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-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/Makefile4
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy.c24
-rw-r--r--security/capability.c4
-rw-r--r--security/device_cgroup.c412
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h6
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c16
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c114
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c18
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c6
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key_auth.c8
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted.c16
-rw-r--r--security/keys/user_defined.c14
-rw-r--r--security/security.c4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c22
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c2
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c4
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/common.h2
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/mount.c5
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c4
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/util.c9
21 files changed, 432 insertions, 264 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index 806bd19..5706b74 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -57,9 +57,9 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
$(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
$(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
-$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \
+$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
$(src)/Makefile
$(call cmd,make-caps)
-$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h \
+$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \
$(src)/Makefile
$(call cmd,make-rlim)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index cf5fd22..8132003 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -724,6 +724,8 @@ fail:
*/
static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
{
+ struct aa_profile *p;
+
AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile);
if (!profile)
@@ -751,7 +753,27 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
- aa_put_profile(profile->replacedby);
+ /* put the profile reference for replacedby, but not via
+ * put_profile(kref_put).
+ * replacedby can form a long chain that can result in cascading
+ * frees that blows the stack because kref_put makes a nested fn
+ * call (it looks like recursion, with free_profile calling
+ * free_profile) for each profile in the chain lp#1056078.
+ */
+ for (p = profile->replacedby; p; ) {
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&p->base.count.refcount)) {
+ /* no more refs on p, grab its replacedby */
+ struct aa_profile *next = p->replacedby;
+ /* break the chain */
+ p->replacedby = NULL;
+ /* now free p, chain is broken */
+ free_profile(p);
+
+ /* follow up with next profile in the chain */
+ p = next;
+ } else
+ break;
+ }
kzfree(profile);
}
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index a40aac6..b14a30c 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -74,8 +74,8 @@ static int cap_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
return 0;
}
-static int cap_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type,
- unsigned long flags, void *data)
+static int cap_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
+ const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index 4b877a9..842c254 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -26,12 +26,12 @@
static DEFINE_MUTEX(devcgroup_mutex);
/*
- * whitelist locking rules:
+ * exception list locking rules:
* hold devcgroup_mutex for update/read.
* hold rcu_read_lock() for read.
*/
-struct dev_whitelist_item {
+struct dev_exception_item {
u32 major, minor;
short type;
short access;
@@ -41,7 +41,11 @@ struct dev_whitelist_item {
struct dev_cgroup {
struct cgroup_subsys_state css;
- struct list_head whitelist;
+ struct list_head exceptions;
+ enum {
+ DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW,
+ DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY,
+ } behavior;
};
static inline struct dev_cgroup *css_to_devcgroup(struct cgroup_subsys_state *s)
@@ -74,12 +78,12 @@ static int devcgroup_can_attach(struct cgroup *new_cgrp,
/*
* called under devcgroup_mutex
*/
-static int dev_whitelist_copy(struct list_head *dest, struct list_head *orig)
+static int dev_exceptions_copy(struct list_head *dest, struct list_head *orig)
{
- struct dev_whitelist_item *wh, *tmp, *new;
+ struct dev_exception_item *ex, *tmp, *new;
- list_for_each_entry(wh, orig, list) {
- new = kmemdup(wh, sizeof(*wh), GFP_KERNEL);
+ list_for_each_entry(ex, orig, list) {
+ new = kmemdup(ex, sizeof(*ex), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
