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* PKCS#7: Use x509_request_asymmetric_key()David Howells2014-07-292-72/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() and x509_request_asymmetric_key() do the same thing, the latter being a copy of the former created by the IMA folks, so drop the PKCS#7 version as the X.509 location is more general. Whilst we're at it, rename the arguments of x509_request_asymmetric_key() to better reflect what the values being passed in are intended to match on an X.509 cert. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* X.509: x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need string length argumentsDavid Howells2014-07-281-6/+3
| | | | | | | | x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need the lengths of the NUL-terminated strings passing in as it can work that out for itself. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* PKCS#7: fix sparse non static symbol warningWei Yongjun2014-07-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Fixes the following sparse warnings: crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c:73:17: warning: symbol 'key_type_pkcs7' was not declared. Should it be static? Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* PKCS#7: Missing inclusion of linux/err.hDavid Howells2014-07-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c needs to #include linux/err.h rather than relying on getting it through other headers. Without this, the powerpc allyesconfig build fails. Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* Merge branch 'keys-fixes' into keys-nextDavid Howells2014-07-221-1/+0
|\ | | | | | | Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * RSA: Don't select non-existent symbolJean Delvare2014-07-171-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | You can select MPILIB_EXTRA all you want, it doesn't exist ;-) Surprised kconfig doesn't complain about that... Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Acked-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
* | Merge remote-tracking branch 'integrity/next-with-keys' into keys-nextDavid Howells2014-07-223-20/+142
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * | KEYS: validate certificate trust only with builtin keysDmitry Kasatkin2014-07-171-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of allowing public keys, with certificates signed by any key on the system trusted keyring, to be added to a trusted keyring, this patch further restricts the certificates to those signed only by builtin keys on the system keyring. This patch defines a new option 'builtin' for the kernel parameter 'keys_ownerid' to allow trust validation using builtin keys. Simplified Mimi's "KEYS: define an owner trusted keyring" patch Changelog v7: - rename builtin_keys to use_builtin_keys Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | KEYS: validate certificate trust only with selected keyDmitry Kasatkin2014-07-172-0/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of allowing public keys, with certificates signed by any key on the system trusted keyring, to be added to a trusted keyring, this patch further restricts the certificates to those signed by a particular key on the system keyring. This patch defines a new kernel parameter 'ca_keys' to identify the specific key which must be used for trust validation of certificates. Simplified Mimi's "KEYS: define an owner trusted keyring" patch. Changelog: - support for builtin x509 public keys only - export "asymmetric_keyid_match" - remove ifndefs MODULE - rename kernel boot parameter from keys_ownerid to ca_keys Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | KEYS: make partial key id matching as a dedicated functionDmitry Kasatkin2014-07-172-19/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | To avoid code duplication this patch refactors asymmetric_key_match(), making partial ID string match a separate function. This patch also implicitly fixes a bug in the code. asymmetric_key_match() allows to match the key by its subtype. But subtype matching could be undone if asymmetric_key_id(key) would return NULL. This patch first checks for matching spec and then for its value. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' keyMimi Zohar2014-07-171-1/+86
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Only public keys, with certificates signed by an existing 'trusted' key on the system trusted keyring, should be added to a trusted keyring. This patch adds support for verifying a certificate's signature. This is derived from David Howells pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() patch. Changelog v6: - on error free key - Dmitry - validate trust only for not already trusted keys - Dmitry - formatting cleanup Changelog: - define get_system_trusted_keyring() to fix kbuild issues Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
* | Merge tag 'keys-pefile-20140709' into keys-nextDavid Howells2014-07-226-1/+678
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Here's a set of changes that implement a PE file signature checker. This provides the following facility: (1) Extract the signature from the PE file. This is a PKCS#7 message containing, as its data, a hash of the signed parts of the file. (2) Digest the signed parts of the file. (3) Compare the digest with the one from the PKCS#7 message. (4) Validate the signatures on the PKCS#7 message and indicate whether it was matched by a trusted key. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * | pefile: Validate PKCS#7 trust chainDavid Howells2014-07-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Validate the PKCS#7 trust chain against the contents of the system keyring. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
