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* Merge branch 'core-rseq-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-06-101-0/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull restartable sequence support from Thomas Gleixner: "The restartable sequences syscall (finally): After a lot of back and forth discussion and massive delays caused by the speculative distraction of maintainers, the core set of restartable sequences has finally reached a consensus. It comes with the basic non disputed core implementation along with support for arm, powerpc and x86 and a full set of selftests It was exposed to linux-next earlier this week, so it does not fully comply with the merge window requirements, but there is really no point to drag it out for yet another cycle" * 'core-rseq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: rseq/selftests: Provide Makefile, scripts, gitignore rseq/selftests: Provide parametrized tests rseq/selftests: Provide basic percpu ops test rseq/selftests: Provide basic test rseq/selftests: Provide rseq library selftests/lib.mk: Introduce OVERRIDE_TARGETS powerpc: Wire up restartable sequences system call powerpc: Add syscall detection for restartable sequences powerpc: Add support for restartable sequences x86: Wire up restartable sequence system call x86: Add support for restartable sequences arm: Wire up restartable sequences system call arm: Add syscall detection for restartable sequences arm: Add restartable sequences support rseq: Introduce restartable sequences system call uapi/headers: Provide types_32_64.h
| * rseq: Introduce restartable sequences system callMathieu Desnoyers2018-06-061-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Expose a new system call allowing each thread to register one userspace memory area to be used as an ABI between kernel and user-space for two purposes: user-space restartable sequences and quick access to read the current CPU number value from user-space. * Restartable sequences (per-cpu atomics) Restartables sequences allow user-space to perform update operations on per-cpu data without requiring heavy-weight atomic operations. The restartable critical sections (percpu atomics) work has been started by Paul Turner and Andrew Hunter. It lets the kernel handle restart of critical sections. [1] [2] The re-implementation proposed here brings a few simplifications to the ABI which facilitates porting to other architectures and speeds up the user-space fast path. Here are benchmarks of various rseq use-cases. Test hardware: arm32: ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l) "Cubietruck", 2-core x86-64: Intel E5-2630 v3@2.40GHz, 16-core, hyperthreading The following benchmarks were all performed on a single thread. * Per-CPU statistic counter increment getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup arm32: 344.0 31.4 11.0 x86-64: 15.3 2.0 7.7 * LTTng-UST: write event 32-bit header, 32-bit payload into tracer per-cpu buffer getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup arm32: 2502.0 2250.0 1.1 x86-64: 117.4 98.0 1.2 * liburcu percpu: lock-unlock pair, dereference, read/compare word getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup arm32: 751.0 128.5 5.8 x86-64: 53.4 28.6 1.9 * jemalloc memory allocator adapted to use rseq Using rseq with per-cpu memory pools in jemalloc at Facebook (based on rseq 2016 implementation): The production workload response-time has 1-2% gain avg. latency, and the P99 overall latency drops by 2-3%. * Reading the current CPU number Speeding up reading the current CPU number on which the caller thread is running is done by keeping the current CPU number up do date within the cpu_id field of the memory area registered by the thread. This is done by making scheduler preemption set the TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME flag on the current thread. Upon return to user-space, a notify-resume handler updates the current CPU value within the registered user-space memory area. User-space can then read the current CPU number directly from memory. Keeping the current cpu id in a memory area shared between kernel and user-space is an improvement over current mechanisms available to read the current CPU number, which has the following benefits over alternative approaches: - 35x speedup on ARM vs system call through glibc - 20x speedup on x86 compared to calling glibc, which calls vdso executing a "lsl" instruction, - 14x speedup on x86 compared to inlined "lsl" instruction, - Unlike vdso approaches, this cpu_id value can be read from an inline assembly, which makes it a useful building block for restartable sequences. - The approach of reading the cpu id through memory mapping shared between kernel and user-space is portable (e.g. ARM), which is not the case for the lsl-based x86 vdso. On x86, yet another possible approach would be to use the gs segment selector to point to user-space per-cpu data. This approach performs similarly to the cpu id cache, but it has two disadvantages: it is not portable, and it is incompatible with existing applications already using the gs segment selector for other purposes. Benchmarking various approaches for reading the current CPU number: ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l) Machine model: Cubietruck - Baseline (empty loop): 8.4 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id: 16.7 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register): 19.8 ns - glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6.6 getcpu: 301.8 ns - getcpu system call: 234.9 ns x86-64 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz: - Baseline (empty loop): 0.8 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id: 0.8 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register): 0.8 ns - Read using gs segment selector: 0.8 ns - "lsl" inline assembly: 13.0 ns - glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6 getcpu: 16.6 ns - getcpu system call: 53.9 ns - Speed (benchmark taken on v8 of patchset) Running 10 runs of hackbench -l 100000 seems to indicate, contrary to expectations, that enabling CONFIG_RSEQ slightly accelerates the scheduler: Configuration: 2 sockets * 8-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz (directly on hardware, hyperthreading disabled in BIOS, energy saving disabled in BIOS, turboboost disabled in BIOS, cpuidle.off=1 kernel parameter), with a Linux v4.6 defconfig+localyesconfig, restartable sequences series applied. * CONFIG_RSEQ=n avg.: 41.37 s std.dev.: 0.36 s * CONFIG_RSEQ=y avg.: 40.46 s std.dev.: 0.33 s - Size On x86-64, between CONFIG_RSEQ=n/y, the text size increase of vmlinux is 567 bytes, and the data size increase of vmlinux is 5696 bytes. