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* security: change link order of LSMs so security=tomoyo worksJames Morris2009-02-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | LSMs need to be linked before root_plug to ensure the security= boot parameter works with them. Do this for Tomoyo. (root_plug probably needs to be taken out and shot at some point, too). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* MAINTAINERS infoKentaro Takeda2009-02-121-0/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The archive of tomoyo-users-en mailing list is available at http://lists.sourceforge.jp/mailman/archives/tomoyo-users-en/ . Mailing lists for Japanese users are at http://lists.sourceforge.jp/mailman/archives/tomoyo-users/ and http://lists.sourceforge.jp/mailman/archives/tomoyo-dev/ . TOMOYO Linux English portal is at http://elinux.org/TomoyoLinux . Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Kconfig and MakefileKentaro Takeda2009-02-124-0/+15
| | | | | | | | TOMOYO uses LSM hooks for pathname based access control and securityfs support. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* LSM adapter functions.Kentaro Takeda2009-02-122-0/+399
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Domain transition handler.Kentaro Takeda2009-02-121-0/+878
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This file controls domain creation/deletion/transition. Every process belongs to a domain in TOMOYO Linux. Domain transition occurs when execve(2) is called and the domain is expressed as 'process invocation history', such as '<kernel> /sbin/init /etc/init.d/rc'. Domain information is stored in current->cred->security field. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* File operation restriction part.Kentaro Takeda2009-02-121-0/+1241
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This file controls file related operations of TOMOYO Linux. tomoyo/tomoyo.c calls the following six functions in this file. Each function handles the following access types. * tomoyo_check_file_perm sysctl()'s "read" and "write". * tomoyo_check_exec_perm "execute". * tomoyo_check_open_permission open(2) for "read" and "write". * tomoyo_check_1path_perm "create", "unlink", "mkdir", "rmdir", "mkfifo", "mksock", "mkblock", "mkchar", "truncate" and "symlink". * tomoyo_check_2path_perm "rename" and "unlink". * tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission "rewrite". ("rewrite" are operations which may lose already recorded data of a file, i.e. open(!O_APPEND) || open(O_TRUNC) || truncate() || ftruncate()) The functions which actually checks ACLs are the following three functions. Each function handles the following access types. ACL directive is expressed by "allow_<access type>". * tomoyo_check_file_acl Open() operation and execve() operation. ("read", "write", "read/write" and "execute") * tomoyo_check_single_write_acl Directory modification operations with 1 pathname. ("create", "unlink", "mkdir", "rmdir", "mkfifo", "mksock", "mkblock", "mkchar", "truncate", "symlink" and "rewrite") * tomoyo_check_double_write_acl Directory modification operations with 2 pathname. ("link" and "rename") Also, this file contains handlers of some utility directives for file related operations. * "allow_read": specifies globally (for all domains) readable files. * "path_group": specifies pathname macro. * "deny_rewrite": restricts rewrite operation. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Common functions for TOMOYO Linux.Kentaro Takeda2009-02-122-0/+2561
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This file contains common functions (e.g. policy I/O, pattern matching). -------------------- About pattern matching -------------------- Since TOMOYO Linux is a name based access control, TOMOYO Linux seriously considers "safe" string representation. TOMOYO Linux's string manipulation functions make reviewers feel crazy, but there are reasons why TOMOYO Linux needs its own string manipulation functions. ----- Part 1 : preconditions ----- People definitely want to use wild card. To support pattern matching, we have to support wild card characters. In a typical Linux system, filenames are likely consists of only alphabets, numbers, and some characters (e.g. + - ~ . / ). But theoretically, the Linux kernel accepts all characters but NUL character (which is used as a terminator of a string). Some Linux systems can have filenames which contain * ? ** etc. Therefore, we have to somehow modify string so that we can distinguish wild card characters and normal characters. It might be possible for some application's configuration files to restrict acceptable characters. It is impossible for kernel to restrict acceptable characters. We can't accept approaches which will cause troubles for applications. ----- Part 2 : commonly used approaches ----- Text formatted strings separated by space character (0x20) and new line character (0x0A) is more preferable for users over array of NUL-terminated string. Thus, people use text formatted configuration files separated by space character and new line. We sometimes need to handle non-printable characters. Thus, people use \ character (0x5C) as escape character and represent non-printable characters using octal or hexadecimal format. At this point, we remind (at least) 3 approaches. (1) Shell glob style expression (2) POSIX regular expression (UNIX style regular expression) (3) Maverick wild card expression On the surface, (1) and (2) sound good choices. But they have a big pitfall. All meta-characters in (1) and (2) are legal characters for representing a pathname, and users easily write incorrect expression. What is worse, users unlikely notice incorrect expressions because characters used for regular pathnames unlikely contain meta-characters. This incorrect use of meta-characters