| * | pefile: Digest the PE binary and compare to the PKCS#7 dataDavid Howells2014-07-091-0/+197
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Digest the signed parts of the PE binary, canonicalising the section table before we need it, and then compare the the resulting digest to the one in the PKCS#7 signed content. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| * | pefile: Handle pesign using the wrong OIDVivek Goyal2014-07-091-1/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The pesign utility had a bug where it was using OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose instead of OID_msPeImageDataObjId - so allow both OIDs. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
| * | pefile: Parse the "Microsoft individual code signing" data blobDavid Howells2014-07-095-1/+168
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The PKCS#7 certificate should contain a "Microsoft individual code signing" data blob as its signed content. This blob contains a digest of the signed content of the PE binary and the OID of the digest algorithm used (typically SHA256). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| * | pefile: Parse the presumed PKCS#7 content of the certificate blobDavid Howells2014-07-091-1/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Parse the content of the certificate blob, presuming it to be PKCS#7 format. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| * | pefile: Strip the wrapper off of the cert data blockDavid Howells2014-07-091-0/+71
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The certificate data block in a PE binary has a wrapper around the PKCS#7 signature we actually want to get at. Strip this off and check that we've got something that appears to be a PKCS#7 signature. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| * | pefile: Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature contained thereinDavid Howells2014-07-094-0/+217
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature contained therein. Later patches will check the signature and add the key if the signature checks out. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| * | KEYS: X.509: Fix a spelling mistakeDavid Howells2014-07-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
* | | Merge tag 'keys-pkcs7-20140708' into keys-nextDavid Howells2014-07-2211-2/+1302
|\ \ \ | |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Here's a set of changes that implement a PKCS#7 message parser in the kernel. The PKCS#7 message parsing will then be used to limit kexec to authenticated kernels only if so configured. The changes provide the following facilities: (1) Parse an ASN.1 PKCS#7 message and pick out useful bits such as the data content and the X.509 certificates used to sign it and all the data signatures. (2) Verify all the data signatures against the set of X.509 certificates available in the message. (3) Follow the certificate chains and verify that: (a) for every self-signed X.509 certificate, check that it validly signed itself, and: (b) for every non-self-signed certificate, if we have a 'parent' certificate, the former is validly signed by the latter. (4) Look for intersections between the certificate chains and the trusted keyring, if any intersections are found, verify that the trusted certificates signed the intersection point in the chain. (5) For testing purposes, a key type can be made available that will take a PKCS#7 message, check that the message is trustworthy, and if so, add its data content into the key. Note that (5) has to be altered to take account of the preparsing patches already committed to this branch. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * | PKCS#7: Provide a key type for testing PKCS#7David Howells2014-07-083-0/+117
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Provide a key type for testing the PKCS#7 parser. It is given a non-detached PKCS#7 message as payload: keyctl padd pkcs7_test a @s <stuff.pkcs7 The PKCS#7 wrapper is validated against the trusted certificates available and then stripped off. If successful, the key can be read, which will give the data content of the PKCS#7 message. A suitable message can be created by running make on the attached Makefile. This will produce a file called stuff.pkcs7 for test loading. The key3.x509 file should be put into the kernel source tree before it is built and converted to DER form: openssl x509 -in .../pkcs7/key3.x509 -outform DER -out key3.x509 ############################################################################### # # Create a pkcs7 message and sign it twice # # openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key2.x509 # ############################################################################### stuff.pkcs7: stuff.txt key2.priv key2.x509 key4.priv key4.x509 certs $(RM) $@ openssl smime -sign \ -signer key2.x509 \ -inkey key2.priv \ -signer key4.x509 \ -inkey key4.priv \ -in stuff.txt \ -certfile certs \ -out $@ -binary -outform DER -nodetach openssl pkcs7 -inform DER -in stuff.pkcs7 -print_certs -noout openssl asn1parse -inform DER -in stuff.pkcs7 -i >out stuff.txt: echo "The quick red fox jumped over the lazy brown dog" >stuff.txt certs: key1.x509 key2.x509 key3.x509 key4.x509 cat key{1,3}.x509 >$@ ############################################################################### # # Generate a signed key # # openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key2.x509 # ############################################################################### key2.x509: key2.x509_unsigned key1.priv key1.x509 openssl x509 \ -req -in