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-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/.gitignore1
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/Makefile43
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c1
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/file.c30
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/audit.h26
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/net.h114
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/perms.h5
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/policy.h13
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lib.c5
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c387
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/net.c184
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c47
12 files changed, 16 insertions, 840 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
index d5b291e..9cdec70 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore
+++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
#
# Generated include files
#
-net_names.h
capability_names.h
rlim_names.h
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index dafdd38..81a3442 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -4,44 +4,11 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
- resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o net.o
+ resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o
apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
-clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
+clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
-# Build a lower case string table of address family names
-# Transform lines from
-# #define AF_LOCAL 1 /* POSIX name for AF_UNIX */
-# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */
-# to
-# [1] = "local",
-# [2] = "inet",
-#
-# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
-# Transforms lines from
-# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */
-# to
-# #define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "local inet"
-quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN $@
-cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
- sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \
- 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
- echo "};" >> $@ ;\
- printf '%s' '\#define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
- sed -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \
- 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
- $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
-
-# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
-# Transform lines from
-# SOCK_STREAM = 1,
-# to
-# [1] = "stream",
-quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN $@
-cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
- sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
- -e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
- echo "};" >> $@
# Build a lower case string table of capability names
# Transforms lines from
@@ -94,7 +61,6 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
$(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
-$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
$(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
$(src)/Makefile
@@ -102,8 +68,3 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \
$(src)/Makefile
$(call cmd,make-rlim)
-$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
- $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
- $(src)/Makefile
- $(call cmd,make-af)
- $(call cmd,make-sock)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 518d592..caaf51d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -2202,7 +2202,6 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = {
AA_SFS_DIR("policy", aa_sfs_entry_policy),
AA_SFS_DIR("domain", aa_sfs_entry_domain),
AA_SFS_DIR("file", aa_sfs_entry_file),
- AA_SFS_DIR("network", aa_sfs_entry_network),
AA_SFS_DIR("mount", aa_sfs_entry_mount),
AA_SFS_DIR("namespaces", aa_sfs_entry_ns),
AA_SFS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index db80221..3382518 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@
#include "include/context.h"
#include "include/file.h"
#include "include/match.h"
-#include "include/net.h"
#include "include/path.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/label.h"
@@ -567,32 +566,6 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
return error;
}
-static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
- struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file,
- u32 request, u32 denied)
-{
- struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
- int error;
-
- AA_BUG(!sock);
-
- /* revalidation due to label out of date. No revocation at this time */
- if (!denied && aa_label_is_subset(flabel, label))
- return 0;
-
- /* TODO: improve to skip profiles cached in flabel */
- error = aa_sock_file_perm(label, op, request, sock);
- if (denied) {
- /* TODO: improve to skip profiles checked above */
- /* check every profile in file label to is cached */
- last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(flabel, op, request, sock));
- }
- if (!error)
- update_file_ctx(file_ctx(file), label, request);
-
- return error;
-}
-
/**
* aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file
* @op: operation being checked
@@ -637,9 +610,6 @@ int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
error = __file_path_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request,
denied);
- else if (S_ISSOCK(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
- error = __file_sock_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request,
- denied);
done:
rcu_read_unlock();
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index ff4316e..620e811 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -121,29 +121,21 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
/* these entries require a custom callback fn */
struct {
struct aa_label *peer;
- union {
- struct {
- kuid_t ouid;
- const char *target;
- } fs;
- struct {
- int type, protocol;
- struct sock *peer_sk;
- void *addr;
- int addrlen;
- } net;
- int signal;
- struct {
- int rlim;
- unsigned long max;
- } rlim;
- };
+ struct {
+ const char *target;
+ kuid_t ouid;
+ } fs;
};
struct {
struct aa_profile *profile;
const char *ns;
long pos;
} iface;
+ int signal;
+ struct {
+ int rlim;
+ unsigned long max;
+ } rlim;
struct {
const char *src_name;
const char *type;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 140c8efc..0000000
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * AppArmor security module
- *
- * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
- *
- * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
- * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
- * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
- * License.
