diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/array.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/base.c | 26 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/namespaces.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/root.c | 11 |
5 files changed, 27 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c index 9b45ee8..3a1dafd 100644 --- a/fs/proc/array.c +++ b/fs/proc/array.c @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static inline void task_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, task_tgid_nr_ns(rcu_dereference(p->real_parent), ns) : 0; tpid = 0; if (pid_alive(p)) { - struct task_struct *tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p); + struct task_struct *tracer = ptrace_parent(p); if (tracer) tpid = task_pid_nr_ns(tracer, ns); } diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 14def99..c9e3f65 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ static struct mm_struct *__check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task) if (task_is_stopped_or_traced(task)) { int match; rcu_read_lock(); - match = (tracehook_tracer_task(task) == current); + match = (ptrace_parent(task) == current); rcu_read_unlock(); if (match && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)) return mm; @@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ static int mounts_open_common(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, p->m.private = p; p->ns = ns; p->root = root; - p->event = ns->event; + p->m.poll_event = ns->event; return 0; @@ -1118,10 +1118,9 @@ static ssize_t oom_adjust_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, * Warn that /proc/pid/oom_adj is deprecated, see * Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt. */ - printk_once(KERN_WARNING "%s (%d): /proc/%d/oom_adj is deprecated, " - "please use /proc/%d/oom_score_adj instead.\n", - current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), - task_pid_nr(task), task_pid_nr(task)); + WARN_ONCE(1, "%s (%d): /proc/%d/oom_adj is deprecated, please use /proc/%d/oom_score_adj instead.\n", + current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), task_pid_nr(task), + task_pid_nr(task)); task->signal->oom_adj = oom_adjust; /* * Scale /proc/pid/oom_score_adj appropriately ensuring that a maximum @@ -2167,13 +2166,9 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_fd_operations = { * /proc/pid/fd needs a special permission handler so that a process can still * access /proc/self/fd after it has executed a setuid(). */ -static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned int flags) +static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { - int rv; - - if (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU) - return -ECHILD; - rv = generic_permission(inode, mask, flags, NULL); + int rv = generic_permission(inode, mask); if (rv == 0) return 0; if (task_pid(current) == proc_pid(inode)) @@ -2712,6 +2707,9 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer, int whole) struct task_io_accounting acct = task->ioac; unsigned long flags; + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) + return -EACCES; + if (whole && lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) { struct task_struct *t = task; @@ -2843,7 +2841,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = { REG("coredump_filter", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_coredump_filter_operations), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING - INF("io", S_IRUGO, proc_tgid_io_accounting), + INF("io", S_IRUSR, proc_tgid_io_accounting), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_HARDWALL INF("hardwall", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_hardwall), @@ -3185,7 +3183,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = { REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING - INF("io", S_IRUGO, proc_tid_io_accounting), + INF("io", S_IRUSR, proc_tid_io_accounting), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_HARDWALL INF("hardwall", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_hardwall), diff --git a/fs/proc/namespaces.c b/fs/proc/namespaces.c index 781dec5..be177f7 100644 --- a/fs/proc/namespaces.c +++ b/fs/proc/namespaces.c @@ -38,18 +38,21 @@ static struct dentry *proc_ns_instantiate(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode; struct proc_inode *ei; struct dentry *error = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); + void *ns; inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task); if (!inode) goto out; + ns = ns_ops->get(task); + if (!ns) + goto out_iput; + ei = PROC_I(inode); inode->i_mode = S_IFREG|S_IRUSR; inode->i_fop = &ns_file_operations; ei->ns_ops = ns_ops; - ei->ns = ns_ops->get(task); - if (!ei->ns) - goto out_iput; + ei->ns = ns; dentry->d_op = &pid_dentry_operations; d_add(dentry, inode); diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c index f50133c..1a77dbe 100644 --- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c +++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c @@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ out: return ret; } -static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,unsigned int flags) +static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { /* * sysctl entries that are not writeable, @@ -304,9 +304,6 @@ static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,unsigned int flags) struct ctl_table *table; int error; - if (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU) - return -ECHILD; - /* Executable files are not allowed under /proc/sys/ */ if ((mask & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return -EACCES; @@ -319,7 +316,7 @@ static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,unsigned int flags) if (!table) /* global root - r-xr-xr-x */ error = mask & MAY_WRITE ? -EACCES : 0; else /* Use the permissions on the sysctl table entry */ - error = sysctl_perm(head->root, table, mask); + error = sysctl_perm(head->root, table, mask & ~MAY_NOT_BLOCK); sysctl_head_finish(head); return error; diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c index a9000e9..d6c3b41 100644 --- a/fs/proc/root.c +++ b/fs/proc/root.c @@ -28,11 +28,12 @@ static int proc_test_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data) static int proc_set_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data) { - struct pid_namespace *ns; - - ns = (struct pid_namespace *)data; - sb->s_fs_info = get_pid_ns(ns); - return set_anon_super(sb, NULL); + int err = set_anon_super(sb, NULL); + if (!err) { + struct pid_namespace *ns = (struct pid_namespace *)data; + sb->s_fs_info = get_pid_ns(ns); + } + return err; } static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, |