALSA) still straggled along for some time.... however with commit c2b1239a9f22f19c53543b460b24507d0e21ea0c the last user is now gone. This is a good thing, since using sys_open / sys_read etc for firmware is a very buggy to dangerous thing to do; these operations put an fd in the process file descriptor table.... which then can be tampered with from other threads for example. For those who don't want the firmware loader, filp_open()/vfs_read are the better APIs to use, without this security issue. The patch below marks sys_open and sys_read unused now that they're really not used anymore, and for deletion in the 2.6.25 timeframe. Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] pass dentry to audit_inode()/audit_inode_child()Al Viro2007-10-211-2/+2
| | | | | | makes caller simpler *and* allows to scan ancestors Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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