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* crypto: drbg - remove unnecessary sanity check for shadow stateStephan Mueller2014-08-251-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | During creation of the DRBG shadow state, it is ensured that the DRBG state structure is already allocated. Thus, a sanity check for verifying that the structure is allocated is removed. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: drbg - remove configuration of fixed valuesStephan Mueller2014-08-251-33/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | SP800-90A mandates several hard-coded values. The old drbg_cores allows the setting of these values per DRBG implementation. However, due to the hard requirement of SP800-90A, these values are now returned globally for each DRBG. The ability to set such values per DRBG is therefore removed. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: drbg - remove unnecessary sanity checksStephan Mueller2014-08-251-9/+0
| | | | | | | | | The drbg_make_shadow function contains sanity checks which are not needed as the function is invoked at times where it is ensured that the checked-for variables are available. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: drbg - use kmalloc instead of kzalloc for V and CStephan Mueller2014-08-251-3/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | When allocating V, C, the zeroization is only needed when allocating a new instance of the DRBG, i.e. when performing an initial seeding. For all other allocations, the memcpy implemented in drbg_copy_drbg ensures that the memory is filled with the correct information. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: drbg - remove superflowous memset(0)Stephan Mueller2014-08-251-4/+2
| | | | | | | Remove memset(0) which is not needed due to the kzalloc of the memory. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: drbg - remove superflowous checksStephan Mueller2014-08-251-10/+6
| | | | | | | | The crypto_init and crypto_fini functions are always implemented. Thus, there is no need for a protecting check. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: drbg - kzfree does not need a check for NULL pointerStephan Mueller2014-08-251-12/+6
| | | | | | | | The kzfree function already performs the NULL pointer check. Therefore, the DRBG code does not need to implement such check. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: drbg - replace int2byte with cpu_to_beStephan Mueller2014-08-251-16/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The DRBG requires the conversion of an integer into a string representation of that integer. The previous implementation converted the given integer byte-wise. However, the kernel offers the cpu_to_be function which already re-arranges the memory representation of an integer such that it applies when interpreting the same memory as character string. The change therefore uses an integer-cast / union of the target character array together with the cpu_to_be function to convert an integer into its string representation. Tests show that the Hash and CTR DRBG implementations (the HMAC DRBG does not require such conversion) is about 10% faster (or requires less computing power, respectively). Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: testmgr - remove unused function argumentCristian Stoica2014-08-251-11/+5
| | | | | | | | | The argument "req" of do_one_async_hash_op is not used by the function. This patch removes this argument and renames the function to match more closely its purpose. Signed-off-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: sha-mb - multibuffer crypto infrastructureTim Chen2014-08-253-0/+736
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch introduces the multi-buffer crypto daemon which is responsible for submitting crypto jobs in a work queue to the responsible multi-buffer crypto algorithm. The idea of the multi-buffer algorihtm is to put data streams from multiple jobs in a wide (AVX2) register and then take advantage of SIMD instructions to do crypto computation on several buffers simultaneously. The multi-buffer crypto daemon is also responsbile for flushing the remaining buffers to complete the computation if no new buffers arrive for a while. Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: testmgr - delay execution of set-up codeCristian Stoica2014-08-251-8/+6
| | | | | | | Prepare IV array only if the dependent code is executed. Signed-off-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: testmgr - white space removal on __test_skcipherCristian Stoica2014-08-251-149/+138
| | | | | | | | This patch inverts two if conditions to remove code blocks indentation. Several white space clean-ups follow. Signed-off-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: testmgr - white space removal on __test_hashCristian Stoica2014-08-251-63/+60
| | | | | | | | This patch inverts one if condition to remove code block indentation. Several white space clean-ups follow. Signed-off-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: testmgr - white space fix-ups on test_aeadCristian Stoica2014-08-251-256/+242