goto free_and_exit;
list_add_tail(&new->list, dest);
@@ -88,64 +92,60 @@ static int dev_whitelist_copy(struct list_head *dest, struct list_head *orig)
return 0;
free_and_exit:
- list_for_each_entry_safe(wh, tmp, dest, list) {
- list_del(&wh->list);
- kfree(wh);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(ex, tmp, dest, list) {
+ list_del(&ex->list);
+ kfree(ex);
}
return -ENOMEM;
}
-/* Stupid prototype - don't bother combining existing entries */
/*
* called under devcgroup_mutex
*/
-static int dev_whitelist_add(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
- struct dev_whitelist_item *wh)
+static int dev_exception_add(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
+ struct dev_exception_item *ex)
{
- struct dev_whitelist_item *whcopy, *walk;
+ struct dev_exception_item *excopy, *walk;
- whcopy = kmemdup(wh, sizeof(*wh), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!whcopy)
+ excopy = kmemdup(ex, sizeof(*ex), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!excopy)
return -ENOMEM;
- list_for_each_entry(walk, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) {
- if (walk->type != wh->type)
+ list_for_each_entry(walk, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) {
+ if (walk->type != ex->type)
continue;
- if (walk->major != wh->major)
+ if (walk->major != ex->major)
continue;
- if (walk->minor != wh->minor)
+ if (walk->minor != ex->minor)
continue;
- walk->access |= wh->access;
- kfree(whcopy);
- whcopy = NULL;
+ walk->access |= ex->access;
+ kfree(excopy);
+ excopy = NULL;
}
- if (whcopy != NULL)
- list_add_tail_rcu(&whcopy->list, &dev_cgroup->whitelist);
+ if (excopy != NULL)
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&excopy->list, &dev_cgroup->exceptions);
return 0;
}
/*
* called under devcgroup_mutex
*/
-static void dev_whitelist_rm(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
- struct dev_whitelist_item *wh)
+static void dev_exception_rm(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
+ struct dev_exception_item *ex)
{
- struct dev_whitelist_item *walk, *tmp;
+ struct dev_exception_item *walk, *tmp;
- list_for_each_entry_safe(walk, tmp, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) {
- if (walk->type == DEV_ALL)
- goto remove;
- if (walk->type != wh->type)
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(walk, tmp, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) {
+ if (walk->type != ex->type)
continue;
- if (walk->major != ~0 && walk->major != wh->major)
+ if (walk->major != ex->major)
continue;
- if (walk->minor != ~0 && walk->minor != wh->minor)
+ if (walk->minor != ex->minor)
continue;
-remove:
- walk->access &= ~wh->access;
+ walk->access &= ~ex->access;
if (!walk->access) {
list_del_rcu(&walk->list);
kfree_rcu(walk, rcu);
@@ -153,6 +153,22 @@ remove:
}
}
+/**
+ * dev_exception_clean - frees all entries of the exception list
+ * @dev_cgroup: dev_cgroup with the exception list to be cleaned
+ *
+ * called under devcgroup_mutex
+ */
+static void dev_exception_clean(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup)
+{
+ struct dev_exception_item *ex, *tmp;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(ex, tmp, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) {
+ list_del(&ex->list);
+ kfree(ex);
+ }
+}
+
/*
* called from kernel/cgroup.c with cgroup_lock() held.
*/
@@ -165,25 +181,17 @@ static struct cgroup_subsys_state *devcgroup_create(struct cgroup *cgroup)
dev_cgroup = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev_cgroup), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev_cgroup)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev_cgroup->whitelist);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev_cgroup->exceptions);
parent_cgroup = cgroup->parent;
- if (parent_cgroup == NULL) {
- struct dev_whitelist_item *wh;
- wh = kmalloc(sizeof(*wh), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!wh) {
- kfree(dev_cgroup);
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- }
- wh->minor = wh->major = ~0;
- wh->type = DEV_ALL;
- wh->access = ACC_MASK;
- list_add(&wh->list, &dev_cgroup->whitelist);
- } else {
+ if (parent_cgroup == NULL)
+ dev_cgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
+ else {
parent_dev_cgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(parent_cgroup);
mutex_lock(&devcgroup_mutex);
- ret = dev_whitelist_copy(&dev_cgroup->whitelist,
- &parent_dev_cgroup->whitelist);
+ ret = dev_exceptions_copy(&dev_cgroup->exceptions,
+ &parent_dev_cgroup->exceptions);
+ dev_cgroup->behavior = parent_dev_cgroup->behavior;
mutex_unlock(&devcgroup_mutex);
if (ret) {
kfree(dev_cgroup);
@@ -197,13 +205,9 @@ static struct cgroup_subsys_state *devcgroup_create(struct cgroup *cgroup)