in pathname representation reveals vulnerability (e.g. unexpected results) only when irregular pathname is specified. The authors of TOMOYO Linux think that approaches which adds some character for interpreting meta-characters as normal characters (i.e. (1) and (2)) are not suitable for security use. Therefore, the authors of TOMOYO Linux propose (3). ----- Part 3: consideration points ----- We need to solve encoding problem. A single character can be represented in several ways using encodings. For Japanese language, there are "ShiftJIS", "ISO-2022-JP", "EUC-JP", "UTF-8" and more. Some languages (e.g. Japanese language) supports multi-byte characters (where a single character is represented using several bytes). Some multi-byte characters may match the escape character. For Japanese language, some characters in "ShiftJIS" encoding match \ character, and bothering Web's CGI developers. It is important that the kernel string is not bothered by encoding problem. Linus said, "I really would expect that kernel strings don't have an encoding. They're just C strings: a NUL-terminated stream of bytes." http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/11/6/142 Yes. The kernel strings are just C strings. We are talking about how to store and carry "kernel strings" safely. If we store "kernel string" into policy file as-is, the "kernel string" will be interpreted differently depending on application's encoding settings. One application may interpret "kernel string" as "UTF-8", another application may interpret "kernel string" as "ShiftJIS". Therefore, we propose to represent strings using ASCII encoding. In this way, we are no longer bothered by encoding problems. We need to avoid information loss caused by display. It is difficult to input and display non-printable characters, but we have to be able to handle such characters because the kernel string is a C string. If we use only ASCII printable characters (from 0x21 to 0x7E) and space character (0x20) and new line character (0x0A), it is easy to input from keyboard and display on all terminals which is running Linux. Therefore, we propose to represent strings using only characters which value is one of "from 0x21 to 0x7E", "0x20", "0x0A". We need to consider ease of splitting strings from a line. If we use an approach which uses "\ " for representing a space character within a string, we have to count the string from the beginning to check whether this space character is accompanied with \ character or not. As a result, we cannot monotonically split a line using space character. If we use an approach which uses "\040" for representing a space character within a string, we can monotonically split a line using space character. If we use an approach which uses NUL character as a delimiter, we cannot use string manipulation functions for splitting strings from a line. Therefore, we propose that we represent space character as "\040". We need to avoid wrong designations (incorrect use of special characters). Not all users can understand and utilize POSIX's regular expressions correctly and perfectly. If a character acts as a wild card by default, the user will get unexpected result if that user didn't know the meaning of that character. Therefore, we propose that all characters but \ character act as a normal character and let the user add \ character to make a character act as a wild card. In this way, users needn't to know all wild card characters beforehand. They can learn when they encountered an unseen wild card character for their first time. ----- Part 4: supported wild card expressions ----- At this point, we have wild card expressions listed below. +-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+ | Wild card | Meaning and example | +-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+ | \* | More than or equals to 0 character other than '/'. | | | /var/log/samba/\* | +-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+ | \@ | More than or equals to 0 character other than '/' or '.'. | | | /var/www/html/\@.html | +-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+ | \? | 1 byte character other than '/'. | | | /tmp/mail.\?\?\?\?\?\? | +-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+ | \$ | More than or equals to 1 decimal digit. | | | /proc/\$/cmdline | +-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+ | \+ | 1 decimal digit. | | | /var/tmp/my_work.\+ | +-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+ | \X | More than or equals to 1 hexadecimal digit. | | | /var/tmp/my-work.\X | +-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+ | \x | 1 hexadecimal digit. | | | /tmp/my-work.\x | +-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+ | \A | More than or equals to 1 alphabet character. | | | /var/log/my-work/\$-\A-\$.log | +-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+ | \a | 1 alphabet character. | | | /home/users/\a/\*/public_html/\*.html | +-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+ | \- | Pathname subtraction operator. | | | +---------------------+------------------------------------+ | | | | Example | Meaning | | | | +---------------------+------------------------------------+ | | | | /etc/\* | All files in /etc/ directory. | | | | +---------------------+------------------------------------+ | | | | /etc/\*\-\*shadow\* | /etc/\* other than /etc/\*shadow\* | | | | +---------------------+------------------------------------+ | | | | /\*\-proc\-sys/ | /\*/ other than /proc/ /sys/ | | | | +---------------------+------------------------------------+ | +-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------+---------------------------------------------------------+ | Representation | Meaning and example | +----------------+---------------------------------------------------------+ | \\ | backslash