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/650333/ [2] http://www.linuxplumbersconf.org/2013/ocw/system/presentations/1695/original/LPC%20-%20PerCpu%20Atomics.pdf Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Chris Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Hunter <ahh@google.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ben Maurer <bmaurer@fb.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151027235635.16059.11630.stgit@pjt-glaptop.roam.corp.google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150624222609.6116.86035.stgit@kitami.mtv.corp.google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180602124408.8430-3-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
* | umh: introduce fork_usermode_blob() helperAlexei Starovoitov2018-05-231-9/+29
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce helper: int fork_usermode_blob(void *data, size_t len, struct umh_info *info); struct umh_info { struct file *pipe_to_umh; struct file *pipe_from_umh; pid_t pid; }; that GPLed kernel modules (signed or unsigned) can use it to execute part of its own data as swappable user mode process. The kernel will do: - allocate a unique file in tmpfs - populate that file with [data, data + len] bytes - user-mode-helper code will do_execve that file and, before the process starts, the kernel will create two unix pipes for bidirectional communication between kernel module and umh - close tmpfs file, effectively deleting it - the fork_usermode_blob will return zero on success and populate 'struct umh_info' with two unix pipes and the pid of the user process As the first step in the development of the bpfilter project the fork_usermode_blob() helper is introduced to allow user mode code to be invoked from a kernel module. The idea is that user mode code plus normal kernel module code are built as part of the kernel build and installed as traditional kernel module into distro specified location, such that from a distribution point of view, there is no difference between regular kernel modules and kernel modules + umh code. Such modules can be signed, modprobed, rmmod, etc. The use of this new helper by a kernel module doesn't make it any special from kernel and user space tooling point of view. Such approach enables kernel to delegate functionality traditionally done by the kernel modules into the user space processes (either root or !root) and reduces security attack surface of the new code. The buggy umh code would crash the user process, but not the kernel. Another advantage is that umh code of the kernel module can be debugged and tested out of user space (e.g. opening the possibility to run clang sanitizers, fuzzers or user space test suites on the umh code). In case of the bpfilter project such architecture allows complex control plane to be done in the user space while bpf based data plane stays in the kernel. Since umh can crash, can be oom-ed by the kernel, killed by the admin, the kernel module that uses them (like bpfilter) needs to manage life time of umh on its own via two unix pipes and the pid of umh. The exit code of such kernel module should kill the umh it started, so that rmmod of the kernel module will cleanup the corresponding umh. Just like if the kernel module does kmalloc() it should kfree() it in the exit code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* exec: pin stack limit during execKees Cook2018-04-111-12/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since the stack rlimit is used in multiple places during exec and it can be changed via other threads (via setrlimit()) or processes (via prlimit()), the assumption that the value doesn't change cannot be made. This leads to races with mm layout selection and argument size calculations. This changes the exec path to use the rlimit stored in bprm instead of in current. Before starting the thread, the bprm stack rlimit is stored back to current. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Fixes: 64701dee4178e ("exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* exec: introduce finalize_exec() before start_thread()Kees Cook2018-04-111-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Provide a final callback into fs/exec.c before start_thread() takes over, to handle any last-minute changes, like the coming restoration of the stack limit. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functionsKees Cook2018-04-111-1/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* exec: Set file unwritable before LSM checkKees Cook2018-03-191-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The LSM check should happen after the file has been confirmed to be unchanging. Without this, we could have a race between the Time of Check (the call to security_kernel_read_file() which could read the file and make access policy decisions) and the Time of Use (starting with kernel_read_file()'s reading of the file contents). In theory, file contents could change between the two. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* exec: Weaken dumpability for secureexecKees Cook2018-01-031-2/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is a logical revert of commit e37fdb785a5f ("exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability") This weakens dumpability back to checking only for uid/gid changes in current (which is useless), but userspace depends on dumpability not being tied to secureexec. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1528633 Reported-by: Tom Horsley <horsley1953@gmail.com> Fixes: e37fdb785a5f ("exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"Kees Cook2017-12-171-6/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 04e35f4495dd560db30c25efca4eecae8ec8c375. SELinux runs with secureexec for all non-"noatsecure" domain transitions, which means lots of processes end up hitting the stack hard-limit change that was introduced in order to fix a race with prlimit(). That race fix will need to be redesigned. Reported-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Reported-by: Tomáš Trnka <trnka@scm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* exec: avoid gcc-8 warning for get_task_commArnd Bergmann2017-12-141-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | gcc-8 warns about using strncpy() with the source size as the limit: fs/exec.c:1223:32: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'strncpy' call is the same expression as the source; did you mean to use the size of the destination? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess] This is indeed slightly suspicious, as it protects us from source arguments without NUL-termination, but does not guarantee that the destination is terminated. This keeps the strncpy() to ensure we have properly padded target buffer, but ensures that we use the correct length, by passing the actual length of the destination buffer as well as adding a build-time check to ensure it is exactly TASK_COMM_LEN. There are only 23 callsites which I all reviewed to ensure this is currently the case. We could get away with doing only the check or passing the right length, but it doesn't hurt to do both. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171205151724.1764896-1-arnd@arndb.de Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()Kees Cook2017-11-291-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While the defense-in-depth RLIMIT_STACK limit on setuid processes was protected against races from other threads calling setrlimit(), I missed protecting it against races from external processes calling prlimit(). This adds locking around the change and makes sure that rlim_max is set too. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171127193457.GA11348@beast Fixes: 64701dee4178e ("exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* locking/atomics: COCCINELLE/treewide: Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() patterns ↵Mark Rutland2017-10-251-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | to READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() Please do not apply this to mainline directly, instead please re-run the coccinelle script shown below and apply its output. For several reasons, it is desirable to use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() in preference to ACCESS_ONCE(), and new code is expected to use one of the former. So far, there's been no reason to change most existing uses of ACCESS_ONCE(), as these aren't harmful, and changing them results in churn. However, for some features, the read/write distinction is critical to correct operation. To distinguish these cases, separate read/write accessors must be used. This patch migrates (most) remaining ACCESS_ONCE() instances to {READ,WRITE}_ONCE(), using the following coccinelle script: ---- // Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() uses to equivalent READ_ONCE() and // WRITE_ONCE() // $ make coccicheck COCCI=/home/mark/once.cocci SPFLAGS="--include-headers" MODE=patch virtual patch @ depends on patch @ expression E1, E2; @@ - ACCESS_ONCE(E1) = E2 + WRITE_ONCE(E1, E2) @ depends on patch @ expression E; @@ - ACCESS_ONCE(E) + READ_ONCE(E) ---- Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: davem@davemloft.net Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au Cc: shuah@kernel.org Cc: snitzer@redhat.com Cc: thor.thayer@linux.intel.com Cc: tj@kernel.org Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508792849-3115-19-git-send-email-paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* membarrier: Provide register expedited private commandMathieu Desnoyers2017-10-191-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This introduces a "register private expedited" membarrier command which allows eventual removal of important memory barrier constraints on the scheduler fast-paths. It changes how the "private expedited" membarrier command (new to 4.14) is used from user-space. This new command allows processes to register their intent to use the private expedited command. This affects how the expedited private command introduced in 4.14-rc is meant to be used, and should be merged before 4.14 final. Processes are now required to register before using MEMBARRIER_CMD_PRIVATE_EXPEDITED, otherwise that command returns EPERM. This fixes a problem that arose when designing requested extensions to sys_membarrier() to allow JITs to efficiently flush old code from instruction caches. Several potential algorithms are much less painful if the user register intent to use this functionality early on, for example, before the process spawns the second thread. Registering at this time removes the need to interrupt each and every thread in that process at the first expedited sys_membarrier() system call. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* exec: load_script: kill the onstack interp[BINPRM_BUF_SIZE] arrayOleg Nesterov2017-10-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Patch series "exec: binfmt_misc: fix use-after-free, kill iname[BINPRM_BUF_SIZE]". It looks like this code was always wrong, then commit 948b701a607f ("binfmt_misc: add persistent opened binary handler for containers") added more problems. This patch (of 6): load_script() can simply use i_name instead, it points into bprm->buf[] and nobody can change this memory until we call prepare_binprm(). The only complication is that we need to also change the signature of bprm_change_interp() but this change looks good too. While at it, do whitespace/style cleanups. NOTE: the real motivation for this change is that people want to increase BINPRM_BUF_SIZE, we need to change load_misc_binary() too but this looks more complicated because afaics it is very buggy. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170918163446.GA26793@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Travis Gummels <tgummels@redhat.com> Cc: Ben Woodard <woodard@redhat.com> Cc: Jim Foraker <foraker1@llnl.gov> Cc: <tdhooge@llnl.gov> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* vfs: constify path argument to kernel_read_file_from_pathMimi Zohar2017-09-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | This patch constifies the path argument to kernel_read_file_from_path(). Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'work.set_fs' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-09-141-21/+3