static void devcgroup_destroy(struct cgroup *cgroup)
{
struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
- struct dev_whitelist_item *wh, *tmp;
dev_cgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(cgroup);
- list_for_each_entry_safe(wh, tmp, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) {
- list_del(&wh->list);
- kfree(wh);
- }
+ dev_exception_clean(dev_cgroup);
kfree(dev_cgroup);
}
@@ -249,59 +253,87 @@ static int devcgroup_seq_read(struct cgroup *cgroup, struct cftype *cft,
struct seq_file *m)
{
struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(cgroup);
- struct dev_whitelist_item *wh;
+ struct dev_exception_item *ex;
char maj[MAJMINLEN], min[MAJMINLEN], acc[ACCLEN];
rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(wh, &devcgroup->whitelist, list) {
- set_access(acc, wh->access);
- set_majmin(maj, wh->major);
- set_majmin(min, wh->minor);
- seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(wh->type),
+ /*
+ * To preserve the compatibility:
+ * - Only show the "all devices" when the default policy is to allow
+ * - List the exceptions in case the default policy is to deny
+ * This way, the file remains as a "whitelist of devices"
+ */
+ if (devcgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) {
+ set_access(acc, ACC_MASK);
+ set_majmin(maj, ~0);
+ set_majmin(min, ~0);
+ seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(DEV_ALL),
maj, min, acc);
+ } else {
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, &devcgroup->exceptions, list) {
+ set_access(acc, ex->access);
+ set_majmin(maj, ex->major);
+ set_majmin(min, ex->minor);
+ seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(ex->type),
+ maj, min, acc);
+ }
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
-/*
- * may_access_whitelist:
- * does the access granted to dev_cgroup c contain the access
- * requested in whitelist item refwh.
- * return 1 if yes, 0 if no.
- * call with devcgroup_mutex held
+/**
+ * may_access - verifies if a new exception is part of what is allowed
+ * by a dev cgroup based on the default policy +
+ * exceptions. This is used to make sure a child cgroup
+ * won't have more privileges than its parent or to
+ * verify if a certain access is allowed.
+ * @dev_cgroup: dev cgroup to be tested against
+ * @refex: new exception
*/
-static int may_access_whitelist(struct dev_cgroup *c,
- struct dev_whitelist_item *refwh)
+static int may_access(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
+ struct dev_exception_item *refex)
{
- struct dev_whitelist_item *whitem;
+ struct dev_exception_item *ex;
+ bool match = false;
- list_for_each_entry(whitem, &c->whitelist, list) {
- if (whitem->type & DEV_ALL)
- return 1;
- if ((refwh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(whitem->type & DEV_BLOCK))
+ list_for_each_entry(ex, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) {
+ if ((refex->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEV_BLOCK))
continue;
- if ((refwh->type & DEV_CHAR) && !(whitem->type & DEV_CHAR))
+ if ((refex->type & DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEV_CHAR))
continue;
- if (whitem->major != ~0 && whitem->major != refwh->major)
+ if (ex->major != ~0 && ex->major != refex->major)
continue;
- if (whitem->minor != ~0 && whitem->minor != refwh->minor)
+ if (ex->minor != ~0 && ex->minor != refex->minor)
continue;
- if (refwh->access & (~whitem->access))
+ if (refex->access & (~ex->access))
continue;
- return 1;
+ match = true;
+ break;
}
+
+ /*
+ * In two cases we'll consider this new exception valid:
+ * - the dev cgroup has its default policy to allow + exception list:
+ * the new exception should *not* match any of the exceptions
+ * (behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW, !match)
+ * - the dev cgroup has its default policy to deny + exception list:
+ * the new exception *should* match the exceptions
+ * (behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY, match)
+ */
+ if ((dev_cgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY) == match)
+ return 1;
return 0;
}
/*
* parent_has_perm:
- * when adding a new allow rule to a device whitelist, the rule
+ * when adding a new allow rule to a device exception list, the rule
* must be allowed in the parent device
*/
static int parent_has_perm(struct dev_cgroup *childcg,
- struct dev_whitelist_item *wh)
+ struct dev_exception_item *ex)
{
struct cgroup *pcg = childcg->css.cgroup->parent;
struct dev_cgroup *parent;
@@ -309,17 +341,28 @@ static int parent_has_perm(struct dev_cgroup *childcg,
if (!pcg)
return 1;
parent = cgroup_to_devcgroup(pcg);
- return may_access_whitelist(parent, wh);
+ return may_access(parent, ex);
+}
+
+/**
+ * may_allow_all - checks if it's possible to change the behavior to
+ * allow based on parent's rules.