key2.x509_unsigned \ -out key2.x509 \ -extfile key2.genkey -extensions myexts \ -CA key1.x509 \ -CAkey key1.priv \ -CAcreateserial key2.priv key2.x509_unsigned: key2.genkey openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \ -batch -outform PEM \ -config key2.genkey \ -keyout key2.priv \ -out key2.x509_unsigned key2.genkey: @echo Generating X.509 key generation config @echo >$@ "[ req ]" @echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096" @echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name" @echo >>$@ "prompt = no" @echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only" @echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]" @echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea" @echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 2" @echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]" @echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE" @echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature" @echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash" @echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid" ############################################################################### # # Generate a couple of signing keys # # openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key1.x509 # ############################################################################### key1.x509: key1.x509_unsigned key4.priv key4.x509 openssl x509 \ -req -in key1.x509_unsigned \ -out key1.x509 \ -extfile key1.genkey -extensions myexts \ -CA key4.x509 \ -CAkey key4.priv \ -CAcreateserial key1.priv key1.x509_unsigned: key1.genkey openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \ -batch -outform PEM \ -config key1.genkey \ -keyout key1.priv \ -out key1.x509_unsigned key1.genkey: @echo Generating X.509 key generation config @echo >$@ "[ req ]" @echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096" @echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name" @echo >>$@ "prompt = no" @echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only" @echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]" @echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea" @echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 1" @echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]" @echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE" @echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyCertSign" @echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash" @echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid" ############################################################################### # # Generate a signed key # # openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key4.x509 # ############################################################################### key4.x509: key4.x509_unsigned key3.priv key3.x509 openssl x509 \ -req -in key4.x509_unsigned \ -out key4.x509 \ -extfile key4.genkey -extensions myexts \ -CA key3.x509 \ -CAkey key3.priv \ -CAcreateserial key4.priv key4.x509_unsigned: key4.genkey openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \ -batch -outform PEM \ -config key4.genkey \ -keyout key4.priv \ -out key4.x509_unsigned key4.genkey: @echo Generating X.509 key generation config @echo >$@ "[ req ]" @echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096" @echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name" @echo >>$@ "prompt = no" @echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only" @echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]" @echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea" @echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 4" @echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]" @echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE" @echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyCertSign" @echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash" @echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid" ############################################################################### # # Generate a couple of signing keys # # openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key3.x509 # ############################################################################### key3.priv key3.x509: key3.genkey openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \ -batch -x509 -outform PEM \ -config key3.genkey \ -keyout key3.priv \ -out key3.x509 key3.genkey: @echo Generating X.509 key generation config @echo >$@ "[ req ]" @echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096" @echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name" @echo >>$@ "prompt = no" @echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only" @echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]" @echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea" @echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 3" @echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]" @echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE" @echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyCertSign" @echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash" @echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid" clean: $(RM) *~ $(RM) key1.* key2.* key3.* key4.* stuff.* out certs Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * | PKCS#7: Find intersection between PKCS#7 message and known, trusted keysDavid Howells2014-07-082-0/+220
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Find the intersection between the X.509 certificate chain contained in a PKCS#7 message and a set of keys that we already know and trust. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| * | PKCS#7: Verify internal certificate chainDavid Howells2014-07-081-1/+87