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull more set_fs removal from Al Viro: "Christoph's 'use kernel_read and friends rather than open-coding set_fs()' series" * 'work.set_fs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: fs: unexport vfs_readv and vfs_writev fs: unexport vfs_read and vfs_write fs: unexport __vfs_read/__vfs_write lustre: switch to kernel_write gadget/f_mass_storage: stop messing with the address limit mconsole: switch to kernel_read btrfs: switch write_buf to kernel_write net/9p: switch p9_fd_read to kernel_write mm/nommu: switch do_mmap_private to kernel_read serial2002: switch serial2002_tty_write to kernel_{read/write} fs: make the buf argument to __kernel_write a void pointer fs: fix kernel_write prototype fs: fix kernel_read prototype fs: move kernel_read to fs/read_write.c fs: move kernel_write to fs/read_write.c autofs4: switch autofs4_write to __kernel_write ashmem: switch to ->read_iter
| * fs: fix kernel_read prototypeChristoph Hellwig2017-09-041-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use proper ssize_t and size_t types for the return value and count argument, move the offset last and make it an in/out argument like all other read/write helpers, and make the buf argument a void pointer to get rid of lots of casts in the callers. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * fs: move kernel_read to fs/read_write.cChristoph Hellwig2017-09-041-17/+0
| | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | mm: treewide: remove GFP_TEMPORARY allocation flagMichal Hocko2017-09-131-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | GFP_TEMPORARY was introduced by commit e12ba74d8ff3 ("Group short-lived and reclaimable kernel allocations") along with __GFP_RECLAIMABLE. It's primary motivation was to allow users to tell that an allocation is short lived and so the allocator can try to place such allocations close together and prevent long term fragmentation. As much as this sounds like a reasonable semantic it becomes much less clear when to use the highlevel GFP_TEMPORARY allocation flag. How long is temporary? Can the context holding that memory sleep? Can it take locks? It seems there is no good answer for those questions. The current implementation of GFP_TEMPORARY is basically GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_RECLAIMABLE which in itself is tricky because basically none of the existing caller provide a way to reclaim the allocated memory. So this is rather misleading and hard to evaluate for any benefits. I have checked some random users and none of them has added the flag with a specific justification. I suspect most of them just copied from other existing users and others just thought it might be a good idea to use without any measuring. This suggests that GFP_TEMPORARY just motivates for cargo cult usage without any reasoning. I believe that our gfp flags are quite complex already and especially those with highlevel semantic should be clearly defined to prevent from confusion and abuse. Therefore I propose dropping GFP_TEMPORARY and replace all existing users to simply use GFP_KERNEL. Please note that SLAB users with shrinkers will still get __GFP_RECLAIMABLE heuristic and so they will be placed properly for memory fragmentation prevention. I can see reasons we might want some gfp flag to reflect shorterm allocations but I propose starting from a clear semantic definition and only then add users with proper justification. This was been brought up before LSF this year by Matthew [1] and it turned out that GFP_TEMPORARY really doesn't have a clear semantic. It seems to be a heuristic without any measured advantage for most (if not all) its current users. The follow up discussion has revealed that opinions on what might be temporary allocation differ a lot between developers. So rather than trying to tweak existing users into a semantic which they haven't expected I propose to simply remove the flag and start from scratch if we really need a semantic for short term allocations. [1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170118054945.GD18349@bombadil.infradead.org [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix typo] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: drm/i915: fix up] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170816144703.378d4f4d@canb.auug.org.au Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170728091904.14627-1-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearingKees Cook2017-08-011-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of an additional secureexec check for pdeath_signal, just move it up into the initial secureexec test. Neither perf nor arch code touches pdeath_signal, so the relocation shouldn't change anything. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
* | exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexecKees Cook2017-08-011-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For a secureexec, before memory layout selection has happened, reset the stack rlimit to something sane to avoid the caller having control over the resulting layouts. $ ulimit -s 8192 $ ulimit -s unlimited $ /bin/sh -c 'ulimit -s' unlimited $ sudo /bin/sh -c 'ulimit -s' 8192 Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