| | | | | | | | This patch inverts two if conditions and allows removal of one tab-stop in their code-blocks. Only white-space clean-up follows. Signed-off-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: hash - initialize entry len for null input in crypto hash sg list walkTim Chen2014-08-251-3/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | For the special case when we have a null input string, we want to initialize the entry len to 0 for the hash/ahash walk, so cyrpto_hash_walk_last will return the correct result indicating that we have completed the scatter list walk. Otherwise we may keep walking the sg list and access bogus memory address. Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* initramfs: support initramfs that is bigger than 2GiBYinghai Lu2014-08-081-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now with 64bit bzImage and kexec tools, we support ramdisk that size is bigger than 2g, as we could put it above 4G. Found compressed initramfs image could not be decompressed properly. It turns out that image length is int during decompress detection, and it will become < 0 when length is more than 2G. Furthermore, during decompressing len as int is used for inbuf count, that has problem too. Change len to long, that should be ok as on 32 bit platform long is 32bits. Tested with following compressed initramfs image as root with kexec. gzip, bzip2, xz, lzma, lzop, lz4. run time for populate_rootfs(): size name Nehalem-EX Westmere-EX Ivybridge-EX 9034400256 root_img : 26s 24s 30s 3561095057 root_img.lz4 : 28s 27s 27s 3459554629 root_img.lzo : 29s 29s 28s 3219399480 root_img.gz : 64s 62s 49s 2251594592 root_img.xz : 262s 260s 183s 2226366598 root_img.lzma: 386s 376s 277s 2901482513 root_img.bz2 : 635s 599s Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Rashika Kheria <rashika.kheria@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com> Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Cc: "Daniel M. Weeks" <dan@danweeks.net> Cc: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@nvidia.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2014-08-0618-50/+2075
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "In this release: - PKCS#7 parser for the key management subsystem from David Howells - appoint Kees Cook as seccomp maintainer - bugfixes and general maintenance across the subsystem" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (94 commits) X.509: Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key() netlabel: shorter names for the NetLabel catmap funcs/structs netlabel: fix the catmap walking functions netlabel: fix the horribly broken catmap functions netlabel: fix a problem when setting bits below the previously lowest bit PKCS#7: X.509 certificate issuer and subject are mandatory fields in the ASN.1 tpm: simplify code by using %*phN specifier tpm: Provide a generic means to override the chip returned timeouts tpm: missing tpm_chip_put in tpm_get_random() tpm: Properly clean sysfs entries in error path tpm: Add missing tpm_do_selftest to ST33 I2C driver PKCS#7: Use x509_request_asymmetric_key() Revert "selinux: fix the default socket labeling in sock_graft()" X.509: x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need string length arguments PKCS#7: fix sparse non static symbol warning KEYS: revert encrypted key change ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmware firmware_class: perform new LSM checks security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook PKCS#7: Missing inclusion of linux/err.h ...
| * X.509: Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key()David Howells2014-08-031-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key() so that PKCS#7 can use it if compiled as a module. Reported-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * PKCS#7: X.509 certificate issuer and subject are mandatory fields in the ASN.1David Howells2014-07-311-4/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | X.509 certificate issuer and subject fields are mandatory fields in the ASN.1 and so their existence needn't be tested for. They are guaranteed to end up with an empty string if the name material has nothing we can use (see x509_fabricate_name()). Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
| * PKCS#7: Use x509_request_asymmetric_key()David Howells2014-07-292-72/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() and x509_request_asymmetric_key() do the same thing, the latter being a copy of the former created by the IMA folks, so drop the PKCS#7 version as the X.509 location is more general. Whilst we're at it, rename the arguments of x509_request_asymmetric_key() to better reflect what the values being passed in are intended to match on an X.509 cert. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * X.509: x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need string length argumentsDavid Howells2014-07-281-6/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need the lengths of the NUL-terminated strings passing in as it can work that out for itself. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * PKCS#7: fix sparse non static symbol warningWei Yongjun2014-07-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fixes the following sparse warnings: crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c:73:17: warning: symbol 'key_type_pkcs7' was not declared. Should it be static? Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * PKCS#7: Missing inclusion of linux/err.hDavid Howells2014-07-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c needs to #include linux/err.h rather than relying on getting it through other headers. Without this, the powerpc allyesconfig build fails. Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * Merge branch 'keys-fixes' into keys-nextDavid Howells2014-07-221-1/+0
| |\ | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | * RSA: Don't select non-existent symbolJean Delvare2014-07-171-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | You can select MPILIB_EXTRA all you want, it doesn't exist ;-) Surprised kconfig doesn't complain about that... Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Acked-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | Merge remote-tracking branch 'integrity/next-with-keys' into keys-nextDavid Howells2014-07-223-20/+142
