summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/dummy.c23
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c7
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/xfrm.h23
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/xfrm.c199
4 files changed, 210 insertions, 42 deletions
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index bd3bc5f..c1f1065 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -835,7 +835,8 @@ static int dummy_xfrm_policy_delete_security(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
return 0;
}
-static int dummy_xfrm_state_alloc_security(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
+static int dummy_xfrm_state_alloc_security(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 secid)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -853,6 +854,23 @@ static int dummy_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir)
{
return 0;
}
+
+static int dummy_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int dummy_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int dummy_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
static int dummy_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
{
@@ -1076,6 +1094,9 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_delete_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_lookup);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_pol_flow_match);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_flow_state_match);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_decode_session);
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_alloc);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index d67abf7..5c189da 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3468,7 +3468,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (err)
goto out;
- err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb);
+ err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb, &ad);
out:
return err;
}
@@ -3720,7 +3720,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
if (err)
goto out;
- err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb);
+ err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb, &ad);
out:
return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
}
@@ -4633,6 +4633,9 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
.xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
.xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
+ .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
+ .xfrm_flow_state_match = selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match,
+ .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index c96498a..f51a3e8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
* SELinux support for the XFRM LSM hooks
*
* Author : Trent Jaeger, <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
+ * Updated : Venkat Yekkirala, <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
*/
#ifndef _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
#define _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
@@ -10,10 +11,16 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *
int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new);
void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp);
int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp);
-int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 secid);
void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl);
+int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm);
+int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl);
+
/*
* Extract the security blob from the sock (it's actually on the socket)
@@ -39,17 +46,21 @@ static inline u32 selinux_no_sk_sid(struct flowi *fl)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
-int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
-int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
+int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct avc_audit_data *ad);
+int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct avc_audit_data *ad);
u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk);
u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb);
#else
-static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct avc_audit_data *ad)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct avc_audit_data *ad)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 6c985ce..a502b05 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -6,7 +6,12 @@
* Authors: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@us.ibm.com>
* Trent Jaeger <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
*
+ * Updated: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
+ *
+ * Granular IPSec Associations for use in MLS environments.
+ *
* Copyright (C) 2005 International Business Machines Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
@@ -67,10 +72,10 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
}
/*
- * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a socket can be used
- * with the corresponding xfrm_sec_ctx and direction.
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use
+ * a xfrm policy rule.
*/
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir)
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
{
int rc = 0;
u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
@@ -84,27 +89,129 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir)
sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
}
- rc = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
- ((dir == FLOW_DIR_IN) ? ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM :
- ((dir == FLOW_DIR_OUT) ? ASSOCIATION__SENDTO :
- (ASSOCIATION__SENDTO | ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM))),
+ rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+ ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
NULL);
return rc;
}
/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches
+ * the given policy, flow combo.
+ */
+
+int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+ struct flowi *fl)
+{
+ u32 state_sid;
+ u32 pol_sid;
+ int err;
+
+ if (x->security)
+ state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
+ else
+ state_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+ if (xp->security)
+ pol_sid = xp->security->ctx_sid;
+ else
+ pol_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+ err = avc_has_perm(state_sid, pol_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+ ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
+ NULL);
+
+ if (err)
+ return 0;
+
+ return selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(fl, x);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a particular outgoing flow
+ * can use a given security association.
+ */
+
+int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
+
+ /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
+ if ((ctx = xfrm->security)) {
+ if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
+ return 0;
+
+ sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+ }
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+ ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
+ NULL)? 0:1;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that determines the sid for the session.
+ */
+
+int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
+{
+ struct sec_path *sp;
+
+ fl->secid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+ if (skb == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ sp = skb->sp;
+ if (sp) {
+ int i, sid_set = 0;
+
+ for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
+ if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+
+ if (!sid_set) {
+ fl->secid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+ sid_set = 1;
+ }
+ else if (fl->secid != ctx->ctx_sid)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
* Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state
* CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
*/
-static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 sid)
{
int rc = 0;
struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+ char *ctx_str = NULL;
+ u32 str_len;
+ u32 ctx_sid;
+
+ BUG_ON(uctx && pol);
+
+ if (pol)
+ goto from_policy;
BUG_ON(!uctx);
- BUG_ON(uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX);
+
+ if (uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
+ return -EINVAL;
if (uctx->ctx_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -141,9 +248,41 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_us
return rc;
+from_policy:
+ BUG_ON(!pol);
+ rc = security_sid_mls_copy(pol->ctx_sid, sid, &ctx_sid);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(ctx_sid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
+ str_len,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+
+ if (!ctx) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+
+ ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
+ ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
+ ctx->ctx_sid = ctx_sid;
+ ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
+ memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
+ ctx_str,
+ str_len);
+
+ goto out2;
+
out:
*ctxp = NULL;
kfree(ctx);
+out2:
+ kfree(ctx_str);
return rc;
}
@@ -157,7 +296,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *
BUG_ON(!xp);
- err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx);
+ err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx, NULL, 0);
return err;
}
@@ -217,13 +356,14 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
* LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers sec_ctx spec to
* xfrm_state.
*/
-int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 secid)
{
int err;
BUG_ON(!x);
- err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx);
+ err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, pol, secid);
return err;
}
@@ -329,38 +469,30 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
* we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have
* gone thru the IPSec process.
*/
-int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
+int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct avc_audit_data *ad)
{
int i, rc = 0;
struct sec_path *sp;
+ u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sp = skb->sp;
if (sp) {
- /*
- * __xfrm_policy_check does not approve unless xfrm_policy_ok
- * says that spi's match for policy and the socket.
- *
- * Only need to verify the existence of an authorizable sp.
- */
for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) {
struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
- if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
- goto accept;
+ if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+ sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+ break;
+ }
}
}
- /* check SELinux sock for unlabelled access */
- rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
- ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, NULL);
- if (rc)
- goto drop;
-
-accept:
- return 0;
+ rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+ ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
-drop:
return rc;
}
@@ -371,7 +503,8 @@ drop:
* If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
* checked in xfrm_policy_lookup hook.
*/
-int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
+int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct avc_audit_data *ad)
{
struct dst_entry *dst;
int rc = 0;
@@ -391,7 +524,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
- ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, NULL);
+ ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
out:
return rc;
}
OpenPOWER on IntegriCloud