character itself. | +----------------+---------------------------------------------------------+ | \ooo | 1 byte character. | | | ooo is 001 <= ooo <= 040 || 177 <= ooo <= 377. | | | | | | \040 for space character. | | | \177 for del character. | | | | +----------------+---------------------------------------------------------+ ----- Part 5: Advantages ----- We can obtain extensibility. Since our proposed approach adds \ to a character to interpret as a wild card, we can introduce new wild card in future while maintaining backward compatibility. We can process monotonically. Since our proposed approach separates strings using a space character, we can split strings using existing string manipulation functions. We can reliably analyze access logs. It is guaranteed that a string doesn't contain space character (0x20) and new line character (0x0A). It is guaranteed that a string won't be converted by FTP and won't be damaged by a terminal's settings. It is guaranteed that a string won't be affected by encoding converters (except encodings which insert NUL character (e.g. UTF-16)). ----- Part 6: conclusion ----- TOMOYO Linux is using its own encoding with reasons described above. There is a disadvantage that we need to introduce a series of new string manipulation functions. But TOMOYO Linux's encoding is useful for all users (including audit and AppArmor) who want to perform pattern matching and safely exchange string information between the kernel and the userspace. -------------------- About policy interface -------------------- TOMOYO Linux creates the following files on securityfs (normally mounted on /sys/kernel/security) as interfaces between kernel and userspace. These files are for TOMOYO Linux management tools *only*, not for general programs. * profile * exception_policy * domain_policy * manager * meminfo * self_domain * version * .domain_status * .process_status ** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile ** This file is used to read or write profiles. "profile" means a running mode of process. A profile lists up functions and their modes in "$number-$variable=$value" format. The $number is profile number between 0 and 255. Each domain is assigned one profile. To assign profile to domains, use "ccs-setprofile" or "ccs-editpolicy" or "ccs-loadpolicy" commands. (Example) [root@tomoyo]# cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile 0-COMMENT=-----Disabled Mode----- 0-MAC_FOR_FILE=disabled 0-MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY=2048 0-TOMOYO_VERBOSE=disabled 1-COMMENT=-----Learning Mode----- 1-MAC_FOR_FILE=learning 1-MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY=2048 1-TOMOYO_VERBOSE=disabled 2-COMMENT=-----Permissive Mode----- 2-MAC_FOR_FILE=permissive 2-MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY=2048 2-TOMOYO_VERBOSE=enabled 3-COMMENT=-----Enforcing Mode----- 3-MAC_FOR_FILE=enforcing 3-MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY=2048 3-TOMOYO_VERBOSE=enabled - MAC_FOR_FILE: Specifies access control level regarding file access requests. - MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY: Limits the max number of ACL entries that are automatically appended during learning mode. Default is 2048. - TOMOYO_VERBOSE: Specifies whether to print domain policy violation messages or not. ** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager ** This file is used to read or append the list of programs or domains that can write to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo interface. By default, only processes with both UID = 0 and EUID = 0 can modify policy via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo interface. You can use keyword "manage_by_non_root" to allow policy modification by non root user. (Example) [root@tomoyo]# cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager /usr/lib/ccs/loadpolicy /usr/lib/ccs/editpolicy /usr/lib/ccs/setlevel /usr/lib/ccs/setprofile /usr/lib/ccs/ld-watch /usr/lib/ccs/ccs-queryd ** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy ** This file is used to read and write system global settings. Each line has a directive and operand pair. Directives are listed below. - initialize_domain: To initialize domain transition when specific program is executed, use initialize_domain directive. * initialize_domain "program" from "domain" * initialize_domain "program" from "the last program part of domain" * initialize_domain "program" If the part "from" and after is not given, the entry is applied to all domain. If the "domain" doesn't start with "<kernel>", the entry is applied to all domain whose domainname ends with "the last program part of domain". This directive is intended to aggregate domain transitions for daemon program and program that are invoked by the kernel on demand, by transiting to different domain. - keep_domain To prevent domain transition when program is executed from specific domain, use keep_domain directive. * keep_domain "program" from "domain" * keep_domain "program" from "the last program part of domain" * keep_domain "domain" * keep_domain "the last program part of domain" If the part "from" and before is not given, this entry is applied to all program. If the "domain" doesn't start with "<kernel>", the entry is applied to all domain whose domainname ends with "the last program part of domain". This directive is intended to reduce total number of domains and memory usage by suppressing unneeded domain transitions. To declare domain keepers, use keep_domain directive followed by domain definition. Any process that belongs to any domain declared with this directive, the process stays at the same domain unless any program registered with initialize_domain directive is executed. In order to control domain transition in detail, you can use no_keep_domain/no_initialize_domain