diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/capability.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/dummy.c | 45 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/internal.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/key.c | 58 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/keyring.c | 66 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/user_defined.c | 33 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/Makefile | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 39 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 54 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/xfrm.c | 305 |
16 files changed, 470 insertions, 162 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 64d3f1e..34f5934 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -54,6 +54,19 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK implement socket and networking access controls. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM + bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks" + depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK + help + This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks. + If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to + implement per-packet access controls based on labels + derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are + designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized + to communicate unlabelled data can send without using + IPSec. + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + config SECURITY_CAPABILITIES tristate "Default Linux Capabilities" depends on SECURITY diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index ec18d60..f9b35cc 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -49,8 +49,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = { .vm_enough_memory = cap_vm_enough_memory, }; -#define MY_NAME __stringify(KBUILD_MODNAME) - /* flag to keep track of how we were registered */ static int secondary; @@ -67,7 +65,7 @@ static int __init capability_init (void) /* register ourselves with the security framework */ if (register_security (&capability_ops)) { /* try registering with primary module */ - if (mod_reg_security (MY_NAME, &capability_ops)) { + if (mod_reg_security (KBUILD_MODNAME, &capability_ops)) { printk (KERN_INFO "Failure registering capabilities " "with primary security module.\n"); return -EINVAL; @@ -85,7 +83,7 @@ static void __exit capability_exit (void) return; /* remove ourselves from the security framework */ if (secondary) { - if (mod_unreg_security (MY_NAME, &capability_ops)) + if (mod_unreg_security (KBUILD_MODNAME, &capability_ops)) printk (KERN_INFO "Failure unregistering capabilities " "with primary module.\n"); return; diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c index 3ca5f2b..a15c547 100644 --- a/security/dummy.c +++ b/security/dummy.c @@ -776,8 +776,42 @@ static inline int dummy_sk_alloc_security (struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t pr static inline void dummy_sk_free_security (struct sock *sk) { } + +static unsigned int dummy_sk_getsid(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl, u8 dir) +{ + return 0; +} #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM +static int dummy_xfrm_policy_alloc_security(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int dummy_xfrm_policy_clone_security(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void dummy_xfrm_policy_free_security(struct xfrm_policy *xp) +{ +} + +static int dummy_xfrm_state_alloc_security(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void dummy_xfrm_state_free_security(struct xfrm_state *x) +{ +} + +static int dummy_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ static int dummy_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops) { return -EINVAL; @@ -970,7 +1004,16 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_alloc_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_free_security); -#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_getsid); + #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_clone_security); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_free_security); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_alloc_security); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_free_security); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_lookup); +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_alloc); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_free); diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index db99ed4..39cba97 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ #define kdebug(FMT, a...) do {} while(0) #endif -extern struct key_type key_type_dead; extern struct key_type key_type_user; /*****************************************************************************/ diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index 01bcfec..99781b7 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static DECLARE_WORK(key_cleanup_task, key_cleanup, NULL); DECLARE_RWSEM(key_construction_sem); /* any key who's type gets unegistered will be re-typed to this */ -struct key_type key_type_dead = { +static struct key_type key_type_dead = { .name = "dead", }; @@ -240,9 +240,9 @@ static inline void key_alloc_serial(struct key *key) /* * allocate a key of the specified type * - update the user's quota to reflect the existence of the key - * - called from a key-type operation with key_types_sem read-locked by either - * key_create_or_update() or by key_duplicate(); this prevents unregistration - * of the key type + * - called from a key-type operation with key_types_sem read-locked by + * key_create_or_update() + * - this prevents unregistration of the key type * - upon return the key is as yet uninstantiated; the caller needs to either * instantiate the key or discard it before returning */ @@ -889,56 +889,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update); /*****************************************************************************/ /* - * duplicate a key, potentially with a revised description - * - must be supported by the keytype (keyrings for instance can be duplicated) - */ -struct key *key_duplicate(struct key *source, const char *desc) -{ - struct key *key; - int ret; - - key_check(source); - - if (!desc) - desc = source->description; - - down_read(&key_types_sem); - - ret = -EINVAL; - if (!source->type->duplicate) - goto error; - - /* allocate and instantiate a key */ - key = key_alloc(source->type, desc, current->fsuid, current->fsgid, - source->perm, 0); - if (IS_ERR(key)) - goto error_k; - - down_read(&source->sem); - ret = key->type->duplicate(key, source); - up_read(&source->sem); - if (ret < 0) - goto error2; - - atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys); - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags); - - error_k: - up_read(&key_types_sem); - out: - return key; - - error2: - key_put(key); - error: - up_read(&key_types_sem); - key = ERR_PTR(ret); - goto out; - -} /* end key_duplicate() */ - -/*****************************************************************************/ -/* * revoke a key */ void key_revoke(struct key *key) diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index 4e9fa8b..5d22c03 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ static inline unsigned keyring_hash(const char *desc) */ static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring, const void *data, size_t datalen); -static int keyring_duplicate(struct key *keyring, const struct key *source); static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *criterion); static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring); static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m); @@ -59,7 +58,6 @@ struct key_type key_type_keyring = { .name = "keyring", .def_datalen = sizeof(struct keyring_list), .instantiate = keyring_instantiate, - .duplicate = keyring_duplicate, .match = keyring_match, .destroy = keyring_destroy, .describe = keyring_describe, @@ -70,7 +68,7 @@ struct key_type key_type_keyring = { * semaphore to serialise link/link calls to prevent two link calls in parallel * introducing a cycle */ -DECLARE_RWSEM(keyring_serialise_link_sem); +static DECLARE_RWSEM(keyring_serialise_link_sem); /*****************************************************************************/ /* @@ -120,68 +118,6 @@ static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring, /*****************************************************************************/ /* - * duplicate the list of subscribed keys from a source keyring into this one - */ -static int keyring_duplicate(struct key *keyring, const struct key *source) -{ - struct keyring_list *sklist, *klist; - unsigned max; - size_t size; - int loop, ret; - - const unsigned limit = - (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(*klist)) / sizeof(struct key *); - - ret = 0; - - /* find out how many keys are currently linked */ - rcu_read_lock(); - sklist = rcu_dereference(source->payload.subscriptions); - max = 0; - if (sklist) - max = sklist->nkeys; - rcu_read_unlock(); - - /* allocate a new payload and stuff load with key links */ - if (max > 0) { - BUG_ON(max > limit); - - max = (max + 3) & ~3; - if (max > limit) - max = limit; - - ret = -ENOMEM; - size = sizeof(*klist) + sizeof(struct key *) * max; - klist = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!klist) - goto error; - - /* set links */ - rcu_read_lock(); - sklist = rcu_dereference(source->payload.subscriptions); - - klist->maxkeys = max; - klist->nkeys = sklist->nkeys; - memcpy(klist->keys, - sklist->keys, - sklist->nkeys * sizeof(struct key *)); - - for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) - atomic_inc(&klist->keys[loop]->usage); - - rcu_read_unlock(); - - rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, klist); - ret = 0; - } - - error: - return ret; - -} /* end keyring_duplicate() */ - -/*****************************************************************************/ -/* * match keyrings on their name */ static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *description) diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c index cbda3b2..8e71895 100644 --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ struct key_type key_type_user = { .name = "user", .instantiate = user_instantiate, - .duplicate = user_duplicate, .update = user_update, .match = user_match, .destroy = user_destroy, @@ -68,42 +67,10 @@ error: return ret; } /* end user_instantiate() */ - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_instantiate); /*****************************************************************************/ /* - * duplicate a user defined key - * - both keys' semaphores are locked against further modification - * - the new key cannot yet be accessed - */ -int user_duplicate(struct key *key, const struct key *source) -{ - struct user_key_payload *upayload, *spayload; - int ret; - - /* just copy the payload */ - ret = -ENOMEM; - upayload = kmalloc(sizeof(*upayload) + source->datalen, GFP_KERNEL); - if (upayload) { - spayload = rcu_dereference(source->payload.data); - BUG_ON(source->datalen != spayload->datalen); - - upayload->datalen = key->datalen = spayload->datalen; - memcpy(upayload->data, spayload->data, key->datalen); - - key->payload.data = upayload; - ret = 0; - } - - return ret; - -} /* end user_duplicate() */ - -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_duplicate); - -/*****************************************************************************/ -/* * dispose of the old data from an updated user defined key */ static void user_update_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu) diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile index b038cd0..06d54d9 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Makefile +++ b/security/selinux/Makefile @@ -8,5 +8,7 @@ selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) += netif.o +selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o + EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux/include diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index fc77443..3d496ea 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ #include "avc.h" #include "objsec.h" #include "netif.h" +#include "xfrm.h" #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX @@ -3349,6 +3350,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid, sock_class, recv_perm, &ad); } + + if (!err) + err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb); + out: return err; } @@ -3401,6 +3406,24 @@ static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) sk_free_security(sk); } +static unsigned int selinux_sk_getsid_security(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl, u8 dir) +{ + struct inode_security_struct *isec; + u32 sock_sid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET; + + if (!sk) + return selinux_no_sk_sid(fl); + + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + isec = get_sock_isec(sk); + + if (isec) + sock_sid = isec->sid; + + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + return sock_sid; +} + static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { int err = 0; @@ -3536,6 +3559,11 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, send_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT; } + if (err != NF_ACCEPT) + goto out; + + err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb); + out: return err; } @@ -4380,6 +4408,16 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .socket_getpeersec = selinux_socket_getpeersec, .