* | exec: Consolidate dumpability logicKees Cook2017-08-011-6/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since it's already valid to set dumpability in the early part of setup_new_exec(), we can consolidate the logic into a single place. The BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP is set during would_dump() calls before setup_new_exec(), so its test is safe to move as well. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signalKees Cook2017-08-011-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Like dumpability, clearing pdeath_signal happens both in setup_new_exec() and later in commit_creds(). The test in setup_new_exec() is different from all other privilege comparisons, though: it is checking the new cred (bprm) uid vs the old cred (current) euid. This appears to be a bug, introduced by commit a6f76f23d297 ("CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials"): - if (bprm->e_uid != current_euid() || - bprm->e_gid != current_egid()) { - set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); + if (bprm->cred->uid != current_euid() || + bprm->cred->gid != current_egid()) { It was bprm euid vs current euid (and egids), but the effective got dropped. Nothing in the exec flow changes bprm->cred->uid (nor gid). The call traces are: prepare_bprm_creds() prepare_exec_creds() prepare_creds() memcpy(new_creds, old_creds, ...) security_prepare_creds() (unimplemented by commoncap) ... prepare_binprm() bprm_fill_uid() resets euid/egid to current euid/egid sets euid/egid on bprm based on set*id file bits security_bprm_set_creds() cap_bprm_set_creds() handle all caps-based manipulations so this test is effectively a test of current_uid() vs current_euid(), which is wrong, just like the prior dumpability tests were wrong. The commit log says "Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds()." This may be meaning the earlier old euid vs new euid (and egid) test that got changed. Luckily, as with dumpability, this is all masked by commit_creds() which performs old/new euid and egid tests and clears pdeath_signal. And again, like dumpability, we should include LSM secureexec logic for pdeath_signal clearing. For example, Smack goes out of its way to clear pdeath_signal when it finds a secureexec condition. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpabilityKees Cook2017-08-011-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The examination of "current" to decide dumpability is wrong. This was a check of and euid/uid (or egid/gid) mismatch in the existing process, not the newly created one. This appears to stretch back into even the "history.git" tree. Luckily, dumpability is later set in commit_creds(). In earlier kernel versions before creds existed, similar checks also existed late in the exec flow, covering up the mistake as far back as I could find. Note that because the commit_creds() check examines differences of euid, uid, egid, gid, and capabilities between the old and new creds, it would look like the setup_new_exec() dumpability test could be entirely removed. However, the secureexec test may cover a different set of tests (specific to the LSMs) than what commit_creds() checks for. So, fix this test to use secureexec (the removed euid tests are redundant to the commoncap secureexec checks now). Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hookKees Cook2017-08-011-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This removes the bprm_secureexec hook since the logic has been folded into the bprm_set_creds hook for all LSMs now. Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
* | commoncap: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hookKees Cook2017-08-011-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The commoncap implementation of the bprm_secureexec hook is the only LSM that depends on the final call to its bprm_set_creds hook (since it may be called for multiple files, it ignores bprm->called_set_creds). As a result, it cannot safely _clear_ bprm->secureexec since other LSMs may have set it. Instead, remove the bprm_secureexec hook by introducing a new flag to bprm specific to commoncap: cap_elevated. This is similar to cap_effective, but that is used for a specific subset of elevated privileges, and exists solely to track state from bprm_set_creds to bprm_secureexec. As such, it will be removed in the next patch. Here, set the new bprm->cap_elevated flag when setuid/setgid has happened from bprm_fill_uid() or fscapabilities have been prepared. This temporarily moves the bprm_secureexec hook to a static inline. The helper will be removed in the next patch; this makes the step easier to review and bisect, since this does not introduce any changes to inputs nor outputs to the "elevated privileges" calculation. The new flag is merged with the bprm->secureexec flag in setup_new_exec() since this marks the end of any further prepare_binprm() calls. Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
* | binfmt: Introduce secureexec flagKees Cook2017-08-011-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The bprm_secureexec hook can be moved earlier. Right now, it is called during create_elf_tables(), via load_binary(), via search_binary_handler(), via exec_binprm(). Nearly all (see exception below) state used by bprm_secureexec is created during the bprm_set_creds hook, called from prepare_binprm(). For all LSMs (except commoncaps described next), only the first execution of bprm_set_creds takes any effect (they all check bprm->called_set_creds which prepare_binprm() sets after the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook). However, all these LSMs also only do anything with bprm_secureexec when they detected a secure state during their first run of bprm_set_creds. Therefore, it is functionally identical to move the detection into bprm_set_creds, since the results from secureexec here only need to be based on the first call to the LSM's bprm_set_creds hook. The single exception is that the commoncaps secureexec hook also examines euid/uid and egid/gid differences which are controlled by bprm_fill_uid(), via prepare_binprm(), which can be called multiple times (e.g. binfmt_script, binfmt_misc), and may clear the euid/egid for the final load (i.e. the script interpreter). However, while commoncaps specifically ignores bprm->cred_prepared, and runs its bprm_set_creds hook each time prepare_binprm() may get called, it needs to base the secureexec decision on the final call to bprm_set_creds. As a result, it will need special handling. To begin this refactoring, this adds the secureexec flag to the bprm struct, and calls the secureexec hook during setup_new_exec(). This is safe since all the cred work is finished (and past the point of no return). This explicit call will be removed in later patches once the hook has been removed. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | exec: Correct comments about "point of no return"Kees Cook2017-08-011-3/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In commit 221af7f87b97 ("Split 'flush_old_exec' into two functions"), the comment about the point of no return should have stayed in flush_old_exec() since it refers to "bprm->mm = NULL;" line, but prior changes in commits c89681ed7d0e ("remove steal_locks()"), and fd8328be874f ("sanitize handling of shared descriptor tables in failing execve()") made it look like it meant the current->sas_ss_sp line instead. The comment was referring to the fact that once bprm->mm is NULL, all failures from a binfmt load_binary hook (e.g. load_elf_binary), will get SEGV raised against current. Move this comment and expand the explanation a bit, putting it above the assignment this time, and add details about the true nature of "point of no return" being the call to flush_old_exec() itself. This also removes an erroneous commet about when credentials are being installed. That has its own dedicated function, install_exec_creds(), which carries a similar (and correct) comment, so remove the bogus comment where installation is not actually happening. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
* | exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_credsKees Cook2017-08-011-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The cred_prepared bprm flag has a misleading name. It has nothing to do with the bprm_prepare_cred hook, and actually tracks if bprm_set_creds has been called. Rename this flag and improve its comment. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
* exec: Limit arg stack to at most 75% of _STK_LIMKees Cook2017-07-071-5/+6
| | | | | | | | To avoid pathological stack usage or the need to special-case setuid execs, just limit all arg stack usage to at most 75% of _STK_LIM (6MB). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointersKees Cook2017-06-231-4/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When limiting the argv/envp strings during exec to 1/4 of the stack limit, the storage of the pointers to the strings was not included. This means that an exec with huge numbers of tiny strings could eat 1/4 of the stack limit in strings and then additional space would be later used by the pointers to the strings. For example, on 32-bit with a 8MB stack rlimit, an exec with 1677721 single-byte strings would consume less than 2MB of stack, the max (8MB / 4) amount allowed, but the pointers to the strings would consume the remaining additional stack space (1677721 * 4 == 6710884). The result (1677721 + 6710884 == 8388605) would exhaust stack space entirely. Controlling this stack exhaustion could result in pathological behavior in setuid binaries (CVE-2017-1000365). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: additional commenting from Kees] Fixes: b6a2fea39318 ("mm: variable length argument support") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622001720.GA32173@beast Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* x86/arch_prctl: Add ARCH_[GET|SET]_CPUIDKyle Huey2017-03-201-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Intel supports faulting on the CPUID instruction beginning with Ivy Bridge. When enabled, the processor will fault on attempts to execute the CPUID instruction with CPL>0. Exposing this feature to userspace will allow a ptracer to trap and emulate the CPUID instruction. When supported, this feature is controlled by toggling bit 0 of MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES. It is documented in detail in Section 2.3.2 of https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=243991 Implement a new pair of arch_prctls, available on both x86-32 and x86-64. ARCH_GET_CPUID: Returns the current CPUID state, either 0 if CPUID faulting is enabled (and thus the CPUID instruction is not available) or 1 if CPUID faulting is not enabled. ARCH_SET_CPUID: Set the CPUID state to the second argument. If cpuid_enabled is 0 CPUID faulting will be activated, otherwise it will be deactivated. Returns ENODEV if CPUID faulting is not supported on this system. The state of the CPUID faulting flag is propagated across forks, but reset upon exec. Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Robert O'Callahan <robert@ocallahan.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320081628.18952-9-khuey@kylehuey.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to ↵Ingo Molnar2017-03-021-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | <linux/sched/task.h> We are going to split <linux/sched/task.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to ↵Ingo Molnar2017-03-021-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | <linux/sched/numa_balancing.h> We are going to split <linux/sched/numa_balancing.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/numa_balancing.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to ↵Ingo Molnar2017-03-021-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | <linux/sched/signal.h> We are going to split <linux/sched/signal.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/signal.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to ↵Ingo Molnar2017-03-021-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | <linux/sched/coredump.h> We are going to split <linux/sched/coredump.