diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
92 files changed, 545 insertions, 1181 deletions
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index f2d71cd..4d2d378 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # # Makefile for the kernel security code # diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore index d5b291e..9cdec70 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore +++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ # # Generated include files # -net_names.h capability_names.h rlim_names.h diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile index dafdd38..9a6b403 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile @@ -1,47 +1,15 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # Makefile for AppArmor Linux Security Module # obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \ path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \ - resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o net.o + resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o -clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h +clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h -# Build a lower case string table of address family names -# Transform lines from -# #define AF_LOCAL 1 /* POSIX name for AF_UNIX */ -# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */ -# to -# [1] = "local", -# [2] = "inet", -# -# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping. -# Transforms lines from -# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */ -# to -# #define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "local inet" -quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN $@ -cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\ - sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \ - 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\ - echo "};" >> $@ ;\ - printf '%s' '\#define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\ - sed -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \ - 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\ - $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@ - -# Build a lower case string table of sock type names -# Transform lines from -# SOCK_STREAM = 1, -# to -# [1] = "stream", -quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN $@ -cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\ - sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \ - -e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\ - echo "};" >> $@ # Build a lower case string table of capability names # Transforms lines from @@ -94,7 +62,6 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \ tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@ $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h -$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \ $(src)/Makefile @@ -102,8 +69,3 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \ $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \ $(src)/Makefile $(call cmd,make-rlim) -$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \ - $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \ - $(src)/Makefile - $(call cmd,make-af) - $(call cmd,make-sock) diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index 518d592..caaf51d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -2202,7 +2202,6 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = { AA_SFS_DIR("policy", aa_sfs_entry_policy), AA_SFS_DIR("domain", aa_sfs_entry_domain), AA_SFS_DIR("file", aa_sfs_entry_file), - AA_SFS_DIR("network", aa_sfs_entry_network), AA_SFS_DIR("mount", aa_sfs_entry_mount), AA_SFS_DIR("namespaces", aa_sfs_entry_ns), AA_SFS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK), diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c index db80221..3382518 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/file.c +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ #include "include/context.h" #include "include/file.h" #include "include/match.h" -#include "include/net.h" #include "include/path.h" #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/label.h" @@ -567,32 +566,6 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, return error; } -static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, - struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file, - u32 request, u32 denied) -{ - struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data; - int error; - - AA_BUG(!sock); - - /* revalidation due to label out of date. No revocation at this time */ - if (!denied && aa_label_is_subset(flabel, label)) - return 0; - - /* TODO: improve to skip profiles cached in flabel */ - error = aa_sock_file_perm(label, op, request, sock); - if (denied) { - /* TODO: improve to skip profiles checked above */ - /* check every profile in file label to is cached */ - last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(flabel, op, request, sock)); - } - if (!error) - update_file_ctx(file_ctx(file), label, request); - - return error; -} - /** * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file * @op: operation being checked @@ -637,9 +610,6 @@ int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file, error = __file_path_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request, denied); - else if (S_ISSOCK(file_inode(file)->i_mode)) - error = __file_sock_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request, - denied); done: rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index ff4316e..620e811 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -121,29 +121,21 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data { /* these entries require a custom callback fn */ struct { struct aa_label *peer; - union { - struct { - kuid_t ouid; - const char *target; - } fs; - struct { - int type, protocol; - struct sock *peer_sk; - void *addr; - int addrlen; - } net; - int signal; - struct { - int rlim; - unsigned long max; - } rlim; - }; + struct { + const char *target; + kuid_t ouid; + } fs; }; struct { struct aa_profile *profile; const char *ns; long pos; } iface; + int signal; + struct { + int rlim; + unsigned long max; + } rlim; struct { const char *src_name; const char *type; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h index 436b3a7..f546707 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h @@ -19,17 +19,6 @@ #include "match.h" -/* Provide our own test for whether a write lock is held for asserts - * this is because on none SMP systems write_can_lock will always - * resolve to true, which is what you want for code making decisions - * based on it, but wrong for asserts checking that the lock is held - */ -#ifdef CONFIG_SMP -#define write_is_locked(X) !write_can_lock(X) -#else -#define write_is_locked(X) (1) -#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ - /* * DEBUG remains global (no per profile flag) since it is mostly used in sysctl * which is not related to profile accesses. diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h deleted file mode 100644 index 140c8efc..0000000 --- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,114 +0,0 @@ -/* - * AppArmor security module - * - * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions. - * - * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE - * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd. - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or - * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as - * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the - * License. - */ - -#ifndef __AA_NET_H -#define __AA_NET_H - -#include <net/sock.h> -#include <linux/path.h> - -#include "apparmorfs.h" -#include "label.h" -#include "perms.h" -#include "policy.h" - -#define AA_MAY_SEND AA_MAY_WRITE -#define AA_MAY_RECEIVE AA_MAY_READ - -#define AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN AA_MAY_DELETE - -#define AA_MAY_CONNECT AA_MAY_OPEN -#define AA_MAY_ACCEPT 0x00100000 - -#define AA_MAY_BIND 0x00200000 -#define AA_MAY_LISTEN 0x00400000 - -#define AA_MAY_SETOPT 0x01000000 -#define AA_MAY_GETOPT 0x02000000 - -#define NET_PERMS_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE | \ - AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_BIND | AA_MAY_LISTEN | \ - AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SETATTR | \ - AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_SETOPT | AA_MAY_GETOPT) - -#define NET_FS_PERMS (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE | \ - AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_RENAME |\ - AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_CHMOD | \ - AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_CHGRP | AA_MAY_LOCK | \ - AA_MAY_MPROT) - -#define NET_PEER_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CONNECT | \ - AA_MAY_ACCEPT) -struct aa_sk_ctx { - struct aa_label *label; - struct aa_label *peer; - struct path path; -}; - -#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security) -#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security -#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \ - struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \ - .family = (F)}; \ - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME, \ - ((SK) && (F) != AF_UNIX) ? LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET : \ - LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, \ - OP); \ - NAME.u.net = &(NAME ## _net); \ - aad(&NAME)->net.type = (T); \ - aad(&NAME)->net.protocol = (P) - -#define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, SK) \ - DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type, \ - (SK)->sk_protocol) - -/* struct aa_net - network confinement data - * @allow: basic network families permissions - * @audit: which network permissions to force audit - * @quiet: which network permissions to quiet rejects - */ -struct aa_net { - u16 allow[AF_MAX]; - u16 audit[AF_MAX]; - u16 quiet[AF_MAX]; -}; - - -extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[]; - -void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va); -int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, - u32 request, u16 family, int type); -int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, - int type, int protocol); -static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, - struct common_audit_data *sa, - u32 request, - struct sock *sk) -{ - return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, sa, request, sk->sk_family, - sk->sk_type); -} -int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk); - -int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, - struct socket *sock); - - -static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new) -{ - /* NOP */ -} - -#endif /* __AA_NET_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h index af04d5a..2b27bb7 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h @@ -135,10 +135,9 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms; void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask); -void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names, - u32 mask); +void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask); void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs, - u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask); + u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask); void