diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/Kconfig | 73 |
1 files changed, 68 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index f1cf895..97ff872 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -86,9 +86,7 @@ config KPROBES_ON_FTRACE optimize on top of function tracing. config UPROBES - bool "Transparent user-space probes (EXPERIMENTAL)" - depends on UPROBE_EVENT && PERF_EVENTS - default n + def_bool n select PERCPU_RWSEM help Uprobes is the user-space counterpart to kprobes: they @@ -101,8 +99,6 @@ config UPROBES managed by the kernel and kept transparent to the probed application. ) - If in doubt, say "N". - config HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS def_bool 64BIT && !HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS help @@ -336,6 +332,73 @@ config SECCOMP_FILTER See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for details. +config HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR + bool + help + An arch should select this symbol if: + - its compiler supports the -fstack-protector option + - it has implemented a stack canary (e.g. __stack_chk_guard) + +config CC_STACKPROTECTOR + def_bool n + help + Set when a stack-protector mode is enabled, so that the build + can enable kernel-side support for the GCC feature. + +choice + prompt "Stack Protector buffer overflow detection" + depends on HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR + default CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE + help + This option turns on the "stack-protector" GCC feature. This + feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on + the stack just before the return address, and validates + the value just before actually returning. Stack based buffer + overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also + overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then + neutralized via a kernel panic. + +config CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE + bool "None" + help + Disable "stack-protector" GCC feature. + +config CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR + bool "Regular" + select CC_STACKPROTECTOR + help + Functions will have the stack-protector canary logic added if they + have an 8-byte or larger character array on the stack. + + This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above, or a distribution + gcc with the feature backported ("-fstack-protector"). + + On an x86 "defconfig" build, this feature adds canary checks to + about 3% of all kernel functions, which increases kernel code size + by about 0.3%. + +config CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG + bool "Strong" + select CC_STACKPROTECTOR + help + Functions will have the stack-protector canary logic added in any + of the following conditions: + + - local variable's address used as part of the right hand side of an + assignment or function argument + - local variable is an array (or union containing an array), + regardless of array type or length + - uses register local variables + + This feature requires gcc version 4.9 or above, or a distribution + gcc with the feature backported ("-fstack-protector-strong"). + + On an x86 "defconfig" build, this feature adds canary checks to + about 20% of all kernel functions, which increases the kernel code + size by about 2%. + +endchoice + config HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING bool help |