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/coredump.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to ↵Ingo Molnar2017-03-021-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | <linux/sched/mm.h> We are going to split <linux/sched/mm.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/mm.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. The APIs that are going to be moved first are: mm_alloc() __mmdrop() mmdrop() mmdrop_async_fn() mmdrop_async() mmget_not_zero() mmput() mmput_async() get_task_mm() mm_access() mm_release() Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* sched/headers, cgroups: Remove the threadgroup_change_*() wrapperyIngo Molnar2017-03-021-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | threadgroup_change_begin()/end() is a pointless wrapper around cgroup_threadgroup_change_begin()/end(), minus a might_sleep() in the !CONFIG_CGROUPS=y case. Remove the wrappery, move the might_sleep() (the down_read() already has a might_sleep() check). This debloats <linux/sched.h> a bit and simplifies this API. Update all call sites. No change in functionality. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* vfs: Use upper filesystem inode in bprm_fill_uid()Vivek Goyal2017-02-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now bprm_fill_uid() uses inode fetched from file_inode(bprm->file). This in turn returns inode of lower filesystem (in a stacked filesystem setup). I was playing with modified patches of shiftfs posted by james bottomley and realized that through shiftfs setuid bit does not take effect. And reason being that we fetch uid/gid from inode of lower fs (and not from shiftfs inode). And that results in following checks failing. /* We ignore suid/sgid if there are no mappings for them in the ns */ if (!kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, uid) || !kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, gid)) return; uid/gid fetched from lower fs inode might not be mapped inside the user namespace of container. So we need to look at uid/gid fetched from upper filesystem (shiftfs in this particular case) and these should be mapped and setuid bit can take affect. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAPEric W. Biederman2017-01-241-6/+2
| | | | | | | | With previous changes every location that tests for LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP also tests for LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE making the LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP redundant, so remove it. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* Replace <asm/uaccess.h> with <linux/uaccess.h> globallyLinus Torvalds2016-12-241-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This was entirely automated, using the script by Al: PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>' sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \ $(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h) to do the replacement at the end of the merge window. Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs: exec: apply CLOEXEC before changing dumpable task flagsAleksa Sarai2016-12-221-2/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If you have a process that has set itself to be non-dumpable, and it then undergoes exec(2), any CLOEXEC file descriptors it has open are "exposed" during a race window between the dumpable flags of the process being reset for exec(2) and CLOEXEC being applied to the file descriptors. This can be exploited by a process by attempting to access /proc/<pid>/fd/... during this window, without requiring CAP_SYS_PTRACE. The race in question is after set_dumpable has been (for get_link, though the trace is basically the same for readlink): [vfs] -> proc_pid_link_inode_operations.get_link -> proc_pid_get_link -> proc_fd_access_allowed -> ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); Which will return 0, during the race window and CLOEXEC file descriptors will still be open during this window because do_close_on_exec has not been called yet. As a result, the ordering of these calls should be reversed to avoid this race window. This is of particular concern to container runtimes, where joining a PID namespace with file descriptors referring to the host filesystem can result in security issues (since PRCTL_SET_DUMPABLE doesn't protect against access of CLOEXEC file descriptors -- file descriptors which may reference filesystem objects the container shouldn't have access to). Cc: dev@opencontainers.org Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.2+ Reported-by: Michael Crosby <crosbymichael@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)Linus Torvalds2016-12-141-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Merge more updates from Andrew Morton: - a few misc things - kexec updates - DMA-mapping updates to better support networking DMA operations - IPC updates - various MM changes to improve DAX fault handling - lots of radix-tree changes, mainly to the test suite. All leading up to reimplementing the IDA/IDR code to be a wrapper layer over the radix-tree. However the final trigger-pulling patch is held off for 4.11. * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (114 commits) radix tree test suite: delete unused rcupdate.c radix tree test suite: add new tag check radix-tree: ensure counts are initialised radix tree test suite: cache recently freed objects radix tree test suite: add some more functionality idr: reduce the number of bits per level from 8 to 6 rxrpc: abstract away knowledge of IDR internals tpm: use idr_find(), not idr_find_slowpath() idr: add ida_is_empty radix tree test suite: check multiorder iteration radix-tree: fix replacement for multiorder entries radix-tree: add radix_tree_split_preload() radix-tree: add radix_tree_split radix-tree: add radix_tree_join radix-tree: delete radix_tree_range_tag_if_tagged() radix-tree: delete radix_tree_locate_item() radix-tree: improve multiorder iterators btrfs: fix race in btrfs_free_dummy_fs_info() radix-tree: improve dump output radix-tree: make radix_tree_find_next_bit more useful ...
