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-rw-r--r--security/capability.c58
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c830
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h49
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c25
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c210
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c15
-rw-r--r--security/keys/permission.c29
-rw-r--r--security/keys/proc.c8
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c469
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c135
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key_auth.c46
-rw-r--r--security/root_plug.c13
-rw-r--r--security/security.c103
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/exports.c8
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c1254
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h5
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/flask.h1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/objsec.h11
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c13
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/xfrm.c6
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_access.c4
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c176
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c6
26 files changed, 1988 insertions, 1493 deletions
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 2458748..2dce66f 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -32,24 +32,19 @@ static int cap_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
return 0;
}
-static int cap_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int cap_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
return 0;
}
-static void cap_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static void cap_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
}
-static void cap_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static void cap_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
}
-static int cap_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static int cap_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
{
return 0;
@@ -64,7 +59,7 @@ static int cap_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
return 0;
}
-static int cap_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+static int cap_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -330,7 +325,7 @@ static int cap_file_receive(struct file *file)
return 0;
}
-static int cap_dentry_open(struct file *file)
+static int cap_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -340,15 +335,29 @@ static int cap_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
return 0;
}
-static int cap_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *p)
+static void cap_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+{
+}
+
+static int cap_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
{
return 0;
}
-static void cap_task_free_security(struct task_struct *p)
+static void cap_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
}
+static int cap_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int cap_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
{
return 0;
@@ -750,7 +759,7 @@ static void cap_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-static int cap_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *ctx,
+static int cap_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
return 0;
@@ -760,7 +769,7 @@ static void cap_key_free(struct key *key)
{
}
-static int cap_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, struct task_struct *context,
+static int cap_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm)
{
return 0;
@@ -814,8 +823,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_may_access);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset_check);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset_set);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, acct);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capable);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quotactl);
@@ -824,11 +832,9 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, syslog);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, settime);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, vm_enough_memory);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_alloc_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_free_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_apply_creds);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_post_apply_creds);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_set_security);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_set_creds);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_committing_creds);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_committed_creds);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_check_security);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_secureexec);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_alloc_security);
@@ -890,10 +896,13 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_open);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_alloc_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_free_security);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_free);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_prepare);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_commit);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setuid);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_post_setuid);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setgid);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setpgid);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getpgid);
@@ -910,7 +919,6 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_wait);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_kill);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_prctl);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_reparent_to_init);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_to_inode);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_permission);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecid);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 3976613..7971354 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -29,7 +30,7 @@
int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective;
+ NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current_cap();
return 0;
}
@@ -39,23 +40,41 @@ int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
-
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
-/*
+/**
+ * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
+ * @tsk: The task to query
+ * @cap: The capability to check for
+ * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
+ *
+ * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
+ * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
+ *
* NOTE WELL: cap_capable() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
- * function. That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable()
- * returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable()
- * returns 1 for this case.
+ * function. That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable() returns 0
+ * when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable() returns 1 for this
+ * case.
*/
-int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
{
+ __u32 cap_raised;
+
/* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
- if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap))
- return 0;
- return -EPERM;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ cap_raised = cap_raised(__task_cred(tsk)->cap_effective, cap);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return cap_raised ? 0 : -EPERM;
}
+/**
+ * cap_settime - Determine whether the current process may set the system clock
+ * @ts: The time to set
+ * @tz: The timezone to set
+ *
+ * Determine whether the current process may set the system clock and timezone
+ * information, returning 0 if permission granted, -ve if denied.
+ */
int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
{
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME))
@@ -63,121 +82,157 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * cap_ptrace_may_access - Determine whether the current process may access
+ * another
+ * @child: The process to be accessed
+ * @mode: The mode of attachment.
+ *
+ * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
+ * granted, -ve if denied.
+ */
int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
{
- /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
- if (cap_issubset(child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
- return 0;
- if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
- return 0;
- return -EPERM;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ if (!cap_issubset(__task_cred(child)->cap_permitted,
+ current_cred()->cap_permitted) &&
+ !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return ret;
}
+/**
+ * cap_ptrace_traceme - Determine whether another process may trace the current
+ * @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer
+ *
+ * Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current
+ * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
+ */
int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
- /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
- if (cap_issubset(current->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted))
- return 0;
- if (has_capability(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
- return 0;
- return -EPERM;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ if (!cap_issubset(current_cred()->cap_permitted,
+ __task_cred(parent)->cap_permitted) &&
+ !has_capability(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return ret;
}
-int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+/**
+ * cap_capget - Retrieve a task's capability sets
+ * @target: The task from which to retrieve the capability sets
+ * @effective: The place to record the effective set
+ * @inheritable: The place to record the inheritable set
+ * @permitted: The place to record the permitted set
+ *
+ * This function retrieves the capabilities of the nominated task and returns
+ * them to the caller.
+ */
+int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
+ const struct cred *cred;
+
/* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */
- *effective = target->cap_effective;
- *inheritable = target->cap_inheritable;
- *permitted = target->cap_permitted;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ cred = __task_cred(target);
+ *effective = cred->cap_effective;
+ *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
+ *permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
-
-static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *target)
-{
- /*
- * No support for remote process capability manipulation with
- * filesystem capability support.
- */
- return (target != current);
-}
-
+/*
+ * Determine whether the inheritable capabilities are limited to the old
+ * permitted set. Returns 1 if they are limited, 0 if they are not.
+ */
static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
{
- /*
- * Return 1 if changes to the inheritable set are limited
- * to the old permitted set. That is, if the current task
- * does *not* possess the CAP_SETPCAP capability.
- */
- return (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0);
-}
-
-static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void) { return 1; }
-
-#else /* ie., ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
-static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *t) { return 0; }
-static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) { return 1; }
-static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void)
-{
- return !capable(CAP_SETPCAP);
+ /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
+ * capability
+ */
+ if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
+ return 0;
+#endif
+ return 1;
}
-#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
-
-int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
-{
- if (cap_block_setpcap(target)) {
- return -EPERM;
- }
- if (cap_inh_is_capped()
- && !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
- cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
- current->cap_permitted))) {
+/**
+ * cap_capset - Validate and apply proposed changes to current's capabilities
+ * @new: The proposed new credentials; alterations should be made here
+ * @old: The current task's current credentials
+ * @effective: A pointer to the proposed new effective capabilities set
+ * @inheritable: A pointer to the proposed new inheritable capabilities set
+ * @permitted: A pointer to the proposed new permitted capabilities set
+ *
+ * This function validates and applies a proposed mass change to the current
+ * process's capability sets. The changes are made to the proposed new
+ * credentials, and assuming no error, will be committed by the caller of LSM.
+ */
+int cap_capset(struct cred *new,
+ const struct cred *old,
+ const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+ if (cap_inh_is_capped() &&
+ !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
+ cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
+ old->cap_permitted)))
/* incapable of using this inheritable set */
return -EPERM;
- }
+
if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
- cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
- current->cap_bset))) {
+ cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
+ old->cap_bset)))
/* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
return -EPERM;
- }
/* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
- if (!cap_issubset (*permitted,
- cap_combine (target->cap_permitted,
- current->cap_permitted))) {
+ if (!cap_issubset(*permitted, old->cap_permitted))
return -EPERM;
- }
/* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */
- if (!cap_issubset (*effective, *permitted)) {
+ if (!cap_issubset(*effective, *permitted))
return -EPERM;
- }
+ new->cap_effective = *effective;
+ new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
+ new->cap_permitted = *permitted;
return 0;
}
-void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
-{
- target->cap_effective = *effective;
- target->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
- target->cap_permitted = *permitted;
-}
-
+/*
+ * Clear proposed capability sets for execve().
+ */
static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- cap_clear(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted);
+ cap_clear(bprm->cred->cap_permitted);
bprm->cap_effective = false;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
+/**
+ * cap_inode_need_killpriv - Determine if inode change affects privileges
+ * @dentry: The inode/dentry in being changed with change marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV
+ *
+ * Determine if an inode having a change applied that's marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV
+ * affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should
+ * inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected?
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if granted; +ve if granted, but inode_killpriv() is required; and
+ * -ve to deny the change.
+ */
int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
@@ -192,6 +247,14 @@ int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
return 1;
}
+/**
+ * cap_inode_killpriv - Erase the security markings on an inode
+ * @dentry: The inode/dentry to alter
+ *
+ * Erase the privilege-enhancing security markings on an inode.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
+ */
int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
@@ -202,19 +265,75 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
}
-static inline int cap_from_disk(struct vfs_cap_data *caps,
- struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned size)
+/*
+ * Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached
+ * to a file.
+ */
+static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
+ struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+ bool *effective)
+{
+ struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
+ unsigned i;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
+ *effective = true;
+
+ CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
+ __u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i];
+ __u32 inheritable = caps->inheritable.cap[i];
+
+ /*
+ * pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
+ */
+ new->cap_permitted.cap[i] =
+ (new->cap_bset.cap[i] & permitted) |
+ (new->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable);
+
+ if (permitted & ~new->cap_permitted.cap[i])
+ /* insufficient to execute correctly */
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For legacy apps, with no internal support for recognizing they
+ * do not have enough capabilities, we return an error if they are
+ * missing some "forced" (aka file-permitted) capabilities.
+ */
+ return *effective ? ret : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract the on-exec-apply capability sets for an executable file.
+ */
+int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps)
{
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
__u32 magic_etc;
unsigned tocopy, i;
- int ret;
+ int size;
+ struct vfs_cap_data caps;
+
+ memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
+
+ if (!inode || !inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
+ return -ENODATA;
+
+ size = inode->i_op->getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &caps,
+ XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
+ if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ /* no data, that's ok */
+ return -ENODATA;
+ if (size < 0)
+ return size;
if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
return -EINVAL;
- magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc);
+ cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps.magic_etc);
- switch ((magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)) {
+ switch (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) {
case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -229,77 +348,48 @@ static inline int cap_from_disk(struct vfs_cap_data *caps,
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) {
- bprm->cap_effective = true;
- } else {
- bprm->cap_effective = false;
- }
-
- ret = 0;
-
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
- __u32 value_cpu;
-
- if (i >= tocopy) {
- /*
- * Legacy capability sets have no upper bits
- */
- bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted.cap[i] = 0;
- continue;
- }
- /*
- * pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
- */
- value_cpu = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].permitted);
- bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted.cap[i] =
- (current->cap_bset.cap[i] & value_cpu) |
- (current->cap_inheritable.cap[i] &
- le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].inheritable));
- if (value_cpu & ~bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted.cap[i]) {
- /*
- * insufficient to execute correctly
- */
- ret = -EPERM;
- }
+ if (i >= tocopy)
+ break;
+ cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].permitted);
+ cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].inheritable);
}
- /*
- * For legacy apps, with no internal support for recognizing they
- * do not have enough capabilities, we return an error if they are
- * missing some "forced" (aka file-permitted) capabilities.
- */
- return bprm->cap_effective ? ret : 0;
+ return 0;
}
-/* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
-static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+/*
+ * Attempt to get the on-exec apply capability sets for an executable file from
+ * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
+ * constructed by execve().
+ */
+static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
int rc = 0;
- struct vfs_cap_data vcaps;
- struct inode *inode;
+ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
+ if (!file_caps_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
return 0;
dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
- inode = dentry->d_inode;
- if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
- goto out;
- rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &vcaps,
- XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
- if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
- /* no data, that's ok */
- rc = 0;
+ rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ if (rc == -EINVAL)
+ printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_vfs_caps_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
+ __func__, rc, bprm->filename);
+ else if (rc == -ENODATA)
+ rc = 0;
goto out;
}
- if (rc < 0)
- goto out;
- rc = cap_from_disk(&vcaps, bprm, rc);
+ rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective);
if (rc == -EINVAL)
printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
__func__, rc, bprm->filename);
@@ -323,18 +413,57 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
return 0;
}
-static inline int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps)
+{
+ memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
+ return -ENODATA;
+}
+
+static inline int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective)
{
bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
return 0;
}
#endif
-int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+/*
+ * Determine whether a exec'ing process's new permitted capabilities should be
+ * limited to just what it already has.
+ *
+ * This prevents processes that are being ptraced from gaining access to
+ * CAP_SETPCAP, unless the process they're tracing already has it, and the
+ * binary they're executing has filecaps that elevate it.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if they should be limited, 0 if they are not.
+ */
+static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void)
+{
+#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
+ if (capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
+ return 0;
+#endif
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
+ * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
+ *
+ * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being
+ * constructed by execve(). The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered,
+ * which won't take effect immediately. Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
+ */
+int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
+ const struct cred *old = current_cred();
+ struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
+ bool effective;
int ret;
- ret = get_file_caps(bprm);
+ effective = false;
+ ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
/*
@@ -342,75 +471,113 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* executables under compatibility mode, we override the
* capability sets for the file.
*
- * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective
- * bit.
+ * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
*/
- if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
+ if (new->euid == 0 || new->uid == 0) {
/* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
- bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted = cap_combine(
- current->cap_bset, current->cap_inheritable
- );
- bprm->cap_effective = (bprm->e_uid == 0);
- ret = 0;
+ new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
+ old->cap_inheritable);
}
+ if (new->euid == 0)
+ effective = true;
}
- return ret;
-}
-
-void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
-{
- if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid ||
- !cap_issubset(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted,
- current->cap_permitted)) {
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
- current->pdeath_signal = 0;
-
- if (unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
- if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
- bprm->e_uid = current->uid;
- bprm->e_gid = current->gid;
- }
- if (cap_limit_ptraced_target()) {
- bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted = cap_intersect(
- bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted,
- current->cap_permitted);
- }
+ /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
+ * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
+ */
+ if ((new->euid != old->uid ||
+ new->egid != old->gid ||
+ !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
+ bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
+ /* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
+ if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
+ new->euid = new->uid;
+ new->egid = new->gid;
}
+ if (cap_limit_ptraced_target())
+ new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,
+ old->cap_permitted);
}
- current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
- current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
+ new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
+ new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
- /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set
- * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual
- * capability rules */
+ /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set in the initial
+ * task. Thus we skip the usual capability rules
+ */
if (!is_global_init(current)) {
- current->cap_permitted = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
- if (bprm->cap_effective)
- current->cap_effective = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
+ if (effective)
+ new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
else
- cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
+ cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
}
+ bprm->cap_effective = effective;
- /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
+ /*
+ * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
+ *
+ * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
+ * 1) cap_effective has all caps
+ * 2) we are root
+ * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
+ * Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
+ *
+ * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
+ * that is interesting information to audit.