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | * | KEYS: validate certificate trust only with builtin keysDmitry Kasatkin2014-07-171-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of allowing public keys, with certificates signed by any key on the system trusted keyring, to be added to a trusted keyring, this patch further restricts the certificates to those signed only by builtin keys on the system keyring. This patch defines a new option 'builtin' for the kernel parameter 'keys_ownerid' to allow trust validation using builtin keys. Simplified Mimi's "KEYS: define an owner trusted keyring" patch Changelog v7: - rename builtin_keys to use_builtin_keys Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | KEYS: validate certificate trust only with selected keyDmitry Kasatkin2014-07-172-0/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of allowing public keys, with certificates signed by any key on the system trusted keyring, to be added to a trusted keyring, this patch further restricts the certificates to those signed by a particular key on the system keyring. This patch defines a new kernel parameter 'ca_keys' to identify the specific key which must be used for trust validation of certificates. Simplified Mimi's "KEYS: define an owner trusted keyring" patch. Changelog: - support for builtin x509 public keys only - export "asymmetric_keyid_match" - remove ifndefs MODULE - rename kernel boot parameter from keys_ownerid to ca_keys Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | KEYS: make partial key id matching as a dedicated functionDmitry Kasatkin2014-07-172-19/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | To avoid code duplication this patch refactors asymmetric_key_match(), making partial ID string match a separate function. This patch also implicitly fixes a bug in the code. asymmetric_key_match() allows to match the key by its subtype. But subtype matching could be undone if asymmetric_key_id(key) would return NULL. This patch first checks for matching spec and then for its value. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' keyMimi Zohar2014-07-171-1/+86
| | |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Only public keys, with certificates signed by an existing 'trusted' key on the system trusted keyring, should be added to a trusted keyring. This patch adds support for verifying a certificate's signature. This is derived from David Howells pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() patch. Changelog v6: - on error free key - Dmitry - validate trust only for not already trusted keys - Dmitry - formatting cleanup Changelog: - define get_system_trusted_keyring() to fix kbuild issues Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
| * | Merge tag 'keys-pefile-20140709' into keys-nextDavid Howells2014-07-226-1/+678
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Here's a set of changes that implement a PE file signature checker. This provides the following facility: (1) Extract the signature from the PE file. This is a PKCS#7 message containing, as its data, a hash of the signed parts of the file. (2) Digest the signed parts of the file. (3) Compare the digest with the one from the PKCS#7 message. (4) Validate the signatures on the PKCS#7 message and indicate whether it was matched by a trusted key. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | * | pefile: Validate PKCS#7 trust chainDavid Howells2014-07-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Validate the PKCS#7 trust chain against the contents of the system keyring. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
| | * | pefile: Digest the PE binary and compare to the PKCS#7 dataDavid Howells2014-07-091-0/+197
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Digest the signed parts of the PE binary, canonicalising the section table before we need it, and then compare the the resulting digest to the one in the PKCS#7 signed content. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | pefile: Handle pesign using the wrong OIDVivek Goyal2014-07-091-1/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The pesign utility had a bug where it was using OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose instead of OID_msPeImageDataObjId - so allow both OIDs. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
| | * | pefile: Parse the "Microsoft individual code signing" data blobDavid Howells2014-07-095-1/+168
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The PKCS#7 certificate should contain a "Microsoft individual code signing" data blob as its signed content. This blob contains a digest of the signed content of the PE binary and the OID of the digest algorithm used (typically SHA256). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | pefile: Parse the presumed PKCS#7 content of the certificate blobDavid Howells2014-07-091-1/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Parse the content of the certificate blob, presuming it to be PKCS#7 format. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | pefile: Strip the wrapper off of the cert data blockDavid Howells2014-07-091-0/+71
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The certificate data block in a PE binary has a wrapper around the PKCS#7 signature we actually want to get at. Strip this off and check that we've got something that appears to be a PKCS#7 signature. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | pefile: Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature contained thereinDavid Howells2014-07-094-0/+217
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature contained therein. Later patches will check the signature and add the key if the signature checks out. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | KEYS: X.509: Fix a spelling mistakeDavid Howells2014-07-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
