| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Remove SELinux hooks which do nothing except defer to the capabilites
hooks (or in one case, replicates the function).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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Remove secondary ops call to shm_shmat, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove secondary ops call to unix_stream_connect, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove secondary ops call to task_kill, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove secondary ops call to task_setrlimit, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove unused cred_commit hook from SELinux. This
currently calls into the capabilities hook, which is a noop.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove secondary ops call to task_create, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove secondary ops call to file_mprotect, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove secondary ops call to inode_setattr, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove secondary ops call to inode_permission, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove secondary ops call to inode_follow_link, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove secondary ops call to inode_mknod, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove secondary ops call to inode_unlink, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove secondary ops call to inode_link, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove secondary ops call to sb_umount, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove secondary ops call to sb_mount, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove secondary ops call to bprm_committed_creds, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove secondary ops call to bprm_committing_creds, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove unused bprm_check_security hook from SELinux. This
currently calls into the capabilities hook, which is a noop.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Context mounts and genfs labeled file systems behave differently with respect to
setting file system labels. This patch brings genfs labeled file systems in line
with context mounts in that setxattr calls to them should return EOPNOTSUPP and
fscreate calls will be ignored.
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@macbook.localdomain>
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There is no easy way to tell if a file system supports SELinux security labeling.
Because of this a new flag is being added to the super block security structure
to indicate that the particular super block supports labeling. This flag is set
for file systems using the xattr, task, and transition labeling methods unless
that behavior is overridden by context mounts.
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@macbook.localdomain>
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code.
The super block security structure currently has three fields for what are
essentially flags. The flags field is used for mount options while two other
char fields are used for initialization and proc flags. These latter two fields are
essentially bit fields since the only used values are 0 and 1. These fields
have been collapsed into the flags field and new bit masks have been added for
them. The code is also fixed to work with these new flags.
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@macbook.localdomain>
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Add url to the security subsystem wiki.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Fix a regression in cap_capable() due to:
commit 3b11a1decef07c19443d24ae926982bc8ec9f4c0
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri Nov 14 10:39:26 2008 +1100
CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task
The problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of
credentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when
accessing current's creds.
There is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the
real/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current
task.
Ordinarily this doesn't matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current
point to the same set of creds. However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this
facility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test,
without affecting the creds as seen from other processes.
One of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the
effective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores.
The affected capability check is in generic_permission():
if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode))
if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
This change passes the set of credentials to be tested down into the commoncap
and SELinux code. The security functions called by capable() and
has_capability() select the appropriate set of credentials from the process
being checked.
This can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite:
/*
* t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug.
*
* Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued.
* Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html
*/
#include <limits.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#define UID 500
#define GID 100
#define PERM 0
#define TESTPATH "/tmp/t_access"
static void
errExit(char *msg)
{
perror(msg);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} /* errExit */
static void
accessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr)
{
printf("access(%s, %s) returns %d\n", file, mstr, access(file, mask));
} /* accessTest */
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd, perm, uid, gid;
char *testpath;
char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20];
testpath = (argc > 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH;
perm = (argc > 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM;
uid = (argc > 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID;
gid = (argc > 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID;
unlink(testpath);
fd = open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0);
if (fd == -1) errExit("open");
if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) == -1) errExit("fchown");
if (fchmod(fd, perm) == -1) errExit("fchmod");
close(fd);
snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ls -l %s", testpath);
system(cmd);
if (seteuid(uid) == -1) errExit("seteuid");
accessTest(testpath, 0, "0");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK, "R_OK");
accessTest(testpath, W_OK, "W_OK");
accessTest(testpath, X_OK, "X_OK");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, "R_OK | W_OK");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | X_OK");
accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, "W_OK | X_OK");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | W_OK | X_OK");
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
} /* main */
This can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS
filesystem. If successful, it will show:
[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx
access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
If unsuccessful, it will show:
[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx
access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
I've also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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[ver #2]"
This reverts commit 14eaddc967b16017d4a1a24d2be6c28ecbe06ed8.