+ */
+ if (!cap_isclear(new->cap_effective)) {
+ if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
+ new->euid != 0 || new->uid != 0 ||
+ issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
+ ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
- current->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+ new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+ return 0;
}
-int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+/**
+ * cap_bprm_secureexec - Determine whether a secure execution is required
+ * @bprm: The execution parameters
+ *
+ * Determine whether a secure execution is required, return 1 if it is, and 0
+ * if it is not.
+ *
+ * The credentials have been committed by this point, and so are no longer
+ * available through @bprm->cred.
+ */
+int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- if (current->uid != 0) {
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+ if (cred->uid != 0) {
if (bprm->cap_effective)
return 1;
- if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted))
+ if (!cap_isclear(cred->cap_permitted))
return 1;
}
- return (current->euid != current->uid ||
- current->egid != current->gid);
+ return (cred->euid != cred->uid ||
+ cred->egid != cred->gid);
}
+/**
+ * cap_inode_setxattr - Determine whether an xattr may be altered
+ * @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered
+ * @name: The name of the xattr to be changed
+ * @value: The value that the xattr will be changed to
+ * @size: The size of value
+ * @flags: The replacement flag
+ *
+ * Determine whether an xattr may be altered or set on an inode, returning 0 if
+ * permission is granted, -ve if denied.
+ *
+ * This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get updated or set by those
+ * who aren't privileged to do so.
+ */
int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
@@ -418,28 +585,42 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
- } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+ }
+
+ if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * cap_inode_removexattr - Determine whether an xattr may be removed
+ * @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered
+ * @name: The name of the xattr to be changed
+ *
+ * Determine whether an xattr may be removed from an inode, returning 0 if
+ * permission is granted, -ve if denied.
+ *
+ * This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get removed by those who
+ * aren't privileged to remove them.
+ */
int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
- } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+ }
+
+ if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
-/* moved from kernel/sys.c. */
-/*
+/*
* cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of
* a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid.
*
@@ -453,10 +634,10 @@ int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
* 3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective
* capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities.
*
- * fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should
+ * fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should
* never happen.
*
- * -astor
+ * -astor
*
* cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99
* A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it
@@ -468,61 +649,60 @@ int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
* files..
* Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this.
*/
-static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid (int old_ruid, int old_euid,
- int old_suid)
+static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) &&
- (current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0 && current->suid != 0) &&
+ if ((old->uid == 0 || old->euid == 0 || old->suid == 0) &&
+ (new->uid != 0 && new->euid != 0 && new->suid != 0) &&
!issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) {
- cap_clear (current->cap_permitted);
- cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
- }
- if (old_euid == 0 && current->euid != 0) {
- cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
- }
- if (old_euid != 0 && current->euid == 0) {
- current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted;
+ cap_clear(new->cap_permitted);
+ cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
}
+ if (old->euid == 0 && new->euid != 0)
+ cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
+ if (old->euid != 0 && new->euid == 0)
+ new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
}
-int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
- int flags)
+/**
+ * cap_task_fix_setuid - Fix up the results of setuid() call
+ * @new: The proposed credentials
+ * @old: The current task's current credentials
+ * @flags: Indications of what has changed
+ *
+ * Fix up the results of setuid() call before the credential changes are
+ * actually applied, returning 0 to grant the changes, -ve to deny them.
+ */
+int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
{
switch (flags) {
case LSM_SETID_RE:
case LSM_SETID_ID:
case LSM_SETID_RES:
- /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setreuid/setuid/setresuid. */
- if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
- cap_emulate_setxuid (old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid);
- }
+ /* juggle the capabilities to follow [RES]UID changes unless
+ * otherwise suppressed */
+ if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))
+ cap_emulate_setxuid(new, old);
break;
- case LSM_SETID_FS:
- {
- uid_t old_fsuid = old_ruid;
- /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setfsuid. */
-
- /*
- * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
- * if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
- */
-
- if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
- if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) {
- current->cap_effective =
- cap_drop_fs_set(
- current->cap_effective);
- }
- if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) {
- current->cap_effective =
- cap_raise_fs_set(
- current->cap_effective,
- current->cap_permitted);
- }
- }
- break;
+ case LSM_SETID_FS:
+ /* juggle the capabilties to follow FSUID changes, unless
+ * otherwise suppressed
+ *
+ * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
+ * if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
+ */
+ if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
+ if (old->fsuid == 0 && new->fsuid != 0)
+ new->cap_effective =
+ cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective);
+
+ if (old->fsuid != 0 && new->fsuid == 0)
+ new->cap_effective =
+ cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective,
+ new->cap_permitted);
}
+ break;
+
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -543,42 +723,71 @@ int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
*/
static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
{
- if (!cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
- !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
+ int is_subset;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ is_subset = cap_issubset(__task_cred(p)->cap_permitted,
+ current_cred()->cap_permitted);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (!is_subset && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
-int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
+/**
+ * cap_task_setscheduler - Detemine if scheduler policy change is permitted
+ * @p: The task to affect
+ * @policy: The policy to effect
+ * @lp: The parameters to the scheduling policy
+ *
+ * Detemine if the requested scheduler policy change is permitted for the
+ * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
+ */
+int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
struct sched_param *lp)
{
return cap_safe_nice(p);
}
-int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+/**
+ * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if I/O priority change is permitted
+ * @p: The task to affect
+ * @ioprio: The I/O priority to set
+ *
+ * Detemine if the requested I/O priority change is permitted for the specified
+ * task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
+ */
+int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
{
return cap_safe_nice(p);
}
-int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+/**
+ * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if task priority change is permitted
+ * @p: The task to affect
+ * @nice: The nice value to set
+ *
+ * Detemine if the requested task priority change is permitted for the
+ * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
+ */
+int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
return cap_safe_nice(p);
}
/*
- * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
- * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
- * no new races - i.e. only another task doing capget() on
- * this task could get inconsistent info. There can be no
- * racing writer bc a task can only change its own caps.
+ * Implement PR_CAPBSET_DROP. Attempt to remove the specified capability from
+ * the current task's bounding set. Returns 0 on success, -ve on error.
*/
-static long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
+static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
{
if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
return -EPERM;
if (!cap_valid(cap))
return -EINVAL;
- cap_lower(current->cap_bset, cap);
+
+ cap_lower(new->cap_bset, cap);
return 0;
}
@@ -598,22 +807,42 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
}
#endif
+/**
+ * cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module
+ * @option: The process control function requested
+ * @arg2, @arg3, @arg4, @arg5: The argument data for this function
+ *
+ * Allow process control functions (sys_prctl()) to alter capabilities; may
+ * also deny access to other functions not otherwise implemented here.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 or +ve on success, -ENOSYS if this function is not implemented
+ * here, other -ve on error. If -ENOSYS is returned, sys_prctl() and other LSM
+ * modules will consider performing the function.
+ */
int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
- unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
+ unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
+ struct cred *new;
long error = 0;
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
switch (option) {
case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
+ error = -EINVAL;
if (!cap_valid(arg2))
- error = -EINVAL;
- else
- error = !!cap_raised(current->cap_bset, arg2);
- break;
+ goto error;
+ error = !!cap_raised(new->cap_bset, arg2);
+ goto no_change;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
- error = cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
- break;
+ error = cap_prctl_drop(new, arg2);
+ if (error < 0)
+ goto error;
+ goto changed;
/*
* The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a
@@ -635,12 +864,12 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
* capability-based-privilege environment.
*/
case PR_SET_SECUREBITS:
- if ((((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
- & (current->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
- || ((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS
- & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
- || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
- || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0)) { /*[4]*/
+ error = -EPERM;
+ if ((((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
+ & (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
+ || ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
+ || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
+ || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
/*
* [1] no changing of bits that are locked
* [2] no unlocking of locks
@@ -648,65 +877,80 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
* [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about
* the "sendmail capabilities bug")
*/
- error = -EPERM; /* cannot change a locked bit */
- } else {
- current->securebits = arg2;
- }
- break;
+ )
+ /* cannot change a locked bit */
+ goto error;
+ new->securebits = arg2;
+ goto changed;
+
case PR_GET_SECUREBITS:
- error = current->securebits;
- break;
+ error = new->securebits;
+ goto no_change;
#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
error = 1;
- break;
+ goto no_change;
+
case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
+ error = -EINVAL;
if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */
- error = -EINVAL;
- else if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
- error = -EPERM;
- else if (arg2)
- current->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+ goto error;
+ error = -EPERM;
+ if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
+ goto error;
+ if (arg2)
+ new->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
else
- current->securebits &=
- ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
- break;
+ new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+ goto changed;
default:
/* No functionality available - continue with default */
- return 0;
+ error = -ENOSYS;
+ goto error;
}
/* Functionality provided */
- *rc_p = error;
- return 1;
-}
+changed:
+ return commit_creds(new);
-void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
-{
- cap_set_init_eff(p->cap_effective);
- cap_clear(p->cap_inheritable);
- cap_set_full(p->cap_permitted);
- p->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT;
- return;
+no_change:
+ error = 0;
+error:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return error;
}
-int cap_syslog (int type)
+/**
+ * cap_syslog - Determine whether syslog function is permitted
+ * @type: Function requested
+ *
+ * Determine whether the current process is permitted to use a particular
+ * syslog function, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if not.
+ */
+int cap_syslog(int type)
{
if ((type != 3 && type != 10) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * cap_vm_enough_memory - Determine whether a new virtual mapping is permitted
+ * @mm: The VM space in which the new mapping is to be made
+ * @pages: The size of the mapping
+ *
+ * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current
+ * task is permitted, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if not.
+ */
int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int cap_sys_admin = 0;
- if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0)
+ if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
}
-
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 239098f..81932ab 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@
#ifndef _INTERNAL_H
#define _INTERNAL_H
+#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
-#include <linux/key-ui.h>
static inline __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)))
void no_printk(const char *fmt, ...)
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ void no_printk(const char *fmt, ...)