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security, .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security, + .sk_getsid = selinux_sk_getsid_security, +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM + .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc, + .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone, + .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free, + .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc, + .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free, + .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup, #endif }; @@ -4491,6 +4529,7 @@ static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void) panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err); #endif /* IPV6 */ + out: return err; } diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h index 1deb59e..591e98d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h @@ -238,3 +238,4 @@ S_(SECCLASS_NSCD, NSCD__SHMEMHOST, "shmemhost") S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, "sendto") S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, "recvfrom") + S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, "setcontext") diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h index a78b5d5..d7f02ed 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h @@ -908,6 +908,7 @@ #define ASSOCIATION__SENDTO 0x00000001UL #define ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM 0x00000002UL +#define ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT 0x00000004UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8e87996 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* + * SELinux support for the XFRM LSM hooks + * + * Author : Trent Jaeger, <jaegert@us.ibm.com> + */ +#ifndef _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ +#define _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ + +int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx); +int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new); +void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp); +int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx); +void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x); +int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir); + +/* + * Extract the security blob from the sock (it's actually on the socket) + */ +static inline struct inode_security_struct *get_sock_isec(struct sock *sk) +{ + if (!sk->sk_socket) + return NULL; + + return SOCK_INODE(sk->sk_socket)->i_security; +} + + +static inline u32 selinux_no_sk_sid(struct flowi *fl) +{ + /* NOTE: no sock occurs on ICMP reply, forwards, ... */ + /* icmp_reply: authorize as kernel packet */ + if (fl && fl->proto == IPPROTO_ICMP) { + return SECINITSID_KERNEL; + } + + return SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM +int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb); +int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb); +#else +static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return NF_ACCEPT; +} +#endif + +#endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 0e1352a..e59da63 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ static ssize_t selinux_transaction_write(struct file *file, const char __user *b char *data; ssize_t rv; - if (ino >= sizeof(write_op)/sizeof(write_op[0]) || !write_op[ino]) + if (ino >= ARRAY_SIZE(write_op) || !write_op[ino]) return -EINVAL; data = simple_transaction_get(file, buf, size); @@ -1161,7 +1161,7 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir) #endif }; - for (i = 0; i < sizeof (files) / sizeof (files[0]); i++) { + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(files); i++) { struct inode *inode; struct dentry *dentry; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c index dde094f..d049c7a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c @@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(void *fp, u32 vers, struct avtab *a, return -1; } - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(spec_order)/sizeof(u16); i++) { + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) { if (val & spec_order[i]) { key.specified = spec_order[i] | enabled; datum.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index 0ac311d..0111990 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version) int i; struct policydb_compat_info *info = NULL; - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(policydb_compat)/sizeof(*info); i++) { + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(policydb_compat); i++) { if (policydb_compat[i].version == version) { info = &policydb_compat[i]; break; diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5b77765 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@ +/* + * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module + * + * This file contains the SELinux XFRM hook function implementations. + * + * Authors: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@us.ibm.com> + * Trent Jaeger <jaegert@us.ibm.com> + * + * Copyright (C) 2005 International Business Machines Corporation + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + */ + +/* + * USAGE: + * NOTES: + * 1. Make sure to enable the following options in your kernel config: + * CONFIG_SECURITY=y + * CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y + * CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y + * CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=m/y + * ISSUES: + * 1. Caching packets, so they are not dropped during negotiation + * 2. Emulating a reasonable SO_PEERSEC across machines + * 3. Testing addition of sk_policy's with security context via setsockopt + */ +#include <linux/config.