- */
-
-#ifndef __AA_NET_H
-#define __AA_NET_H
-
-#include <net/sock.h>
-#include <linux/path.h>
-
-#include "apparmorfs.h"
-#include "label.h"
-#include "perms.h"
-#include "policy.h"
-
-#define AA_MAY_SEND AA_MAY_WRITE
-#define AA_MAY_RECEIVE AA_MAY_READ
-
-#define AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN AA_MAY_DELETE
-
-#define AA_MAY_CONNECT AA_MAY_OPEN
-#define AA_MAY_ACCEPT 0x00100000
-
-#define AA_MAY_BIND 0x00200000
-#define AA_MAY_LISTEN 0x00400000
-
-#define AA_MAY_SETOPT 0x01000000
-#define AA_MAY_GETOPT 0x02000000
-
-#define NET_PERMS_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE | \
- AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_BIND | AA_MAY_LISTEN | \
- AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SETATTR | \
- AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_SETOPT | AA_MAY_GETOPT)
-
-#define NET_FS_PERMS (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE | \
- AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_RENAME |\
- AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_CHMOD | \
- AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_CHGRP | AA_MAY_LOCK | \
- AA_MAY_MPROT)
-
-#define NET_PEER_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CONNECT | \
- AA_MAY_ACCEPT)
-struct aa_sk_ctx {
- struct aa_label *label;
- struct aa_label *peer;
- struct path path;
-};
-
-#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
-#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
-#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \
- struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
- .family = (F)}; \
- DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME, \
- ((SK) && (F) != AF_UNIX) ? LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET : \
- LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, \
- OP); \
- NAME.u.net = &(NAME ## _net); \
- aad(&NAME)->net.type = (T); \
- aad(&NAME)->net.protocol = (P)
-
-#define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, SK) \
- DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type, \
- (SK)->sk_protocol)
-
-/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
- * @allow: basic network families permissions
- * @audit: which network permissions to force audit
- * @quiet: which network permissions to quiet rejects
- */
-struct aa_net {
- u16 allow[AF_MAX];
- u16 audit[AF_MAX];
- u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
-};
-
-
-extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[];
-
-void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va);
-int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
- u32 request, u16 family, int type);
-int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
- int type, int protocol);
-static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
- struct common_audit_data *sa,
- u32 request,
- struct sock *sk)
-{
- return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, sa, request, sk->sk_family,
- sk->sk_type);
-}
-int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk);
-
-int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
- struct socket *sock);
-
-
-static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
-{
- /* NOP */
-}
-
-#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
index af04d5a..2b27bb7 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
@@ -135,10 +135,9 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms;
void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask);
-void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names,
- u32 mask);
+void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask);
void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs,
- u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask);
+ u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask);
void aa_apply_modes_to_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
struct aa_perms *perms);
void aa_compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index 4364088..17fe41a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@
#include "file.h"
#include "lib.h"
#include "label.h"
-#include "net.h"
#include "perms.h"
#include "resource.h"
@@ -112,7 +111,6 @@ struct aa_data {
* @policy: general match rules governing policy
* @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
* @caps: capabilities for the profile
- * @net: network controls for the profile
* @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
*
* @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs
@@ -150,7 +148,6 @@ struct aa_profile {
struct aa_policydb policy;
struct aa_file_rules file;
struct aa_caps caps;
- struct aa_net net;
struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
struct aa_loaddata *rawdata;
@@ -223,16 +220,6 @@ static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_SAFE(struct aa_profile *profile,
return 0;
}
-static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_profile *profile,
- u16 AF) {
- unsigned int state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET);
- u16 be_af = cpu_to_be16(AF);
-
- if (!state)
- return 0;
- return aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2);
-}
-
/**
* aa_get_profile - increment refcount on profile @p
* @p: profile (MAYBE NULL)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c
index 8818621..08ca26b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lib.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c
@@ -211,8 +211,7 @@ void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask)
*str = '\0';
}
-void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names,
- u32 mask)
+void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask)
{
const char *fmt = "%s";
unsigned int i, perm = 1;
@@ -230,7 +229,7 @@ void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names,
}
void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs,
- u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask)
+ u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask)
{
char str[33];
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 72b915d..1346ee5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@
#include "include/context.h"
#include "include/file.h"
#include "include/ipc.h"
-#include "include/net.h"
#include "include/path.h"
#include "include/label.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
@@ -737,368 +736,6 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info,
return error;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
- */
-static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
-{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
-
- ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
- if (!ctx)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
- */
-static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
-{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
-
- SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
- aa_put_label(ctx->label);
- aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
- path_put(&ctx->path);
- kfree(ctx);
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field
- */