#define kleave(FMT, ...) \
printk(KERN_DEBUG "<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "xxx" FMT"yyy\n", ##__VA_ARGS__)
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG " "FMT"\n", ##__VA_ARGS__)
#else
#define kenter(FMT, ...) \
no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ extern struct mutex key_construction_mutex;
extern wait_queue_head_t request_key_conswq;
+extern struct key_type *key_type_lookup(const char *type);
+extern void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype);
+
extern int __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key);
extern key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
@@ -95,7 +98,7 @@ extern struct key *keyring_search_instkey(struct key *keyring,
typedef int (*key_match_func_t)(const struct key *, const void *);
extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- struct task_struct *tsk,
+ const struct cred *cred,
struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match);
@@ -103,13 +106,13 @@ extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match,
- struct task_struct *tsk);
+ const struct cred *cred);
extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check);
-extern int install_user_keyrings(struct task_struct *tsk);
-extern int install_thread_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk);
-extern int install_process_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk);
+extern int install_user_keyrings(void);
+extern int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *);
+extern int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *);
extern struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
@@ -119,12 +122,39 @@ extern struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
struct key *dest_keyring,
unsigned long flags);
+extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
+ key_perm_t perm);
+
+extern long join_session_keyring(const char *name);
+
+/*
+ * check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way
+ */
+extern int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
+ const struct cred *cred,
+ key_perm_t perm);
+
+static inline int key_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, key_perm_t perm)
+{
+ return key_task_permission(key_ref, current_cred(), perm);
+}
+
+/* required permissions */
+#define KEY_VIEW 0x01 /* require permission to view attributes */
+#define KEY_READ 0x02 /* require permission to read content */
+#define KEY_WRITE 0x04 /* require permission to update / modify */
+#define KEY_SEARCH 0x08 /* require permission to search (keyring) or find (key) */
+#define KEY_LINK 0x10 /* require permission to link */
+#define KEY_SETATTR 0x20 /* require permission to change attributes */
+#define KEY_ALL 0x3f /* all the above permissions */
+
/*
* request_key authorisation
*/
struct request_key_auth {
struct key *target_key;
- struct task_struct *context;
+ struct key *dest_keyring;
+ const struct cred *cred;
void *callout_info;
size_t callout_len;
pid_t pid;
@@ -133,7 +163,8 @@ struct request_key_auth {
extern struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth;
extern struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target,
const void *callout_info,
- size_t callout_len);
+ size_t callout_len,
+ struct key *dest_keyring);
extern struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id);
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 14948cf..f76c8a5 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ serial_exists:
* instantiate the key or discard it before returning
*/
struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
- uid_t uid, gid_t gid, struct task_struct *ctx,
+ uid_t uid, gid_t gid, const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags)
{
struct key_user *user = NULL;
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
#endif
/* let the security module know about the key */
- ret = security_key_alloc(key, ctx, flags);
+ ret = security_key_alloc(key, cred, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto security_error;
@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
const void *data,
size_t datalen,
struct key *keyring,
- struct key *instkey)
+ struct key *authkey)
{
int ret, awaken;
@@ -421,8 +421,8 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
ret = __key_link(keyring, key);
/* disable the authorisation key */
- if (instkey)
- key_revoke(instkey);
+ if (authkey)
+ key_revoke(authkey);
}
}
@@ -444,14 +444,14 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
const void *data,
size_t datalen,
struct key *keyring,
- struct key *instkey)
+ struct key *authkey)
{
int ret;
if (keyring)
down_write(&keyring->sem);
- ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, data, datalen, keyring, instkey);
+ ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, data, datalen, keyring, authkey);
if (keyring)
up_write(&keyring->sem);
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_instantiate_and_link);
int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
unsigned timeout,
struct key *keyring,
- struct key *instkey)
+ struct key *authkey)
{
struct timespec now;
int ret, awaken;
@@ -504,8 +504,8 @@ int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
ret = __key_link(keyring, key);
/* disable the authorisation key */
- if (instkey)
- key_revoke(instkey);
+ if (authkey)
+ key_revoke(authkey);
}
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
@@ -743,6 +743,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
key_perm_t perm,
unsigned long flags)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key_type *ktype;
struct key *keyring, *key = NULL;
key_ref_t key_ref;
@@ -802,8 +803,8 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
}
/* allocate a new key */
- key = key_alloc(ktype, description, current->fsuid, current->fsgid,
- current, perm, flags);
+ key = key_alloc(ktype, description, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
+ perm, flags);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
goto error_3;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index acc9c89..7c72baa 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_add_key(const char __user *_type,
}
/* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error3;
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_request_key(const char __user *_type,
/* get the destination keyring if specified */
dest_ref = NULL;
if (destringid) {
- dest_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, destringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+ dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
goto error3;
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id, int create)
key_ref_t key_ref;
long ret;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, id, create, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, create, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
}
/* find the target key (which must be writable) */
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, id, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error2;
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
key_ref_t key_ref;
long ret;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, id, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
key_ref_t keyring_ref;
long ret;
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error;
@@ -388,13 +388,13 @@ long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
long ret;
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error;
}
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, id, 1, 0, KEY_LINK);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 0, KEY_LINK);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error2;
@@ -422,13 +422,13 @@ long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
long ret;
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, ringid, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error;
}
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, id, 0, 0, 0);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error2;
@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
char *tmpbuf;
long ret;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, keyid, 0, 1, KEY_VIEW);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 1, KEY_VIEW);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
/* viewing a key under construction is permitted if we have the
* authorisation token handy */
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(keyid);
if (!IS_ERR(instkey)) {
key_put(instkey);
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, keyid,
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid,
0, 1, 0);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto okay;
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
}
/* get the keyring at which to begin the search */
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, ringid, 0, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error2;
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
/* get the destination keyring if specified */
dest_ref = NULL;
if (destringid) {
- dest_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, destringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+ dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
goto error3;
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
long ret;
/* find the key first */
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, keyid, 0, 0, 0);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = -ENOKEY;
goto error;
@@ -699,7 +699,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
if (uid == (uid_t) -1 && gid == (gid_t) -1)
goto error;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
@@ -804,7 +804,7 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
if (perm & ~(KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL | KEY_GRP_ALL | KEY_OTH_ALL))
goto error;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
@@ -817,7 +817,7 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
down_write(&key->sem);
/* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
- if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || key->uid == current->fsuid) {
+ if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || key->uid == current_fsuid()) {
key->perm = perm;
ret = 0;
}
@@ -829,6 +829,60 @@ error:
} /* end keyctl_setperm_key() */
+/*
+ * get the destination keyring for instantiation
+ */
+static long get_instantiation_keyring(key_serial_t ringid,
+ struct request_key_auth *rka,
+ struct key **_dest_keyring)
+{
+ key_ref_t dkref;
+
+ /* just return a NULL pointer if we weren't asked to make a link */
+ if (ringid == 0) {
+ *_dest_keyring = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* if a specific keyring is nominated by ID, then use that */
+ if (ringid > 0) {
+ dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+ if (IS_ERR(dkref))
+ return PTR_ERR(dkref);
+ *_dest_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(dkref);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ringid == KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* otherwise specify the destination keyring recorded in the
+ * authorisation key (any KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING) */
+ if (ringid >= KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING) {
+ *_dest_keyring = rka->dest_keyring;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return -ENOKEY;
+}
+
+/*
+ * change the request_key authorisation key on the current process
+ */
+static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key *key)
+{
+ struct cred *new;
+
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ key_put(new->request_key_auth);
+ new->request_key_auth = key_get(key);
+
+ return commit_creds(new);
+}
+
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* instantiate the key with the specified payload, and, if one is given, link
@@ -839,13 +893,15 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
size_t plen,
key_serial_t ringid)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct request_key_auth *rka;
- struct key *instkey;
- key_ref_t keyring_ref;
+ struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
void *payload;
long ret;
bool vm = false;
+ kenter("%d,,%zu,%d", id, plen, ringid);
+
ret = -EINVAL;
if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1)
goto error;
@@ -853,7 +909,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
/* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
* assumed before calling this */
ret = -EPERM;
- instkey = current->request_key_auth;
+ instkey = cred->request_key_auth;
if (!instkey)
goto error;
@@ -883,28 +939,20 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
/* find the destination keyring amongst those belonging to the
* requesting task */
- keyring_ref = NULL;
- if (ringid) {
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(rka->context, ringid, 1, 0,
- KEY_WRITE);
- if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
- goto error2;
- }
- }
+ ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error2;
/* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(rka->target_key, payload, plen,
- key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), instkey);
+ dest_keyring, instkey);
- key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
+ key_put(dest_keyring);
/* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
* instantiation of the key */
- if (ret == 0) {
- key_put(current->request_key_auth);
- current->request_key_auth = NULL;
- }
+ if (ret == 0)
+ keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
error2:
if (!vm)
@@ -923,15 +971,17 @@ error:
*/
long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct request_key_auth *rka;
- struct key *instkey;
- key_ref_t keyring_ref;
+ struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
long ret;
+ kenter("%d,%u,%d", id, timeout, ringid);
+
/* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
* assumed before calling this */
ret = -EPERM;
- instkey = current->request_key_auth;
+ instkey = cred->request_key_auth;
if (!instkey)
goto error;
@@ -941,27 +991,20 @@ long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid)
/* find the destination keyring if present (which must also be
* writable) */
- keyring_ref = NULL;
- if (ringid) {
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
- if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
- goto error;
- }
- }
+ ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
/* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
ret = key_negate_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout,
- key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), instkey);
+ dest_keyring, instkey);
- key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
+ key_put(dest_keyring);
/* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
* instantiation of the key */
- if (ret == 0) {
- key_put(current->request_key_auth);
- current->request_key_auth = NULL;
- }
+ if (ret == 0)
+ keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
error:
return ret;
@@ -975,35 +1018,56 @@ error:
*/
long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
{
- int ret;
+ struct cred *new;
+ int ret, old_setting;
+
+ old_setting = current_cred_xxx(jit_keyring);
+
+ if (reqkey_defl == KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE)
+ return old_setting;
+
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
switch (reqkey_defl) {
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
- ret = install_thread_keyring(current);
+ ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ goto error;
goto set;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
- ret = install_process_keyring(current);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ if (ret != -EEXIST)
+ goto error;
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ goto set;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
- set:
- current->jit_keyring = reqkey_defl;
+ case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
+ goto set;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE:
- return current->jit_keyring;
-
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
default:
- return -EINVAL;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto error;
}
+set:
+ new->jit_keyring = reqkey_defl;
+ commit_creds(new);
+ return old_setting;
+error:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return -EINVAL;
+
} /* end keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() */
/*****************************************************************************/
@@ -1018,7 +1082,7 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
time_t expiry;
long ret;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
@@ -1062,9 +1126,7 @@ long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id)
/* we divest ourselves of authority if given an ID of 0 */
if (id == 0) {
- key_put(current->request_key_auth);
- current->request_key_auth = NULL;
- ret = 0;
+ ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
goto error;
}
@@ -1079,10 +1141,12 @@ long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id)
goto error;
}
- key_put(current->request_key_auth);
- current->request_key_auth = authkey;
- ret = authkey->serial;
+ ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(authkey);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+ key_put(authkey);
+ ret = authkey->serial;
error:
return ret;
@@ -1105,7 +1169,7 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
char *context;
long ret;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, keyid, 0, 1, KEY_VIEW);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 1, KEY_VIEW);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EACCES)
return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
@@ -1117,7 +1181,7 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
key_put(instkey);
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, keyid, 0, 1, 0);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 1, 0);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index a9ab8af..ed85157 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <keys/keyring-type.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -244,14 +245,14 @@ static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
* allocate a keyring and link into the destination keyring
*/
struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
- struct task_struct *ctx, unsigned long flags,
+ const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags,
struct key *dest)
{
struct key *keyring;
int ret;
keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, description,
- uid, gid, ctx,
+ uid, gid, cred,
(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL,
flags);
@@ -280,7 +281,7 @@ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
* - we propagate the possession attribute from the keyring ref to the key ref
*/
key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- struct task_struct *context,
+ const struct cred *cred,
struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match)
@@ -303,7 +304,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
key_check(keyring);
/* top keyring must have search permission to begin the search */
- err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, context, KEY_SEARCH);
+ err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, cred, KEY_SEARCH);
if (err < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(err);
goto error;
@@ -376,7 +377,7 @@ descend:
/* key must have search permissions */
if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed),
- context, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
+ cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
continue;
/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
@@ -403,7 +404,7 @@ ascend:
continue;
if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed),
- context, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
+ cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
continue;
/* stack the current position */
@@ -458,7 +459,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
if (!type->match)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
- return keyring_search_aux(keyring, current,
+ return keyring_search_aux(keyring, current->cred,
type, description, type->match);
} /* end keyring_search() */
diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c
index 3b41f9b5..5d9fc7b 100644
--- a/security/keys/permission.c
+++ b/security/keys/permission.c
@@ -14,12 +14,19 @@
#include "internal.h"
/*****************************************************************************/
-/*
- * check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way,
- * but permit the security modules to override
+/**
+ * key_task_permission - Check a key can be used
+ * @key_ref: The key to check
+ * @cred: The credentials to use
+ * @perm: The permissions to check for
+ *
+ * Check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way,
+ * but permit the security modules to override.
+ *
+ * The caller must hold either a ref on cred or must hold the RCU readlock or a
+ * spinlock.
*/
-int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
- struct task_struct *context,
+int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm)
{
struct key *key;
@@ -29,7 +36,7 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
/* use the second 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller owns */
- if (key->uid == context->fsuid) {
+ if (key->uid == cred->fsuid) {
kperm = key->perm >> 16;
goto use_these_perms;
}
@@ -37,15 +44,12 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
/* use the third 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller has a group
* membership in common with */
if (key->gid != -1 && key->perm & KEY_GRP_ALL) {
- if (key->gid == context->fsgid) {
+ if (key->gid == cred->fsgid) {
kperm = key->perm >> 8;
goto use_these_perms;
}
- task_lock(context);
- ret = groups_search(context->group_info, key->gid);
- task_unlock(context);
-
+ ret = groups_search(cred->group_info, key->gid);
if (ret) {
kperm = key->perm >> 8;
goto use_these_perms;
@@ -56,6 +60,7 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
kperm = key->perm;
use_these_perms:
+
/* use the top 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller possesses
* - possessor permissions are additive with other permissions
*/
@@ -68,7 +73,7 @@ use_these_perms:
return -EACCES;
/* let LSM be the final arbiter */
- return security_key_permission(key_ref, context, perm);
+ return security_key_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
} /* end key_task_permission() */
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index f619170..7f508de 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -136,8 +136,12 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
int rc;
/* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key (assuming
- * non-possession) */
- rc = key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, 0), current, KEY_VIEW);
+ * non-possession)
+ * - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our
+ * access to __current_cred() safe