David has a better version to come.
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I started playing with pahole today and decided to put it against the
selinux structures. Found we could save a little bit of space on x86_64
(and no harm on i686) just reorganizing some structs.
Object size changes:
av_inherit: 24 -> 16
selinux_class_perm: 48 -> 40
context: 80 -> 72
Admittedly there aren't many of av_inherit or selinux_class_perm's in
the kernel (33 and 1 respectively) But the change to the size of struct
context reverberate out a bit. I can get some hard number if they are
needed, but I don't see why they would be. We do change which cacheline
context->len and context->str would be on, but I don't see that as a
problem since we are clearly going to have to load both if the context
is to be of any value. I've run with the patch and don't seem to be
having any problems.
An example of what's going on using struct av_inherit would be:
form: to:
struct av_inherit { struct av_inherit {
u16 tclass; const char **common_pts;
const char **common_pts; u32 common_base;
u32 common_base; u16 tclass;
};
(notice all I did was move u16 tclass to the end of the struct instead
of the beginning)
Memory layout before the change:
struct av_inherit {
u16 tclass; /* 2 */
/* 6 bytes hole */
const char** common_pts; /* 8 */
u32 common_base; /* 4 */
/* 4 byes padding */
/* size: 24, cachelines: 1 */
/* sum members: 14, holes: 1, sum holes: 6 */
/* padding: 4 */
};
Memory layout after the change:
struct av_inherit {
const char ** common_pts; /* 8 */
u32 common_base; /* 4 */
u16 tclass; /* 2 */
/* 2 bytes padding */
/* size: 16, cachelines: 1 */
/* sum members: 14, holes: 0, sum holes: 0 */
/* padding: 2 */
};
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Fix a regression in cap_capable() due to:
commit 5ff7711e635b32f0a1e558227d030c7e45b4a465
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Wed Dec 31 02:52:28 2008 +0000
CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task
The problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of
credentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when
accessing current's creds.
There is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the
real/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current
task.
Ordinarily this doesn't matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current
point to the same set of creds. However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this
facility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test,
without affecting the creds as seen from other processes.
One of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the
effective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores.
The affected capability check is in generic_permission():
if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode))
if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
This change splits capable() from has_capability() down into the commoncap and
SELinux code. The capable() security op now only deals with the current
process, and uses the current process's subjective creds. A new security op -
task_capable() - is introduced that can check any task's objective creds.
strictly the capable() security op is superfluous with the presence of the
task_capable() op, however it should be faster to call the capable() op since
two fewer arguments need be passed down through the various layers.
This can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite:
/*
* t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug.
*
* Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued.
* Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html
*/
#include <limits.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#define UID 500
#define GID 100
#define PERM 0
#define TESTPATH "/tmp/t_access"
static void
errExit(char *msg)
{
perror(msg);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} /* errExit */
static void
accessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr)
{
printf("access(%s, %s) returns %d\n", file, mstr, access(file, mask));
} /* accessTest */
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd, perm, uid, gid;
char *testpath;
char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20];
testpath = (argc > 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH;
perm = (argc > 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM;
uid = (argc > 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID;
gid = (argc > 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID;
unlink(testpath);
fd = open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0);
if (fd == -1) errExit("open");
if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) == -1) errExit("fchown");
if (fchmod(fd, perm) == -1) errExit("fchmod");
close(fd);
snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ls -l %s", testpath);
system(cmd);
if (seteuid(uid) == -1) errExit("seteuid");
accessTest(testpath, 0, "0");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK, "R_OK");
accessTest(testpath, W_OK, "W_OK");
accessTest(testpath, X_OK, "X_OK");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, "R_OK | W_OK");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | X_OK");
accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, "W_OK | X_OK");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | W_OK | X_OK");
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
} /* main */
This can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS
filesystem. If successful, it will show:
[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx
access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
If unsuccessful, it will show:
[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx
access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
I've also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/lblnet-2.6_next into next
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Add support for unlabeled network hosts and networks.
Relies heavily on Paul Moore's netlabel support.
