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UDF specification allows arbitrarily large symlinks. However we support
only symlinks at most one block large. Check the length of the symlink
so that we don't access memory beyond end of the symlink block.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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Verify that inode size is sane when loading inode with data stored in
ICB. Otherwise we may get confused later when working with the inode and
inode size is too big.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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We didn't check length of rock ridge ER records before printing them.
Thus corrupted isofs image can cause us to access and print some memory
behind the buffer with obvious consequences.
Reported-and-tested-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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Neither Sage nor I noticed that Zheng Yan had mistakenly committed
fs/ceph/super.h.rej as part of commit 31c542a199d7 ("ceph: add inline
data to pagecache").
Remove it.
Requested-by: Yan, Zheng <ukernel@gmail.com>
Cc: Sage Weil <sweil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sage/ceph-client
Pull ceph updates from Sage Weil:
"The big item here is support for inline data for CephFS and for
message signatures from Zheng. There are also several bug fixes,
including interrupted flock request handling, 0-length xattrs, mksnap,
cached readdir results, and a message version compat field. Finally
there are several cleanups from Ilya, Dan, and Markus.
Note that there is another series coming soon that fixes some bugs in
the RBD 'lingering' requests, but it isn't quite ready yet"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sage/ceph-client: (27 commits)
ceph: fix setting empty extended attribute
ceph: fix mksnap crash
ceph: do_sync is never initialized
libceph: fixup includes in pagelist.h
ceph: support inline data feature
ceph: flush inline version
ceph: convert inline data to normal data before data write
ceph: sync read inline data
ceph: fetch inline data when getting Fcr cap refs
ceph: use getattr request to fetch inline data
ceph: add inline data to pagecache
ceph: parse inline data in MClientReply and MClientCaps
libceph: specify position of extent operation
libceph: add CREATE osd operation support
libceph: add SETXATTR/CMPXATTR osd operations support
rbd: don't treat CEPH_OSD_OP_DELETE as extent op
ceph: remove unused stringification macros
libceph: require cephx message signature by default
ceph: introduce global empty snap context
ceph: message versioning fixes
...
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make sure 'value' is not null. otherwise __ceph_setxattr will remove
the extended attribute.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
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mksnap reply only contain 'target', does not contain 'dentry'. So
it's wrong to use req->r_reply_info.head->is_dentry to detect traceless
reply.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
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Probably this code was syncing a lot more often then intended because
the do_sync variable wasn't set to zero.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
Fixes: c62988ec0910 ('ceph: avoid meaningless calling ceph_caps_revoking if sync_mode == WB_SYNC_ALL.')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
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pagelist.h needs to include linux/types.h and asm/byteorder.h and not
rely on other headers pulling yet another set of headers.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
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After converting inline data to normal data, client need to flush
the new i_inline_version (CEPH_INLINE_NONE) to MDS. This commit makes
cap messages (sent to MDS) contain inline_version and inline_data.
Client always converts inline data to normal data before data write,
so the inline data length part is always zero.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
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Before any data write, convert inline data to normal data and set
i_inline_version to CEPH_INLINE_NONE. The OSD request that saves
inline data to object contains 3 operations (CMPXATTR, WRITE and
SETXATTR). It compares a xattr named 'inline_version' to prevent
old data overwrites newer data.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
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we can't use getattr to fetch inline data while holding Fr cap,
because it can cause deadlock. If we need to sync read inline data,
drop cap refs first, then use getattr to fetch inline data.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
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we can't use getattr to fetch inline data after getting Fcr caps,
because it can cause deadlock. The solution is try bringing inline
data to page cache when not holding any cap, and hope the inline
data page is still there after getting the Fcr caps. If the page
is still there, pin it in page cache for later IO.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
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Add a new parameter 'locked_page' to ceph_do_getattr(). If inline data
in getattr reply will be copied to the page.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
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Request reply and cap message can contain inline data. add inline data
to the page cache if there is Fc cap.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
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allow specifying position of extent operation in multi-operations
osd request. This is required for cephfs to convert inline data to
normal data (compare xattr, then write object).