keywrods. - alias: To allow executing programs using the name of symbolic links, use alias keyword followed by dereferenced pathname and reference pathname. For example, /sbin/pidof is a symbolic link to /sbin/killall5 . In normal case, if /sbin/pidof is executed, the domain is defined as if /sbin/killall5 is executed. By specifying "alias /sbin/killall5 /sbin/pidof", you can run /sbin/pidof in the domain for /sbin/pidof . (Example) alias /sbin/killall5 /sbin/pidof - allow_read: To grant unconditionally readable permissions, use allow_read keyword followed by canonicalized file. This keyword is intended to reduce size of domain policy by granting read access to library files such as GLIBC and locale files. Exception is, if ignore_global_allow_read keyword is given to a domain, entries specified by this keyword are ignored. (Example) allow_read /lib/libc-2.5.so - file_pattern: To declare pathname pattern, use file_pattern keyword followed by pathname pattern. The pathname pattern must be a canonicalized Pathname. This keyword is not applicable to neither granting execute permissions nor domain definitions. For example, canonicalized pathname that contains a process ID (i.e. /proc/PID/ files) needs to be grouped in order to make access control work well. (Example) file_pattern /proc/\$/cmdline - path_group To declare pathname group, use path_group keyword followed by name of the group and pathname pattern. For example, if you want to group all files under home directory, you can define path_group HOME-DIR-FILE /home/\*/\* path_group HOME-DIR-FILE /home/\*/\*/\* path_group HOME-DIR-FILE /home/\*/\*/\*/\* in the exception policy and use like allow_read @HOME-DIR-FILE to grant file access permission. - deny_rewrite: To deny overwriting already written contents of file (such as log files) by default, use deny_rewrite keyword followed by pathname pattern. Files whose pathname match the patterns are not permitted to open for writing without append mode or truncate unless the pathnames are explicitly granted using allow_rewrite keyword in domain policy. (Example) deny_rewrite /var/log/\* - aggregator To deal multiple programs as a single program, use aggregator keyword followed by name of original program and aggregated program. This keyword is intended to aggregate similar programs. For example, /usr/bin/tac and /bin/cat are similar. By specifying "aggregator /usr/bin/tac /bin/cat", you can run /usr/bin/tac in the domain for /bin/cat . For example, /usr/sbin/logrotate for Fedora Core 3 generates programs like /tmp/logrotate.\?\?\?\?\?\? and run them, but TOMOYO Linux doesn't allow using patterns for granting execute permission and defining domains. By specifying "aggregator /tmp/logrotate.\?\?\?\?\?\? /tmp/logrotate.tmp", you can run /tmp/logrotate.\?\?\?\?\?\? as if /tmp/logrotate.tmp is running. ** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy ** This file contains definition of all domains and permissions that are granted to each domain. Lines from the next line to a domain definition ( any lines starting with "<kernel>") to the previous line to the next domain definitions are interpreted as access permissions for that domain. ** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/meminfo ** This file is to show the total RAM used to keep policy in the kernel by TOMOYO Linux in bytes. (Example) [root@tomoyo]# cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/meminfo Shared: 61440 Private: 69632 Dynamic: 768 Total: 131840 You can set memory quota by writing to this file. (Example) [root@tomoyo]# echo Shared: 2097152 > /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/meminfo [root@tomoyo]# echo Private: 2097152 > /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/meminfo ** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain ** This file is to show the name of domain the caller process belongs to. (Example) [root@etch]# cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/zsh /bin/cat ** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/version ** This file is used for getting TOMOYO Linux's version. (Example) [root@etch]# cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/version 2.2.0-pre ** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.domain_status ** This is a view (of a DBMS) that contains only profile number and domainnames of domain so that "ccs-setprofile" command can do line-oriented processing easily. ** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.process_status ** This file is used by "ccs-ccstree" command to show "list of processes currently running" and "domains which each process belongs to" and "profile number which the domain is currently assigned" like "pstree" command. This file is writable by programs that aren't registered as policy manager. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Memory and pathname management functions.Kentaro Takeda2009-02-122-0/+550
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Add in_execve flag into task_struct.Kentaro Takeda2009-02-123-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch allows LSM modules to determine whether current process is in an execve operation or not so that they can behave differently while an execve operation is in progress. This patch is needed by TOMOYO. Please see another patch titled "LSM adapter functions." for backgrounds. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* integrity: audit updateMimi Zohar2009-02-127-22/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | Based on discussions on linux-audit, as per Steve Grubb's request http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/2/6/269, the following changes were made: - forced audit result to be either 0 or 1. - made template names const - Added new stand-alone message type: AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* integrity: shmem zero fixMimi Zohar2009-02-112-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on comments from Mike Frysinger and Randy Dunlap: (http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/2/9/262) - moved ima.h include before CONFIG_SHMEM test to fix compiler error on Blackfin: mm/shmem.c: In function 'shmem_zero_setup': mm/shmem.c:2670: error: implicit declaration of function 'ima_shm_check' - added 'struct linux_binprm' in ima.h to fix compiler warning on Blackfin: In file included from mm/shmem.c:32: include/linux/ima.h:25: warning: 'struct linux_binprm' declared inside parameter list include/linux/ima.h:25: warning: its scope is only this definition or declaration, which is probably not what you want - moved fs.h include within _LINUX_IMA_H definition Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris2009-02-066489-206584/+846076
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: fs/namei.c Manually merged per: diff --cc fs/namei.c index 734f2b5,bbc15c2..0000000 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@@ -860,9 -848,8 +849,10 @@@ static int __link_path_walk(const char nd->flags |= LOOKUP_CONTINUE; err = exec_permission_lite(inode); if (err == -EAGAIN) - err = vfs_permission(nd, MAY_EXEC); + err = inode_permission(nd->path.dentry->d_inode, + MAY_EXEC); + if (!err) + err = ima_path_check(&nd->path, MAY_EXEC); if (err) break; @@@ -1525,14 -1506,9 +1509,14 @@@ int may_open(struct path *path, int acc flag &= ~O_TRUNC; } - error = vfs_permission(nd, acc_mode); + error = inode_permission(inode, acc_mode); if (error) return error; + - error = ima_path_check(&nd->path, ++ error = ima_path_check(path, + acc_mode & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC)); + if (error) + return error; /* * An append-only file must be opened in append mode for writing. */ Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * seq_file: fix big-enough lseek() + read()Alexey Dobriyan2009-02-051-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | lseek() further than length of the file will leave stale ->index (second-to-last during iteration). Next seq_read() will not notice that ->f_pos is big enough to return 0, but will print last item as if ->f_pos is pointing to it. Introduced in commit cb510b8172602a66467f3551b4be1911f5a7c8c2 aka "seq_file: more atomicity in traverse()". Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * seq_file: move traverse so it can be used from seq_readEric Biederman2009-02-051-57/+57
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In 2.6.25 some /proc files were converted to use the seq_file infrastructure. But seq_files do not correctly support pread(), which broke some usersapce applications. To handle pread correctly we can't assume that f_pos is where we left it in seq_read. So move traverse() so that we can eventually use it in seq_read and do thus some day support pread(). Signed-off-by: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * sgi-xp: fix writing past the end of kzalloc()'d spaceDean Nelson2009-02-052-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A missing type cast results in writing way beyond the end of a kzalloc()'d memory segment resulting in slab corruption. But it seems like the better solution is to define ->recv_msg_slots as a 'void *' rather than a 'struct xpc_notify_mq_msg_uv *' and add the type cast. Signed-off-by: Dean Nelson <dcn@sgi.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * alpha: fixup BUG macroAlexey Dobriyan2009-02-051-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Do usual do {} while (0) dance, otherwise fs/gfs2/util.c:99: error: expected expression before 'else' drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_sli.c:363: error: expected expression before 'else' Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * sx.c: fix missed unlock_kernel() on error path in sx_fw_ioctl()Dan Carpenter2009-02-051-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If we return directly with -EPERM then lock_kernel() is still held. This was found with a code checker (http://repo.or.cz/w/smatch.git/). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix another such path - missed func_exit()] Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Cc: <R.E.Wolff@BitWizard.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * atyfb: fix CONFIG_ namespace violationsRandy Dunlap2009-02-057-52/+52
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix namespace violations by changing non-kconfig CONFIG_ names to CNFG_*. Fixes breakage in staging/, which adds a real CONFIG_PANEL. Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * rtc-ds1390: fix compilation warnings in drivers/rtc/rtc-ds1390.cManish Katiyar2009-02-051-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | drivers/rtc/rtc-ds1390.c:125: warning: unused variable 'rtc' Signed-off-by: Manish Katiyar <mkatiyar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alessandro Zummo <a.zummo@towertech.it> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * drivers/video/backlight: rename da903x to da903x_blMike Rapoport2009-02-052-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently both da903x backlight and voltage reulator drivers have the same name. Rename the backlight driver to allow use of both drivers as modules. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <mike@compulab.co.il> Acked-by: Eric Miao <eric.miao@marvell.com> Cc: Richard Purdie <rpurdie@rpsys.