Creates a new entry in /smack called netlabel. Writes to /smack/netlabel
take the form:
A.B.C.D LABEL
or
A.B.C.D/N LABEL
where A.B.C.D is a network address, N is an integer between 0-32,
and LABEL is the Smack label to be used. If /N is omitted /32 is
assumed. N designates the netmask for the address. Entries are
matched by the most specific address/mask pair. 0.0.0.0/0 will
match everything, while 192.168.1.117/32 will match exactly one
host.
A new system label "@", pronounced "web", is defined. Processes
can not be assigned the web label. An address assigned the web
label can be written to by any process, and packets coming from
a web address can be written to any socket. Use of the web label
is a violation of any strict MAC policy, but the web label has
been requested many times.
The nltype entry has been removed from /smack. It did not work right
and the netlabel interface can be used to specify that all hosts
be treated as unlabeled.
CIPSO labels on incoming packets will be honored, even from designated
single label hosts. Single label hosts can only be written to by
processes with labels that can write to the label of the host.
Packets sent to single label hosts will always be unlabeled.
Once added a single label designation cannot be removed, however
the label may be changed.
The behavior of the ambient label remains unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
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This patch is the first step towards removing the old "compat_net" code from
the kernel. Secmark, the "compat_net" replacement was first introduced in
2.6.18 (September 2006) and the major Linux distributions with SELinux support
have transitioned to Secmark so it is time to start deprecating the "compat_net"
mechanism. Testing a patched version of 2.6.28-rc6 with the initial release of
Fedora Core 5 did not show any problems when running in enforcing mode.
This patch adds an entry to the feature-removal-schedule.txt file and removes
the SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT configuration option, forcing
Secmark on by default although it can still be disabled at runtime. The patch
also makes the Secmark permission checks "dynamic" in the sense that they are
only executed when Secmark is configured; this should help prevent problems
with older distributions that have not yet migrated to Secmark.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Update the NetLabel kernel API to expose the new features added in kernel
releases 2.6.25 and 2.6.28: the static/fallback label functionality and network
address based selectors.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
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Fix the following sparse warning:
CC security/keys/key.o
security/keys/keyctl.c:1297:10: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces)
security/keys/keyctl.c:1297:10: expected char [noderef] <asn:1>*buffer
security/keys/keyctl.c:1297:10: got char *<noident>
which appears to be caused by lack of __user annotation to the cast of
a syscall argument.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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* 'for-linus' of git://oss.sgi.com/xfs/xfs: (184 commits)
[XFS] Fix race in xfs_write() between direct and buffered I/O with DMAPI
[XFS] handle unaligned data in xfs_bmbt_disk_get_all
[XFS] avoid memory allocations in xfs_fs_vcmn_err
[XFS] Fix speculative allocation beyond eof
[XFS] Remove XFS_BUF_SHUT() and friends
[XFS] Use the incore inode size in xfs_file_readdir()
[XFS] set b_error from bio error in xfs_buf_bio_end_io
[XFS] use inode_change_ok for setattr permission checking
[XFS] add a FMODE flag to make XFS invisible I/O less hacky
[XFS] resync headers with libxfs
[XFS] simplify projid check in xfs_rename
[XFS] replace b_fspriv with b_mount
[XFS] Remove unused tracing code
[XFS] Remove unnecessary assertion
[XFS] Remove unused variable in ktrace_free()
[XFS] Check return value of xfs_buf_get_noaddr()
[XFS] Fix hang after disallowed rename across directory quota domains
[XFS] Fix compile with CONFIG_COMPAT enabled
move inode tracing out of xfs_vnode.
move vn_iowait / vn_iowake into xfs_aops.c
...
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Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6
Conflicts:
fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h
fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_globals.h
fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_ioctl.c
fs/xfs/xfs_vnodeops.h
Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@sgi.com>
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The iolock is dropped and re-acquired around the call to XFS_SEND_NAMESP().
While the iolock is released the file can become cached. We then
'goto retry' and - if we are doing direct I/O - mapping->nrpages may now be
non zero but need_i_mutex will be zero and we will hit the WARN_ON().