+ * @parent: device cgroup's parent
+ * returns: != 0 in case it's allowed, 0 otherwise
+ */
+static inline int may_allow_all(struct dev_cgroup *parent)
+{
+ return parent->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
}
/*
- * Modify the whitelist using allow/deny rules.
+ * Modify the exception list using allow/deny rules.
* CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed for this. It's at least separate from CAP_MKNOD
* so we can give a container CAP_MKNOD to let it create devices but not
- * modify the whitelist.
+ * modify the exception list.
* It seems likely we'll want to add a CAP_CONTAINER capability to allow
* us to also grant CAP_SYS_ADMIN to containers without giving away the
- * device whitelist controls, but for now we'll stick with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+ * device exception list controls, but for now we'll stick with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
*
* Taking rules away is always allowed (given CAP_SYS_ADMIN). Granting
* new access is only allowed if you're in the top-level cgroup, or your
@@ -329,28 +372,44 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
int filetype, const char *buffer)
{
const char *b;
- char *endp;
- int count;
- struct dev_whitelist_item wh;
+ char temp[12]; /* 11 + 1 characters needed for a u32 */
+ int count, rc;
+ struct dev_exception_item ex;
+ struct cgroup *p = devcgroup->css.cgroup;
+ struct dev_cgroup *parent = cgroup_to_devcgroup(p->parent);
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- memset(&wh, 0, sizeof(wh));
+ memset(&ex, 0, sizeof(ex));
b = buffer;
switch (*b) {
case 'a':
- wh.type = DEV_ALL;
- wh.access = ACC_MASK;
- wh.major = ~0;
- wh.minor = ~0;
- goto handle;
+ switch (filetype) {
+ case DEVCG_ALLOW:
+ if (!may_allow_all(parent))
+ return -EPERM;
+ dev_exception_clean(devcgroup);
+ rc = dev_exceptions_copy(&devcgroup->exceptions,
+ &parent->exceptions);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
+ break;
+ case DEVCG_DENY:
+ dev_exception_clean(devcgroup);
+ devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
case 'b':
- wh.type = DEV_BLOCK;
+ ex.type = DEV_BLOCK;
break;
case 'c':
- wh.type = DEV_CHAR;
+ ex.type = DEV_CHAR;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
@@ -360,11 +419,19 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
return -EINVAL;
b++;
if (*b == '*') {
- wh.major = ~0;
+ ex.major = ~0;
b++;
} else if (isdigit(*b)) {
- wh.major = simple_strtoul(b, &endp, 10);
- b = endp;
+ memset(temp, 0, sizeof(temp));
+ for (count = 0; count < sizeof(temp) - 1; count++) {
+ temp[count] = *b;
+ b++;
+ if (!isdigit(*b))
+ break;
+ }
+ rc = kstrtou32(temp, 10, &ex.major);
+ if (rc)
+ return -EINVAL;
} else {
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -374,11 +441,19 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
/* read minor */
if (*b == '*') {
- wh.minor = ~0;
+ ex.minor = ~0;
b++;
} else if (isdigit(*b)) {
- wh.minor = simple_strtoul(b, &endp, 10);
- b = endp;
+ memset(temp, 0, sizeof(temp));
+ for (count = 0; count < sizeof(temp) - 1; count++) {
+ temp[count] = *b;
+ b++;
+ if (!isdigit(*b))
+ break;
+ }
+ rc = kstrtou32(temp, 10, &ex.minor);
+ if (rc)
+ return -EINVAL;
} else {
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -387,13 +462,13 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
for (b++, count = 0; count < 3; count++, b++) {
switch (*b) {
case 'r':
- wh.access |= ACC_READ;
+ ex.access |= ACC_READ;
break;
case 'w':
- wh.access |= ACC_WRITE;
+ ex.access |= ACC_WRITE;
break;
case 'm':
- wh.access |= ACC_MKNOD;
+ ex.access |= ACC_MKNOD;
break;
case '\n':
case '\0':
@@ -404,15 +479,31 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
}
}
-handle:
switch (filetype) {
case DEVCG_ALLOW:
- if (!parent_has_perm(devcgroup, &wh))
+ if (!parent_has_perm(devcgroup, &ex))
return -EPERM;
- return dev_whitelist_add(devcgroup, &wh);
+ /*
+ * If the default policy is to allow by default, try to remove
+ * an matching exception instead. And be silent about it: we
+ * don't want to break compatibility
+ */
+ if (devcgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) {
+ dev_exception_rm(devcgroup, &ex);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return dev_exception_add(devcgroup, &ex);
case DEVCG_DENY:
- dev_whitelist_rm(devcgroup, &wh);
- break;
+ /*
+ * If the default policy is to deny by default, try to remove
+ * an matching exception instead. And be silent about it: we
+ * don't want to break compatibility
+ */
+ if (devcgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY) {
+ dev_exception_rm(devcgroup, &ex);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return dev_exception_add(devcgroup, &ex);
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -468,73 +559,70 @@ struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys = {
.broken_hierarchy = true,
};
-int __devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+/**
+ * __devcgroup_check_permission - checks if an inode operation is permitted