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * atmel-ssc: fix misuse of dev_dbg when requested ssc instance is not foundHans-Christian Egtvedt2009-02-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The ssc pointer is not valid when the id is not found in the list. Convert the message from a debug one into an error message and avoid dereferencing the bad pointer. Signed-off-by: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <hans-christian.egtvedt@atmel.com> Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Cc: Huang Weiyi <weiyi.huang@gmail.com> Acked-by: Haavard Skinnemoen <haavard.skinnemoen@atmel.com> Cc: David Brownell <dbrownell@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * do_wp_page: fix regression with execute in placeCarsten Otte2009-02-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix do_wp_page for VM_MIXEDMAP mappings. In the case where pfn_valid returns 0 for a pfn at the beginning of do_wp_page and the mapping is not shared writable, the code branches to label `gotten:' with old_page == NULL. In case the vma is locked (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED), lock_page, clear_page_mlock, and unlock_page try to access the old_page. This patch checks whether old_page is valid before it is dereferenced. The regression was introduced by "mlock: mlocked pages are unevictable" (commit b291f000393f5a0b679012b39d79fbc85c018233). Signed-off-by: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.28.x] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * wait: prevent exclusive waiter starvationJohannes Weiner2009-02-053-11/+63
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With exclusive waiters, every process woken up through the wait queue must ensure that the next waiter down the line is woken when it has finished. Interruptible waiters don't do that when aborting due to a signal. And if an aborting waiter is concurrently woken up through the waitqueue, noone will ever wake up the next waiter. This has been observed with __wait_on_bit_lock() used by lock_page_killable(): the first contender on the queue was aborting when the actual lock holder woke it up concurrently. The aborted contender didn't acquire the lock and therefor never did an unlock followed by waking up the next waiter. Add abort_exclusive_wait() which removes the process' wait descriptor from the waitqueue, iff still queued, or wakes up the next waiter otherwise. It does so under the waitqueue lock. Racing with a wake up means the aborting process is either already woken (removed from the queue) and will wake up the next waiter, or it will remove itself from the queue and the concurrent wake up will apply to the next waiter after it. Use abort_exclusive_wait() in __wait_event_interruptible_exclusive() and __wait_on_bit_lock() when they were interrupted by other means than a wake up through the queue. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Reported-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Mentored-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <matthew@wil.cx> Cc: Chuck Lever <cel@citi.umich.edu> Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> ["after some testing"] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * maintainers: general@lists.openfabrics.org is moderatedRandy Dunlap2009-02-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I got the "list is moderated message," so add it here. Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * lis3lv02d: add axes knowledge for HP 6710Martin Kebert2009-02-051-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for the HP laptops of model 6710x for having correctly setup axes. Signed-off-by: Martin Kebert <gkmarty@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Piel <eric.piel@tremplin-utc.net> Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * lis3lv02d: add axes knowledge for HP 6730Pavel Herrmann2009-02-051-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for the HP laptops of model 6730x for having correctly setup axes. Signed-off-by: Pavel Herrmann <morpheus.ibis@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Piel <eric.piel@tremplin-utc.net> Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * lis3lv02d: add axes knowledge for HP 6530Eric Piel2009-02-051-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for the HP laptops of model 6530x for having correctly setup axes. Reported-by: Jerome Poulin <jeromepoulin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Piel <eric.piel@tremplin-utc.net> Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * lis3lv02d: add axes knowledge for HP 6510bJiri Tersel2009-02-051-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | According to dmesg my laptop model HP 6510b is not being recognized by this driver. After I have modified "lis3lv02d.c" axes in Neverball are OK. Signed-off-by: Jiri Tersel <tersel@mail.muni.cz> Signed-off-by: Eric Piel <eric.piel@tremplin-utc.net> Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * hp-wmi: fix error path in hp_wmi_bios_setup()Andrew Morton2009-02-051-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The error-path code can call rfkill_unregister() with a pointer which does not contain the result of a call to rfkill_register(). It goes BUG(). Addresses http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12560. Cc: Frans Pop <elendil@planet.nl> Cc: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net> Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Reported-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Testted-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * revert "rlimit: permit setting RLIMIT_NOFILE to RLIM_INFINITY"Andrew Morton2009-02-051-12/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Revert commit 0c2d64fb6cae9aae480f6a46cfe79f8d7d48b59f because it causes (arguably poorly designed) existing userspace to spend interminable periods closing billions of not-open file descriptors. We could bring this back, with some sort of opt-in tunable in /proc, which defaults to "off". Peter's alanysis follows: : I spent several hours trying to get to the bottom of a serious : performance issue that appeared on one of our servers after