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
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Add CEPH_OSD_OP_CREATE support. Also change libceph to not treat
CEPH_OSD_OP_DELETE as an extent op and add an assert to that end.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
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CEPH_OSD_OP_DELETE is not an extent op, stop treating it as such. This
sneaked in with discard patches - it's one of the three osd ops (the
other two are CEPH_OSD_OP_TRUNCATE and CEPH_OSD_OP_ZERO) that discard
is implemented with.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
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These were used to report git versions a long time ago.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
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Current snaphost code does not properly handle moving inode from one
empty snap realm to another empty snap realm. After changing inode's
snap realm, some dirty pages' snap context can be not equal to inode's
i_head_snap. This can trigger BUG() in ceph_put_wrbuffer_cap_refs()
The fix is introduce a global empty snap context for all empty snap
realm. This avoids triggering the BUG() for filesystem with no snapshot.
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/9928
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
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There were two places we were assigning version in host byte order
instead of network byte order.
Also in MSG_CLIENT_SESSION we weren't setting compat_version in the
header to reflect continued compatability with older MDSs.
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/9945
Signed-off-by: John Spray <john.spray@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
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2 bytes of what was reserved space is now used by userspace for the
compat_version field.
Signed-off-by: John Spray <john.spray@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
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Session key is required when calculating message signature. Save the session
key in authorizer, this avoid lookup ticket handler for each message
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
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The functions ceph_put_snap_context() and iput() test whether their
argument is NULL and then return immediately. Thus the test around the
call is not needed.
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
[idryomov@redhat.com: squashed rbd.c hunk, changelog]
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
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After creating/deleting/renaming file, offsets of sibling dentries may
change. So we can not use cached dentries to satisfy readdir. But we can
still use the cached dentries to conclude -ENOENT for lookup.
This patch introduces a new inode flag indicating if child dentries are
ordered. The flag is set at the same time marking a directory complete.
After creating/deleting/renaming file, we clear the flag on directory
inode. This prevents ceph_readdir() from using cached dentries to satisfy
readdir syscall.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
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Use kvfree() from linux/mm.h instead, which is identical. Also fix the
ceph_buffer comment: we will allocate with kmalloc() up to 32k - the
value of PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER, but that really is just an
implementation detail so don't mention it at all.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
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When a lock operation is interrupted, current code sends a unlock request to
MDS to undo the lock operation. This method does not work as expected because
the unlock request can drop locks that have already been acquired.
The fix is use the newly introduced CEPH_LOCK_FCNTL_INTR/CEPH_LOCK_FLOCK_INTR
requests to interrupt blocked file lock request. These requests do not drop
locks that have alread been acquired, they only interrupt blocked file lock
request.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace related fixes from Eric Biederman:
"As these are bug fixes almost all of thes changes are marked for
backporting to stable.
The first change (implicitly adding MNT_NODEV on remount) addresses a
regression that was created when security issues with unprivileged
remount were closed. I go on to update the remount test to make it
easy to detect if this issue reoccurs.
Then there are a handful of mount and umount related fixes.
Then half of the changes deal with the a recently discovered design
bug in the permission checks of gid_map. Unix since the beginning has
allowed setting group permissions on files to less than the user and
other permissions (aka ---rwx---rwx). As the unix permission checks
stop as soon as a group matches, and setgroups allows setting groups
that can not later be dropped, results in a situtation where it is
possible to legitimately use a group to assign fewer privileges to a
process. Which means dropping a group can increase a processes
privileges.
The fix I have adopted is that gid_map is now no longer writable
without privilege unless the new file /proc/self/setgroups has been
set to permanently disable setgroups.
The bulk of user namespace using applications even the applications
using applications using user namespaces without privilege remain
unaffected by this change. Unfortunately this ix breaks a couple user
space applications, that were relying on the problematic behavior (one
of which was tools/selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c).
To hopefully prevent needing a regression fix on top of my security
fix I rounded folks who work with the container implementations mostly
like to be affected and encouraged them to test the changes.