+ * @dev_cgroup: the dev cgroup to be tested against
+ * @type: device type
+ * @major: device major number
+ * @minor: device minor number
+ * @access: combination of ACC_WRITE, ACC_READ and ACC_MKNOD
+ *
+ * returns 0 on success, -EPERM case the operation is not permitted
+ */
+static int __devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor,
+ short access)
{
struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
- struct dev_whitelist_item *wh;
+ struct dev_exception_item ex;
+ int rc;
- rcu_read_lock();
+ memset(&ex, 0, sizeof(ex));
+ ex.type = type;
+ ex.major = major;
+ ex.minor = minor;
+ ex.access = access;
+ rcu_read_lock();
dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current);
+ rc = may_access(dev_cgroup, &ex);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(wh, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) {
- if (wh->type & DEV_ALL)
- goto found;
- if ((wh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode))
- continue;
- if ((wh->type & DEV_CHAR) && !S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode))
- continue;
- if (wh->major != ~0 && wh->major != imajor(inode))
- continue;
- if (wh->minor != ~0 && wh->minor != iminor(inode))
- continue;
-
- if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && !(wh->access & ACC_WRITE))
- continue;
- if ((mask & MAY_READ) && !(wh->access & ACC_READ))
- continue;
-found:
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return 0;
- }
+ if (!rc)
+ return -EPERM;
- rcu_read_unlock();
+ return 0;
+}
- return -EPERM;
+int __devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+ short type, access = 0;
+
+ if (S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode))
+ type = DEV_BLOCK;
+ if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode))
+ type = DEV_CHAR;
+ if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
+ access |= ACC_WRITE;
+ if (mask & MAY_READ)
+ access |= ACC_READ;
+
+ return __devcgroup_check_permission(type, imajor(inode), iminor(inode),
+ access);
}
int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev)
{
- struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
- struct dev_whitelist_item *wh;
+ short type;
if (!S_ISBLK(mode) && !S_ISCHR(mode))
return 0;
- rcu_read_lock();
-
- dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current);
-
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(wh, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) {
- if (wh->type & DEV_ALL)
- goto found;
- if ((wh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !S_ISBLK(mode))
- continue;
- if ((wh->type & DEV_CHAR) && !S_ISCHR(mode))
- continue;
- if (wh->major != ~0 && wh->major != MAJOR(dev))
- continue;
- if (wh->minor != ~0 && wh->minor != MINOR(dev))
- continue;
-
- if (!(wh->access & ACC_MKNOD))
- continue;
-found:
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return 0;
- }
+ if (S_ISBLK(mode))
+ type = DEV_BLOCK;
+ else
+ type = DEV_CHAR;
- rcu_read_unlock();
+ return __devcgroup_check_permission(type, MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev),
+ ACC_MKNOD);
- return -EPERM;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 8180add..6ee8826 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename);
-int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
+int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
#else
@@ -154,8 +154,8 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
}
-static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
+static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask,
+ enum ima_hooks func)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 0aa43bd..bdc8ba1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ __setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup);
*
* Return 1 to appraise
*/
-int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
+int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 2d1bb8a..9e1e005 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -773,8 +773,8 @@ static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
*
* On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
*/
-static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
- size_t datalen)
+static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key,
+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
char *datablob = NULL;
@@ -782,16 +782,17 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
char *master_desc = NULL;
char *decrypted_datalen = NULL;
char *hex_encoded_iv = NULL;
+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
int ret;
- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
return -EINVAL;
datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!datablob)
return -ENOMEM;
datablob[datalen] = 0;
- memcpy(datablob, data, datalen);
+ memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &format, &master_desc,
&decrypted_datalen, &hex_encoded_iv);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -834,16 +835,17 @@ static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