upgrading to : 2.6.28. In the end it's what could be considered a userspace bug that : was triggered by a change in 2.6.28. Since this might also affect other : people I figured I'd at least document what I found here, and maybe we : can even do something about it: : : : So, I upgraded some of debian.org's machines to 2.6.28.1 and immediately : the team maintaining our ftp archive complained that one of their : scripts that previously ran in a few minutes still hadn't even come : close to being done after an hour or so. Downgrading to 2.6.27 fixed : that. : : Turns out that script is forking a lot and something in it or python or : whereever closes all the file descriptors it doesn't want to pass on. : That is, it starts at zero and goes up to ulimit -n/RLIMIT_NOFILE and : closes them all with a few exceptions. : : Turns out that takes a long time when your limit -n is now 2^20 (1048576). : : With 2.6.27.* the ulimit -n was the standard 1024, but with 2.6.28 it is : now a thousand times that. : : 2.6.28 included a patch titled "rlimit: permit setting RLIMIT_NOFILE to : RLIM_INFINITY" (0c2d64fb6cae9aae480f6a46cfe79f8d7d48b59f)[1] that : allows, as the title implies, to set the limit for number of files to : infinity. : : Closer investigation showed that the broken default ulimit did not apply : to "system" processes (like stuff started from init). In the end I : could establish that all processes that passed through pam_limit at one : point had the bad resource limit. : : Apparently the pam library in Debian etch (4.0) initializes the limits : to some default values when it doesn't have any settings in limit.conf : to override them. Turns out that for nofiles this is RLIM_INFINITY. : Commenting out "case RLIMIT_NOFILE" in pam_limit.c:267 of our pam : package version 0.79-5 fixes that - tho I'm not sure what side effects : that has. : : Debian lenny (the upcoming 5.0 version) doesn't have this issue as it : uses a different pam (version). Reported-by: Peter Palfrader <weasel@debian.org> Cc: Adam Tkac <vonsch@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.28.x] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * shm: fix shmctl(SHM_INFO) lockup with !CONFIG_SHMEMTony Battersby2009-02-051-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | shm_get_stat() assumes that the inode is a "struct shmem_inode_info", which is incorrect for !CONFIG_SHMEM (see fs/ramfs/inode.c: ramfs_get_inode() vs. mm/shmem.c: shmem_get_inode()). This bad assumption can cause shmctl(SHM_INFO) to lockup when shm_get_stat() tries to spin_lock(&info->lock). Users of !CONFIG_SHMEM may encounter this lockup simply by invoking the 'ipcs' command. Reported by Jiri Olsa back in February 2008: http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/29/74 Signed-off-by: Tony Battersby <tonyb@cybernetics.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.everything] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * fbmem: don't call copy_from/to_user() with mutex heldAndrea Righi2009-02-053-72/+98
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Avoid calling copy_from/to_user() with fb_info->lock mutex held in fbmem ioctl(). fb_mmap() is called under mm->mmap_sem (A) held, that also acquires fb_info->lock (B); fb_ioctl() takes fb_info->lock (B) and does copy_from/to_user() that might acquire mm->mmap_sem (A), causing a deadlock. NOTE: it doesn't push down the fb_info->lock in each own driver's fb_ioctl(), so there are still potential deadlocks elsewhere. Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@saeurebad.de> Cc: Krzysztof Helt <krzysztof.h1@wp.pl> Cc: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com> Cc: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * rtc: rtc-dm355evm driverDavid Brownell2009-02-053-0/+182
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Simple RTC driver for the MSP430 firmware on the DM355 EVM board. Other than not supporting atomic reads/writes of all four bytes, this is reasonable as a basic no-alarm RTC. Signed-off-by: David Brownell <dbrownell@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Kevin Hilman <khilman@deeprootsystems.com> Acked-by: Alessandro Zummo <a.zummo@towertech.it> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * misc: dell-laptop should depend on POWER_SUPPLYMatthew Garrett2009-02-051-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | dell-laptop makes use of the power supply class information to choose which backlight interface to change. Add a depends on it. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * generic swap(): don't return a value from swap()Peter Zijlstra2009-02-051-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The swap() macro is accidentally retuning the value of its first argument. Change it into a doesn't-return-anything macro before someone goes and relies upon this behaviour. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Wu Fengguang <wfg@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * hpilo: open/close fixDavid Altobelli2009-02-052-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The device can take a while to respond to an open/close request, so increase the time kernel will wait for response (1 ms to 10ms). Also, properly clean up a channel on a failed open, by calling the channel close routine. Just freeing the memory isn't sufficient, the device needs to be informed that the channel is no longer open, and the device memory cleared of references to freed dma buffer. Signed-off-by: David Altobelli <david.altobelli@hp.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * kernel/async.c: fix printk warningsAndrew Morton2009-02-051-4/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | alpha: kernel/async.c: In function 'run_one_entry': kernel/async.c:141: warning: format '%lli' expects type 'long long int', but argument 2 has type 'async_cookie_t' kernel/async.c:149: warning: format '%lli' expects type 'long long int', but argument 2 has type 'async_cookie_t' kernel/async.c:149: warning: format '%lld' expects type 'long long int', but argument 4 has type 's64' kernel/async.c: In function 'async_synchronize_cookie_special': kernel/async.c:250: warning: format '%lli' expects type 'long long int', but argument 3 has type 's64' Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * Merge branch 'x86-fixes-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2009-02-0411-31/+65
