diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/security/Yama.txt | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/security.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 41 |
3 files changed, 48 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/security/Yama.txt b/Documentation/security/Yama.txt index e369de2..dd908cf 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/Yama.txt +++ b/Documentation/security/Yama.txt @@ -46,14 +46,13 @@ restrictions, it can call prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY, ...) so that any otherwise allowed process (even those in external pid namespaces) may attach. -These restrictions do not change how ptrace via PTRACE_TRACEME operates. - -The sysctl settings are: +The sysctl settings (writable only with CAP_SYS_PTRACE) are: 0 - classic ptrace permissions: a process can PTRACE_ATTACH to any other process running under the same uid, as long as it is dumpable (i.e. did not transition uids, start privileged, or have called - prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE...) already). + prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE...) already). Similarly, PTRACE_TRACEME is + unchanged. 1 - restricted ptrace: a process must have a predefined relationship with the inferior it wants to call PTRACE_ATTACH on. By default, @@ -61,12 +60,13 @@ The sysctl settings are: classic criteria is also met. To change the relationship, an inferior can call prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, debugger, ...) to declare an allowed debugger PID to call PTRACE_ATTACH on the inferior. + Using PTRACE_TRACEME is unchanged. 2 - admin-only attach: only processes with CAP_SYS_PTRACE may use ptrace - with PTRACE_ATTACH. + with PTRACE_ATTACH, or through children calling PTRACE_TRACEME. -3 - no attach: no processes may use ptrace with PTRACE_ATTACH. Once set, - this sysctl cannot be changed to a lower value. +3 - no attach: no processes may use ptrace with PTRACE_ATTACH nor via + PTRACE_TRACEME. Once set, this sysctl value cannot be changed. The original children-only logic was based on the restrictions in grsecurity. diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 4e5a73c..3dea6a9 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1242,8 +1242,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the * current process before allowing the current process to present itself * to the @parent process for tracing. - * The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_access_check - * checks before it is allowed to trace this one. * @parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @capget: diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c index 83554ee..d51b7c7 100644 --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c @@ -290,10 +290,51 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, return rc; } +/** + * yama_ptrace_traceme - validate PTRACE_TRACEME calls + * @parent: task that will become the ptracer of the current task + * + * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error. + */ +static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) +{ + int rc; + + /* If standard caps disallows it, so does Yama. We should + * only tighten restrictions further. + */ + rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* Only disallow PTRACE_TRACEME on more aggressive settings. */ + switch (ptrace_scope) { + case YAMA_SCOPE_CAPABILITY: + if (!ns_capable(task_user_ns(parent), CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + rc = -EPERM; + break; + case YAMA_SCOPE_NO_ATTACH: + rc = -EPERM; + break; + } + + if (rc) { + char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; + printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE + "ptraceme of pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n", + current->pid, + get_task_comm(name, parent), + parent->pid); + } + + return rc; +} + static struct security_operations yama_ops = { .name = "yama", .ptrace_access_check = yama_ptrace_access_check, + .ptrace_traceme = yama_ptrace_traceme, .task_prctl = yama_task_prctl, .task_free = yama_task_free, }; |