*
* On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
*/
-static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
+static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data;
struct encrypted_key_payload *new_epayload;
char *buf;
char *new_master_desc = NULL;
const char *format = NULL;
+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
int ret = 0;
- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
return -EINVAL;
buf = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -851,7 +853,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
return -ENOMEM;
buf[datalen] = 0;
- memcpy(buf, data, datalen);
+ memcpy(buf, prep->data, datalen);
ret = datablob_parse(buf, &format, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index a30e927..a15c9da 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -405,8 +405,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_payload_reserve);
* key_construction_mutex.
*/
static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
- const void *data,
- size_t datalen,
+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep,
struct key *keyring,
struct key *authkey,
unsigned long *_prealloc)
@@ -424,7 +423,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
/* can't instantiate twice */
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
/* instantiate the key */
- ret = key->type->instantiate(key, data, datalen);
+ ret = key->type->instantiate(key, prep);
if (ret == 0) {
/* mark the key as being instantiated */
@@ -475,22 +474,37 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
struct key *keyring,
struct key *authkey)
{
+ struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
unsigned long prealloc;
int ret;
+ memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
+ prep.data = data;
+ prep.datalen = datalen;
+ prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen;
+ if (key->type->preparse) {
+ ret = key->type->preparse(&prep);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+ }
+
if (keyring) {
ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description,
&prealloc);
if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ goto error_free_preparse;
}
- ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, data, datalen, keyring, authkey,
+ ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, authkey,
&prealloc);
if (keyring)
__key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc);
+error_free_preparse:
+ if (key->type->preparse)
+ key->type->free_preparse(&prep);
+error:
return ret;
}
@@ -699,7 +713,7 @@ void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype)
* if we get an error.
*/
static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref,
- const void *payload, size_t plen)
+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
int ret;
@@ -715,7 +729,7 @@ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref,
down_write(&key->sem);
- ret = key->type->update(key, payload, plen);
+ ret = key->type->update(key, prep);
if (ret == 0)
/* updating a negative key instantiates it */
clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
@@ -767,6 +781,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
unsigned long flags)
{
unsigned long prealloc;
+ struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key_type *ktype;
struct key *keyring, *key = NULL;
@@ -782,8 +797,9 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
}
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- if (!ktype->match || !ktype->instantiate)
- goto error_2;
+ if (!ktype->match || !ktype->instantiate ||
+ (!description && !ktype->preparse))
+ goto error_put_type;
keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
@@ -791,18 +807,37 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
- goto error_2;
+ goto error_put_type;
+
+ memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
+ prep.data = payload;
+ prep.datalen = plen;
+ prep.quotalen = ktype->def_datalen;
+ if (ktype->preparse) {
+ ret = ktype->preparse(&prep);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
+ goto error_put_type;
+ }
+ if (!description)
+ description = prep.description;
+ key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ if (!description)
+ goto error_free_prep;
+ }
ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, ktype, description, &prealloc);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error_2;
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
+ goto error_free_prep;
+ }
/* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have
* to modify the keyring */
ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_WRITE);
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
- goto error_3;
+ goto error_link_end;
}
/* if it's possible to update this type of key, search for an existing
@@ -833,25 +868,27 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
perm, flags);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
- goto error_3;
+ goto error_link_end;
}
/* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */
- ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, payload, plen, keyring, NULL,
- &prealloc);
+ ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, NULL, &prealloc);
if (ret < 0) {
key_put(key);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
- goto error_3;
+ goto error_link_end;
}
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
- error_3:
+error_link_end:
__key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc);
- error_2:
+error_free_prep:
+ if (ktype->preparse)
+ ktype->free_preparse(&prep);
+error_put_type:
key_type_put(ktype);
- error:
+error:
return key_ref;
found_matching_key:
@@ -859,10 +896,9 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
* - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned
*/
__key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc);
- key_type_put(ktype);
- key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, payload, plen);
- goto error;
+ key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
+ goto error_free_prep;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_create_or_update);
@@ -881,6 +917,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_create_or_update);
*/
int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
{
+ struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
int ret;
@@ -893,18 +930,31 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
/* attempt to update it if supported */
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (key->type->update) {
- down_write(&key->sem);
-
- ret = key->type->update(key, payload, plen);
- if (ret == 0)
- /* updating a negative key instantiates it */
- clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
+ if (!key->type->update)
+ goto error;
- up_write(&key->sem);
+ memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
+ prep.data = payload;
+ prep.datalen = plen;
+ prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen;
+ if (key->type->preparse) {
+ ret = key->type->preparse(&prep);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
}
- error:
+ down_write(&key->sem);
+
+ ret = key->type->update(key, &prep);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ /* updating a negative key instantiates it */
+ clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
+
+ up_write(&key->sem);
+
+ if (key->type->preparse)
+ key->type->free_preparse(&prep);
+error:
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 305ecb7..5d34b4e 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type,
* Extract the description of a new key from userspace and either add it as a
* new key to the specified keyring or update a matching key in that keyring.
*
+ * If the description is NULL or an empty string, the key type is asked to
+ * generate one from the payload.
+ *
* The keyring must be writable so that we can attach the key to it.
*
* If successful, the new key's serial number is returned, otherwise an error
@@ -72,10 +75,17 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE);
- if (IS_ERR(description)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(description);
- goto error;
+ description = NULL;
+ if (_description) {
+ description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (IS_ERR(description)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(description);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (!*description) {
+ kfree(description);
+ description = NULL;
+ }
}
/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index a5f5c4b..6e42df1 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static inline unsigned keyring_hash(const char *desc)
* operations.
*/
static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
- const void *data, size_t datalen);
+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *criterion);
static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring);
static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring);
@@ -121,12 +121,12 @@ static void keyring_publish_name(struct key *keyring)
* Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL if given any data.
*/
static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
- const void *data, size_t datalen)
+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
int ret;
ret = -EINVAL;
- if (datalen == 0) {
+ if (prep->datalen == 0) {
/* make the keyring available by name if it has one */
keyring_publish_name(keyring);
ret = 0;
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 60d4e3f..85730d5 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include "internal.h"
-static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *, const void *, size_t);
+static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *,
+ struct key_preparsed_payload *);
static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *);
static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *);
static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *);
@@ -42,10 +43,9 @@ struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = {
* Instantiate a request-key authorisation key.
