diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 137 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/xfrm.c | 62 |
3 files changed, 165 insertions, 42 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 794c3ca..bff7791 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */ #include <net/sock.h> #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */ +#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> @@ -3828,7 +3829,7 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) u32 nlbl_sid; u32 nlbl_type; - err = selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid); + err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid); if (unlikely(err)) return -EACCES; err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid); @@ -3846,6 +3847,30 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) return 0; } +/** + * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection + * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID + * @skb_sid: the packet's SID + * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID + * + * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is + * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create + * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy + * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure. + * + */ +static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid) +{ + int err = 0; + + if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL) + err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid); + else + *conn_sid = sk_sid; + + return err; +} + /* socket security operations */ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, @@ -4452,7 +4477,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; int err; u16 family = sk->sk_family; - u32 newsid; + u32 connsid; u32 peersid; /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ @@ -4462,16 +4487,11 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid); if (err) return err; - if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) { - req->secid = sksec->sid; - req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; - } else { - err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid); - if (err) - return err; - req->secid = newsid; - req->peer_secid = peersid; - } + err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid); + if (err) + return err; + req->secid = connsid; + req->peer_secid = peersid; return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family); } @@ -4731,6 +4751,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops, static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family) { + struct sock *sk; u32 sid; if (!netlbl_enabled()) @@ -4739,8 +4760,27 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb, /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */ - if (skb->sk) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security; + sk = skb->sk; + if (sk) { + struct sk_security_struct *sksec; + + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) + /* if the socket is the listening state then this + * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to + * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and + * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't + * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on + * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent. + * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is + * as any IP option based labeling should be copied + * from the initial connection request (in the IP + * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a + * security label in the packet itself this is the + * best we can do. */ + return NF_ACCEPT; + + /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */ + sksec = sk->sk_security; sid = sksec->sid; } else sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; @@ -4810,27 +4850,36 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, * as fast and as clean as possible. */ if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family); + + secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); + peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); + if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) + return NF_ACCEPT; + + sk = skb->sk; + #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks * when the packet is on it's final way out. * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst - * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */ - if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL) + * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. + * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the + * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing + * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do; + * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per + * connection. */ + if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL && + !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)) return NF_ACCEPT; #endif - secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); - peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); - if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) - return NF_ACCEPT; - /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the - * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local - * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label - * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */ - sk = skb->sk; if (sk == NULL) { + /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming + * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet + * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded + * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */ if (skb->skb_iif) { secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid)) @@ -4839,7 +4888,45 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; } + } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) { + /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the + * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In + * this particular case the correct security label is assigned + * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't + * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent + * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only + * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in + * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output() + * for similar problems. */ + u32 skb_sid; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid)) + return NF_DROP; + /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL + * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM + * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final" + * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied + * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely + * pass the packet. */ + if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) { + switch (family) { + case PF_INET: + if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED) + return NF_ACCEPT; + break; + case PF_INET6: + if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED) + return NF_ACCEPT; + default: + return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); + } + } + if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid)) + return NF_DROP; + secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; } else { + /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the + * associated socket. */ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; peer_sid = sksec->sid; secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h index 0dec76c..48c3cc9 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto); int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall); +int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid); static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void) { @@ -79,11 +80,12 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void) { } -#endif -static inline int selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid) +static inline int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid) { - return selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, sid, 0); + *sid = SECSID_NULL; + return 0; } +#endif #endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index a91d205..0462cb3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -209,19 +209,26 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, NULL) ? 0 : 1); } -/* - * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the - * incoming packet. - */ -int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall) +static u32 selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(struct sk_buff *skb) { - u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL; - struct sec_path *sp; + struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb); + struct xfrm_state *x; - if (skb == NULL) - goto out; + if (dst == NULL) + return SECSID_NULL; + x = dst->xfrm; + if (x == NULL || !selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) + return SECSID_NULL; + + return x->security->ctx_sid; +} + +static int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(struct sk_buff *skb, + u32 *sid, int ckall) +{ + u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL; + struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp; - sp = skb->sp; if (sp) { int i; @@ -248,6 +255,30 @@ out: } /* + * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the + * incoming packet. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall) +{ + if (skb == NULL) { + *sid = SECSID_NULL; + return 0; + } + return selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, ckall); +} + +int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid) +{ + int rc; + + rc = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, 0); + if (rc == 0 && *sid == SECSID_NULL) + *sid = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(skb); + + return rc; +} + +/* * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to xfrm_policy. */ int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, @@ -327,19 +358,22 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, return rc; ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!ctx) - return -ENOMEM; + if (!ctx) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM; ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX; ctx->ctx_sid = secid; ctx->ctx_len = str_len; memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, ctx_str, str_len); - kfree(ctx_str); x->security = ctx; atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); - return 0; +out: + kfree(ctx_str); + return rc; } /* |