> So far nothing broke on my libvirt-lxc test bed. :-)
> Tested with openSUSE 13.2 and libvirt 1.2.9.
> Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
> Tested on Fedora20 with libvirt 1.2.11, works fine.
> Tested-by: Chen Hanxiao <chenhanxiao@cn.fujitsu.com>
> Ok, thanks - yes, unprivileged lxc is working fine with your kernels.
> Just to be sure I was testing the right thing I also tested using
> my unprivileged nsexec testcases, and they failed on setgroup/setgid
> as now expected, and succeeded there without your patches.
> Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
> I tested this with Sandstorm. It breaks as is and it works if I add
> the setgroups thing.
> Tested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> # breaks things as designed :("
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
userns: Unbreak the unprivileged remount tests
userns; Correct the comment in map_write
userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled
userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis
userns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex
userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings
userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping
userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings
userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished
userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings.
groups: Consolidate the setgroups permission checks
mnt: Clear mnt_expire during pivot_root
mnt: Carefully set CL_UNPRIVILEGED in clone_mnt
mnt: Move the clear of MNT_LOCKED from copy_tree to it's callers.
umount: Do not allow unmounting rootfs.
umount: Disallow unprivileged mount force
mnt: Update unprivileged remount test
mnt: Implicitly add MNT_NODEV on remount when it was implicitly added by mount
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A security fix in caused the way the unprivileged remount tests were
using user namespaces to break. Tweak the way user namespaces are
being used so the test works again.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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It is important that all maps are less than PAGE_SIZE
or else setting the last byte of the buffer to '0'
could write off the end of the allocated storage.
Correct the misleading comment.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Now that setgroups can be disabled and not reenabled, setting gid_map
without privielge can now be enabled when setgroups is disabled.
This restores most of the functionality that was lost when unprivileged
setting of gid_map was removed. Applications that use this functionality
will need to check to see if they use setgroups or init_groups, and if they
don't they can be fixed by simply disabling setgroups before writing to
gid_map.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc/<pid>/setgroups
A value of "deny" means the setgroups system call is disabled in the
current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the
future in this user namespace.
A value of "allow" means the segtoups system call is enabled.
- Descendant user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from
their parents.
- A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls currently do
not allow checking the permissions at open time.
- Writing to the proc file is restricted to before the gid_map
for the user namespace is set.
This ensures that disabling setgroups at a user namespace
level will never remove the ability to call setgroups
from a process that already has that ability.
A process may opt in to the setgroups disable for itself by
creating, entering and configuring a user namespace or by calling
setns on an existing user namespace with setgroups disabled.
Processes without privileges already can not call setgroups so this
is a noop. Prodcess with privilege become processes without
privilege when entering a user namespace and as with any other path
to dropping privilege they would not have the ability to call
setgroups. So this remains within the bounds of what is possible
without a knob to disable setgroups permanently in a user namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Generalize id_map_mutex so it can be used for more state of a user namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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If you did not create the user namespace and are allowed
to write to uid_map or gid_map you should already have the necessary
privilege in the parent user namespace to establish any mapping
you want so this will not affect userspace in practice.
Limiting unprivileged uid mapping establishment to the creator of the
user namespace makes it easier to verify all credentials obtained with
the uid mapping can be obtained without the uid mapping without
privilege.
Limiting unprivileged gid mapping establishment (which is temporarily
absent) to the creator of the user namespace also ensures that the
combination of uid and gid can already be obtained without privilege.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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setresuid allows the euid to be set to any of uid, euid, suid, and
fsuid. Therefor it is safe to allow an unprivileged user to map
their euid and use CAP_SETUID privileged with exactly that uid,
as no new credentials can be obtained.
I can not find a combination of existing system calls that allows setting
uid, euid, suid, and fsuid from the fsuid making the previous use
of fsuid for allowing unprivileged mappings a bug.