aa_apply_modes_to_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms); void aa_compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h index 4364088..17fe41a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ #include "file.h" #include "lib.h" #include "label.h" -#include "net.h" #include "perms.h" #include "resource.h" @@ -112,7 +111,6 @@ struct aa_data { * @policy: general match rules governing policy * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions * @caps: capabilities for the profile - * @net: network controls for the profile * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile * * @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs @@ -150,7 +148,6 @@ struct aa_profile { struct aa_policydb policy; struct aa_file_rules file; struct aa_caps caps; - struct aa_net net; struct aa_rlimit rlimits; struct aa_loaddata *rawdata; @@ -223,16 +220,6 @@ static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_SAFE(struct aa_profile *profile, return 0; } -static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_profile *profile, - u16 AF) { - unsigned int state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET); - u16 be_af = cpu_to_be16(AF); - - if (!state) - return 0; - return aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2); -} - /** * aa_get_profile - increment refcount on profile @p * @p: profile (MAYBE NULL) diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c index 66fb9ed..7ca0032 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static inline int map_signal_num(int sig) return SIGUNKNOWN; else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN) return sig - SIGRTMIN + 128; /* rt sigs mapped to 128 */ - else if (sig <= MAXMAPPED_SIG) + else if (sig < MAXMAPPED_SIG) return sig_map[sig]; return SIGUNKNOWN; } @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied); } } - if (aad(sa)->signal <= MAXMAPPED_SIG) + if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIG) audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]); else audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d", diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c index c5b99b9..ad28e03 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/label.c +++ b/security/apparmor/label.c @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ void __aa_proxy_redirect(struct aa_label *orig, struct aa_label *new) AA_BUG(!orig); AA_BUG(!new); - AA_BUG(!write_is_locked(&labels_set(orig)->lock)); + lockdep_assert_held_exclusive(&labels_set(orig)->lock); tmp = rcu_dereference_protected(orig->proxy->label, &labels_ns(orig)->lock); @@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ static bool __label_remove(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_label *new) AA_BUG(!ls); AA_BUG(!label); - AA_BUG(!write_is_locked(&ls->lock)); + lockdep_assert_held_exclusive(&ls->lock); if (new) __aa_proxy_redirect(label, new); @@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ static bool __label_replace(struct aa_label *old, struct aa_label *new) AA_BUG(!ls); AA_BUG(!old); AA_BUG(!new); - AA_BUG(!write_is_locked(&ls->lock)); + lockdep_assert_held_exclusive(&ls->lock); AA_BUG(new->flags & FLAG_IN_TREE); if (!label_is_stale(old)) @@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ static struct aa_label *__label_insert(struct aa_labelset *ls, AA_BUG(!ls); AA_BUG(!label); AA_BUG(labels_set(label) != ls); - AA_BUG(!write_is_locked(&ls->lock)); + lockdep_assert_held_exclusive(&ls->lock); AA_BUG(label->flags & FLAG_IN_TREE); /* Figure out where to put new node */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c index 8818621..08ca26b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lib.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c @@ -211,8 +211,7 @@ void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask) *str = '\0'; } -void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names, - u32 mask) +void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask) { const char *fmt = "%s"; unsigned int i, perm = 1; @@ -230,7 +229,7 @@ void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names, } void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs, - u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask) + u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask) { char str[33]; diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 72b915d..1346ee5 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ #include "include/context.h" #include "include/file.h" #include "include/ipc.h" -#include "include/net.h" #include "include/path.h" #include "include/label.h" #include "include/policy.h" @@ -737,368 +736,6 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info, return error; } -/** - * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field - */ -static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags) -{ - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; - - ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags); - if (!ctx) - return -ENOMEM; - - SK_CTX(sk) = ctx; - - return 0; -} - -/** - * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field - */ -static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) -{ - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); - - SK_CTX(sk) = NULL; - aa_put_label(ctx->label); - aa_put_label(ctx->peer); - path_put(&ctx->path); - kfree(ctx); -} - -/** - * apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field - */ -static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, - struct sock *newsk) -{ - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); - struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk); - - new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label); - new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer); - new->path = ctx->path; - path_get(&new->path); -} - -static int aa_sock_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type, - int protocol) -{ - AA_BUG(!label); - AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - - return aa_af_perm(label, OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type, - protocol); -} - - -/** - * apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket - */ -static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) -{ - struct aa_label *label; - int error = 0; - - label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - if (!(kern || unconfined(label))) - error = aa_sock_create_perm(label, family, type, protocol); - end_current_label_crit_section(label); - - return error; -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct - * - * Note: - * - kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to - * move to a special kernel label - * - socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or - * sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in - * sock_graft. - */ -static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, - int type, int protocol, int kern) -{ - struct aa_label *label; - - if (kern) { - struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns(); - - label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns)); - aa_put_ns(ns); - } else - label = aa_get_current_label(); - - if (sock->sk) { - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk); - - aa_put_label(ctx->label); - ctx->label = aa_get_label(label); - } - aa_put_label(label); - - return 0; -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket - */ -static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, - struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) -{ - AA_BUG(!sock); - AA_BUG(!sock->sk); - AA_BUG(!address); - AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - - return aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address - */ -static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, - struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) -{ - AA_BUG(!sock); - AA_BUG(!sock->sk); - AA_BUG(!address); - AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - - return aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen - */ -static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) -{ - AA_BUG(!sock); - AA_BUG(!sock->sk); - AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - - return aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection. - * - * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept - * has not been done. - */ -static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) -{ - AA_BUG(!sock); - AA_BUG(!sock->sk); - AA_BUG(!newsock); - AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - - return aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk); -} - -static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, - struct msghdr *msg, int size) -{ - AA_BUG(!sock); - AA_BUG(!sock->sk); - AA_BUG(!msg); - AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - - return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket - */ -static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, - struct msghdr *msg, int size) -{ - return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message - */ -static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, - struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags) -{ - return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size); -} - -/* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */ -static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock) -{ - AA_BUG(!sock); - AA_BUG(!sock->sk); - AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - - return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address - */ -static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) -{ - return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address - */ -static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) -{ - return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); -} - -/* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */ -static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, - int level, int optname) -{ - AA_BUG(!sock); - AA_BUG(!sock->sk); - AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - - return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk); -} - -/** - * apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options - */ -static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, - int optname) -{ - return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock, - level, optname); -} - -/** - * apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options - */ -static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, - int optname) -{ - return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock, - level, optname); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn - */ -static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) -{ - return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk - * - * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held - * - * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram() - * to deny an incoming connection socket_sock_rcv_skb() - */ -static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) -{ - return 0; -} - - -static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk) -{ - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); - - if (ctx->peer) - return ctx->peer; - - return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer - * - * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan - */ -static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, - char __user *optval, - int __user *optlen, - unsigned int len) -{ - char *name; - int slen, error = 0; - struct aa_label *label; - struct aa_label *peer; - - label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk); - if (IS_ERR(peer)) { - error = PTR_ERR(peer); - goto done; - } - slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer, - FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | - FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL); - /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */ - if (slen < 0) { - error = -ENOMEM; - } else { - if (slen > len) { - error = -ERANGE; - } else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) { - error = -EFAULT; - goto out; - } - if (put_user(slen, optlen)) - error = -EFAULT; -out: - kfree(name); - - } - -done: - end_current_label_crit_section(label); - - return error; -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet - * @sock: the peer socket - * @skb: packet data - * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet - * - * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent - */ -static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, - struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) - -{ - /* TODO: requires secid support */ - return -ENOPROTOOPT; -} - -/** - * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket - * @sk: child sock - * @parent: parent socket - * - * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can - * just set sk security information off of current creating process label - * Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based - * instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled - * socket is shared by different tasks. - */ -static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) -{ - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); - - if (!ctx->label) - ctx->label = aa_get_current_label(); -} - static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme), @@ -1133,30 +770,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security), - - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, - apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, - apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare), diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c deleted file mode 100644 index 33d5443..0000000 --- a/security/apparmor/net.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,184 +0,0 @@ -/* - * AppArmor security module - * - * This file contains AppArmor network mediation - * - * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE - * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd. - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or - * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as - * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the - * License. - */ - -#include "include/apparmor.h" -#include "include/audit.h" -#include "include/context.h" -#include "include/label.h" -#include "include/net.h" -#include "include/policy.h" - -#include "net_names.h" - - -struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = { - AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_SFS_AF_MASK), - { } -}; - -static const char * const net_mask_names[] = { - "unknown", - "send", - "receive", - "unknown", - - "create", - "shutdown", - "connect", - "unknown", - - "setattr", - "getattr", - "setcred", - "getcred", - - "chmod", - "chown", - "chgrp", - "lock", - - "mmap", - "mprot", - "unknown", - "unknown", - - "accept", - "bind", - "listen", - "unknown", - - "setopt", - "getopt", - "unknown", - "unknown", - - "unknown", - "unknown", - "unknown", - "unknown", -}; - - -/* audit callback for net specific fields */ -void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) -{ - struct common_audit_data *sa = va; - - audit_log_format(ab, " family="); - if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) - audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]); - else - audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family); - audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type="); - if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]) - audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]); - else - audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", aad(sa)->net.type); - audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol); - - if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) { - audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); - aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, NULL, 0, - net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK); - - if (aad(sa)->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) { - audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask="); - aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, NULL, 0, - net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK); - } - } - if (aad(sa)->peer) { - audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); - aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, - FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); - } -} - - -/* Generic af perm */ -int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, - u32 request, u16 family, int type) -{ - struct aa_perms perms = { }; - - AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX); - AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX); - - if (profile_unconfined(profile)) - return 0; - - perms.allow = (profile->net.allow[family] & (1 << type)) ? - ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0; - perms.audit = (profile->net.audit[family] & (1 << type)) ? - ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0; - perms.quiet = (profile->net.quiet[family] & (1 << type)) ? - ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0; - aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); - - return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb); -} - -int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, - int type, int protocol) -{ - struct aa_profile *profile; - DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, NULL, family, type, protocol); - - return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, request, family, - type)); -} - -static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, - struct sock *sk) -{ - struct aa_profile *profile; - DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk); - - AA_BUG(!label); - AA_BUG(!sk); - - if (unconfined(label)) - return 0; - - return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk)); -} - -int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk) -{ - struct aa_label *label; - int error; - - AA_BUG(!sk); - AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - - /* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */ - label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk); - end_current_label_crit_section(label); - - return error; -} - - -int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, - struct socket *sock) -{ - AA_BUG(!label); - AA_BUG(!sock); - AA_BUG(!sock->sk); - - return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk); -} diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index 5a2aec3..4ede87c 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -275,19 +275,6 @@ fail: return 0; } -static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name) -{ - if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) { - if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16))) - return 0; - if (data) - *data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((__le16 *) e->pos)); - e->pos += sizeof(u16); - return 1; - } - return 0; -} - static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name) { if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) { @@ -597,7 +584,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; const char *tmpname, *tmpns = NULL, *name = NULL; const char *info = "failed to unpack profile"; - size_t size = 0, ns_len; + size_t ns_len; struct rhashtable_params params = { 0 }; char *key = NULL; struct aa_data *data; @@ -730,38 +717,6 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) goto fail; } - size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af"); - if (size) { - - for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { - /* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will - * never request - */ - if (i >= AF_MAX) { - u16 tmp; - - if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) || - !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) || - !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL)) - goto fail; - continue; - } - if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL)) - goto fail; - if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL)) - goto fail; - if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL)) - goto fail; - } - if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL)) - goto fail; - } - if (VERSION_LT(e->version, v7)) { - /* pre v7 policy always allowed these */ - profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff; - profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff; - } - if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) { /* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */ info = "failed to unpack policydb"; diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index c25e0d2..4f8e093 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size) static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps, struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, - bool *has_cap) + bool *has_fcap) { struct cred *new = bprm->cred; unsigned i; @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps, *effective = true; if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) - *has_cap = true; + *has_fcap = true; CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { __u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i]; @@ -585,13 +585,14 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data struct vfs_ns_cap_data data, *nscaps = &data; struct vfs_cap_data *caps = (struct vfs_cap_data *) &data; kuid_t rootkuid; - struct user_namespace *fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns; + struct user_namespace *fs_ns; memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data)); if (!inode) return -ENODATA; + fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns; size = __vfs_getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &data, XATTR_CAPS_SZ); if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP) @@ -652,7 +653,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being * constructed by execve(). */ -static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap) +static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_fcap) { int rc = 0; struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; @@ -683,7 +684,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c goto out; } - rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap); + rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_fcap); if (rc == -EINVAL) printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n", __func__, rc, bprm->filename); @@ -695,6 +696,115 @@ out: return rc; } +static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); } + +static inline bool __is_real(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred) +{ return uid_eq(cred->uid, uid); } + +static inline bool __is_eff(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred) +{ return uid_eq(cred->euid, uid); } + +static inline bool __is_suid(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred) +{ return !