| |\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'x86-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: x86: APIC: enable workaround on AMD Fam10h CPUs xen: disable interrupts before saving in percpu x86: add x86@kernel.org to MAINTAINERS x86: push old stack address on irqstack for unwinder irq, x86: fix lock status with numa_migrate_irq_desc x86: add cache descriptors for Intel Core i7 x86/Voyager: make it build and boot
| | * Merge branch 'core/xen' into x86/urgentIngo Molnar2009-02-042239-20020/+62857
| | |\
| | | * xen: disable interrupts before saving in percpuJeremy Fitzhardinge2009-02-031-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Impact: Fix race condition xen_mc_batch has a small preempt race where it takes the address of a percpu variable immediately before disabling interrupts, thereby leaving a small window in which we may migrate to another cpu and save the flags in the wrong percpu variable. Disable interrupts before saving the old flags in a percpu. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
| | * | x86: APIC: enable workaround on AMD Fam10h CPUsBorislav Petkov2009-02-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Impact: fix to enable APIC for AMD Fam10h on chipsets with a missing/b0rked ACPI MP table (MADT) Booting a 32bit kernel on an AMD Fam10h CPU running on chipsets with missing/b0rked MP table leads to a hang pretty early in the boot process due to the APIC not being initialized. Fix that by falling back to the default APIC base address in 32bit code, as it is done in the 64bit codepath. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
| | * | x86: add x86@kernel.org to MAINTAINERSH. Peter Anvin2009-02-031-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Impact: Documentation only There is an email alias as well to reach the x86 maintainers: x86@kernel.org. Document it. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
| | * | x86: push old stack address on irqstack for unwinderMartin Hicks2009-02-021-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Impact: Fixes dumpstack and KDB on 64 bits This re-adds the old stack pointer to the top of the irqstack to help with unwinding. It was removed in commit d99015b1abbad743aa049b439c1e1dede6d0fa49 as part of the save_args out-of-line work. Both dumpstack and KDB require this information. Signed-off-by: Martin Hicks <mort@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
| | * | irq, x86: fix lock status with numa_migrate_irq_descYinghai Lu2009-02-012-3/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Eric Paris reported: > I have an hp dl785g5 which is unable to successfully run > 2.6.29-0.66.rc3.fc11.x86_64 or 2.6.29-rc2-next-20090126. During bootup > (early in userspace daemons starting) I get the below BUG, which quickly > renders the machine dead. I assume it is because sparse_irq_lock never > gets released when the BUG kills that task. Adjust lock sequence when migrating a descriptor with CONFIG_NUMA_MIGRATE_IRQ_DESC enabled. Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
| | * | x86: add cache descriptors for Intel Core i7Dave Jones2009-02-011-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
| | * | x86/Voyager: make it build and bootJames Bottomley2009-01-314-26/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ mingo@elte.hu: these fixes are a subset of changes cherry-picked from: git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/voyager-2.6.git They fix various problems that recent x86 changes caused in the Voyager subarchitecture: both APIC changes and cpumask changes and certain cleanups caused subarch assumptions to break. Most of these changes are obsolete as the subarch code has been removed from the x86 development tree - but we merge them upstream to make Voyager build and boot. ] Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
| * | | Merge branch 'sched-fixes-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2009-02-041-0/+1
| |\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'sched-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: sched: add missing kernel-doc in sched.h
| | * | | sched: add missing kernel-doc in sched.hRandy Dunlap2009-02-031-0/+1
| | | |/ | | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add kernel-doc notation for @lock: include/linux/sched.h:457: No description found for parameter 'lock' Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
| * | | Merge branch 'tracing-fixes-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2009-02-041-0/+5
| |\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'tracing-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: ftrace: do_each_pid_task() needs rcu lock
| | * | | ftrace: do_each_pid_task() needs rcu lockOleg Nesterov2009-02-031-0/+5
| | |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | "ftrace: use struct pid" commit 978f3a45d9499c7a447ca7615455cefb63d44165 converted ftrace_pid_trace to "struct pid*". But we can't use do_each_pid_task() without rcu_read_lock() even if we know the pid itself can't go away (it was pinned in ftrace_pid_write). The exiting task can detach itself from this pid at any moment. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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