This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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As any gid mapping will allow and must allow for backwards
compatibility dropping groups don't allow any gid mappings to be
established without CAP_SETGID in the parent user namespace.
For a small class of applications this change breaks userspace
and removes useful functionality. This small class of applications
includes tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivilged-remount-test.c
Most of the removed functionality will be added back with the addition
of a one way knob to disable setgroups. Once setgroups is disabled
setting the gid_map becomes as safe as setting the uid_map.
For more common applications that set the uid_map and the gid_map
with privilege this change will have no affect.
This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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setgroups is unique in not needing a valid mapping before it can be called,
in the case of setgroups(0, NULL) which drops all supplemental groups.
The design of the user namespace assumes that CAP_SETGID can not actually
be used until a gid mapping is established. Therefore add a helper function
to see if the user namespace gid mapping has been established and call
that function in the setgroups permission check.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989, being able to drop groups
without privilege using user namespaces.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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The rule is simple. Don't allow anything that wouldn't be allowed
without unprivileged mappings.
It was previously overlooked that establishing gid mappings would
allow dropping groups and potentially gaining permission to files and
directories that had lesser permissions for a specific group than for
all other users.
This is the rule needed to fix CVE-2014-8989 and prevent any other
security issues with new_idmap_permitted.
The reason for this rule is that the unix permission model is old and
there are programs out there somewhere that take advantage of every
little corner of it. So allowing a uid or gid mapping to be
established without privielge that would allow anything that would not
be allowed without that mapping will result in expectations from some
code somewhere being violated. Violated expectations about the
behavior of the OS is a long way to say a security issue.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Today there are 3 instances of setgroups and due to an oversight their
permission checking has diverged. Add a common function so that
they may all share the same permission checking code.
This corrects the current oversight in the current permission checks
and adds a helper to avoid this in the future.
A user namespace security fix will update this new helper, shortly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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When inspecting the pivot_root and the current mount expiry logic I
realized that pivot_root fails to clear like mount move does.
Add the missing line in case someone does the interesting feat of
moving an expirable submount. This gives a strong guarantee that root
of the filesystem tree will never expire.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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old->mnt_expiry should be ignored unless CL_EXPIRE is set.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Clear MNT_LOCKED in the callers of copy_tree except copy_mnt_ns, and
collect_mounts. In copy_mnt_ns it is necessary to create an exact
copy of a mount tree, so not clearing MNT_LOCKED is important.
Similarly collect_mounts is used to take a snapshot of the mount tree
for audit logging purposes and auditing using a faithful copy of the
tree is important.
This becomes particularly significant when we start setting MNT_LOCKED
on rootfs to prevent it from being unmounted.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Andrew Vagin <avagin@parallels.com> writes:
> #define _GNU_SOURCE
> #include <sys/types.h>
> #include <sys/stat.h>
> #include <fcntl.h>
> #include <sched.h>
> #include <unistd.h>
> #include <sys/mount.h>
>
> int main(int argc, char **argv)
> {
> int fd;
>
> fd = open("/proc/self/ns/mnt", O_RDONLY);
> if (fd < 0)
> return 1;
> while (1) {
> if (umount2("/", MNT_DETACH) ||
> setns(fd, CLONE_NEWNS))
> break;
> }
>
> return 0;
> }
>
> root@ubuntu:/home/avagin# gcc -Wall nsenter.c -o nsenter
> root@ubuntu:/home/avagin# strace ./nsenter
> execve("./nsenter", ["./nsenter"], [/* 22 vars */]) = 0
> ...
> open("/proc/self/ns/mnt", O_RDONLY) = 3
> umount("/", MNT_DETACH) = 0
> setns(3, 131072) = 0
> umount("/", MNT_DETACH
>
causes:
> [ 260.548301] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> [ 260.550941] kernel BUG at /build/buildd/linux-3.13.0/fs/pnode.c:372!