| * | | Merge tag 'keys-pkcs7-20140708' into keys-nextDavid Howells2014-07-2211-2/+1302
| |\ \ \ | | |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Here's a set of changes that implement a PKCS#7 message parser in the kernel. The PKCS#7 message parsing will then be used to limit kexec to authenticated kernels only if so configured. The changes provide the following facilities: (1) Parse an ASN.1 PKCS#7 message and pick out useful bits such as the data content and the X.509 certificates used to sign it and all the data signatures. (2) Verify all the data signatures against the set of X.509 certificates available in the message. (3) Follow the certificate chains and verify that: (a) for every self-signed X.509 certificate, check that it validly signed itself, and: (b) for every non-self-signed certificate, if we have a 'parent' certificate, the former is validly signed by the latter. (4) Look for intersections between the certificate chains and the trusted keyring, if any intersections are found, verify that the trusted certificates signed the intersection point in the chain. (5) For testing purposes, a key type can be made available that will take a PKCS#7 message, check that the message is trustworthy, and if so, add its data content into the key. Note that (5) has to be altered to take account of the preparsing patches already committed to this branch. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | * | PKCS#7: Provide a key type for testing PKCS#7David Howells2014-07-083-0/+117
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Provide a key type for testing the PKCS#7 parser. It is given a non-detached PKCS#7 message as payload: keyctl padd pkcs7_test a @s <stuff.pkcs7 The PKCS#7 wrapper is validated against the trusted certificates available and then stripped off. If successful, the key can be read, which will give the data content of the PKCS#7 message. A suitable message can be created by running make on the attached Makefile. This will produce a file called stuff.pkcs7 for test loading. The key3.x509 file should be put into the kernel source tree before it is built and converted to DER form: openssl x509 -in .../pkcs7/key3.x509 -outform DER -out key3.x509 ############################################################################### # # Create a pkcs7 message and sign it twice # # openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key2.x509 # ############################################################################### stuff.pkcs7: stuff.txt key2.priv key2.x509 key4.priv key4.x509 certs $(RM) $@ openssl smime -sign \ -signer key2.x509 \ -inkey key2.priv \ -signer key4.x509 \ -inkey key4.priv \ -in stuff.txt \ -certfile certs \ -out $@ -binary -outform DER -nodetach openssl pkcs7 -inform DER -in stuff.pkcs7 -print_certs -noout openssl asn1parse -inform DER -in stuff.pkcs7 -i >out stuff.txt: echo "The quick red fox jumped over the lazy brown dog" >stuff.txt certs: key1.x509 key2.x509 key3.x509 key4.x509 cat key{1,3}.x509 >$@ ############################################################################### # # Generate a signed key # # openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key2.x509 # ############################################################################### key2.x509: key2.x509_unsigned key1.priv key1.x509 openssl x509 \ -req -in key2.x509_unsigned \ -out key2.x509 \ -extfile key2.genkey -extensions myexts \ -CA key1.x509 \ -CAkey key1.priv \ -CAcreateserial key2.priv key2.x509_unsigned: key2.genkey openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \ -batch -outform PEM \ -config key2.genkey \ -keyout key2.priv \ -out key2.x509_unsigned key2.genkey: @echo Generating X.509 key generation config @echo >$@ "[ req ]" @echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096" @echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name" @echo >>$@ "prompt = no" @echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only" @echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]" @echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea" @echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 2" @echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]" @echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE" @echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature" @echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash" @echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid" ############################################################################### # # Generate a couple of signing keys # # openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key1.x509 # ############################################################################### key1.x509: key1.x509_unsigned key4.priv key4.x509 openssl x509 \ -req -in key1.x509_unsigned \ -out key1.x509 \ -extfile key1.genkey -extensions myexts \ -CA key4.x509 \ -CAkey key4.priv \ -CAcreateserial key1.priv key1.x509_unsigned: key1.genkey openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \ -batch -outform PEM \ -config key1.genkey \ -keyout key1.priv \ -out key1.x509_unsigned key1.genkey: @echo Generating X.509 key generation config @echo >$@ "[ req ]" @echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096" @echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name" @echo >>$@ "prompt = no" @echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only" @echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]" @echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea" @echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 1" @echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]" @echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE" @echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyCertSign" @echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash" @echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid" ############################################################################### # # Generate