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-rw-r--r--security/capability.c27
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--security/keys/Kconfig18
-rw-r--r--security/keys/proc.c8
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c1
-rw-r--r--security/security.c36
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c5
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c102
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/classmap.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c8
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/Kconfig1
11 files changed, 147 insertions, 62 deletions
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index d68c57a..070dd46 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -12,6 +12,29 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
+static int cap_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
+ struct task_struct *to)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
+ struct task_struct *to)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
+ struct task_struct *to, struct file *file)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int cap_syslog(int type)
{
return 0;
@@ -930,6 +953,10 @@ static void cap_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
{
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_set_context_mgr);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_transaction);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_transfer_binder);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_transfer_file);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_access_check);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 57515bc..df30334 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -126,7 +126,6 @@ config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed"
depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
- select KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
default y
help
This option requires that all keys added to the .ima
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index a4f3f8c..72483b8 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -80,21 +80,3 @@ config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
-
-config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
- bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed"
- depends on KEYS
- help
- This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file - through which
- can be listed all the keys on the system that are viewable by the
- reading process.
-
- The only keys included in the list are those that grant View
- permission to the reading process whether or not it possesses them.
- Note that LSM security checks are still performed, and may further
- filter out keys that the current process is not authorised to view.
-
- Only key attributes are listed here; key payloads are not included in
- the resulting table.
-
- If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 972eeb3..f0611a6 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
#include <asm/errno.h>
#include "internal.h"
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);
static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos);
static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos);
@@ -38,7 +37,6 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_keys_fops = {
.llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = seq_release,
};
-#endif
static int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);
static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos);
@@ -67,11 +65,9 @@ static int __init key_proc_init(void)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *p;
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
p = proc_create("keys", 0, NULL, &proc_keys_fops);
if (!p)
panic("Cannot create /proc/keys\n");
-#endif
p = proc_create("key-users", 0, NULL, &proc_key_users_fops);
if (!p)
@@ -86,8 +82,6 @@ __initcall(key_proc_init);
* Implement "/proc/keys" to provide a list of the keys on the system that
* grant View permission to the caller.
*/
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
-
static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct seq_file *p, struct rb_node *n)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p);
@@ -275,8 +269,6 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
return 0;
}
-#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS */
-
static struct rb_node *__key_user_next(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_node *n)
{
while (n) {
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 0c7aea4..486ef6f 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -414,6 +414,7 @@ link_check_failed:
link_prealloc_failed:
mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
+ key_put(key);
kleave(" = %d [prelink]", ret);
return ret;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 18b35c6..e81d5bb 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -135,6 +135,29 @@ int __init register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
/* Security operations */
+int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
+{
+ return security_ops->binder_set_context_mgr(mgr);
+}
+
+int security_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
+ struct task_struct *to)
+{
+ return security_ops->binder_transaction(from, to);
+}
+
+int security_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
+ struct task_struct *to)
+{
+ return security_ops->binder_transfer_binder(from, to);
+}
+
+int security_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
+ struct task_struct *to, struct file *file)
+{
+ return security_ops->binder_transfer_file(from, to, file);
+}
+
int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
@@ -726,16 +749,15 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
return prot | PROT_EXEC;
/*
* ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need
- * BDI_CAP_EXEC_MMAP (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case
+ * NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case
*/
if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) {
#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
- unsigned long caps = 0;
- struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
- if (mapping && mapping->backing_dev_info)
- caps = mapping->backing_dev_info->capabilities;
- if (!(caps & BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP))
- return prot;
+ if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) {
+ unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file);
+ if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC))
+ return prot;
+ }
#endif
return prot | PROT_EXEC;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index a18f1fa..afcc0ae 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -517,11 +517,6 @@ out:
return rc;
}
-static inline int avc_sidcmp(u32 x, u32 y)
-{
- return (x == y || x == SECSID_WILD || y == SECSID_WILD);
-}
-
/**
* avc_update_node Update an AVC entry
* @event : Updating event
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 6da7532..29c39e0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -401,23 +401,14 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
- if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
- sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
- sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK)
- return 1;
-
- /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
- if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
- return 1;
-
- /*
- * Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but supports
- * setting SELinux context on in-core inodes.
- */
- if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs", sizeof("rootfs")) == 0)
- return 1;
-
- return 0;
+ return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
+ sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
+ sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
+ /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs");
}
static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
@@ -456,10 +447,6 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
- else
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
- sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
- labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
@@ -1933,6 +1920,74 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
/* Hook functions begin here. */
+static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
+{
+ u32 mysid = current_sid();
+ u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
+
+ return avc_has_perm(mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
+ BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
+ struct task_struct *to)
+{
+ u32 mysid = current_sid();
+ u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
+ u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
+ int rc;
+
+ if (mysid != fromsid) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
+ BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
+ NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
+ struct task_struct *to)
+{
+ u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
+ u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
+
+ return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
+ NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
+ struct task_struct *to,
+ struct file *file)
+{
+ u32 sid = task_sid(to);
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+ ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+
+ if (sid != fsec->sid) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_FD,
+ FD__USE,
+ &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+ return 0;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
+ &ad);
+}
+
static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned int mode)
{
@@ -5810,6 +5865,11 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.name = "selinux",
+ .binder_set_context_mgr = selinux_binder_set_context_mgr,
+ .binder_transaction = selinux_binder_transaction,
+ .binder_transfer_binder = selinux_binder_transfer_binder,
+ .binder_transfer_file = selinux_binder_transfer_file,
+
.ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
.ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
.capget = selinux_capget,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index be491a7..eccd61b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -151,5 +151,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
{ "tun_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "attach_queue", NULL } },
+ { "binder", { "impersonate", "call", "set_context_mgr", "transfer",
+ NULL } },
{ NULL }
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index bc2a586..74aa224 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -289,12 +289,16 @@ static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
goto out;
p->filename_trans = hashtab_create(filenametr_hash, filenametr_cmp, (1 << 10));
- if (!p->filename_trans)
+ if (!p->filename_trans) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
+ }
p->range_tr = hashtab_create(rangetr_hash, rangetr_cmp, 256);
- if (!p->range_tr)
+ if (!p->range_tr) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
+ }
ebitmap_init(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps);
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Kconfig b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig
index 8eb779b9d..604e718 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/Kconfig
+++ b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ config SECURITY_TOMOYO
select SECURITYFS
select SECURITY_PATH
select SECURITY_NETWORK
+ select SRCU
default n
help
This selects TOMOYO Linux, pathname-based access control.
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