Since we have dropped the I/O lock then the file size may have also changed
so what we need to do here is 'goto start' like we do for the XFS_SEND_DATA()
DMAPI event.
We also need to update the filesize before releasing the iolock so that
needs to be done before the XFS_SEND_NAMESP event. If we drop the iolock
before setting the filesize we could race with a truncate.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@sgi.com>
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In libxfs xfs_bmbt_disk_get_all needs to handle unaligned data and thus
has been updated to use get_unaligned_be64. In kernelspace we don't strictly
need it as the routine is only used for tracing and xfsidbg, but let's keep
the two implementations in sync.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@sgi.com>
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xfs_fs_vcmn_err can be called under a spinlock, but does a sleeping memory
allocation to create buffer for it's internal sprintf. Fortunately it's
the only caller of icmn_err, so we can merge the two and have one single
static buffer and spinlock protecting it. While we're at it make sure
we proper __attribute__ format annotations so that the compiler can detect
mismatched format strings.
Reported-by: Alexander Beregalov <a.beregalov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@sandeen.net>
Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@sgi.com>
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Speculative allocation beyond eof doesn't work properly. It was
broken some time ago after a code cleanup that moved what is now
xfs_iomap_eof_align_last_fsb() and xfs_iomap_eof_want_preallocate()
out of xfs_iomap_write_delay() into separate functions. The code
used to use the current file size in various checks but got changed
to be max(file_size, i_new_size). Since i_new_size is the result
of 'offset + count' then in xfs_iomap_eof_want_preallocate() the
check for '(offset + count) <= isize' will always be true.
ie if 'offset + count' is > ip->i_size then isize will be i_new_size
and equal to 'offset + count'.
This change fixes all the places that used to use the current file
size.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@sgi.com>
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Code does nothing so remove it.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@sgi.com>
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We should be using the incore inode size here not the linux inode
size. The incore inode size is always up to date for directories
whereas the linux inode size is not updated for directories.
We've hit assertions in xfs_bmap() and traced it back to the linux
inode size being zero but the incore size being correct.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@sgi.com>
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Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6
Conflicts:
fs/xfs/xfs_rename.c
Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@sgi.com>
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Instead of implementing our own checks use inode_change_ok to check for
necessary permission in setattr. There is a slight change in behaviour
as inode_change_ok doesn't allow i_mode updates to add the suid or sgid
without superuser privilegues while the old XFS code just stripped away
those bits from the file mode.
(First sent on Semptember 29th)
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@sgi.com>
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XFS has a mode called invisble I/O that doesn't update any of the
timestamps. It's used for HSM-style applications and exposed through
the nasty open by handle ioctl.
Instead of doing directly assignment of file operations that set an
internal flag for it add a new FMODE_NOCMTIME flag that we can check
in the normal file operations.
(addition of the generic VFS flag has been ACKed by Al as an interims
solution)
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@sgi.com>
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- xfs_sb.h add the XFS_SB_VERSION2_PARENTBIT features2 that has been
around in userspace for some time
- xfs_inode.h: move a few things out of __KERNEL__ that are needed by
userspace
- xfs_mount.h: only include xfs_sync.h under __KERNEL__
- xfs_inode.c: minor whitespace fixup. I accidentaly changes this when
importing this file for use by userspace.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@sgi.com>
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Check for the project ID after attaching all inodes to the transaction.
That way the unlock in the error case is done by the transaction subsystem,
which guaratees that is uses the right flags (which was wrong from day one
of this check), and avoids having special code unlocking an array of inodes
with potential duplicates. Attaching the inode first is the method used
by xfs_rename and the other namespace methods all other error that require
multiple locked inodes.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@sgi.com>
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Replace the b_fspriv pointer and it's ugly accessors with a properly types
xfs_mount pointer. Also switch log reocvery over to it instead of using
b_fspriv for the mount pointer.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@sgi.com>
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None of this code appears to be used anywhere so remove it.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@sgi.com>
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Preserve any error returned by the bio layer.
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@sandeen.net>
Reviewed-by: Tim Shimmin <tes@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@sgi.com>
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