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/netfilter.h> +#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> +#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> +#include <linux/ip.h> +#include <linux/tcp.h> +#include <linux/skbuff.h> +#include <linux/xfrm.h> +#include <net/xfrm.h> +#include <net/checksum.h> +#include <net/udp.h> +#include <asm/semaphore.h> + +#include "avc.h" +#include "objsec.h" +#include "xfrm.h" + + +/* + * Returns true if an LSM/SELinux context + */ +static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) +{ + return (ctx && + (ctx->ctx_doi == XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM) && + (ctx->ctx_alg == XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)); +} + +/* + * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux + */ +static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x) +{ + return selinux_authorizable_ctx(x->security); +} + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a socket can be used + * with the corresponding xfrm_sec_ctx and direction. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir) +{ + int rc = 0; + u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx; + + /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */ + if ((ctx = xp->security)) { + if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx)) + return -EINVAL; + + sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid; + } + + rc = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, + ((dir == FLOW_DIR_IN) ? ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM : + ((dir == FLOW_DIR_OUT) ? ASSOCIATION__SENDTO : + (ASSOCIATION__SENDTO | ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM))), + NULL); + + return rc; +} + +/* + * Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state + * CTX does not have a meaningful value on input + */ +static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx; + + BUG_ON(!uctx); + BUG_ON(uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX); + + if (uctx->ctx_len >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + + uctx->ctx_len, + GFP_KERNEL); + + if (!ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + + ctx->ctx_doi = uctx->ctx_doi; + ctx->ctx_len = uctx->ctx_len; + ctx->ctx_alg = uctx->ctx_alg; + + memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, + uctx+1, + ctx->ctx_len); + rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, + ctx->ctx_len, + &ctx->ctx_sid); + + if (rc) + goto out; + + /* + * Does the subject have permission to set security or permission to + * do the relabel? + * Must be permitted to relabel from default socket type (process type) + * to specified context + */ + rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, + SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, + ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; + + return rc; + +out: + *ctxp = 0; + kfree(ctx); + return rc; +} + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to + * xfrm_policy. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) +{ + int err; + + BUG_ON(!xp); + + err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx); + return err; +} + + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to + * new for policy cloning. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new) +{ + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, *new_ctx; + + old_ctx = old->security; + + if (old_ctx) { + new_ctx = new->security = kmalloc(sizeof(*new_ctx) + + old_ctx->ctx_len, + GFP_KERNEL); + + if (!new_ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + + memcpy(new_ctx, old_ctx, sizeof(*new_ctx)); + memcpy(new_ctx->ctx_str, old_ctx->ctx_str, new_ctx->ctx_len); + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_policy security information. + */ +void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp) +{ + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security; + if (ctx) + kfree(ctx); +} + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers sec_ctx spec to + * xfrm_state. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) +{ + int err; + + BUG_ON(!x); + + err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx); + return err; +} + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_state security information. + */ +void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) +{ + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; + if (ctx) + kfree(ctx); +} + +/* + * LSM hook that controls access to unlabelled packets. If + * a xfrm_state is authorizable (defined by macro) then it was + * already authorized by the IPSec process. If not, then + * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have + * gone thru the IPSec process. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + int i, rc = 0; + struct sec_path *sp; + + sp = skb->sp; + + if (sp) { + /* + * __xfrm_policy_check does not approve unless xfrm_policy_ok + * says that spi's match for policy and the socket. + * + * Only need to verify the existence of an authorizable sp. + */ + for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) { + struct xfrm_state *x = sp->x[i].xvec; + + if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) + goto accept; + } + } + + /* check SELinux sock for unlabelled access */ + rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, + ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, NULL); + if (rc) + goto drop; + +accept: + return 0; + +drop: + return rc; +} + +/* + * POSTROUTE_LAST hook's XFRM processing: + * If we have no security association, then we need to determine + * whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination. + * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been + * checked in xfrm_policy_lookup hook. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct dst_entry *dst; + int rc = 0; + + dst = skb->dst; + + if (dst) { + struct dst_entry *dst_test; + + for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0; + dst_test = dst_test->child) { + struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm; + + if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) + goto accept; + } + } + + rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, + ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, NULL); + if (rc) + goto drop; + +accept: + return NF_ACCEPT; + +drop: + return NF_DROP; +} |