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Verify certificate chain in the X.509 certificates contained within the PKCS#7 message as far as possible. If any signature that we should be able to verify fails, we reject the whole lot. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| * | PKCS#7: Find the right key in the PKCS#7 key list and verify the signatureDavid Howells2014-07-081-0/+64
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Find the appropriate key in the PKCS#7 key list and verify the signature with it. There may be several keys in there forming a chain. Any link in that chain or the root of that chain may be in our keyrings. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| * | PKCS#7: Digest the data in a signed-data messageDavid Howells2014-07-082-1/+175
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Digest the data in a PKCS#7 signed-data message and attach to the public_key_signature struct contained in the pkcs7_message struct. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| * | PKCS#7: Implement a parser [RFC 2315]David Howells2014-07-085-0/+606
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Implement a parser for a PKCS#7 signed-data message as described in part of RFC 2315. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| * | X.509: Export certificate parse and free functionsDavid Howells2014-07-021-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Export certificate parse and free functions for use by modules. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
| * | X.509: Add bits needed for PKCS#7David Howells2014-07-013-2/+30
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | PKCS#7 validation requires access to the serial number and the raw names in an X.509 certificate. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
* | KEYS: struct key_preparsed_payload should have two payload pointersDavid Howells2014-07-222-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | struct key_preparsed_payload should have two payload pointers to correspond with those in struct key. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
* | KEYS: Provide a generic instantiation functionDavid Howells2014-07-181-24/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | Provide a generic instantiation function for key types that use the preparse hook. This makes it easier to prereserve key quota before keyrings get locked to retain the new key. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
* Merge tag 'llvmlinux-for-v3.16' of ↵Linus Torvalds2014-06-081-1/+2
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.linuxfoundation.org/llvmlinux/kernel Pull LLVM patches from Behan Webster: "Next set of patches to support compiling the kernel with clang. They've been soaking in linux-next since the last merge window. More still in the works for the next merge window..." * tag 'llvmlinux-for-v3.16' of git://git.linuxfoundation.org/llvmlinux/kernel: arm, unwind, LLVMLinux: Enable clang to be used for unwinding the stack ARM: LLVMLinux: Change "extern inline" to "static inline" in glue-cache.h all: LLVMLinux: Change DWARF flag to support gcc and clang net: netfilter: LLVMLinux: vlais-netfilter crypto: LLVMLinux: aligned-attribute.patch
| * crypto: LLVMLinux: aligned-attribute.patchMark Charlebois2014-06-071-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | __attribute__((aligned)) applies the default alignment for the largest scalar type for the target ABI. gcc allows it to be applied inline to a defined type. Clang only allows it to be applied to a type definition (PR11071). Making it into 2 lines makes it more readable and works with both compilers. Author: Mark Charlebois <charlebm@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Charlebois <charlebm@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
* | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/cryptodev-2.6 ↵Linus Torvalds2014-06-075-53/+1674
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | into next Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu: "Here is the crypto update for 3.16: - Added test vectors for SHA/AES-CCM/DES-CBC/3DES-CBC. - Fixed a number of error-path memory leaks in tcrypt. - Fixed error-path memory leak in caam. - Removed unnecessary global mutex from mxs-dcp. - Added ahash walk interface that can actually be asynchronous. - Cleaned up caam error reporting. - Allow crypto_user get operation to be used by non-root users. - Add support for SSS module on Exynos. - Misc fixes" * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/cryptodev-2.6: (60 commits) crypto: testmgr - add aead cbc des, des3_ede tests crypto: testmgr - Fix DMA-API warning crypto: cesa - tfm->__crt_alg->cra_type directly crypto: sahara - tfm->__crt_alg->cra_name directly crypto: padlock - tfm->__crt_alg->cra_name directly crypto: n2 - tfm->__crt_alg->cra_name directly crypto: dcp - tfm->__crt_alg->cra_name directly crypto: cesa - tfm->__crt_alg->cra_name directly crypto: ccp - tfm->__crt_alg->cra_name directly crypto: geode - Don't use tfm->__crt_alg->cra_name directly crypto: geode - Weed out printk() from probe() crypto: geode - Consistently use AES_KEYSIZE_128 crypto: geode - Kill AES_IV_LENGTH crypto: geode - Kill AES_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE crypto: mxs-dcp - Remove global mutex crypto: hash - Add real ahash walk interface hwrng: n2-drv - Introduce the use of the managed version of kzalloc crypto: caam - reinitialize keys_fit_inline for decrypt and givencrypt crypto: s5p-sss - fix multiplatform build hwrng: timeriomem - remove unnecessary OOM messages ...