> [ 260.552068] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
> [ 260.552068] Modules linked in: xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle xt_tcpudp xt_addrtype xt_conntrack ipt_MASQUERADE iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack bridge stp llc dm_thin_pool dm_persistent_data dm_bufio dm_bio_prison iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel binfmt_misc nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl aesni_intel nfs lockd aes_x86_64 sunrpc fscache lrw gf128mul glue_helper ablk_helper cryptd serio_raw ppdev parport_pc lp parport btrfs xor raid6_pq libcrc32c psmouse floppy
> [ 260.552068] CPU: 0 PID: 1723 Comm: nsenter Not tainted 3.13.0-30-generic #55-Ubuntu
> [ 260.552068] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
> [ 260.552068] task: ffff8800376097f0 ti: ffff880074824000 task.ti: ffff880074824000
> [ 260.552068] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811e9483>] [<ffffffff811e9483>] propagate_umount+0x123/0x130
> [ 260.552068] RSP: 0018:ffff880074825e98 EFLAGS: 00010246
> [ 260.552068] RAX: ffff88007c741140 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: ffff88007c741190
> [ 260.552068] RDX: ffff88007c741190 RSI: ffff880074825ec0 RDI: ffff880074825ec0
> [ 260.552068] RBP: ffff880074825eb0 R08: 00000000000172e0 R09: ffff88007fc172e0
> [ 260.552068] R10: ffffffff811cc642 R11: ffffea0001d59000 R12: ffff88007c741140
> [ 260.552068] R13: ffff88007c741140 R14: ffff88007c741140 R15: 0000000000000000
> [ 260.552068] FS: 00007fd5c7e41740(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> [ 260.552068] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> [ 260.552068] CR2: 00007fd5c7968050 CR3: 0000000070124000 CR4: 00000000000406f0
> [ 260.552068] Stack:
> [ 260.552068] 0000000000000002 0000000000000002 ffff88007c631000 ffff880074825ed8
> [ 260.552068] ffffffff811dcfac ffff88007c741140 0000000000000002 ffff88007c741160
> [ 260.552068] ffff880074825f38 ffffffff811dd12b ffffffff811cc642 0000000075640000
> [ 260.552068] Call Trace:
> [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811dcfac>] umount_tree+0x20c/0x260
> [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811dd12b>] do_umount+0x12b/0x300
> [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811cc642>] ? final_putname+0x22/0x50
> [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811cc849>] ? putname+0x29/0x40
> [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811dd88c>] SyS_umount+0xdc/0x100
> [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff8172aeff>] tracesys+0xe1/0xe6
> [ 260.552068] Code: 89 50 08 48 8b 50 08 48 89 02 49 89 45 08 e9 72 ff ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 4c 89 e6 4c 89 e7 e8 f5 f6 ff ff 48 89 c3 e9 39 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 66 66 66 66 90 55 b8 01
> [ 260.552068] RIP [<ffffffff811e9483>] propagate_umount+0x123/0x130
> [ 260.552068] RSP <ffff880074825e98>
> [ 260.611451] ---[ end trace 11c33d85f1d4c652 ]--
Which in practice is totally uninteresting. Only the global root user can
do it, and it is just a stupid thing to do.
However that is no excuse to allow a silly way to oops the kernel.
We can avoid this silly problem by setting MNT_LOCKED on the rootfs
mount point and thus avoid needing any special cases in the unmount
code.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Forced unmount affects not just the mount namespace but the underlying
superblock as well. Restrict forced unmount to the global root user
for now. Otherwise it becomes possible a user in a less privileged
mount namespace to force the shutdown of a superblock of a filesystem
in a more privileged mount namespace, allowing a DOS attack on root.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- MNT_NODEV should be irrelevant except when reading back mount flags,
no longer specify MNT_NODEV on remount.
- Test MNT_NODEV on devpts where it is meaningful even for unprivileged mounts.
- Add a test to verify that remount of a prexisting mount with the same flags
is allowed and does not change those flags.
- Cleanup up the definitions of MS_REC, MS_RELATIME, MS_STRICTATIME that are used
when the code is built in an environment without them.
- Correct the test error messages when tests fail. There were not 5 tests
that tested MS_RELATIME.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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