__is_real(uid, cred) && __is_eff(uid, cred); } + +/* + * handle_privileged_root - Handle case of privileged root + * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds + * @has_fcap: Are any file capabilities set? + * @effective: Do we have effective root privilege? + * @root_uid: This namespace' root UID WRT initial USER namespace + * + * Handle the case where root is privileged and hasn't been neutered by + * SECURE_NOROOT. If file capabilities are set, they won't be combined with + * set UID root and nothing is changed. If we are root, cap_permitted is + * updated. If we have become set UID root, the effective bit is set. + */ +static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap, + bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid) +{ + const struct cred *old = current_cred(); + struct cred *new = bprm->cred; + + if (!root_privileged()) + return; + /* + * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs + * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it + * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin. + */ + if (has_fcap && __is_suid(root_uid, new)) { + warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename); + return; + } + /* + * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root + * executables under compatibility mode, we override the + * capability sets for the file. + */ + if (__is_eff(root_uid, new) || __is_real(root_uid, new)) { + /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */ + new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset, + old->cap_inheritable); + } + /* + * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit. + */ + if (__is_eff(root_uid, new)) + *effective = true; +} + +#define __cap_gained(field, target, source) \ + !cap_issubset(target->cap_##field, source->cap_##field) +#define __cap_grew(target, source, cred) \ + !cap_issubset(cred->cap_##target, cred->cap_##source) +#define __cap_full(field, cred) \ + cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_##field) + +static inline bool __is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) +{ return !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid); } + +static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) +{ return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); } + +/* + * 1) Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set + * + * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true: + * 1) cap_effective has all caps + * 2) we became root *OR* are were already root + * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT) + * Since this is just a normal root execing a process. + * + * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think + * that is interesting information to audit. + * + * A number of other conditions require logging: + * 2) something prevented setuid root getting all caps + * 3) non-setuid root gets fcaps + * 4) non-setuid root gets ambient + */ +static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, + kuid_t root, bool has_fcap) +{ + bool ret = false; + + if ((__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new) && + !(__cap_full(effective, new) && + (__is_eff(root, new) || __is_real(root, new)) && + root_privileged())) || + (root_privileged() && + __is_suid(root, new) && + !__cap_full(effective, new)) || + (!__is_setuid(new, old) && + ((has_fcap && + __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) || + __cap_gained(ambient, new, old)))) + + ret = true; + + return ret; +} + /** * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve(). * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds @@ -707,61 +817,33 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { const struct cred *old = current_cred(); struct cred *new = bprm->cred; - bool effective, has_cap = false, is_setid; + bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid; int ret; kuid_t root_uid; if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old))) return -EPERM; - effective = false; - ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap); + ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_fcap); if (ret < 0) return ret; root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0); - if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { - /* - * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs - * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it - * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin. - */ - if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) { - warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename); - goto skip; - } - /* - * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root - * executables under compatibility mode, we override the - * capability sets for the file. - * - * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit. - */ - if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) { - /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */ - new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset, - old->cap_inheritable); - } - if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) - effective = true; - } -skip: + handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid); /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ - if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) + if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; - /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit. * * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs. */ - is_setid = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); + is_setid = __is_setuid(new, old) || __is_setgid(new, old); - if ((is_setid || - !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) && + if ((is_setid || __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) && ((bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) || !ptracer_capable(current, new->user_ns))) { /* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */ @@ -778,7 +860,7 @@ skip: new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid; /* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */ - if (has_cap || is_setid) + if (has_fcap || is_setid) cap_clear(new->cap_ambient); /* @@ -799,26 +881,10 @@ skip: if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new))) return -EPERM; - /* - * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set - * - * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true: - * 1) cap_effective has all caps - * 2) we are root - * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT) - * Since this is just a normal root execing a process. - * - * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think - * that is interesting information to audit. - */ - if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_effective, new->cap_ambient)) { - if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) || - !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) || - issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { - ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - } + if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, old, root_uid, has_fcap)) { + ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; } new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); @@ -828,13 +894,11 @@ skip: /* Check for privilege-elevated exec. */ bprm->cap_elevated = 0; - if (is_setid) { + if (is_setid || + (!__is_real(root_uid, new) && + (effective || + __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new)))) bprm->cap_elevated = 1; - } else if (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) { - if (effective || - !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, new->cap_ambient)) - bprm->cap_elevated = 1; - } return 0; } diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c index 03c1652..5ef7e52 100644 --- a/security/device_cgroup.c +++ b/security/device_cgroup.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * device_cgroup.c - device cgroup subsystem * diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile index 8d1f4bf..04d6e46 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # # Makefile for caching inode integrity data (iint) # diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 06554c4..6f9e4ce 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -112,21 +112,25 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path) { key_ref_t key; - char *data; + void *data; + loff_t size; int rc; if (!keyring[id]) return -EINVAL; - rc = integrity_read_file(path, &data); - if (rc < 0) + rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0, + READING_X509_CERTIFICATE); + if (rc < 0) { + pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc); return rc; + } key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring[id], 1), "asymmetric", NULL, data, - rc, + size, ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ), KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); @@ -139,6 +143,6 @@ int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path) key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description, path); key_ref_put(key); } - kfree(data); + vfree(data); return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index f5f1272..241aca3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ #define EVM_INIT_HMAC 0x0001 #define EVM_INIT_X509 0x0002 +#define EVM_SETUP 0x80000000 /* userland has signaled key load */ + +#define EVM_INIT_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_SETUP) extern int evm_initialized; extern char *evm_hmac; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 1d32cd2..bcd64ba 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type) if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) { if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) { - pr_err("HMAC key is not set\n"); + pr_err_once("HMAC key is not set\n"); return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); } tfm = &hmac_tfm; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 063d38a..9826c02 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = { XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, #endif #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR + XATTR_NAME_APPARMOR, +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE XATTR_NAME_IMA, #endif diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index c8dccd5..319cf16 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, if (*ppos != 0) return 0; - sprintf(temp, "%d", evm_initialized); + sprintf(temp, "%d", (evm_initialized & ~EVM_SETUP)); rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp)); return rc; @@ -61,24 +61,29 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - char temp[80]; - int i; + int i, ret; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP)) return -EPERM; - if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0) - return -EINVAL; - - if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0) - return -EFAULT; + ret = kstrtoint_from_user(buf, count, 0, &i); - temp[count] = '\0'; + if (ret) + return ret; - if ((sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1) || (i != 1)) + /* Reject invalid values */ + if (!i || (i & ~EVM_INIT_MASK) != 0) return -EINVAL; - evm_init_key(); + if (i & EVM_INIT_HMAC) { + ret = evm_init_key(); + if (ret != 0) + return ret; + /* Forbid further writes after the symmetric key is loaded */ + i |= EVM_SETUP; + } + + evm_initialized |= i; return count; } diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 6fc888c..c84e058 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -200,55 +200,6 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset, } /* - * integrity_read_file - read entire file content into the buffer - * - * This is function opens a file, allocates the buffer of required - * size, read entire file content to the buffer and closes the file - * - * It is used only by init code. - * - */ -int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data) -{ - struct file *file; - loff_t size; - char *buf; - int rc = -EINVAL; - - if (!path || !