| * | crypto: testmgr - add aead cbc des, des3_ede testsNitesh Lal2014-05-223-23/+848
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Test vectors were taken from existing test for CBC(DES3_EDE). Associated data has been added to test vectors. HMAC computed with Crypto++ has been used. Following algos have been covered. (a) "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des))" (b) "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des3_ede))" (c) "authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(des))" (d) "authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(des3_ede))" (e) "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des))" (f) "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des3_ede))" (g) "authenc(hmac(sha384),cbc(des))" (h) "authenc(hmac(sha384),cbc(des3_ede))" (i) "authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(des))" (j) "authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(des3_ede))" Signed-off-by: Vakul Garg <vakul@freescale.com> [NiteshNarayanLal@freescale.com: added hooks for the missing algorithms test and tested the patch] Signed-off-by: Nitesh Lal <NiteshNarayanLal@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: testmgr - Fix DMA-API warningTadeusz Struk2014-05-221-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With DMA-API debug enabled testmgr triggers a "DMA-API: device driver maps memory from stack" warning, when tested on a crypto HW accelerator. Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: hash - Add real ahash walk interfaceHerbert Xu2014-05-211-5/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Although the existing hash walk interface has already been used by a number of ahash crypto drivers, it turns out that none of them were really asynchronous. They were all essentially polling for completion. That's why nobody has noticed until now that the walk interface couldn't work with a real asynchronous driver since the memory is mapped using kmap_atomic. As we now have a use-case for a real ahash implementation on x86, this patch creates a minimal ahash walk interface. Basically it just calls kmap instead of kmap_atomic and does away with the crypto_yield call. Real ahash crypto drivers don't need to yield since by definition they won't be hogging the CPU. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: user - Allow CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG without CAP_NET_ADMINMatthias-Christian Ott2014-05-081-3/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CRYPTO_USER requires CAP_NET_ADMIN for all operations. Most information provided by CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG is also accessible through /proc/modules and AF_ALG. CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG should not require CAP_NET_ADMIN so that processes without CAP_NET_ADMIN can use CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG to get cipher details, such as cipher priorities, for AF_ALG. Signed-off-by: Matthias-Christian Ott <ott@mirix.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: tcrypt - Fix leak of struct aead_request in test_aead_speed()Christian Engelmayer2014-04-281-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix leakage of memory for struct aead_request that is allocated via aead_request_alloc() but not released via aead_request_free(). Reported by Coverity - CID 1163869. Signed-off-by: Christian Engelmayer <cengelma@gmx.at> Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de> Acked-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: tcrypt - Fix potential leak in test_aead_speed() if ↵Christian Engelmayer2014-04-281-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | crypto_alloc_aead() fails Fix a potential memory leak in the error handling of test_aead_speed(). In case crypto_alloc_aead() fails, the function returns without going through the centralized cleanup path. Reported by Coverity - CID 1163870. Signed-off-by: Christian Engelmayer <cengelma@gmx.at> Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de> Acked-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: tcrypt - Fix potential leak in test_aead_speed() if aad_size is too bigChristian Engelmayer2014-04-281-8/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix a potential memory leak in the error handling of test_aead_speed(). In case the size check on the associate data length parameter fails, the function goes through the wrong exit label. Reported by Coverity - CID 1163870. Signed-off-by: Christian Engelmayer <cengelma@gmx.at> Acked-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: testmgr - add empty and large test vectors for SHA-1, SHA-224, ↵Jussi Kivilinna2014-04-161-7/+721