+ */
+ rc = key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, 0), current_cred(),
+ KEY_VIEW);
if (rc < 0)
return 0;
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 45b240a..2f5d89e 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -40,13 +40,17 @@ struct key_user root_key_user = {
/*
* install user and user session keyrings for a particular UID
*/
-int install_user_keyrings(struct task_struct *tsk)
+int install_user_keyrings(void)
{
- struct user_struct *user = tsk->user;
+ struct user_struct *user;
+ const struct cred *cred;
struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;
char buf[20];
int ret;
+ cred = current_cred();
+ user = cred->user;
+
kenter("%p{%u}", user, user->uid);
if (user->uid_keyring) {
@@ -67,7 +71,7 @@ int install_user_keyrings(struct task_struct *tsk)
uid_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, (gid_t) -1,
- tsk, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
+ cred, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
NULL);
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);
@@ -83,7 +87,7 @@ int install_user_keyrings(struct task_struct *tsk)
if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
session_keyring =
keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, (gid_t) -1,
- tsk, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ cred, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);
goto error_release;
@@ -115,140 +119,128 @@ error:
return ret;
}
-/*****************************************************************************/
/*
- * deal with the UID changing
+ * install a fresh thread keyring directly to new credentials
*/
-void switch_uid_keyring(struct user_struct *new_user)
+int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
{
-#if 0 /* do nothing for now */
- struct key *old;
-
- /* switch to the new user's session keyring if we were running under
- * root's default session keyring */
- if (new_user->uid != 0 &&
- current->session_keyring == &root_session_keyring
- ) {
- atomic_inc(&new_user->session_keyring->usage);
-
- task_lock(current);
- old = current->session_keyring;
- current->session_keyring = new_user->session_keyring;
- task_unlock(current);
+ struct key *keyring;
- key_put(old);
- }
-#endif
+ keyring = keyring_alloc("_tid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
+ KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+ return PTR_ERR(keyring);
-} /* end switch_uid_keyring() */
+ new->thread_keyring = keyring;
+ return 0;
+}
-/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* install a fresh thread keyring, discarding the old one
*/
-int install_thread_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk)
+static int install_thread_keyring(void)
{
- struct key *keyring, *old;
- char buf[20];
+ struct cred *new;
int ret;
- sprintf(buf, "_tid.%u", tsk->pid);
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
- KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
- if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
- goto error;
+ BUG_ON(new->thread_keyring);
+
+ ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return ret;
}
- task_lock(tsk);
- old = tsk->thread_keyring;
- tsk->thread_keyring = keyring;
- task_unlock(tsk);
+ return commit_creds(new);
+}
- ret = 0;
+/*
+ * install a process keyring directly to a credentials struct
+ * - returns -EEXIST if there was already a process keyring, 0 if one installed,
+ * and other -ve on any other error
+ */
+int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
+{
+ struct key *keyring;
+ int ret;
- key_put(old);
-error:
+ if (new->tgcred->process_keyring)
+ return -EEXIST;
+
+ keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid,
+ new, KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+ return PTR_ERR(keyring);
+
+ spin_lock_irq(&new->tgcred->lock);
+ if (!new->tgcred->process_keyring) {
+ new->tgcred->process_keyring = keyring;
+ keyring = NULL;
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ ret = -EEXIST;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irq(&new->tgcred->lock);
+ key_put(keyring);
return ret;
+}
-} /* end install_thread_keyring() */
-
-/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* make sure a process keyring is installed
+ * - we
*/
-int install_process_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk)
+static int install_process_keyring(void)
{
- struct key *keyring;
- char buf[20];
+ struct cred *new;
int ret;
- might_sleep();
-
- if (!tsk->signal->process_keyring) {
- sprintf(buf, "_pid.%u", tsk->tgid);
-
- keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
- KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
- if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
- goto error;
- }
-
- /* attach keyring */
- spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
- if (!tsk->signal->process_keyring) {
- tsk->signal->process_keyring = keyring;
- keyring = NULL;
- }
- spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- key_put(keyring);
+ ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return ret != -EEXIST ?: 0;
}
- ret = 0;
-error:
- return ret;
-
-} /* end install_process_keyring() */
+ return commit_creds(new);
+}
-/*****************************************************************************/
/*
- * install a session keyring, discarding the old one
- * - if a keyring is not supplied, an empty one is invented
+ * install a session keyring directly to a credentials struct
*/
-static int install_session_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk,
- struct key *keyring)
+static int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred,
+ struct key *keyring)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct key *old;
- char buf[20];
might_sleep();
/* create an empty session keyring */
if (!keyring) {
- sprintf(buf, "_ses.%u", tsk->tgid);
-
flags = KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN;
- if (tsk->signal->session_keyring)
+ if (cred->tgcred->session_keyring)
flags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA;
- keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
- flags, NULL);
+ keyring = keyring_alloc("_ses", cred->uid, cred->gid,
+ cred, flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
- }
- else {
+ } else {
atomic_inc(&keyring->usage);
}
/* install the keyring */
- spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
- old = tsk->signal->session_keyring;
- rcu_assign_pointer(tsk->signal->session_keyring, keyring);
- spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+ spin_lock_irq(&cred->tgcred->lock);
+ old = cred->tgcred->session_keyring;
+ rcu_assign_pointer(cred->tgcred->session_keyring, keyring);
+ spin_unlock_irq(&cred->tgcred->lock);
/* we're using RCU on the pointer, but there's no point synchronising
* on it if it didn't previously point to anything */
@@ -258,110 +250,29 @@ static int install_session_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk,
}
return 0;
+}
-} /* end install_session_keyring() */
-
-/*****************************************************************************/
-/*
- * copy the keys in a thread group for fork without CLONE_THREAD
- */
-int copy_thread_group_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
- key_check(current->thread_group->session_keyring);
- key_check(current->thread_group->process_keyring);
-
- /* no process keyring yet */
- tsk->signal->process_keyring = NULL;
-
- /* same session keyring */
- rcu_read_lock();
- tsk->signal->session_keyring =
- key_get(rcu_dereference(current->signal->session_keyring));
- rcu_read_unlock();
-
- return 0;
-
-} /* end copy_thread_group_keys() */
-
-/*****************************************************************************/
-/*
- * copy the keys for fork
- */
-int copy_keys(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
- key_check(tsk->thread_keyring);
- key_check(tsk->request_key_auth);
-
- /* no thread keyring yet */
- tsk->thread_keyring = NULL;
-
- /* copy the request_key() authorisation for this thread */
- key_get(tsk->request_key_auth);
-
- return 0;
-
-} /* end copy_keys() */
-
-/*****************************************************************************/
-/*
- * dispose of thread group keys upon thread group destruction
- */
-void exit_thread_group_keys(struct signal_struct *tg)
-{
- key_put(tg->session_keyring);
- key_put(tg->process_keyring);
-
-} /* end exit_thread_group_keys() */
-
-/*****************************************************************************/
-/*
- * dispose of per-thread keys upon thread exit
- */
-void exit_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
- key_put(tsk->thread_keyring);
- key_put(tsk->request_key_auth);
-
-} /* end exit_keys() */
-
-/*****************************************************************************/
/*
- * deal with execve()
+ * install a session keyring, discarding the old one
+ * - if a keyring is not supplied, an empty one is invented
*/
-int exec_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
+static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)
{
- struct key *old;
-
- /* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */
- task_lock(tsk);
- old = tsk->thread_keyring;
- tsk->thread_keyring = NULL;
- task_unlock(tsk);
-
- key_put(old);
-
- /* discard the process keyring from a newly exec'd task */
- spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
- old = tsk->signal->process_keyring;
- tsk->signal->process_keyring = NULL;
- spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
-
- key_put(old);
-
- return 0;
+ struct cred *new;
+ int ret;
-} /* end exec_keys() */
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
-/*****************************************************************************/
-/*
- * deal with SUID programs
- * - we might want to make this invent a new session keyring
- */
-int suid_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
- return 0;
+ ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return ret;
+ }
-} /* end suid_keys() */
+ return commit_creds(new);
+}
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
@@ -370,10 +281,11 @@ int suid_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
void key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */
- if (tsk->thread_keyring) {
- down_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
- tsk->thread_keyring->uid = tsk->fsuid;
- up_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
+ BUG_ON(!tsk->cred);
+ if (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) {
+ down_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
+ tsk->cred->thread_keyring->uid = tsk->cred->fsuid;
+ up_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
}
} /* end key_fsuid_changed() */
@@ -385,10 +297,11 @@ void key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */
- if (tsk->thread_keyring) {
- down_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
- tsk->thread_keyring->gid = tsk->fsgid;
- up_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
+ BUG_ON(!tsk->cred);
+ if (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) {
+ down_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
+ tsk->cred->thread_keyring->gid = tsk->cred->fsgid;
+ up_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
}
} /* end key_fsgid_changed() */
@@ -404,7 +317,7 @@ void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match,
- struct task_struct *context)
+ const struct cred *cred)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka;
key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;
@@ -423,10 +336,10 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
err = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
/* search the thread keyring first */
- if (context->thread_keyring) {
+ if (cred->thread_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
- make_key_ref(context->thread_keyring, 1),
- context, type, description, match);
+ make_key_ref(cred->thread_keyring, 1),
+ cred, type, description, match);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
@@ -444,10 +357,10 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
}
/* search the process keyring second */
- if (context->signal->process_keyring) {
+ if (cred->tgcred->process_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
- make_key_ref(context->signal->process_keyring, 1),
- context, type, description, match);
+ make_key_ref(cred->tgcred->process_keyring, 1),
+ cred, type, description, match);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
@@ -465,13 +378,13 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
}
/* search the session keyring */
- if (context->signal->session_keyring) {
+ if (cred->tgcred->session_keyring) {
rcu_read_lock();
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(
- context->signal->session_keyring),
+ cred->tgcred->session_keyring),
1),
- context, type, description, match);
+ cred, type, description, match);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
@@ -490,10 +403,10 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
}
}
/* or search the user-session keyring */
- else if (context->user->session_keyring) {
+ else if (cred->user->session_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
- make_key_ref(context->user->session_keyring, 1),
- context, type, description, match);
+ make_key_ref(cred->user->session_keyring, 1),
+ cred, type, description, match);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
@@ -514,20 +427,20 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
* search the keyrings of the process mentioned there
* - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method
*/
- if (context->request_key_auth &&
- context == current &&
+ if (cred->request_key_auth &&
+ cred == current_cred() &&
type != &key_type_request_key_auth
) {
/* defend against the auth key being revoked */
- down_read(&context->request_key_auth->sem);
+ down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
- if (key_validate(context->request_key_auth) == 0) {
- rka = context->request_key_auth->payload.data;
+ if (key_validate(cred->request_key_auth) == 0) {
+ rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description,
- match, rka->context);
+ match, rka->cred);
- up_read(&context->request_key_auth->sem);
+ up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
@@ -544,7 +457,7 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
break;
}
} else {
- up_read(&context->request_key_auth->sem);
+ up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
}
}
@@ -572,93 +485,98 @@ static int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target)
* - don't create special keyrings unless so requested
* - partially constructed keys aren't found unless requested
*/
-key_ref_t lookup_user_key(struct task_struct *context, key_serial_t id,
- int create, int partial, key_perm_t perm)
+key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
+ key_perm_t perm)
{
- key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
+ struct request_key_auth *rka;
+ const struct cred *cred;
struct key *key;
+ key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
int ret;
- if (!context)
- context = current;
-
+try_again:
+ cred = get_current_cred();
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
switch (id) {
case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
- if (!context->thread_keyring) {
+ if (!cred->thread_keyring) {
if (!create)
goto error;
- ret = install_thread_keyring(context);
+ ret = install_thread_keyring();
if (ret < 0) {
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
+ goto reget_creds;
}
- key = context->thread_keyring;
+ key = cred->thread_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:
- if (!context->signal->process_keyring) {
+ if (!cred->tgcred->process_keyring) {
if (!create)
goto error;
- ret = install_process_keyring(context);
+ ret = install_process_keyring();
if (ret < 0) {
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
+ goto reget_creds;
}
- key = context->signal->process_keyring;
+ key = cred->tgcred->process_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:
- if (!context->signal->session_keyring) {
+ if (!cred->tgcred->session_keyring) {
/* always install a session keyring upon access if one
* doesn't exist yet */
- ret = install_user_keyrings(context);
+ ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
ret = install_session_keyring(
- context, context->user->session_keyring);
+ cred->user->session_keyring);
+
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
+ goto reget_creds;
}
rcu_read_lock();
- key = rcu_dereference(context->signal->session_keyring);
+ key = rcu_dereference(cred->tgcred->session_keyring);
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
rcu_read_unlock();
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:
- if (!context->user->uid_keyring) {
- ret = install_user_keyrings(context);
+ if (!cred->user->uid_keyring) {
+ ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
}
- key = context->user->uid_keyring;
+ key = cred->user->uid_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
- if (!context->user->session_keyring) {
- ret = install_user_keyrings(context);
+ if (!cred->user->session_keyring) {
+ ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
}
- key = context->user->session_keyring;
+ key = cred->user->session_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
@@ -669,7 +587,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(struct task_struct *context, key_serial_t id,
goto error;
case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:
- key = context->request_key_auth;
+ key = cred->request_key_auth;
if (!key)
goto error;
@@ -677,6 +595,25 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(struct task_struct *context, key_serial_t id,
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
+ case KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
+ if (!cred->request_key_auth)
+ goto error;
+
+ down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
+ if (cred->request_key_auth->flags & KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) {
+ key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
+ key = NULL;
+ } else {
+ rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
+ key = rka->dest_keyring;
+ atomic_inc(&key->usage);
+ }
+ up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
+ if (!key)
+ goto error;
+ key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
+ break;
+
default:
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (id < 1)
@@ -693,7 +630,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(struct task_struct *context, key_serial_t id,
/* check to see if we possess the key */
skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
lookup_user_key_possessed,
- current);
+ cred);
if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
key_put(key);
@@ -725,11 +662,12 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(struct task_struct *context, key_serial_t id,
goto invalid_key;
/* check the permissions */
- ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, context, perm);
+ ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
if (ret < 0)
goto invalid_key;
error:
+ put_cred(cred);
return key_ref;
invalid_key:
@@ -737,6 +675,12 @@ invalid_key:
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
+ /* if we attempted to install a keyring, then it may have caused new
+ * creds to be installed */
+reget_creds:
+ put_cred(cred);
+ goto try_again;
+
} /* end lookup_user_key() */
/*****************************************************************************/
@@ -748,20 +692,33 @@ invalid_key:
*/
long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
{
- struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+ const struct cred *old;
+ struct cred *new;
struct key *keyring;
- long ret;
+ long ret, serial;
+
+ /* only permit this if there's a single thread in the thread group -
+ * this avoids us having to adjust the creds on all threads and risking
+ * ENOMEM */
+ if (!is_single_threaded(current))
+ return -EMLINK;
+
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ old = current_cred();
/* if no name is provided, install an anonymous keyring */
if (!name) {
- ret = install_session_keyring(tsk, NULL);
+ ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- rcu_read_lock();
- ret = rcu_dereference(tsk->signal->session_keyring)->serial;
- rcu_read_unlock();
- goto error;
+ serial = new->tgcred->session_keyring->serial;
+ ret = commit_creds(new);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = serial;
+ goto okay;
}
/* allow the user to join or create a named keyring */
@@ -771,29 +728,33 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
keyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false);
if (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {
/* not found - try and create a new one */
- keyring = keyring_alloc(name, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
+ keyring = keyring_alloc(name, old->uid, old->gid, old,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
}
- }
- else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
+ } else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
}
/* we've got a keyring - now to install it */
- ret = install_session_keyring(tsk, keyring);
+ ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error2;
+ commit_creds(new);
+ mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
+
ret = keyring->serial;
key_put(keyring);
+okay:
+ return ret;
error2:
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
error:
+ abort_creds(new);
return ret;
-
-} /* end join_session_keyring() */
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index abea08f..0e04f72 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include "internal.h"
+#define key_negative_timeout 60 /* default timeout on a negative key's existence */
+
/*
* wait_on_bit() sleep function for uninterruptible waiting
*/
@@ -64,7 +66,7 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,
const char *op,
void *aux)
{
- struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
key_serial_t prkey, sskey;
struct key *key = cons->key, *authkey = cons->authkey, *keyring;
char *argv[9], *envp[3], uid_str[12], gid_str[12];
@@ -74,15 +76,17 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,
kenter("{%d},{%d},%s", key->serial, authkey->serial, op);
- ret = install_user_keyrings(tsk);
+ ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error_alloc;
/* allocate a new session keyring */
sprintf(desc, "_req.%u", key->serial);
- keyring = keyring_alloc(desc, current->fsuid, current->fsgid, current,
+ cred = get_current_cred();
+ keyring = keyring_alloc(desc, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
+ put_cred(cred);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error_alloc;
@@ -94,29 +98,24 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,
goto error_link;
/* record the UID and GID */
- sprintf(uid_str, "%d", current->fsuid);
- sprintf(gid_str, "%d", current->fsgid);
+ sprintf(uid_str, "%d", cred->fsuid);
+ sprintf(gid_str, "%d", cred->fsgid);
/* we say which key is under construction */