*path) - return -EINVAL; - - file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0); - if (IS_ERR(file)) { - rc = PTR_ERR(file); - pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc); - return rc; - } - - size = i_size_read(file_inode(file)); - if (size <= 0) - goto out; - - buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!buf) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - - rc = integrity_kernel_read(file, 0, buf, size); - if (rc == size) { - *data = buf; - } else { - kfree(buf); - if (rc >= 0) - rc = -EIO; - } -out: - fput(file); - return rc; -} - -/* * integrity_load_keys - load integrity keys hook * * Hooks is called from init/main.c:kernel_init_freeable() diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile index 29f198b..d921dc4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # # Makefile for building Trusted Computing Group's(TCG) runtime Integrity # Measurement Architecture(IMA). diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index c2edba8..c7e8db0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -199,42 +199,59 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; int result = 0; + int length; + void *tmpbuf; + u64 i_version; struct { struct ima_digest_data hdr; char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; } hash; - if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) { - u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version; + if (iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED) + goto out; - if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) { - audit_cause = "failed(directio)"; - result = -EACCES; - goto out; - } + /* + * Dectecting file change is based on i_version. On filesystems + * which do not support i_version, support is limited to an initial + * measurement/appraisal/audit. + */ + i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version; + hash.hdr.algo = algo; - hash.hdr.algo = algo; - - result = (!buf) ? ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr) : - ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr); - if (!result) { - int length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length; - void *tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length, - GFP_NOFS); - if (tmpbuf) { - iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf; - memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length); - iint->version = i_version; - iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED; - } else - result = -ENOMEM; - } + /* Initialize hash digest to 0's in case of failure */ + memset(&hash.digest, 0, sizeof(hash.digest)); + + if (buf) + result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr); + else + result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr); + + if (result && result != -EBADF && result != -EINVAL) + goto out; + + length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length; + tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length, GFP_NOFS); + if (!tmpbuf) { + result = -ENOMEM; + goto out; } + + iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf; + memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length); + iint->version = i_version; + + /* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */ + if (!result) + iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED; out: - if (result) + if (result) { + if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) + audit_cause = "failed(directio)"; + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename, "collect_data", audit_cause, result, 0); + } return result; } @@ -278,7 +295,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, } result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr); - if (!result || result == -EEXIST) { + if ((!result || result == -EEXIST) && !(file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)) { iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED; iint->measured_pcrs |= (0x1 << pcr); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 809ba70..ec7dfa0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ __setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup); */ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) { - return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? 1 : 0; + return ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; } /* @@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST)) return -EINVAL; ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), - (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) ? 1 : 0); + xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); result = 0; } return result; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index 802d5d2..a856d8c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -441,6 +441,16 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash) loff_t i_size; int rc; + /* + * For consistency, fail file's opened with the O_DIRECT flag on + * filesystems mounted with/without DAX option. + */ + if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) { + hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]; + hash->algo = ima_hash_algo; + return -EINVAL; + } + i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file)); if (ima_ahash_minsize && i_size >= ima_ahash_minsize) { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index ad491c5..fa540c0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ bool ima_canonical_fmt; static int __init default_canonical_fmt_setup(char *str) { #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN - ima_canonical_fmt = 1; + ima_canonical_fmt = true; #endif return 1; } @@ -429,10 +429,10 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) } ima_update_policy(); -#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY +#if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY) securityfs_remove(ima_policy); ima_policy = NULL; -#else +#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); #endif return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 2aebb79..7706546 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ static int __init hash_setup(char *str) ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0) ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5; + else + return 1; goto out; } @@ -60,6 +62,8 @@ static int __init hash_setup(char *str) break; } } + if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST) + return 1; out: hash_setup_done = 1; return 1; @@ -235,11 +239,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len); rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo); - if (rc != 0) { - if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) - rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES; + if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL) goto out_digsig; - } if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */ pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename); @@ -247,12 +248,14 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, if (action & IMA_MEASURE) ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr); - if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) + if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, opened); if (action & IMA_AUDIT) ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname); + if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)) + rc = 0; out_digsig: if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG) && !(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) @@ -359,12 +362,12 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) */ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { + bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); + if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) { -#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE - if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && + if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ -#endif return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */ } return 0; @@ -406,6 +409,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */ return 0; + /* permit signed certs */ + if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE) + return 0; + if (!file || !buf || size == 0) { /* should never happen */ if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) return -EACCES; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 95209a5..ee4613f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -196,9 +196,9 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) if ((strcmp(p, "tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy) ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB; else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0) - ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1; + ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) - ima_use_secure_boot = 1; + ima_use_secure_boot = true; } return 1; @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ __setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup); static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str) { - ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1; + ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; return 1; } __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup); diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index a53e7e4..e1bf040 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -120,8 +120,6 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode); int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset, void *addr, unsigned long count); -int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data); - #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM 0 #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA 1 #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MODULE 2 diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index 91eafad..6462e66 