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 Patch adds large test-vectors for SHA algorithms for better code coverage in optimized assembly implementations. Empty test-vectors are also added, as some crypto drivers appear to have special case handling for empty input. Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: testmgr - add test cases for SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256 and AES-CCMArd Biesheuvel2014-04-161-6/+47
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This adds test cases for SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256 and AES-CCM with an input size that is an exact multiple of the block size. The reason is that some implementations use a different code path for these cases. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | | Merge branch 'locking-core-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2014-06-031-1/+1
|\ \ \ | |_|/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip into next Pull core locking updates from Ingo Molnar: "The main changes in this cycle were: - reduced/streamlined smp_mb__*() interface that allows more usecases and makes the existing ones less buggy, especially in rarer architectures - add rwsem implementation comments - bump up lockdep limits" * 'locking-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (33 commits) rwsem: Add comments to explain the meaning of the rwsem's count field lockdep: Increase static allocations arch: Mass conversion of smp_mb__*() arch,doc: Convert smp_mb__*() arch,xtensa: Convert smp_mb__*() arch,x86: Convert smp_mb__*() arch,tile: Convert smp_mb__*() arch,sparc: Convert smp_mb__*() arch,sh: Convert smp_mb__*() arch,score: Convert smp_mb__*() arch,s390: Convert smp_mb__*() arch,powerpc: Convert smp_mb__*() arch,parisc: Convert smp_mb__*() arch,openrisc: Convert smp_mb__*() arch,mn10300: Convert smp_mb__*() arch,mips: Convert smp_mb__*() arch,metag: Convert smp_mb__*() arch,m68k: Convert smp_mb__*() arch,m32r: Convert smp_mb__*() arch,ia64: Convert smp_mb__*() ...
| * | arch: Mass conversion of smp_mb__*()Peter Zijlstra2014-04-181-1/+1
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Mostly scripted conversion of the smp_mb__* barriers. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-55dhyhocezdw1dg7u19hmh1u@git.kernel.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* | net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messagesEric W. Biederman2014-04-241-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that privileged executable did not intend to do. To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls. Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* crypto: sha - SHA1 transform x86_64 AVX2chandramouli narayanan2014-03-211-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This git patch adds x86_64 AVX2 optimization of SHA1 transform to crypto support. The patch has been tested with 3.14.0-rc1 kernel. On a Haswell desktop, with turbo disabled and all cpus running at maximum frequency, tcrypt shows AVX2 performance improvement from 3% for 256 bytes update to 16% for 1024 bytes update over AVX implementation. This patch adds sha1_avx2_transform(), the glue, build and configuration changes needed for AVX2 optimization of SHA1 transform to crypto support. sha1-ssse3 is one module which adds the necessary optimization support (SSSE3/AVX/AVX2) for the low-level SHA1 transform function. With better optimization support, transform function is overridden as the case may be. In the case of AVX2, due to performance reasons across datablock sizes, the AVX or AVX2 transform function is used at run-time as it suits best. The Makefile change therefore appends the necessary objects to the linkage. Due to this, the patch merely appends AVX2 transform to the existing build mix and Kconfig support and leaves the configuration build support as is. Signed-off-by: Chandramouli Narayanan <mouli@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: crypto_wq - Fix late crypto work queue initializationTim Chen2014-03-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The crypto algorithm modules utilizing the crypto daemon could be used early when the system start up. Using module_init does not guarantee that the daemon's work queue is initialized when the cypto alorithm depending on crypto_wq starts. It is necessary to initialize the crypto work queue earlier at the subsystem init time to make sure that it is initialized when used. Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: testmgr - add aead null encryption test vectorsHoria Geanta2014-03-213-0/+220
| | | | | | | | | Add test vectors for aead with null encryption and md5, respectively sha1 authentication. Input data is taken from test vectors listed in RFC2410. Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: export NULL algorithms definesHoria Geanta2014-03-211-5/+1
| | | | | | | These defines might be needed by crypto drivers. Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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