sprintf(key_str, "%d", key->serial);
/* we specify the process's default keyrings */
sprintf(keyring_str[0], "%d",
- tsk->thread_keyring ? tsk->thread_keyring->serial : 0);
+ cred->thread_keyring ? cred->thread_keyring->serial : 0);
prkey = 0;
- if (tsk->signal->process_keyring)
- prkey = tsk->signal->process_keyring->serial;
-
- sprintf(keyring_str[1], "%d", prkey);
+ if (cred->tgcred->process_keyring)
+ prkey = cred->tgcred->process_keyring->serial;
- if (tsk->signal->session_keyring) {
- rcu_read_lock();
- sskey = rcu_dereference(tsk->signal->session_keyring)->serial;
- rcu_read_unlock();
- } else {
- sskey = tsk->user->session_keyring->serial;
- }
+ if (cred->tgcred->session_keyring)
+ sskey = rcu_dereference(cred->tgcred->session_keyring)->serial;
+ else
+ sskey = cred->user->session_keyring->serial;
sprintf(keyring_str[2], "%d", sskey);
@@ -157,8 +156,8 @@ error_link:
key_put(keyring);
error_alloc:
- kleave(" = %d", ret);
complete_request_key(cons, ret);
+ kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
}
@@ -167,7 +166,8 @@ error_alloc:
* - we ignore program failure and go on key status instead
*/
static int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info,
- size_t callout_len, void *aux)
+ size_t callout_len, void *aux,
+ struct key *dest_keyring)
{
struct key_construction *cons;
request_key_actor_t actor;
@@ -181,7 +181,8 @@ static int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info,
return -ENOMEM;
/* allocate an authorisation key */
- authkey = request_key_auth_new(key, callout_info, callout_len);
+ authkey = request_key_auth_new(key, callout_info, callout_len,
+ dest_keyring);
if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
kfree(cons);
ret = PTR_ERR(authkey);
@@ -209,46 +210,67 @@ static int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info,
}
/*
- * link a key to the appropriate destination keyring
- * - the caller must hold a write lock on the destination keyring
+ * get the appropriate destination keyring for the request
+ * - we return whatever keyring we select with an extra reference upon it which
+ * the caller must release
*/
-static void construct_key_make_link(struct key *key, struct key *dest_keyring)
+static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
{
- struct task_struct *tsk = current;
- struct key *drop = NULL;
+ struct request_key_auth *rka;
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ struct key *dest_keyring = *_dest_keyring, *authkey;
- kenter("{%d},%p", key->serial, dest_keyring);
+ kenter("%p", dest_keyring);
/* find the appropriate keyring */
- if (!dest_keyring) {
- switch (tsk->jit_keyring) {
+ if (dest_keyring) {
+ /* the caller supplied one */
+ key_get(dest_keyring);
+ } else {
+ /* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we
+ * find one that we actually have */
+ switch (cred->jit_keyring) {
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
+ case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
+ if (cred->request_key_auth) {
+ authkey = cred->request_key_auth;
+ down_read(&authkey->sem);
+ rka = authkey->payload.data;
+ if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
+ &authkey->flags))
+ dest_keyring =
+ key_get(rka->dest_keyring);
+ up_read(&authkey->sem);
+ if (dest_keyring)
+ break;
+ }
+
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
- dest_keyring = tsk->thread_keyring;
+ dest_keyring = key_get(cred->thread_keyring);
if (dest_keyring)
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
- dest_keyring = tsk->signal->process_keyring;
+ dest_keyring = key_get(cred->tgcred->process_keyring);
if (dest_keyring)
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:
rcu_read_lock();
dest_keyring = key_get(
- rcu_dereference(tsk->signal->session_keyring));
+ rcu_dereference(cred->tgcred->session_keyring));
rcu_read_unlock();
- drop = dest_keyring;
if (dest_keyring)
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
- dest_keyring = tsk->user->session_keyring;
+ dest_keyring =
+ key_get(cred->user->session_keyring);
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:
- dest_keyring = tsk->user->uid_keyring;
+ dest_keyring = key_get(cred->user->uid_keyring);
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
@@ -257,10 +279,9 @@ static void construct_key_make_link(struct key *key, struct key *dest_keyring)
}
}
- /* and attach the key to it */
- __key_link(dest_keyring, key);
- key_put(drop);
- kleave("");
+ *_dest_keyring = dest_keyring;
+ kleave(" [dk %d]", key_serial(dest_keyring));
+ return;
}
/*
@@ -275,6 +296,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
struct key_user *user,
struct key **_key)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
@@ -282,33 +304,28 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
mutex_lock(&user->cons_lock);
- key = key_alloc(type, description,
- current->fsuid, current->fsgid, current, KEY_POS_ALL,
- flags);
+ key = key_alloc(type, description, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
+ KEY_POS_ALL, flags);
if (IS_ERR(key))
goto alloc_failed;
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);
- if (dest_keyring)
- down_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
+ down_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
/* attach the key to the destination keyring under lock, but we do need
* to do another check just in case someone beat us to it whilst we
* waited for locks */
mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
- key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
- current);
+ key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match, cred);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto key_already_present;
- if (dest_keyring)
- construct_key_make_link(key, dest_keyring);
+ __key_link(dest_keyring, key);
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
- if (dest_keyring)
- up_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
+ up_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
*_key = key;
kleave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key));
@@ -346,25 +363,36 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
struct key *key;
int ret;
- user = key_user_lookup(current->fsuid);
+ kenter("");
+
+ user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
if (!user)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);
+
ret = construct_alloc_key(type, description, dest_keyring, flags, user,
&key);
key_user_put(user);
if (ret == 0) {
- ret = construct_key(key, callout_info, callout_len, aux);
- if (ret < 0)
+ ret = construct_key(key, callout_info, callout_len, aux,
+ dest_keyring);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ kdebug("cons failed");
goto construction_failed;
+ }
}
+ key_put(dest_keyring);
+ kleave(" = key %d", key_serial(key));
return key;
construction_failed:
key_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL);
key_put(key);
+ key_put(dest_keyring);
+ kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
@@ -383,6 +411,7 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
struct key *dest_keyring,
unsigned long flags)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
@@ -392,7 +421,7 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
/* search all the process keyrings for a key */
key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
- current);
+ cred);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index bd237b0..8674715 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -105,9 +105,9 @@ static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key)
kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
- if (rka->context) {
- put_task_struct(rka->context);
- rka->context = NULL;
+ if (rka->cred) {
+ put_cred(rka->cred);
+ rka->cred = NULL;
}
} /* end request_key_auth_revoke() */
@@ -122,12 +122,13 @@ static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key)
kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
- if (rka->context) {
- put_task_struct(rka->context);
- rka->context = NULL;
+ if (rka->cred) {
+ put_cred(rka->cred);
+ rka->cred = NULL;
}
key_put(rka->target_key);
+ key_put(rka->dest_keyring);
kfree(rka->callout_info);
kfree(rka);
@@ -139,9 +140,10 @@ static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key)
* access to the caller's security data
*/
struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
- size_t callout_len)
+ size_t callout_len, struct key *dest_keyring)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka, *irka;
+ const struct cred *cred = current->cred;
struct key *authkey = NULL;
char desc[20];
int ret;
@@ -163,31 +165,29 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
/* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of
* another process */
- if (current->request_key_auth) {
+ if (cred->request_key_auth) {
/* it is - use that instantiation context here too */
- down_read(&current->request_key_auth->sem);
+ down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
/* if the auth key has been revoked, then the key we're
* servicing is already instantiated */
- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
- &current->request_key_auth->flags))
+ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &cred->request_key_auth->flags))
goto auth_key_revoked;
- irka = current->request_key_auth->payload.data;
- rka->context = irka->context;
+ irka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
+ rka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred);
rka->pid = irka->pid;
- get_task_struct(rka->context);
- up_read(&current->request_key_auth->sem);
+ up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
}
else {
/* it isn't - use this process as the context */
- rka->context = current;
+ rka->cred = get_cred(cred);
rka->pid = current->pid;
- get_task_struct(rka->context);
}
rka->target_key = key_get(target);
+ rka->dest_keyring = key_get(dest_keyring);
memcpy(rka->callout_info, callout_info, callout_len);
rka->callout_len = callout_len;
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
sprintf(desc, "%x", target->serial);
authkey = key_alloc(&key_type_request_key_auth, desc,
- current->fsuid, current->fsgid, current,
+ cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH |
KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
@@ -203,16 +203,16 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
goto error_alloc;
}
- /* construct and attach to the keyring */
+ /* construct the auth key */
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(authkey, rka, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_inst;
- kleave(" = {%d}", authkey->serial);
+ kleave(" = {%d,%d}", authkey->serial, atomic_read(&authkey->usage));
return authkey;
auth_key_revoked:
- up_read(&current->request_key_auth->sem);
+ up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
kfree(rka->callout_info);
kfree(rka);
kleave("= -EKEYREVOKED");
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ error_inst:
key_put(authkey);
error_alloc:
key_put(rka->target_key);
+ key_put(rka->dest_keyring);
kfree(rka->callout_info);
kfree(rka);
kleave("= %d", ret);
@@ -254,6 +255,7 @@ static int key_get_instantiation_authkey_match(const struct key *key,
*/
struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key *authkey;
key_ref_t authkey_ref;
@@ -261,7 +263,7 @@ struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
&key_type_request_key_auth,
(void *) (unsigned long) target_id,
key_get_instantiation_authkey_match,
- current);
+ cred);
if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {
authkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);
diff --git a/security/root_plug.c b/security/root_plug.c
index c3f68b5..40fb4f1 100644
--- a/security/root_plug.c
+++ b/security/root_plug.c
@@ -55,9 +55,9 @@ static int rootplug_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
struct usb_device *dev;
root_dbg("file %s, e_uid = %d, e_gid = %d\n",
- bprm->filename, bprm->e_uid, bprm->e_gid);
+ bprm->filename, bprm->cred->euid, bprm->cred->egid);
- if (bprm->e_gid == 0) {
+ if (bprm->cred->egid == 0) {
dev = usb_find_device(vendor_id, product_id);
if (!dev) {
root_dbg("e_gid = 0, and device not found, "
@@ -75,15 +75,12 @@ static struct security_operations rootplug_security_ops = {
.ptrace_may_access = cap_ptrace_may_access,
.ptrace_traceme = cap_ptrace_traceme,
.capget = cap_capget,
- .capset_check = cap_capset_check,
- .capset_set = cap_capset_set,
+ .capset = cap_capset,
.capable = cap_capable,
- .bprm_apply_creds = cap_bprm_apply_creds,
- .bprm_set_security = cap_bprm_set_security,
+ .bprm_set_creds = cap_bprm_set_creds,
- .task_post_setuid = cap_task_post_setuid,
- .task_reparent_to_init = cap_task_reparent_to_init,
+ .task_fix_setuid = cap_task_fix_setuid,
.task_prctl = cap_task_prctl,
.bprm_check_security = rootplug_bprm_check_security,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c0acfa7..d85dbb3 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -145,25 +145,23 @@ int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
return security_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-int security_capset_check(struct task_struct *target,
- kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
- return security_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ return security_ops->capset(new, old,
+ effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-void security_capset_set(struct task_struct *target,
- kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
{
- security_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
}
-int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
{
- return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
+ return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
}
int security_acct(struct file *file)
@@ -215,34 +213,24 @@ int security_vm_enough_memory_kern(long pages)
return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages);
}
-int security_bprm_alloc(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- return security_ops->bprm_alloc_security(bprm);
-}
-
-void security_bprm_free(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- security_ops->bprm_free_security(bprm);
-}
-
-void security_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
+int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- security_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
+ return security_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
}
-void security_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- security_ops->bprm_post_apply_creds(bprm);
+ return security_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
}
-int security_bprm_set(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- return security_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
+ security_ops->bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
}
-int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- return security_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
+ security_ops->bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
}
int security_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -266,9 +254,9 @@ int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_copy_data);
-int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
{
- return security_ops->sb_kern_mount(sb, data);
+ return security_ops->sb_kern_mount(sb, flags, data);
}
int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
@@ -603,9 +591,9 @@ int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
return security_ops->file_receive(file);
}
-int security_dentry_open(struct file *file)
+int security_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
{
- return security_ops->dentry_open(file);
+ return security_ops->dentry_open(file, cred);
}
int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
@@ -613,14 +601,29 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
}
-int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *p)
+void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
- return security_ops->task_alloc_security(p);
+ security_ops->cred_free(cred);
}
-void security_task_free(struct task_struct *p)
+int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
{
- security_ops->task_free_security(p);
+ return security_ops->cred_prepare(new, old, gfp);
+}
+
+void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+ security_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
+}
+
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+{
+ return security_ops->kernel_act_as(new, secid);
+}
+
+int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return security_ops->kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
}
int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
@@ -628,10 +631,10 @@ int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
return security_ops->task_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
}
-int security_task_post_setuid(uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid,
- uid_t old_suid, int flags)
+int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ int flags)
{
- return security_ops->task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, flags);
+ return security_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
}
int security_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
@@ -713,14 +716,9 @@ int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
}
int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
- unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
-{
- return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
-}
-
-void security_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
+ unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
- security_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
+ return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
}
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
@@ -1120,9 +1118,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long flags)
+int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
+ unsigned long flags)
{
- return security_ops->key_alloc(key, tsk, flags);
+ return security_ops->key_alloc(key, cred, flags);
}
void security_key_free(struct key *key)
@@ -1131,9 +1130,9 @@ void security_key_free(struct key *key)
}
int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
- struct task_struct *context, key_perm_t perm)
+ const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm)
{
- return security_ops->key_permission(key_ref, context, perm);
+ return security_ops->key_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
}
int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
index 64af2d3..c73aeaa 100644
--- a/security/selinux/exports.c
+++ b/security/selinux/exports.c
@@ -39,9 +39,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_string_to_sid);
int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid)
{
if (selinux_enabled) {
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
+ u32 tsid;
- return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+ __tsec = current_security();
+ tsid = __tsec->sid;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET,
PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
}
return 0;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f85597a..853b58c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -156,33 +156,62 @@ static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
}
-/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
-
-static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
+/*
+ * initialise the security for the init task
+ */
+static void cred_init_security(void)
{
+ struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tsec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
- tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- task->security = tsec;
+ tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ cred->security = tsec;
+}
- return 0;
+/*
+ * get the security ID of a set of credentials
+ */
+static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+ tsec = cred->security;
+ return tsec->sid;
}
-static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
+/*
+ * get the objective security ID of a task
+ */
+static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
- task->security = NULL;
- kfree(tsec);
+ u32 sid;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return sid;
}
+/*
+ * get the subjective security ID of the current task
+ */
+static inline u32 current_sid(void)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
+
+ return tsec->sid;
+}
+
+/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
+
static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
if (!isec)
@@ -193,7 +222,7 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
isec->inode = inode;
isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
- isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
+ isec->task_sid = sid;
inode->i_security = isec;
return 0;
@@ -215,15 +244,15 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fsec)
return -ENOMEM;
- fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
- fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
+ fsec->sid = sid;
+ fsec->fown_sid = sid;
file->f_security = fsec;
return 0;
@@ -338,8 +367,9 @@ static const match_table_t tokens = {
static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
- struct task_security_struct *tsec)
+ const struct cred *cred)
{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
int rc;
rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
@@ -354,8 +384,9 @@ static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
- struct task_security_struct *tsec)
+ const struct cred *cred)
{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
int rc;
rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
@@ -553,8 +584,8 @@ static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int rc = 0, i;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
@@ -671,7 +702,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
sbsec->proc = 1;
/* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
- rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
+ rc = security_fs_use(sbsec->proc ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
__func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
@@ -680,8 +711,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
/* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
if (fscontext_sid) {
-
- rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
+ rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -695,12 +725,14 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
*/
if (context_sid) {
if (!fscontext_sid) {
- rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
+ rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
+ cred);
if (rc)
goto out;
sbsec->sid = context_sid;
} else {
- rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
+ rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
+ cred);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
@@ -712,7 +744,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
}
if (rootcontext_sid) {
- rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
+ rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
+ cred);
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -730,7 +763,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
- sbsec, tsec);
+ sbsec, cred);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
@@ -1345,18 +1378,53 @@ static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
return perm;
}
-/* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
- fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
-static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
- struct task_struct *tsk2,
+/*
+ * Check permission between a pair of credentials
+ * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
+ */
+static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
+ const struct cred *target,
+ u32 perms)
+{
+ u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
+
+ return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
+ * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
+ * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
+ * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
+ */
+static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
+ const struct task_struct *tsk2,
u32 perms)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
+ const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
+ u32 sid1, sid2;
- tsec1 = tsk1->security;
- tsec2 = tsk2->security;
- return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
- SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
+ __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
+ * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
+ * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
+ * - this uses current's subjective creds
+ */
+static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
+ u32 perms)
+{
+ u32 sid, tsid;
+
+ sid = current_sid();
+ tsid = task_sid(tsk);
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
}
#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
@@ -1365,14 +1433,14 @@ static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
- int cap)
+ int cap, int audit)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct av_decision avd;
u16 sclass;
+ u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
-
- tsec = tsk->security;
+ int rc;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
ad.tsk = tsk;
@@ -1390,37 +1458,39 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
"SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
BUG();
}
- return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
+ if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
+ avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
+ return rc;
}
/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
u32 perms)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
- tsec = tsk->security;
-
- return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
}
/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
-static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
+static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
struct inode *inode,
u32 perms,
struct avc_audit_data *adp)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid;
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
- tsec = tsk->security;
+ sid = cred_sid(cred);
isec = inode->i_security;
if (!adp) {
@@ -1429,23 +1499,24 @@ static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
}
- return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
}
/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
pathname if needed. */
-static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
+static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
struct vfsmount *mnt,
struct dentry *dentry,
u32 av)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
- return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
+ return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
}
/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
@@ -1456,33 +1527,35 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
-static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
- struct file *file,
- u32 av)
+static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct file *file,
+ u32 av)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
int rc;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
- if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
+ if (sid != fsec->sid) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
SECCLASS_FD,
FD__USE,
&ad);
if (rc)
- return rc;
+ goto out;
}
/* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
+ rc = 0;
if (av)
- return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
+ rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
- return 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
}
/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
@@ -1490,36 +1563,36 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry,
u16 tclass)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
- u32 newsid;
+ u32 sid, newsid;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
int rc;
- tsec = current->security;
dsec = dir->i_security;
sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+ sid = tsec->sid;
+ newsid = tsec->create_sid;
+
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
&ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
- if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
- newsid = tsec->create_sid;
- } else {
- rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
- &newsid);
+ if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
+ rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -1532,11 +1605,9 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
struct task_struct *ctx)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
- tsec = ctx->security;
-
- return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
}
#define MAY_LINK 0
@@ -1549,13 +1620,12 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
int kind)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
u32 av;
int rc;
- tsec = current->security;
dsec = dir->i_security;
isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
@@ -1564,7 +1634,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
av = DIR__SEARCH;
av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -1584,7 +1654,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
return 0;
}
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
return rc;
}
@@ -1593,14 +1663,13 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
struct inode *new_dir,
struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
u32 av;
int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
int rc;
- tsec = current->security;
old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
@@ -1609,16 +1678,16 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -1628,13 +1697,13 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
if (new_dentry->d_inode)
av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
new_isec->sclass,
(new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
if (rc)
@@ -1645,18 +1714,16 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
}
/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
-static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
+static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
struct super_block *sb,
u32 perms,
struct avc_audit_data *ad)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+ u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
- tsec = tsk->security;
sbsec = sb->s_security;
- return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
- perms, ad);
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
}
/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
@@ -1687,15 +1754,39 @@ static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
return av;
}
+/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
+static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
+{
+ u32 av = 0;
+
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+ av |= FILE__READ;
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+ if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
+ av |= FILE__APPEND;
+ else
+ av |= FILE__WRITE;
+ }
+ if (!av) {
+ /*
+ * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
+ */
+ av = FILE__IOCTL;
+ }
+
+ return av;
+}
+
/*
- * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
+ * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
* open permission.
*/
-static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
+static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
{
- u32 av = file_mask_to_av(mode, mask);
+ u32 av = file_to_av(file);
if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
+ mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
/*
* lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
*/
@@ -1711,34 +1802,11 @@ static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
av |= DIR__OPEN;
else
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
- "unknown mode:%x\n", __func__, mode);
+ "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
}
return av;
}
-/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
-static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
-{
- u32 av = 0;
-
- if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
- av |= FILE__READ;
- if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
- if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
- av |= FILE__APPEND;
- else
- av |= FILE__WRITE;
- }
- if (!av) {
- /*
- * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
- */
- av = FILE__IOCTL;
- }
-
- return av;
-}
-
/* Hook functions begin here. */
static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
@@ -1751,13 +1819,12 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
return rc;
if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
- struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
- return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
- SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ u32 csid = task_sid(child);
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
}
- return task_has_perm(current, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
+ return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
}
static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
@@ -1776,40 +1843,37 @@ static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
{
int error;
- error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
+ error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
if (error)
return error;
return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
int error;
- error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
+ effective, inheritable, permitted);
if (error)
return error;
- return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
+ return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
}
-static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
-{
- secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
-}
-
-static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
+ rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap, audit);
if (rc)
return rc;
- return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
+ return task_has_capability(tsk, cap, audit);
}
static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
@@ -1857,15 +1921,14 @@ static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
{
int error = 0;
u32 av;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- u32 tsid;
+ u32 tsid, sid;
int rc;
rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
if (rc)
return rc;
- tsec = current->security;
+ sid = current_sid();
rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
@@ -1877,7 +1940,7 @@ static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
/* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
* a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
if (op == 001) {
- error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
+ error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
} else {
av = 0;
@@ -1886,7 +1949,7 @@ static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
if (op & 002)
av |= FILE__WRITE;
if (av)
- error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
+ error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
}
@@ -1895,6 +1958,7 @@ static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int rc = 0;
if (!sb)
@@ -1906,14 +1970,12 @@ static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
case Q_QUOTAOFF:
case Q_SETINFO:
case Q_SETQUOTA:
- rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
- NULL);
+ rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
break;
case Q_GETFMT:
case Q_GETINFO:
case Q_GETQUOTA:
- rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
- NULL);
+ rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
break;
default:
rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
@@ -1924,7 +1986,9 @@ static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
{
- return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+ return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
}
static int selinux_syslog(int type)
@@ -1972,16 +2036,8 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
- if (rc == 0)
- rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
- SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
- CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
- 0,
- NULL);
+ rc = selinux_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (rc == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -1990,59 +2046,45 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
/* binprm security operations */
-static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
-
- bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!bsec)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- bsec->set = 0;
-
- bprm->security = bsec;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
+ struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
- u32 newsid;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
+ rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
if (rc)
return rc;
- bsec = bprm->security;
-
- if (bsec->set)
+ /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
+ * the script interpreter */
+ if (bprm->cred_prepared)
return 0;
- tsec = current->security;
+ old_tsec = current_security();
+ new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
isec = inode->i_security;
/* Default to the current task SID. */
- bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
+ new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
+ new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
/* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
- tsec->create_sid = 0;
- tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
- tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
+ new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
+ new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
+ new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
- if (tsec->exec_sid) {
- newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
+ if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
+ new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
/* Reset exec SID on execve. */
- tsec->exec_sid = 0;
+ new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
} else {
/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
- rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
- SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
+ rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
@@ -2051,33 +2093,63 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
- newsid = tsec->sid;
+ new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
- if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+ if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
} else {
/* Check permissions for the transition. */
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
- /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
- current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+ /* Check for shared state */
+ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
+ NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
+ * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
+ if (bprm->unsafe &
+ (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
+ struct task_struct *tracer;
+ struct task_security_struct *sec;
+ u32 ptsid = 0;
- /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
- bsec->sid = newsid;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
+ if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
+ sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
+ ptsid = sec->sid;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (ptsid != 0) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
+ bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
}
- bsec->set = 1;
return 0;
}
@@ -2086,35 +2158,34 @@ static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
}
-
static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+ u32 sid, osid;
int atsecure = 0;
- if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
+ sid = tsec->sid;
+ osid = tsec->osid;
+
+ if (osid != sid) {
/* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
the noatsecure permission is granted between
the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
- atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
- SECCLASS_PROCESS,
- PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
+ atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
}
return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
}
-static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- kfree(bprm->security);
- bprm->security = NULL;
-}
-
extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
-static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
+static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct files_struct *files)
{
struct avc_audit_data ad;
struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
@@ -2136,7 +2207,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
interested in the inode-based check here. */
file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
- if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
+ if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
drop_tty = 1;
}
@@ -2171,7 +2242,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
file = fget(i);
if (!file)
continue;
- if (file_has_perm(current,
+ if (file_has_perm(cred,
file,
file_to_av(file))) {
sys_close(i);
@@ -2185,7 +2256,10 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
if (devnull) {
get_file(devnull);
} else {
- devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
+ devnull = dentry_open(
+ dget(selinux_null),
+ mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
+ O_RDWR, cred);
if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
devnull = NULL;
put_unused_fd(fd);
@@ -2204,94 +2278,78 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
}
-static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
+/*
+ * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
+ */
+static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
- u32 sid;
- int rc;
-
- secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
-
- tsec = current->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
+ struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
+ int rc, i;
- bsec = bprm->security;
- sid = bsec->sid;
+ secondary_ops->bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
- tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
- bsec->unsafe = 0;
- if (tsec->sid != sid) {
- /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
- unchanged and kill. */
- if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
- PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
- if (rc) {
- bsec->unsafe = 1;
- return;
- }
- }
+ new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
+ if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
+ return;
- /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
- Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
- if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
- struct task_struct *tracer;
- struct task_security_struct *sec;
- u32 ptsid = 0;
+ /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
+ flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
- rcu_read_lock();
- tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
- if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
- sec = tracer->security;
- ptsid = sec->sid;
- }
- rcu_read_unlock();
+ /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
+ current->pdeath_signal = 0;
- if (ptsid != 0) {
- rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
- PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
- if (rc) {
- bsec->unsafe = 1;
- return;
- }
- }
+ /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
+ * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
+ * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
+ *
+ * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
+ * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
+ * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
+ * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
+ * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
+ */
+ rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
+ if (rc) {
+ for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
+ rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
+ initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
+ rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
}
- tsec->sid = sid;
+ update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
}
}
/*
- * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
+ * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
+ * due to exec
*/
-static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
struct itimerval itimer;
- struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
+ struct sighand_struct *psig;
+ u32 osid, sid;
int rc, i;
+ unsigned long flags;
- tsec = current->security;
- bsec = bprm->security;
+ secondary_ops->bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
- if (bsec->unsafe) {
- force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
- return;
- }
- if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
+ osid = tsec->osid;
+ sid = tsec->sid;
+
+ if (sid == osid)
return;
- /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
- flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
-
- /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
- from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
- subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
- signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
- been updated so that any kill done after the flush
- will be checked against the new SID. */
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
- PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
+ /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
+ * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
+ * flush and unblock signals.
