diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/bluetooth/smp.c | 62 |
1 files changed, 38 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index 55c41de..e49c83d 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -391,10 +391,12 @@ static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = { static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io) { - /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST WORKS */ + /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets + * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators. + */ if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY || remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY) - return JUST_WORKS; + return JUST_CFM; return gen_method[remote_io][local_io]; } @@ -414,21 +416,25 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io); - /* If neither side wants MITM, use JUST WORKS */ - /* Otherwise, look up method from the table */ + /* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming + * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM + * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this + * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the + * table. + */ if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM)) - method = JUST_WORKS; + method = JUST_CFM; else method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io); - /* If not bonding, don't ask user to confirm a Zero TK */ - if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) && method == JUST_CFM) - method = JUST_WORKS; - /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */ if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) method = JUST_WORKS; + /* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */ + if (method == JUST_CFM && hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) + method = JUST_WORKS; + /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */ if (method == JUST_WORKS) { set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); @@ -443,7 +449,7 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey. */ if (method == OVERLAP) { - if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_MASTER, &hcon->flags)) + if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) method = CFM_PASSKEY; else method = REQ_PASSKEY; @@ -674,6 +680,7 @@ int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey) static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data; + struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; struct smp_chan *smp; u8 key_size, auth, sec_level; int ret; @@ -683,7 +690,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) if (skb->len < sizeof(*req)) return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; - if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_MASTER, &conn->hcon->flags)) + if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags)) @@ -694,6 +701,10 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!smp) return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; + if (!test_bit(HCI_PAIRABLE, &hdev->dev_flags) && + (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) + return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; + smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req)); skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req)); @@ -733,8 +744,6 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) if (ret) return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; - clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags); - return 0; } @@ -750,7 +759,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp)) return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; - if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_MASTER, &conn->hcon->flags)) + if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp)); @@ -844,7 +853,7 @@ static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level) struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; key = hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, - hcon->out); + hcon->role); if (!key) return false; @@ -871,9 +880,12 @@ bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level) /* If we're encrypted with an STK always claim insufficient * security. This way we allow the connection to be re-encrypted * with an LTK, even if the LTK provides the same level of - * security. + * security. Only exception is if we don't have an LTK (e.g. + * because of key distribution bits). */ - if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags)) + if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) && + hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, + hcon->role)) return false; if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level) @@ -895,7 +907,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; - if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_MASTER, &conn->hcon->flags)) + if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req); @@ -911,6 +923,10 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags)) return 0; + if (!test_bit(HCI_PAIRABLE, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags) && + (rp->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) + return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; + smp = smp_chan_create(conn); if (!smp) return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; @@ -925,8 +941,6 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); - clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags); - return 0; } @@ -951,7 +965,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level) if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; - if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_MASTER, &hcon->flags)) + if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level)) return 0; @@ -971,7 +985,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level) hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM; - if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_MASTER, &hcon->flags)) { + if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) { struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq); @@ -1175,7 +1189,7 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) } if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) { - err = -ENOTSUPP; + err = -EOPNOTSUPP; reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; goto done; } @@ -1193,7 +1207,7 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) !conn->smp_chan) { BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP command 0x%02x. Disconnecting.", code); kfree_skb(skb); - return -ENOTSUPP; + return -EOPNOTSUPP; } switch (code) { |