-static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
- struct sock *newsk)
-{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
- struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
-
- new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
- new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
- new->path = ctx->path;
- path_get(&new->path);
-}
-
-static int aa_sock_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type,
- int protocol)
-{
- AA_BUG(!label);
- AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
-
- return aa_af_perm(label, OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type,
- protocol);
-}
-
-
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
-{
- struct aa_label *label;
- int error = 0;
-
- label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
- if (!(kern || unconfined(label)))
- error = aa_sock_create_perm(label, family, type, protocol);
- end_current_label_crit_section(label);
-
- return error;
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct
- *
- * Note:
- * - kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to
- * move to a special kernel label
- * - socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or
- * sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in
- * sock_graft.
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
- int type, int protocol, int kern)
-{
- struct aa_label *label;
-
- if (kern) {
- struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns();
-
- label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns));
- aa_put_ns(ns);
- } else
- label = aa_get_current_label();
-
- if (sock->sk) {
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
-
- aa_put_label(ctx->label);
- ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
- }
- aa_put_label(label);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
- struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
-{
- AA_BUG(!sock);
- AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
- AA_BUG(!address);
- AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
-
- return aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk);
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
- struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
-{
- AA_BUG(!sock);
- AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
- AA_BUG(!address);
- AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
-
- return aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk);
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
-{
- AA_BUG(!sock);
- AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
- AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
-
- return aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk);
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection.
- *
- * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept
- * has not been done.
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
-{
- AA_BUG(!sock);
- AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
- AA_BUG(!newsock);
- AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
-
- return aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk);
-}
-
-static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
- struct msghdr *msg, int size)
-{
- AA_BUG(!sock);
- AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
- AA_BUG(!msg);
- AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
-
- return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
- struct msghdr *msg, int size)
-{
- return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
- struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
-{
- return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size);
-}
-
-/* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */
-static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
-{
- AA_BUG(!sock);
- AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
- AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
-
- return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
-{
- return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
-{
- return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
-}
-
-/* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */
-static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
- int level, int optname)
-{
- AA_BUG(!sock);
- AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
- AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
-
- return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
- int optname)
-{
- return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock,
- level, optname);
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
- int optname)
-{
- return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock,
- level, optname);
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
-{
- return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock);
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
- *
- * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held
- *
- * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram()
- * to deny an incoming connection socket_sock_rcv_skb()
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
-{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
-
- if (ctx->peer)
- return ctx->peer;
-
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT);
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer
- *
- * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
- char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen,
- unsigned int len)
-{
- char *name;
- int slen, error = 0;
- struct aa_label *label;
- struct aa_label *peer;
-
- label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
- peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk);
- if (IS_ERR(peer)) {
- error = PTR_ERR(peer);
- goto done;
- }
- slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer,
- FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
- FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL);
- /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
- if (slen < 0) {
- error = -ENOMEM;
- } else {
- if (slen > len) {
- error = -ERANGE;
- } else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) {
- error = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
- }
- if (put_user(slen, optlen))
- error = -EFAULT;
-out:
- kfree(name);
-
- }
-
-done:
- end_current_label_crit_section(label);
-
- return error;
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
- * @sock: the peer socket
- * @skb: packet data
- * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
- *
- * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
-
-{
- /* TODO: requires secid support */
- return -ENOPROTOOPT;
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
- * @sk: child sock
- * @parent: parent socket
- *
- * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can
- * just set sk security information off of current creating process label
- * Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based
- * instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled
- * socket is shared by different tasks.