+ *
+ * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
+ * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
+ */
+ rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
if (rc) {
memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
@@ -2304,33 +2362,14 @@ static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
}
- /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
- current->pdeath_signal = 0;
-
- /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
- from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
- the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
- task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
- (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
- check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
- the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
- than the default soft limit for cases where the default
- is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
- RLIMIT_STACK.*/
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
- PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
- if (rc) {
- for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
- rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
- initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
- rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
- }
- update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
- }
-
- /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
- recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
+ /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
+ * wait permission to the new task SID. */
+ read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+ psig = current->parent->sighand;
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
+ read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
}
/* superblock security operations */
@@ -2435,8 +2474,9 @@ out:
return rc;
}
-static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct avc_audit_data ad;
int rc;
@@ -2444,18 +2484,23 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
if (rc)
return rc;
+ /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
+ if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
+ return 0;
+
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
- return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
+ return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
}
static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct avc_audit_data ad;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
- return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
+ return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
}
static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
@@ -2464,6 +2509,7 @@ static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
unsigned long flags,
void *data)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int rc;
rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
@@ -2471,22 +2517,23 @@ static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
return rc;
if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
- return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
+ return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
else
- return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
+ return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
FILE__MOUNTON);
}
static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int rc;
rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
if (rc)
return rc;
- return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
+ return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
}
@@ -2506,21 +2553,22 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
char **name, void **value,
size_t *len)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
- u32 newsid, clen;
+ u32 sid, newsid, clen;
int rc;
char *namep = NULL, *context;
- tsec = current->security;
dsec = dir->i_security;
sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
- if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
- newsid = tsec->create_sid;
- } else {
- rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
+ sid = tsec->sid;
+ newsid = tsec->create_sid;
+
+ if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
+ rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
&newsid);
if (rc) {
@@ -2623,21 +2671,25 @@ static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dent
static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
{
- return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+ return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
}
static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int rc;
rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
if (rc)
return rc;
- return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
+ return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
}
static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int rc;
rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
@@ -2649,12 +2701,13 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
return 0;
}
- return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
- open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
+ return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
+ file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
}
static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int rc;
rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
@@ -2666,18 +2719,22 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
- return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+ return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
- return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
+ return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
}
static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
{
- return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+ return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
}
static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
@@ -2692,18 +2749,17 @@ static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
/* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
ordinary setattr permission. */
- return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+ return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
}
static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
- u32 newsid;
+ u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
int rc = 0;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
@@ -2719,7 +2775,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -2733,12 +2789,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
+ rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
isec->sclass);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -2778,12 +2834,16 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
- return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+ return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
}
static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
{
- return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+ return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
}
static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
@@ -2806,7 +2866,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
u32 size;
int error;
char *context = NULL;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
@@ -2821,13 +2880,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
* in-core context value, not a denial.
*/
- error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN);
- if (!error)
- error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
- SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
- CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
- 0,
- NULL);
+ error = selinux_capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (!error)
error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
&size);
@@ -2894,6 +2947,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int rc;
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
@@ -2906,7 +2960,7 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
mask |= MAY_APPEND;
- rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
+ rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -2917,16 +2971,16 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
if (!mask) {
/* No permission to check. Existence test. */
return 0;
}
- if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
+ if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
&& fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
@@ -2946,6 +3000,7 @@ static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
u32 av = 0;
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
@@ -2955,11 +3010,14 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
if (!av)
av = FILE__IOCTL;
- return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
+ return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
}
static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ int rc = 0;
+
#ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
/*
@@ -2967,9 +3025,9 @@ static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared
* private file mapping that will also be writable.
* This has an additional check.
*/
- int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
+ rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
if (rc)
- return rc;
+ goto error;
}
#endif
@@ -2984,9 +3042,11 @@ static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared
if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
- return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
+ return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
}
- return 0;
+
+error:
+ return rc;
}
static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
@@ -2994,7 +3054,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
{
int rc = 0;
- u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
@@ -3013,6 +3073,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int rc;
rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
@@ -3027,12 +3088,11 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
rc = 0;
if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
- rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
- PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
+ rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
} else if (!vma->vm_file &&
vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
- rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
+ rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
} else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
/*
* We are making executable a file mapping that has
@@ -3041,8 +3101,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
* modified content. This typically should only
* occur for text relocations.
*/
- rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
- FILE__EXECMOD);
+ rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
}
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -3054,12 +3113,15 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
{
- return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+ return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
}
static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int err = 0;
switch (cmd) {
@@ -3070,7 +3132,7 @@ static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
}
if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
- err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
+ err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
break;
}
/* fall through */
@@ -3080,7 +3142,7 @@ static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
case F_GETOWN:
case F_GETSIG:
/* Just check FD__USE permission */
- err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
+ err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
break;
case F_GETLK:
case F_SETLK:
@@ -3094,7 +3156,7 @@ static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
- err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
+ err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
break;
}
@@ -3103,12 +3165,10 @@ static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct file_security_struct *fsec;
- tsec = current->security;
fsec = file->f_security;
- fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
+ fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
return 0;
}
@@ -3117,14 +3177,13 @@ static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
{
struct file *file;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
u32 perm;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct file_security_struct *fsec;
/* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
- tsec = tsk->security;
fsec = file->f_security;
if (!signum)
@@ -3132,20 +3191,23 @@ static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
else
perm = signal_to_av(signum);
- return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
+ return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
}
static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
{
- return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+ return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
}
-static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
+static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
{
struct file_security_struct *fsec;
struct inode *inode;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
fsec = file->f_security;
isec = inode->i_security;
@@ -3166,7 +3228,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
* new inode label or new policy.
* This check is not redundant - do not remove.
*/
- return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
+ return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
}
/* task security operations */
@@ -3179,36 +3241,88 @@ static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
if (rc)
return rc;
- return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
+ return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
}
-static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
+/*
+ * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
+ */
+static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
- int rc;
-
- tsec1 = current->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+ cred->security = NULL;
+ kfree(tsec);
+}
- rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
- tsec2 = tsk->security;
+/*
+ * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
+ */
+static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
- tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
+ old_tsec = old->security;
- /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
- tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
- tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
- tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
- tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
+ tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
+ if (!tsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ new->security = tsec;
return 0;
}
-static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
+/*
+ * commit new credentials
+ */
+static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+ secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
+}
+
+/*
+ * set the security data for a kernel service
+ * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
+ */
+static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
+ SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
+ KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
+ NULL);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ tsec->sid = secid;
+ tsec->create_sid = 0;
+ tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
+ tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
+ * objective context of the specified inode
+ */
+static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
{
- task_free_security(tsk);
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
+ KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
+ NULL);
+
+ if (ret == 0)
+ tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
+ return 0;
}
static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
@@ -3222,9 +3336,10 @@ static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
return 0;
}
-static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
+static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ int flags)
{
- return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
+ return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
}
static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
@@ -3235,23 +3350,22 @@ static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
- return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
+ return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
}
static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
+ return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
}
static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
+ return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
}
static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
- *secid = tsec->sid;
+ *secid = task_sid(p);
}
static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
@@ -3268,7 +3382,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
if (rc)
return rc;
- return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+ return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
}
static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
@@ -3279,12 +3393,12 @@ static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
if (rc)
return rc;
- return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+ return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
}
static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
+ return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
}
static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
@@ -3299,9 +3413,9 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim
/* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
- upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
+ upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
- return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
+ return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
return 0;
}
@@ -3314,17 +3428,17 @@ static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct s
if (rc)
return rc;
- return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+ return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
}
static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
+ return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
}
static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+ return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
}
static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
@@ -3332,7 +3446,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
{
u32 perm;
int rc;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
if (rc)
@@ -3342,11 +3455,11 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
else
perm = signal_to_av(sig);
- tsec = p->security;
if (secid)
- rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
else
- rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
+ rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
return rc;
}
@@ -3354,13 +3467,12 @@ static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
unsigned long arg2,
unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4,
- unsigned long arg5,
- long *rc_p)
+ unsigned long arg5)
{
/* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
the state of the current process. */
- return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
+ return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
}
static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
@@ -3368,27 +3480,14 @@ static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
}
-static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
-{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-
- secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
-
- tsec = p->security;
- tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
- tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
- return;
-}
-
static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
struct inode *inode)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ u32 sid = task_sid(p);
- isec->sid = tsec->sid;
+ isec->sid = sid;
isec->initialized = 1;
- return;
}
/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
@@ -3627,19 +3726,19 @@ static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
u32 perms)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid;
int err = 0;
- tsec = task->security;
isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
goto out;
+ sid = task_sid(task);
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
- err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
+ err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
out:
return err;
@@ -3648,18 +3747,20 @@ out:
static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
int protocol, int kern)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+ u32 sid, newsid;
+ u16 secclass;
int err = 0;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- u32 newsid;
if (kern)
goto out;
- tsec = current->security;
- newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
- err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
- socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
- protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
+ sid = tsec->sid;
+ newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
+
+ secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
+ err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
out:
return err;
@@ -3668,18 +3769,26 @@ out:
static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
int type, int protocol, int kern)
{
- int err = 0;
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
- u32 newsid;
+ u32 sid, newsid;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ sid = tsec->sid;
+ newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
- tsec = current->security;
- newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
+ if (kern)
+ isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ else if (newsid)
+ isec->sid = newsid;
+ else
+ isec->sid = sid;
+
isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
- isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
isec->initialized = 1;
if (sock->sk) {
@@ -3714,7 +3823,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
char *addrp;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
@@ -3722,7 +3830,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
u32 sid, node_perm;
- tsec = current->security;
isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
if (family == PF_INET) {
@@ -4387,7 +4494,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
"SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
" type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
- if (!selinux_enforcing)
+ if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
err = 0;
}
@@ -4763,15 +4870,16 @@ static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
u16 sclass)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+ u32 sid;
isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!isec)
return -ENOMEM;
+ sid = task_sid(task);
isec->sclass = sclass;
- isec->sid = tsec->sid;
+ isec->sid = sid;
perm->security = isec;
return 0;
@@ -4809,17 +4917,16 @@ static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
u32 perms)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
- tsec = current->security;
isec = ipc_perms->security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
- return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
}
static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
@@ -4835,22 +4942,21 @@ static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
/* message queue security operations */
static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
if (rc)
return rc;
- tsec = current->security;
isec = msq->q_perm.security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
if (rc) {
ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
@@ -4866,17 +4972,16 @@ static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
- tsec = current->security;
isec = msq->q_perm.security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
- return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
}
@@ -4910,13 +5015,12 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct msg_security_struct *msec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
- tsec = current->security;
isec = msq->q_perm.security;
msec = msg->security;
@@ -4928,9 +5032,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
* Compute new sid based on current process and
* message queue this message will be stored in
*/
- rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
- isec->sid,
- SECCLASS_MSG,
+ rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
&msec->sid);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -4940,16 +5042,16 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
/* Can this process write to the queue? */
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
if (!rc)
/* Can this process send the message */
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
- SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
+ MSG__SEND, &ad);
if (!rc)
/* Can the message be put in the queue? */
- rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
- SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+ MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
return rc;
}
@@ -4958,23 +5060,22 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
struct task_struct *target,
long type, int mode)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct msg_security_struct *msec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = task_sid(target);
int rc;
- tsec = target->security;
isec = msq->q_perm.security;
msec = msg->security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
if (!rc)
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
return rc;
}
@@ -4982,22 +5083,21 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
/* Shared Memory security operations */
static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
if (rc)
return rc;
- tsec = current->security;
isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
SHM__CREATE, &ad);
if (rc) {
ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
@@ -5013,17 +5113,16 @@ static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
- tsec = current->security;
isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
- return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
}
@@ -5081,22 +5180,21 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
/* Semaphore security operations */
static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
if (rc)
return rc;
- tsec = current->security;
isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
SEM__CREATE, &ad);
if (rc) {
ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
@@ -5112,17 +5210,16 @@ static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
- tsec = current->security;
isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
- return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
}
@@ -5212,33 +5309,35 @@ static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
char *name, char **value)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
u32 sid;
int error;
unsigned len;
if (current != p) {
- error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
+ error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
if (error)
return error;
}
- tsec = p->security;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
- sid = tsec->sid;
+ sid = __tsec->sid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
- sid = tsec->osid;
+ sid = __tsec->osid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
- sid = tsec->exec_sid;
+ sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
- sid = tsec->create_sid;
+ sid = __tsec->create_sid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
- sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
+ sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
- sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
+ sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
else
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto invalid;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
if (!sid)
return 0;
@@ -5247,6 +5346,10 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
if (error)
return error;
return len;
+
+invalid:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return -EINVAL;
}
static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
@@ -5254,7 +5357,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct task_struct *tracer;
- u32 sid = 0;
+ struct cred *new;
+ u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
int error;
char *str = value;
@@ -5270,15 +5374,15 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
* above restriction is ever removed.
*/
if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
- error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
+ error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
- error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
+ error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
- error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
+ error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
- error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
+ error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
- error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
+ error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
else
error = -EINVAL;
if (error)
@@ -5301,87 +5405,75 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
return error;
}
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
/* Permission checking based on the specified context is
performed during the actual operation (execve,
open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
- operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
+ operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
- tsec = p->security;
- if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
+ tsec = new->security;
+ if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
tsec->exec_sid = sid;
- else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
+ } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
tsec->create_sid = sid;
- else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
+ } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
error = may_create_key(sid, p);
if (error)
- return error;
+ goto abort_change;
tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
- } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
+ } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
- else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
- struct av_decision avd;
-
+ } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
+ error = -EINVAL;
if (sid == 0)
- return -EINVAL;
- /*
- * SELinux allows to change context in the following case only.
- * - Single threaded processes.
- * - Multi threaded processes intend to change its context into
- * more restricted domain (defined by TYPEBOUNDS statement).