*/
static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key,
- const void *data,
- size_t datalen)
+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- key->payload.data = (struct request_key_auth *) data;
+ key->payload.data = (struct request_key_auth *)prep->data;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index 3f163d0..e13fcf7 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -895,23 +895,24 @@ static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key)
*
* On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
*/
-static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
- size_t datalen)
+static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL;
struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
char *datablob;
int ret = 0;
int key_cmd;
size_t key_len;
- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
return -EINVAL;
datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!datablob)
return -ENOMEM;
- memcpy(datablob, data, datalen);
+ memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
datablob[datalen] = '\0';
options = trusted_options_alloc();
@@ -981,17 +982,18 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
/*
* trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values
*/
-static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
+static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data;
struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
struct trusted_key_options *new_o;
+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
char *datablob;
int ret = 0;
if (!p->migratable)
return -EPERM;
- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
return -EINVAL;
datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1008,7 +1010,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
goto out;
}
- memcpy(datablob, data, datalen);
+ memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
datablob[datalen] = '\0';
ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);
if (ret != Opt_update) {
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index c7660a2..55dc889 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -58,13 +58,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_logon);
/*
* instantiate a user defined key
*/
-int user_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
+int user_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct user_key_payload *upayload;
+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
int ret;
ret = -EINVAL;
- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
goto error;
ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen);
@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ int user_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
/* attach the data */
upayload->datalen = datalen;
- memcpy(upayload->data, data, datalen);
+ memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen);
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, upayload);
ret = 0;
@@ -92,13 +93,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_instantiate);
* update a user defined key
* - the key's semaphore is write-locked
*/
-int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
+int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct user_key_payload *upayload, *zap;
+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
int ret;
ret = -EINVAL;
- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
goto error;
/* construct a replacement payload */
@@ -108,7 +110,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
goto error;
upayload->datalen = datalen;
- memcpy(upayload->data, data, datalen);
+ memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen);
/* check the quota and attach the new data */
zap = upayload;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3724029..8dcd4ae 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -276,8 +276,8 @@ int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
return security_ops->sb_statfs(dentry);
}
-int security_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
- char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
+int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
+ const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
{
return security_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 651d845..61a5336 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2132,18 +2132,14 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
return;
devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
- if (!IS_ERR(devnull)) {
- /* replace all the matching ones with this */
- do {
- replace_fd(n - 1, get_file(devnull), 0);
- } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(devnull))
+ devnull = NULL;
+ /* replace all the matching ones with this */
+ do {
+ replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
+ } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
+ if (devnull)
fput(devnull);
- } else {
- /* just close all the matching ones */
- do {
- replace_fd(n - 1, NULL, 0);
- } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
- }
}
/*
@@ -2452,9 +2448,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
}
-static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
+static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
struct path *path,
- char *type,
+ const char *type,
unsigned long flags,
void *data)
{
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 55af8c5..3a6e873 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ static int sel_mmap_policy(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
return -EACCES;
}
- vma->vm_flags |= VM_RESERVED;
+ vma->vm_flags |= VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP;
vma->vm_ops = &sel_mmap_policy_ops;
return 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 2874c73..38be92c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -408,8 +408,8 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
* Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem
* being mounted on, an error code otherwise.
*/
-static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
- char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
+static int smack_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
+ const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
{
struct superblock_smack *sbp = path->dentry->d_sb->s_security;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index af010b6..d4f166b 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ int tomoyo_init_request_info(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
const u8 index);
int tomoyo_mkdev_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path,
const unsigned int mode, unsigned int dev);
-int tomoyo_mount_permission(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
+int tomoyo_mount_permission(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
const char *type, unsigned long flags,
void *data_page);
int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file);
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/mount.c b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
index fe00cdf..390c646 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/mount.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
@@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ static bool tomoyo_check_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
*
* Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
*/
-static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, char *dev_name,
+static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+ const char *dev_name,
struct path *dir, const char *type,
unsigned long flags)
{
@@ -183,7 +184,7 @@ static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, char *dev_name,
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
-int tomoyo_mount_permission(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
+int tomoyo_mount_permission(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
const char *type, unsigned long flags,
void *data_page)
{
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index d88eb3a..a2ee362 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -408,8 +408,8 @@ static int tomoyo_path_chroot(struct path *path)
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
-static int tomoyo_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
- char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
+static int tomoyo_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
+ const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
{
return tomoyo_mount_permission(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/util.c b/security/tomoyo/util.c
index 867558c..2952ba5 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/util.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/util.c
@@ -949,18 +949,13 @@ bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
const char *tomoyo_get_exe(void)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
- struct vm_area_struct *vma;
const char *cp = NULL;
if (!mm)
return NULL;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
- for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
- if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file) {
- cp = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&vma->vm_file->f_path);
- break;
- }
- }
+ if (mm->exe_file)
+ cp = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&mm->exe_file->f_path);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return cp;
}
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