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ config BIG_KEYS bool "Large payload keys" depends on KEYS depends on TMPFS + select CRYPTO select CRYPTO_AES select CRYPTO_GCM help diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile index 57dff0c..ef1581b 100644 --- a/security/keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # # Makefile for key management # diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c index e607830..929e149 100644 --- a/security/keys/big_key.c +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c @@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ void big_key_revoke(struct key *key) /* clear the quota */ key_payload_reserve(key, 0); - if (key_is_instantiated(key) && + if (key_is_positive(key) && (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) vfs_truncate(path, 0); } @@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) seq_puts(m, key->description); - if (key_is_instantiated(key)) + if (key_is_positive(key)) seq_printf(m, ": %zu [%s]", datalen, datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff"); diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile index d6f8433..7a44dce 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # # Makefile for encrypted keys # diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 69855ba..d92cbf9 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -309,6 +309,13 @@ static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, const u8 **master_k down_read(&ukey->sem); upayload = user_key_payload_locked(ukey); + if (!upayload) { + /* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */ + up_read(&ukey->sem); + key_put(ukey); + ukey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED); + goto error; + } *master_key = upayload->data; *master_keylen = upayload->datalen; error: @@ -847,7 +854,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) size_t datalen = prep->datalen; int ret = 0; - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) + if (key_is_negative(key)) return -ENOKEY; if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h index 47802c0..1809995 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef __ENCRYPTED_KEY_H #define __ENCRYPTED_KEY_H diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c index 8673f7f..afb3a91 100644 --- a/security/keys/gc.c +++ b/security/keys/gc.c @@ -129,15 +129,15 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys) while (!list_empty(keys)) { struct key *key = list_entry(keys->next, struct key, graveyard_link); + short state = key->state; + list_del(&key->graveyard_link); kdebug("- %u", key->serial); key_check(key); /* Throw away the key data if the key is instantiated */ - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags) && - !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags) && - key->type->destroy) + if (state == KEY_IS_POSITIVE && key->type->destroy) key->type->destroy(key); security_key_free(key); @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys) } atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys); - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) + if (state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys); key_user_put(key->user); diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index eb914a8..83bf4b4 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -402,6 +402,18 @@ int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen) EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_payload_reserve); /* + * Change the key state to being instantiated. + */ +static void mark_key_instantiated(struct key *key, int reject_error) +{ + /* Commit the payload before setting the state; barrier versus + * key_read_state(). + */ + smp_store_release(&key->state, + (reject_error < 0) ? reject_error : KEY_IS_POSITIVE); +} + +/* * Instantiate a key and link it into the target keyring atomically. Must be * called with the target keyring's semaphore writelocked. The target key's * semaphore need not be locked as instantiation is serialised by @@ -424,14 +436,14 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex); /* can't instantiate twice */ - if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { + if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) { /* instantiate the key */ ret = key->type->instantiate(key, prep); if (ret == 0) { /* mark the key as being instantiated */ atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys); - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags); + mark_key_instantiated(key, 0); if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags)) awaken = 1; @@ -577,13 +589,10 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key, mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex); /* can't instantiate twice */ - if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { + if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) { /* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */ atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys); - key->reject_error = -error; - smp_wmb(); - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags); + mark_key_instantiated(key, -error); now = current_kernel_time(); key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout; key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay); @@ -752,8 +761,8 @@ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, ret = key->type->update(key, prep); if (ret == 0) - /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ - clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); + /* Updating a negative key positively instantiates it */ + mark_key_instantiated(key, 0); up_write(&key->sem); @@ -936,6 +945,16 @@ error: */ __key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit); + key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); + if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags)) { + ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true); + if (ret < 0) { + key_ref_put(key_ref); + key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); + goto error_free_prep; + } + } + key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep); goto error_free_prep; } @@ -986,8 +1005,8 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) ret = key->type->update(key, &prep); if (ret == 0) - /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ - clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); + /* Updating a negative key positively instantiates it */ + mark_key_instantiated(key, 0); up_write(&key->sem); diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 365ff85..76d22f72 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -766,10 +766,9 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) { - ret = -ENOKEY; - goto error2; - } + ret = key_read_state(key); + if (ret < 0) + goto error2; /* Negatively instantiated */ /* see if we can read it directly */ ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ); @@ -901,7 +900,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group) atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys); atomic_inc(&newowner->nkeys); - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { + if (key->state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) { atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys); atomic_inc(&newowner->nikeys); } diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index 4fa82a8..36f842e 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m) else seq_puts(m, "[anon]"); - if (key_is_instantiated(keyring)) { + if (key_is_positive(keyring)) { if (keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree != 0) seq_printf(m, ": %lu", keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree); else @@ -459,34 +459,33 @@ static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) { struct keyring_read_iterator_context ctx; - unsigned long nr_keys; - int ret; + long ret; kenter("{%d},,%zu", key_serial(keyring), buflen); if (buflen & (sizeof(key_serial_t) - 1)) return -EINVAL; - nr_keys = keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree; - if (nr_keys == 0) - return 0; - - /* Calculate how much data we could return */ - if (!buffer || !buflen) - return nr_keys * sizeof(key_serial_t); - - /* Copy the IDs of the subscribed keys into the buffer */ - ctx.buffer = (key_serial_t __user *)buffer; - ctx.buflen = buflen; - ctx.count = 0; - ret = assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys, keyring_read_iterator, &ctx); - if (ret < 0) { - kleave(" = %d [iterate]", ret); - return ret; + /* Copy as many key IDs as fit into the buffer */ + if (buffer && buflen) { + ctx.buffer = (key_serial_t __user *)buffer; + ctx.buflen = buflen; + ctx.count = 0; + ret = assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys, + keyring_read_iterator, &ctx); + if (ret < 0) { + kleave(" = %ld [iterate]", ret); + return ret; + } } - kleave(" = %zu [ok]", ctx.count); - return ctx.count; + /* Return the size of the buffer needed */ + ret = keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree * sizeof(key_serial_t); + if (ret <= buflen) + kleave("= %ld [ok]", ret); + else + kleave("= %ld [buffer too small]", ret); + return ret; } /* @@ -553,7 +552,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) { struct keyring_search_context *ctx = iterator_data; const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); - unsigned long kflags = key->flags; + unsigned long kflags = READ_ONCE(key->flags); + short state = READ_ONCE(key->state); kenter("{%d}", key->serial); @@ -565,6 +565,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) /* skip invalidated, revoked and expired keys */ if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) { + time_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry); + if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) | (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) { ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED); @@ -572,7 +574,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) goto skipped; } - if (key->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) { + if (expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= expiry) { if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED)) ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYEXPIRED); kleave(" = %d [expire]", ctx->skipped_ret); @@ -597,9 +599,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) { /* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */ - if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) { - smp_rmb(); - ctx->result = ERR_PTR(key->reject_error); + if (state < 0) { + ctx->result = ERR_PTR(state); kleave(" = %d [neg]", ctx->skipped_ret); goto skipped; } diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c index 732cc0b..a72b4dd 100644 --- a/security/keys/permission.c +++ b/security/keys/permission.c @@ -88,7 +88,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_task_permission); */ int key_validate(const struct key *key) { - unsigned long flags = key->flags; + unsigned long flags = READ_ONCE(key->flags); + time_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry); if (flags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED)) return -ENOKEY; @@ -99,9 +100,9 @@ int key_validate(const struct