- */
- if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
- struct task_struct *g, *t;
- struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
- read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
- do_each_thread(g, t) {
- if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
- read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
- error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
- if (!error)
- goto boundary_ok;
-
- return error;
- }
- } while_each_thread(g, t);
- read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ goto abort_change;
+
+ /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
+ error = -EPERM;
+ if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
+ error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
+ if (error)
+ goto abort_change;
}
-boundary_ok:
/* Check permissions for the transition. */
error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
if (error)
- return error;
+ goto abort_change;
/* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
+ ptsid = 0;
task_lock(p);
- rcu_read_lock();
tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
- if (tracer != NULL) {
- struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
- u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
- rcu_read_unlock();
- error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
- SECCLASS_PROCESS,
- PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
- if (!error)
- tsec->sid = sid;
- task_unlock(p);
- avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
- PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
+ if (tracer)
+ ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
+ task_unlock(p);
+
+ if (tracer) {
+ error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
if (error)
- return error;
- } else {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- tsec->sid = sid;
- task_unlock(p);
+ goto abort_change;
}
- } else
- return -EINVAL;
+ tsec->sid = sid;
+ } else {
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ goto abort_change;
+ }
+
+ commit_creds(new);
return size;
+
+abort_change:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return error;
}
static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
@@ -5401,22 +5493,23 @@ static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
+static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct key_security_struct *ksec;
ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ksec)
return -ENOMEM;
+ tsec = cred->security;
if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
else
ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
- k->security = ksec;
+ k->security = ksec;
return 0;
}
@@ -5429,17 +5522,12 @@ static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
}
static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
- struct task_struct *ctx,
- key_perm_t perm)
+ const struct cred *cred,
+ key_perm_t perm)
{
struct key *key;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct key_security_struct *ksec;
-
- key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
-
- tsec = ctx->security;
- ksec = key->security;
+ u32 sid;
/* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
@@ -5447,8 +5535,12 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
if (perm == 0)
return 0;
- return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
- SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
+ sid = cred_sid(cred);
+
+ key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+ ksec = key->security;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
}
static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
@@ -5473,8 +5565,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
.ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
.capget = selinux_capget,
- .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
- .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
+ .capset = selinux_capset,
.sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
.capable = selinux_capable,
.quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
@@ -5485,12 +5576,10 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
.netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
- .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
- .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
- .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
- .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
- .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
+ .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
.bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
+ .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
+ .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
.bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
.sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
@@ -5549,10 +5638,13 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
.task_create = selinux_task_create,
- .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
- .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
+ .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
+ .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
+ .cred_commit = selinux_cred_commit,
+ .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
+ .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
.task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
- .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
+ .task_fix_setuid = selinux_task_fix_setuid,
.task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
.task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
.task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
@@ -5569,7 +5661,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
.task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
.task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
- .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
.task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
.ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
@@ -5665,8 +5756,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
static __init int selinux_init(void)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-
if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
selinux_enabled = 0;
return 0;
@@ -5680,10 +5769,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
/* Set the security state for the initial task. */
- if (task_alloc_security(current))
- panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
- tsec = current->security;
- tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ cred_init_security();
sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index 1223b4f..c0c8854 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -176,3 +176,5 @@
S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, "name_connect")
S_(SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, "mmap_zero")
S_(SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, "recv")
+ S_(SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE, "use_as_override")
+ S_(SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS, "create_files_as")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index c4c5116..0ba79fe 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -841,3 +841,5 @@
#define DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT 0x00800000UL
#define MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO 0x00000001UL
#define PEER__RECV 0x00000001UL
+#define KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE 0x00000001UL
+#define KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS 0x00000002UL
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
index bd813c3..21ec786 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
@@ -72,3 +72,8 @@
S_(NULL)
S_("peer")
S_("capability2")
+ S_(NULL)
+ S_(NULL)
+ S_(NULL)
+ S_(NULL)
+ S_("kernel_service")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/flask.h b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
index febf886..882f27d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/flask.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
#define SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT 61
#define SECCLASS_PEER 68
#define SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 69
+#define SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE 74
/*
* Security identifier indices for initial entities
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index f8be8d7..3cc4516 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -77,17 +77,6 @@ struct ipc_security_struct {
u32 sid; /* SID of IPC resource */
};
-struct bprm_security_struct {
- u32 sid; /* SID for transformed process */
- unsigned char set;
-
- /*
- * unsafe is used to share failure information from bprm_apply_creds()
- * to bprm_post_apply_creds().
- */
- char unsafe;
-};
-
struct netif_security_struct {
int ifindex; /* device index */
u32 sid; /* SID for this interface */
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index ff59c0c..4ed7bab 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] =
{ RTM_GETANYCAST, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
{ RTM_GETNEIGHTBL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
{ RTM_SETNEIGHTBL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_NEWADDRLABEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELADDRLABEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETADDRLABEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
};
static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_firewall_perms[] =
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 69c9dcc..c863036 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -95,13 +95,18 @@ extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
static int task_has_security(struct task_struct *tsk,
u32 perms)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-
- tsec = tsk->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ u32 sid = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tsec = __task_cred(tsk)->security;
+ if (tsec)
+ sid = tsec->sid;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
if (!tsec)
return -EACCES;
- return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_SECURITY,
SECCLASS_SECURITY, perms, NULL);
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 8f17f54..c0eb720 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, u32 sid)
{
int rc = 0;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
char *ctx_str = NULL;
u32 str_len;
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
*/
int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
int rc = 0;
if (ctx) {
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
*/
int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
int rc = 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 79ff21e..247cec3 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode)
{
int rc;
- rc = smk_access(current->security, obj_label, mode);
+ rc = smk_access(current_security(), obj_label, mode);
if (rc == 0)
return 0;
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode)
* only one that gets privilege and current does not
* have that label.
*/
- if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != current->security)
+ if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != current->cred->security)
return rc;
if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 6e2dc0b..1b5551d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
#include "smack.h"
+#define task_security(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), security))
+
/*
* I hope these are the hokeyist lines of code in the module. Casey.
*/
@@ -102,7 +104,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- rc = smk_access(current->security, ctp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
+ rc = smk_access(current_security(), task_security(ctp), MAY_READWRITE);
if (rc != 0 && capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
return rc;
@@ -124,7 +126,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- rc = smk_access(ptp->security, current->security, MAY_READWRITE);
+ rc = smk_access(task_security(ptp), current_security(), MAY_READWRITE);
if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
return rc;
@@ -141,7 +143,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
static int smack_syslog(int type)
{
int rc;
- char *sp = current->security;
+ char *sp = current_security();
rc = cap_syslog(type);
if (rc != 0)
@@ -248,11 +250,12 @@ static int smack_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *smackopts)
/**
* smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
* @sb: the file system superblock
+ * @flags: the mount flags
* @data: the smack mount options
*
* Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
*/
-static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
{
struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
@@ -373,7 +376,7 @@ static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
*/
static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
{
- inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(current->security);
+ inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(current_security());
if (inode->i_security == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
@@ -818,7 +821,7 @@ static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
*/
static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
{
- file->f_security = current->security;
+ file->f_security = current_security();
return 0;
}
@@ -916,7 +919,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
*/
static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
{
- file->f_security = current->security;
+ file->f_security = current_security();
return 0;
}
@@ -941,7 +944,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
*/
file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
- rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
return rc;
@@ -973,33 +976,75 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
*/
/**
- * smack_task_alloc_security - "allocate" a task blob
- * @tsk: the task in need of a blob
+ * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
+ * @cred: the credentials in question
*
* Smack isn't using copies of blobs. Everyone
- * points to an immutable list. No alloc required.
- * No data copy required.
+ * points to an immutable list. The blobs never go away.
+ * There is no leak here.
+ */
+static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+{
+ cred->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the original credentials
+ * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
+ *
+ * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
+ */
+static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ new->security = old->security;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * commit new credentials
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the original credentials
+ */
+static void smack_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
+ * @new points to the set of credentials to be modified.
+ * @secid specifies the security ID to be set
*
- * Always returns 0
+ * Set the security data for a kernel service.
*/
-static int smack_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
+static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
- tsk->security = current->security;
+ char *smack = smack_from_secid(secid);
+
+ if (smack == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ new->security = smack;
return 0;
}
/**
- * smack_task_free_security - "free" a task blob
- * @task: the task with the blob
+ * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
+ * @new points to the set of credentials to be modified
+ * @inode points to the inode to use as a reference
*
- * Smack isn't using copies of blobs. Everyone
- * points to an immutable list. The blobs never go away.
- * There is no leak here.
+ * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
+ * as the objective context of the specified inode
*/
-static void smack_task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
+static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
+ struct inode *inode)
{
- task->security = NULL;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+
+ new->security = isp->smk_inode;
+ return 0;
}
/**
@@ -1011,7 +1056,7 @@ static void smack_task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
*/
static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
}
/**
@@ -1022,7 +1067,7 @@ static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
*/
static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+ return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ);
}
/**
@@ -1033,7 +1078,7 @@ static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
*/
static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+ return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ);
}
/**
@@ -1045,7 +1090,7 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
*/
static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = smack_to_secid(p->security);
+ *secid = smack_to_secid(task_security(p));
}
/**
@@ -1061,7 +1106,7 @@ static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
if (rc == 0)
- rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
return rc;
}
@@ -1078,7 +1123,7 @@ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
if (rc == 0)
- rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
return rc;
}
@@ -1090,7 +1135,7 @@ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
*/
static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+ return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ);
}
/**
@@ -1108,7 +1153,7 @@ static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
if (rc == 0)
- rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
return rc;
}
@@ -1120,7 +1165,7 @@ static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
*/
static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+ return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ);
}
/**
@@ -1131,7 +1176,7 @@ static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
*/
static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
}
/**
@@ -1154,13 +1199,13 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
* can write the receiver.
*/
if (secid == 0)
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
/*
* If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
* specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
* we can't take privilege into account.
*/
- return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
}
/**
@@ -1173,7 +1218,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
{
int rc;
- rc = smk_access(current->security, p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_access(current_security(), task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
if (rc == 0)
return 0;
@@ -1204,7 +1249,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
- isp->smk_inode = p->security;
+ isp->smk_inode = task_security(p);
}
/*
@@ -1223,7 +1268,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
*/
static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
- char *csp = current->security;
+ char *csp = current_security();
struct socket_smack *ssp;
ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
@@ -1448,7 +1493,7 @@ static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
*/
static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
- msg->security = current->security;
+ msg->security = current_security();
return 0;
}
@@ -1484,7 +1529,7 @@ static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
- isp->security = current->security;
+ isp->security = current_security();
return 0;
}
@@ -1593,7 +1638,7 @@ static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
- isp->security = current->security;
+ isp->security = current_security();
return 0;
}
@@ -1697,7 +1742,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
- kisp->security = current->security;
+ kisp->security = current_security();
return 0;
}
@@ -1852,7 +1897,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
struct super_block *sbp;
struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
struct inode_smack *isp;
- char *csp = current->security;
+ char *csp = current_security();
char *fetched;
char *final;
struct dentry *dp;
@@ -2009,7 +2054,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
- cp = kstrdup(p->security, GFP_KERNEL);
+ cp = kstrdup(task_security(p), GFP_KERNEL);
if (cp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -2033,6 +2078,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
+ struct cred *new;
char *newsmack;
/*
@@ -2055,7 +2101,11 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
if (newsmack == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
- p->security = newsmack;
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ new->security = newsmack;
+ commit_creds(new);
return size;
}
@@ -2288,8 +2338,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
return;
ssp = sk->sk_security;
- ssp->smk_in = current->security;
- ssp->smk_out = current->security;
+ ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = current_security();
ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
rc = smack_netlabel(sk);
@@ -2352,17 +2401,17 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
/**
* smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
* @key: object
- * @tsk: the task associated with the key
+ * @cred: the credentials to use
* @flags: unused
*
* No allocation required
*
* Returns 0
*/
-static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *tsk,
+static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
- key->security = tsk->security;
+ key->security = cred->security;
return 0;
}
@@ -2380,14 +2429,14 @@ static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
/*
* smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
* @key_ref: gets to the object
- * @context: task involved
+ * @cred: the credentials to use
* @perm: unused
*
* Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
* an error code otherwise
*/
static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
- struct task_struct *context, key_perm_t perm)
+ const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm)
{
struct key *keyp;
@@ -2403,10 +2452,10 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
/*
* This should not occur
*/
- if (context->security == NULL)
+ if (cred->security == NULL)
return -EACCES;
- return smk_access(context->security, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
+ return smk_access(cred->security, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
@@ -2577,15 +2626,13 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.ptrace_may_access = smack_ptrace_may_access,
.ptrace_traceme = smack_ptrace_traceme,
.capget = cap_capget,
- .capset_check = cap_capset_check,
- .capset_set = cap_capset_set,
+ .capset = cap_capset,
.capable = cap_capable,
.syslog = smack_syslog,
.settime = cap_settime,
.vm_enough_memory = cap_vm_enough_memory,
- .bprm_apply_creds = cap_bprm_apply_creds,
- .bprm_set_security = cap_bprm_set_security,
+ .bprm_set_creds = cap_bprm_set_creds,
.bprm_secureexec = cap_bprm_secureexec,
.sb_alloc_security = smack_sb_alloc_security,
@@ -2627,9 +2674,12 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.file_send_sigiotask = smack_file_send_sigiotask,
.file_receive = smack_file_receive,
- .task_alloc_security = smack_task_alloc_security,
- .task_free_security = smack_task_free_security,
- .task_post_setuid = cap_task_post_setuid,
+ .cred_free = smack_cred_free,
+ .cred_prepare = smack_cred_prepare,
+ .cred_commit = smack_cred_commit,
+ .kernel_act_as = smack_kernel_act_as,
+ .kernel_create_files_as = smack_kernel_create_files_as,
+ .task_fix_setuid = cap_task_fix_setuid,
.task_setpgid = smack_task_setpgid,
.task_getpgid = smack_task_getpgid,
.task_getsid = smack_task_getsid,
@@ -2642,7 +2692,6 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.task_movememory = smack_task_movememory,
.task_kill = smack_task_kill,
.task_wait = smack_task_wait,
- .task_reparent_to_init = cap_task_reparent_to_init,
.task_to_inode = smack_task_to_inode,
.task_prctl = cap_task_prctl,
@@ -2718,6 +2767,8 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
*/
static __init int smack_init(void)
{
+ struct cred *cred;
+
if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
return 0;
@@ -2726,7 +2777,8 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
/*
* Set the security state for the initial task.
*/
- current->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+ cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
+ cred->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known;
/*
* Initialize locks
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index c21d8c8..ca257df 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ static void smk_cipso_doi(void)
audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info.sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
- audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->security);
+ audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current_security());
rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(NULL, &audit_info);
if (rc != 0)
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static void smk_unlbl_ambient(char *oldambient)
audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info.sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
- audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->security);
+ audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current_security());
if (oldambient != NULL) {
rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(oldambient, &audit_info);
@@ -843,7 +843,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char in[SMK_LABELLEN];
- char *sp = current->security;
+ char *sp = current->cred->security;
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
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