- */
-static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
-{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
-
- if (!ctx->label)
- ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
-}
-
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -1133,30 +770,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
-
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
- apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
- apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
-
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 33d5443..0000000
--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * AppArmor security module
- *
- * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
- *
- * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
- * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
- * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
- * License.
- */
-
-#include "include/apparmor.h"
-#include "include/audit.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
-#include "include/label.h"
-#include "include/net.h"
-#include "include/policy.h"
-
-#include "net_names.h"
-
-
-struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
- AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
- { }
-};
-
-static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
- "unknown",
- "send",
- "receive",
- "unknown",
-
- "create",
- "shutdown",
- "connect",
- "unknown",
-
- "setattr",
- "getattr",
- "setcred",
- "getcred",
-
- "chmod",
- "chown",
- "chgrp",
- "lock",
-
- "mmap",
- "mprot",
- "unknown",
- "unknown",
-
- "accept",
- "bind",
- "listen",
- "unknown",
-
- "setopt",
- "getopt",
- "unknown",
- "unknown",
-
- "unknown",
- "unknown",
- "unknown",
- "unknown",
-};
-
-
-/* audit callback for net specific fields */
-void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
-{
- struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
-
- audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
- if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family])
- audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
- else
- audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
- audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
- if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type])
- audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]);
- else
- audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", aad(sa)->net.type);
- audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol);
-
- if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
- aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, NULL, 0,
- net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
-
- if (aad(sa)->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
- aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, NULL, 0,
- net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
- }
- }
- if (aad(sa)->peer) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
- aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
- FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
- }
-}
-
-
-/* Generic af perm */
-int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
- u32 request, u16 family, int type)
-{
- struct aa_perms perms = { };
-
- AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX);
- AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX);
-
- if (profile_unconfined(profile))
- return 0;
-
- perms.allow = (profile->net.allow[family] & (1 << type)) ?
- ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0;
- perms.audit = (profile->net.audit[family] & (1 << type)) ?
- ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0;
- perms.quiet = (profile->net.quiet[family] & (1 << type)) ?
- ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0;
- aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
-
- return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
-}
-
-int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
- int type, int protocol)
-{
- struct aa_profile *profile;
- DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);
-
- return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
- aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, request, family,
- type));
-}
-
-static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
- struct sock *sk)
-{
- struct aa_profile *profile;
- DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
-
- AA_BUG(!label);
- AA_BUG(!sk);
-
- if (unconfined(label))
- return 0;
-
- return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
- aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk));
-}
-
-int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
-{
- struct aa_label *label;
- int error;
-
- AA_BUG(!sk);
- AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
-
- /* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */
- label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
- error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk);
- end_current_label_crit_section(label);
-
- return error;
-}
-
-
-int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
- struct socket *sock)
-{
- AA_BUG(!label);
- AA_BUG(!sock);
- AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
-
- return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
-}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 5a2aec3..4ede87c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -275,19 +275,6 @@ fail:
return 0;
}
-static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
-{
- if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
- if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
- return 0;
- if (data)
- *data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((__le16 *) e->pos));
- e->pos += sizeof(u16);
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
{
if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
@@ -597,7 +584,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
const char *tmpname, *tmpns = NULL, *name = NULL;
const char *info = "failed to unpack profile";
- size_t size = 0, ns_len;
+ size_t ns_len;
struct rhashtable_params params = { 0 };
char *key = NULL;
struct aa_data *data;
@@ -730,38 +717,6 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
goto fail;
}
- size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
- if (size) {
-
- for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
- /* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
- * never request
- */
- if (i >= AF_MAX) {
- u16 tmp;
-
- if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
- !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
- !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
- goto fail;
- continue;
- }
- if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
- goto fail;
- if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
- goto fail;
- if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
- goto fail;
- }
- if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
- goto fail;
- }
- if (VERSION_LT(e->version, v7)) {
- /* pre v7 policy always allowed these */
- profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
- profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
- }
-
if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
/* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
info = "failed to unpack policydb";
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