key *key) return -EKEYREVOKED; /* check it hasn't expired */ - if (key->expiry) { + if (expiry) { struct timespec now = current_kernel_time(); - if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) + if (now.tv_sec >= expiry) return -EKEYEXPIRED; } diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c index de83430..6d1fcbb 100644 --- a/security/keys/proc.c +++ b/security/keys/proc.c @@ -179,9 +179,12 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) struct rb_node *_p = v; struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node); struct timespec now; + time_t expiry; unsigned long timo; + unsigned long flags; key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref; char xbuf[16]; + short state; int rc; struct keyring_search_context ctx = { @@ -217,12 +220,13 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) rcu_read_lock(); /* come up with a suitable timeout value */ - if (key->expiry == 0) { + expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry); + if (expiry == 0) { memcpy(xbuf, "perm", 5); - } else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) { + } else if (now.tv_sec >= expiry) { memcpy(xbuf, "expd", 5); } else { - timo = key->expiry - now.tv_sec; + timo = expiry - now.tv_sec; if (timo < 60) sprintf(xbuf, "%lus", timo); @@ -236,18 +240,21 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) sprintf(xbuf, "%luw", timo / (60*60*24*7)); } -#define showflag(KEY, LETTER, FLAG) \ - (test_bit(FLAG, &(KEY)->flags) ? LETTER : '-') + state = key_read_state(key); +#define showflag(FLAGS, LETTER, FLAG) \ + ((FLAGS & (1 << FLAG)) ? LETTER : '-') + + flags = READ_ONCE(key->flags); seq_printf(m, "%08x %c%c%c%c%c%c%c %5d %4s %08x %5d %5d %-9.9s ", key->serial, - showflag(key, 'I', KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED), - showflag(key, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED), - showflag(key, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD), - showflag(key, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA), - showflag(key, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT), - showflag(key, 'N', KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE), - showflag(key, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED), + state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED ? 'I' : '-', + showflag(flags, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED), + showflag(flags, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD), + showflag(flags, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA), + showflag(flags, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT), + state < 0 ? 'N' : '-', + showflag(flags, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED), refcount_read(&key->usage), xbuf, key->perm, diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 293d359..740affd 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ try_again: ret = -EIO; if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) && - !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) + key_read_state(key) == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) goto invalid_key; /* check the permissions */ diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index 63e63a4..e8036cd 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -595,10 +595,9 @@ int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr) intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE); if (ret) return -ERESTARTSYS; - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) { - smp_rmb(); - return key->reject_error; - } + ret = key_read_state(key); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; return key_validate(key); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_key_construction); diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index 6ebf1af..424e1d9 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key, seq_puts(m, "key:"); seq_puts(m, key->description); - if (key_is_instantiated(key)) + if (key_is_positive(key)) seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len); } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index ddfaebf..98aa89f 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) char *datablob; int ret = 0; - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) + if (key_is_negative(key)) return -ENOKEY; p = key->payload.data[0]; if (!p->migratable) @@ -1147,20 +1147,21 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, p = dereference_key_locked(key); if (!p) return -EINVAL; - if (!buffer || buflen <= 0) - return 2 * p->blob_len; - ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ascii_buf) - return -ENOMEM; - bufp = ascii_buf; - for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) - bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); - if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) { + if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) { + ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ascii_buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + bufp = ascii_buf; + for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) + bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); + if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) { + kzfree(ascii_buf); + return -EFAULT; + } kzfree(ascii_buf); - return -EFAULT; } - kzfree(ascii_buf); return 2 * p->blob_len; } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.h b/security/keys/trusted.h index ff001a5..8d5fe9e 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.h +++ b/security/keys/trusted.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef __TRUSTED_KEY_H #define __TRUSTED_KEY_H diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c index 3d8c68e..9f558be 100644 --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) /* attach the new data, displacing the old */ key->expiry = prep->expiry; - if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) + if (key_is_positive(key)) zap = dereference_key_locked(key); rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload.data[0]); prep->payload.data[0] = NULL; @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_destroy); void user_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) { seq_puts(m, key->description); - if (key_is_instantiated(key)) + if (key_is_positive(key)) seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen); } diff --git a/security/min_addr.c b/security/min_addr.c index f728728..94d2b0c 100644 --- a/security/min_addr.c +++ b/security/min_addr.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/security.h> diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile index ff5895e..c7161f8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Makefile +++ b/security/selinux/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # # Makefile for building the SELinux module as part of the kernel tree. # diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h index a5004e9..57d61cf 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Access vector cache interface for object managers. * diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h index 37d57da..3bcc727 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Access vector cache interface for the security server. * diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index 35ffb29..cc35695 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #include <linux/capability.h> #define COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS "ioctl", "read", "write", "create", \ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h index a59b64e..4f93f69 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* This file is automatically generated. Do not edit. */ static const char *initial_sid_to_string[] = { diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 28dfb2f..02f0412 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Security server interface. * diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h index 36a7ce9..1f173a7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * SELinux support for the XFRM LSM hooks * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h index 33ae2ae..4e563be 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * A constraint is a condition that must be satisfied in * order for one or more permissions to be granted. diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h index a2c0f37c..2260c44 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/context.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * A security context is a set of security attributes * associated with each subject and object controlled diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c index fc28149..b6a78b0 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Implementation of the extensible bitmap type. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h index da1325d..edf4fa3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * An extensible bitmap is a bitmap that supports an * arbitrary number of bits. Extensible bitmaps are diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c index 686c391..6bd6dcd 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Implementation of the hash table type. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h index 009fb5e..3e3e42b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * A hash table (hashtab) maintains associations between * key values and datum values. The type of the key values diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c index d9dc34f4..ad982ce 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Implementation of the multi-level security (MLS) policy. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h index 0f0a1d6..131d762 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Multi-level security (MLS) policy operations. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h index 47f3702..068e0d7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Type definitions for the multi-level security (MLS) policy. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h index 3d9fa95..356bdd3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Implementation of the security services. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c index 6ae08ef..5be31b7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Implementation of the SID table type. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h index de5d0ea..a1a1d26 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * A security identifier table (sidtab) is a hash table * of security context structures indexed by SID value. diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c index d1a6745..dc2ce94 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Implementation of the symbol table type. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h index 0bc12d5..d75fcaf 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * A symbol table (symtab) maintains associations between symbol * strings and datum values. The type of the datum values diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 319add3..14cc794 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1473,7 +1473,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) * @inode: the object * @name: attribute name * @buffer: where to put the result - * @alloc: unused + * @alloc: duplicate memory * * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code */ @@ -1486,43 +1486,38 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, struct super_block *sbp; struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode; struct smack_known *isp; - int ilen; - int rc = 0; - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) { + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) isp = smk_of_inode(inode); - ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known); - *buffer = isp->smk_known; - return ilen; - } - - /* - * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets. - */ - sbp = ip->i_sb; - if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + else { + /* + * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets. + */ + sbp = ip->i_sb; + if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; - sock = SOCKET_I(ip); - if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + sock = SOCKET_I(ip); + if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0) - isp = ssp->smk_in; - else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) - isp = ssp->smk_out; - else - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0) + isp = ssp->smk_in; + else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) + isp = ssp->smk_out; + else + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } - ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known); - if (rc == 0) { - *buffer = isp->smk_known; - rc = ilen; + if (alloc) { + *buffer = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); + if (*buffer == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; } - return rc; + return strlen(isp->smk_known); } @@ -4605,6 +4600,82 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) return 0; } +static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new) +{ + + struct task_smack *tsp; + struct smack_known *skp; + struct inode_smack *isp; + struct cred *new_creds = *new; + + if (new_creds == NULL) { + new_creds = prepare_creds(); + if (new_creds == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + tsp = new_creds->security; + + /* + * Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid + */ + isp = d_inode(dentry->d_parent)->i_security; + skp = isp->smk_inode; + tsp->smk_task = skp; + *new = new_creds; + return 0; +} + +static int smack_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) +{ + /* + * Return 1 if this is the smack access Smack attribute. + */ + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) + return 1; + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, + struct qstr *name, + const struct cred *old, + struct cred *new) +{ + struct task_smack *otsp = old->security; + struct task_smack *ntsp = new->security; + struct inode_smack *isp; + int may; + + /* + * Use the process credential unless all of + * the transmuting criteria are met + */ + ntsp->smk_task = otsp->smk_task; + + /* + * the attribute of the containing directory + */ + isp = d_inode(dentry->d_parent)->i_security; + + if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) { + rcu_read_lock(); + may = smk_access_entry(otsp->smk_task->smk_known, + isp->smk_inode->smk_known, + &otsp->smk_task->smk_rules); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + /* + * If the directory is transmuting and the rule + * providing access is transmuting use the containing + * directory label instead of the process label. + */ + if (may > 0 && (may & MAY_TRANSMUTE)) + ntsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode; + } + return 0; +} + static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme), @@ -4740,6 +4811,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, smack_inode_copy_up), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, smack_inode_copy_up_xattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, smack_dentry_create_files_as), }; diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Makefile b/security/tomoyo/Makefile index 65dbcb2..b7c6a7f 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/Makefile +++ b/security/tomoyo/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 obj-y = audit.o common.o condition.o domain.o environ.o file.o gc.o group.o load_policy.o memory.o mount.o network.o realpath.o securityfs_if.o tomoyo.o util.o targets += builtin-policy.h diff --git a/security/tomoyo/audit.c b/security/tomoyo/audit.c index 3ffa4f5..0f73fe3 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/audit.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/audit.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/audit.c * @@ -156,7 +157,7 @@ static char *tomoyo_print_header(struct tomoyo_request_info *r) if (!buffer) return NULL; - tomoyo_convert_time(get_seconds(), &stamp); + tomoyo_convert_time(ktime_get_real_seconds(), &stamp); pos = snprintf(buffer, tomoyo_buffer_len - 1, "#%04u/%02u/%02u %02u:%02u:%02u# profile=%u mode=%s " diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c index e0fb750..25eed4b 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/common.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/common.c * @@ -2256,7 +2257,7 @@ static const char * const tomoyo_memory_headers[TOMOYO_MAX_MEMORY_STAT] = { /* Timestamp counter for last updated. */ static unsigned int tomoyo_stat_updated[TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY_STAT]; /* Counter for number of updates. */ -static unsigned int tomoyo_stat_modified[TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY_STAT]; +static time64_t tomoyo_stat_modified[TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY_STAT]; /** * tomoyo_update_stat - Update statistic counters. @@ -2271,7 +2272,7 @@ void tomoyo_update_stat(const u8 index) * I don't use atomic operations because race condition is not fatal. */ tomoyo_stat_updated[index]++; - tomoyo_stat_modified[index] = get_seconds(); + tomoyo_stat_modified[index] = ktime_get_real_seconds(); } /** diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h index 361e7a2..7adccdd 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/common.h +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * security/tomoyo/common.h * @@ -1036,7 +1037,7 @@ void tomoyo_check_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, bool (*check_entry) (struct tomoyo_request_info *, const struct tomoyo_acl_info *)); void tomoyo_check_profile(void); -void tomoyo_convert_time(time_t time, struct tomoyo_time *stamp); +void tomoyo_convert_time(time64_t time, struct tomoyo_time *stamp); void tomoyo_del_condition(struct list_head *element); void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr); void tomoyo_get_attributes(struct tomoyo_obj_info *obj); diff --git a/security/tomoyo/condition.c b/security/tomoyo/condition.c index 6c4528d..8d0e1b9 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/condition.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/condition.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/condition.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c index 00d223e..f6758da 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/domain.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/domain.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/environ.c b/security/tomoyo/environ.c index ad4c6e1..7f0a471 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/environ.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/environ.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/environ.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/file.c b/security/tomoyo/file.c index 223f21f..2a374b4d 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/file.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/file.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/file.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/gc.c b/security/tomoyo/gc.c index 540bc29..e22bea8 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/gc.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/gc.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/gc.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/group.c b/security/tomoyo/group.c index 944ad77..21b0cc3 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/group.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/group.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/group.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c b/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c index 078fac0..81b9516 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/load_policy.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/memory.c b/security/tomoyo/memory.c index 1598b55..12477e0 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/memory.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/memory.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/memory.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/mount.c b/security/tomoyo/mount.c index 14b53fb..807fd91 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/mount.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/mount.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/mount.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/network.c b/security/tomoyo/network.c index 6c02ac4..cd6932e 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/network.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/network.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/network.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c index a97b275..6ff8c21 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/realpath.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c index 06ab41b1..49393c2 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index d25b705..213b8c5 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/util.c b/security/tomoyo/util.c index 848317f..d3d9d9f 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/util.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/util.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/util.c * @@ -86,38 +87,17 @@ const u8 tomoyo_index2category[TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX] = { * @stamp: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_time". * * Returns nothing. - * - * This function does not handle Y2038 problem. */ -void tomoyo_convert_time(time_t time, struct tomoyo_time *stamp) +void tomoyo_convert_time(time64_t time64, struct tomoyo_time *stamp) { - static const u16 tomoyo_eom[2][12] = { - { 31, 59, 90, 120, 151, 181, 212, 243, 273, 304, 334, 365 }, - { 31, 60, 91, 121, 152, 182, 213, 244, 274, 305, 335, 366 } - }; - u16 y; - u8 m; - bool r; - stamp->sec = time % 60; - time /= 60; - stamp->min = time % 60; - time /= 60; - stamp->hour = time % 24; - time /= 24; - for (y = 1970; ; y++) { - const unsigned short days = (y & 3) ? 365 : 366; - if (time < days) - break; - time -= days; - } - r = (y & 3) == 0; - for (m = 0; m < 11 && time >= tomoyo_eom[r][m]; m++) - ; - if (m) - time -= tomoyo_eom[r][m - 1]; - stamp->year = y; - stamp->month = ++m; - stamp->day = ++time; + struct tm tm; + time64_to_tm(time64, 0, &tm); + stamp->sec = tm.tm_sec; + stamp->min = tm.tm_min; + stamp->hour = tm.tm_hour; + stamp->day = tm.tm_mday; + stamp->month = tm.tm_mon + 1; + stamp->year = tm.tm_year + 1900; } /** |