| * mm: add locked parameter to get_user_pages_remote()Lorenzo Stoakes2016-12-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Patch series "mm: unexport __get_user_pages_unlocked()". This patch series continues the cleanup of get_user_pages*() functions taking advantage of the fact we can now pass gup_flags as we please. It firstly adds an additional 'locked' parameter to get_user_pages_remote() to allow for its callers to utilise VM_FAULT_RETRY functionality. This is necessary as the invocation of __get_user_pages_unlocked() in process_vm_rw_single_vec() makes use of this and no other existing higher level function would allow it to do so. Secondly existing callers of __get_user_pages_unlocked() are replaced with the appropriate higher-level replacement - get_user_pages_unlocked() if the current task and memory descriptor are referenced, or get_user_pages_remote() if other task/memory descriptors are referenced (having acquiring mmap_sem.) This patch (of 2): Add a int *locked parameter to get_user_pages_remote() to allow VM_FAULT_RETRY faulting behaviour similar to get_user_pages_[un]locked(). Taking into account the previous adjustments to get_user_pages*() functions allowing for the passing of gup_flags, we are now in a position where __get_user_pages_unlocked() need only be exported for his ability to allow VM_FAULT_RETRY behaviour, this adjustment allows us to subsequently unexport __get_user_pages_unlocked() as well as allowing for future flexibility in the use of get_user_pages_remote(). [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: merge fix for get_user_pages_remote API change] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161122210511.024ec341@canb.auug.org.au Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161027095141.2569-2-lstoakes@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krcmar <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-12-141-3/+18
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "After a lot of discussion and work we have finally reachanged a basic understanding of what is necessary to make unprivileged mounts safe in the presence of EVM and IMA xattrs which the last commit in this series reflects. While technically it is a revert the comments it adds are important for people not getting confused in the future. Clearing up that confusion allows us to seriously work on unprivileged mounts of fuse in the next development cycle. The rest of the fixes in this set are in the intersection of user namespaces, ptrace, and exec. I started with the first fix which started a feedback cycle of finding additional issues during review and fixing them. Culiminating in a fix for a bug that has been present since at least Linux v1.0. Potentially these fixes were candidates for being merged during the rc cycle, and are certainly backport candidates but enough little things turned up during review and testing that I decided they should be handled as part of the normal development process just to be certain there were not any great surprises when it came time to backport some of these fixes" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: Revert "evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC" exec: Ensure mm->user_ns contains the execed files ptrace: Don't allow accessing an undumpable mm ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks
| * exec: Ensure mm->user_ns contains the execed filesEric W. Biederman2016-11-221-2/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the user namespace support was merged the need to prevent ptrace from revealing the contents of an unreadable executable was overlooked. Correct this oversight by ensuring that the executed file or files are in mm->user_ns, by adjusting mm->user_ns. Use the new function privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid to see if the executable is a member of the user namespace, and as such if having CAP_SYS_PTRACE in the user namespace should allow tracing the executable. If not update mm->user_ns to the parent user namespace until an appropriate parent is found. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Fixes: 9e4a36ece652 ("userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAPEric W. Biederman2016-11-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the flag PT_PTRACE_CAP was added the PTRACE_TRACEME path was overlooked. This can result in incorrect behavior when an application like strace traces an exec of a setuid executable. Further PT_PTRACE_CAP does not have enough information for making good security decisions as it does not report which user namespace the capability is in. This has already allowed one mistake through insufficient granulariy. I found this issue when I was testing another corner case of exec and discovered that I could not get strace to set PT_PTRACE_CAP even when running strace as root with a full set of caps. This change fixes the above issue with strace allowing stracing as root a setuid executable without disabling setuid. More fundamentaly this change allows what is allowable at all times, by using the correct information in it's decision. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 4214e42f96d4 ("v2.4.9.11 -> v2.4.9.12") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | posix-timers: Make them configurableNicolas Pitre2016-11-161-0/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some embedded systems have no use for them. This removes about 25KB from the kernel binary size when configured out. Corresponding syscalls are routed to a stub logging the attempt to use those syscalls which should be enough of a clue if they were disabled without proper consideration. They are: timer_create, timer_gettime: timer_getoverrun, timer_settime, timer_delete, clock_adjtime, setitimer, getitimer, alarm. The clock_settime, clock_gettime, clock_getres and clock_nanosleep syscalls are replaced by simple wrappers compatible with CLOCK_REALTIME, CLOCK_MONOTONIC and CLOCK_BOOTTIME only which should cover the vast majority of use cases with very little code. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl> Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com> Cc: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478841010-28605-7-git-send-email-nicolas.pitre@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* mm: replace get_user_pages_remote() write/force parameters with gup_flagsLorenzo Stoakes2016-10-191-2/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | This removes the 'write' and 'force' from get_user_pages_remote() and replaces them with 'gup_flags' to make the use of FOLL_FORCE explicit in callers as use of this flag can result in surprising behaviour (and hence bugs) within the mm subsystem. Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-08-041-0/+33
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gerg/m68knommu Pull m68knommu updates from Greg Ungerer: "This series is all about Nicolas flat format support for MMU systems. Traditional m68k no-MMU flat format binaries can now be run on m68k MMU enabled systems too. The series includes some nice cleanups of the binfmt_flat code and converts it to using proper user space accessor functions. With all this in place you can boot and run a complete no-MMU flat format based user space on an MMU enabled system" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gerg/m68knommu: m68k: enable binfmt_flat on systems with an MMU binfmt_flat: allow compressed flat binary format to work on MMU systems binfmt_flat: add MMU-specific support binfmt_flat: update libraries' data segment pointer with userspace accessors binfmt_flat: use clear_user() rather than memset() to clear .bss binfmt_flat: use proper user space accessors with old relocs code binfmt_flat: use proper user space accessors with relocs processing code binfmt_flat: clean up create_flat_tables() and stack accesses binfmt_flat: use generic transfer_args_to_stack() elf_fdpic_transfer_args_to_stack(): make it generic binfmt_flat: prevent kernel dammage from corrupted executable headers binfmt_flat: convert printk invocations to their modern form binfmt_flat: assorted cleanups m68k: use same start_thread() on MMU and no-MMU m68k: fix file path comment m68k: fix bFLT executable running on MMU enabled systems
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