a signed key # # openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key4.x509 # ############################################################################### key4.x509: key4.x509_unsigned key3.priv key3.x509 openssl x509 \ -req -in key4.x509_unsigned \ -out key4.x509 \ -extfile key4.genkey -extensions myexts \ -CA key3.x509 \ -CAkey key3.priv \ -CAcreateserial key4.priv key4.x509_unsigned: key4.genkey openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \ -batch -outform PEM \ -config key4.genkey \ -keyout key4.priv \ -out key4.x509_unsigned key4.genkey: @echo Generating X.509 key generation config @echo >$@ "[ req ]" @echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096" @echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name" @echo >>$@ "prompt = no" @echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only" @echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]" @echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea" @echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 4" @echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]" @echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE" @echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyCertSign" @echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash" @echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid" ############################################################################### # # Generate a couple of signing keys # # openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key3.x509 # ############################################################################### key3.priv key3.x509: key3.genkey openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \ -batch -x509 -outform PEM \ -config key3.genkey \ -keyout key3.priv \ -out key3.x509 key3.genkey: @echo Generating X.509 key generation config @echo >$@ "[ req ]" @echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096" @echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name" @echo >>$@ "prompt = no" @echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only" @echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]" @echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea" @echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 3" @echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]" @echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE" @echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyCertSign" @echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash" @echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid" clean: $(RM) *~ $(RM) key1.* key2.* key3.* key4.* stuff.* out certs Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | * | PKCS#7: Find intersection between PKCS#7 message and known, trusted keysDavid Howells2014-07-082-0/+220
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Find the intersection between the X.509 certificate chain contained in a PKCS#7 message and a set of keys that we already know and trust. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | PKCS#7: Verify internal certificate chainDavid Howells2014-07-081-1/+87
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Verify certificate chain in the X.509 certificates contained within the PKCS#7 message as far as possible. If any signature that we should be able to verify fails, we reject the whole lot. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | PKCS#7: Find the right key in the PKCS#7 key list and verify the signatureDavid Howells2014-07-081-0/+64
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Find the appropriate key in the PKCS#7 key list and verify the signature with it. There may be several keys in there forming a chain. Any link in that chain or the root of that chain may be in our keyrings. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | PKCS#7: Digest the data in a signed-data messageDavid Howells2014-07-082-1/+175
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Digest the data in a PKCS#7 signed-data message and attach to the public_key_signature struct contained in the pkcs7_message struct. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | PKCS#7: Implement a parser [RFC 2315]David Howells2014-07-085-0/+606
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Implement a parser for a PKCS#7 signed-data message as described in part of RFC 2315. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | X.509: Export certificate parse and free functionsDavid Howells2014-07-021-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Export certificate parse and free functions for use by modules. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
| | * | X.509: Add bits needed for PKCS#7David Howells2014-07-013-2/+30
| | |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | PKCS#7 validation requires access to the serial number and the raw names in an X.509 certificate. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
| * | KEYS: struct key_preparsed_payload should have two payload pointersDavid Howells2014-07-222-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | struct key_preparsed_payload should have two payload pointers to correspond with those in struct key. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
| * | KEYS: Provide a generic instantiation functionDavid Howells2014-07-181-24/+1
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Provide a generic instantiation function for key types that use the preparse hook. This makes it easier to prereserve key quota before keyrings get locked to retain the new key. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
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