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-rw-r--r--arch/i386/kernel/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--arch/i386/kernel/audit.c23
-rw-r--r--arch/ia64/ia32/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--arch/ia64/ia32/audit.c11
-rw-r--r--arch/ia64/kernel/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--arch/ia64/kernel/audit.c29
-rw-r--r--arch/x86_64/ia32/Makefile3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86_64/ia32/audit.c11
-rw-r--r--arch/x86_64/kernel/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86_64/kernel/audit.c29
-rw-r--r--include/asm-generic/audit_change_attr.h18
-rw-r--r--include/asm-generic/audit_dir_write.h14
-rw-r--r--include/linux/audit.h25
-rw-r--r--kernel/audit.h1
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditfilter.c209
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditsc.c65
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c48
17 files changed, 403 insertions, 87 deletions
diff --git a/arch/i386/kernel/Makefile b/arch/i386/kernel/Makefile
index 5e70c2f..cbc1184 100644
--- a/arch/i386/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/i386/kernel/Makefile
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_VM86) += vm86.o
obj-$(CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK) += early_printk.o
obj-$(CONFIG_HPET_TIMER) += hpet.o
obj-$(CONFIG_K8_NB) += k8.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o
EXTRA_AFLAGS := -traditional
diff --git a/arch/i386/kernel/audit.c b/arch/i386/kernel/audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a53c6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/i386/kernel/audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+
+static unsigned dir_class[] = {
+#include <asm-generic/audit_dir_write.h>
+~0U
+};
+
+static unsigned chattr_class[] = {
+#include <asm-generic/audit_change_attr.h>
+~0U
+};
+
+static int __init audit_classes_init(void)
+{
+ audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_DIR_WRITE, dir_class);
+ audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, chattr_class);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+__initcall(audit_classes_init);
diff --git a/arch/ia64/ia32/Makefile b/arch/ia64/ia32/Makefile
index 61cb60a..baad8c7 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/ia32/Makefile
+++ b/arch/ia64/ia32/Makefile
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
obj-y := ia32_entry.o sys_ia32.o ia32_signal.o \
ia32_support.o ia32_traps.o binfmt_elf32.o ia32_ldt.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o
# Don't let GCC uses f16-f31 so that save_ia32_fpstate_live() and
# restore_ia32_fpstate_live() can be sure the live register contain user-level state.
diff --git a/arch/ia64/ia32/audit.c b/arch/ia64/ia32/audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab94f2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/ia64/ia32/audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#include <asm-i386/unistd.h>
+
+unsigned ia32_dir_class[] = {
+#include <asm-generic/audit_dir_write.h>
+~0U
+};
+
+unsigned ia32_chattr_class[] = {
+#include <asm-generic/audit_change_attr.h>
+~0U
+};
diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/ia64/kernel/Makefile
index 09a0dbc..0e4553f 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/Makefile
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_FREQ) += cpufreq/
obj-$(CONFIG_IA64_MCA_RECOVERY) += mca_recovery.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KPROBES) += kprobes.o jprobes.o
obj-$(CONFIG_IA64_UNCACHED_ALLOCATOR) += uncached.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o
mca_recovery-y += mca_drv.o mca_drv_asm.o
# The gate DSO image is built using a special linker script.
diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/audit.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f251293
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+
+static unsigned dir_class[] = {
+#include <asm-generic/audit_dir_write.h>
+~0U
+};
+
+static unsigned chattr_class[] = {
+#include <asm-generic/audit_change_attr.h>
+~0U
+};
+
+static int __init audit_classes_init(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_SUPPORT
+ extern __u32 ia32_dir_class[];
+ extern __u32 ia32_chattr_class[];
+ audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_DIR_WRITE_32, ia32_dir_class);
+ audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, ia32_chattr_class);
+#endif
+ audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_DIR_WRITE, dir_class);
+ audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, chattr_class);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+__initcall(audit_classes_init);
diff --git a/arch/x86_64/ia32/Makefile b/arch/x86_64/ia32/Makefile
index e9263b4..62bc5f5 100644
--- a/arch/x86_64/ia32/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86_64/ia32/Makefile
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) += $(sysv-y)
obj-$(CONFIG_IA32_AOUT) += ia32_aout.o
+audit-class-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) := audit.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) += $(audit-class-y)
+
$(obj)/syscall32_syscall.o: \
$(foreach F,sysenter syscall,$(obj)/vsyscall-$F.so)
diff --git a/arch/x86_64/ia32/audit.c b/arch/x86_64/ia32/audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab94f2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86_64/ia32/audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#include <asm-i386/unistd.h>
+
+unsigned ia32_dir_class[] = {
+#include <asm-generic/audit_dir_write.h>
+~0U
+};
+
+unsigned ia32_chattr_class[] = {
+#include <asm-generic/audit_change_attr.h>
+~0U
+};
diff --git a/arch/x86_64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86_64/kernel/Makefile
index aeb9c56..819e84e 100644
--- a/arch/x86_64/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86_64/kernel/Makefile
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KPROBES) += kprobes.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_PM_TIMER) += pmtimer.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_VSMP) += vsmp.o
obj-$(CONFIG_K8_NB) += k8.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
diff --git a/arch/x86_64/kernel/audit.c b/arch/x86_64/kernel/audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a067aa4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86_64/kernel/audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+
+static unsigned dir_class[] = {
+#include <asm-generic/audit_dir_write.h>
+~0U
+};
+
+static unsigned chattr_class[] = {
+#include <asm-generic/audit_change_attr.h>
+~0U
+};
+
+static int __init audit_classes_init(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
+ extern __u32 ia32_dir_class[];
+ extern __u32 ia32_chattr_class[];
+ audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_DIR_WRITE_32, ia32_dir_class);
+ audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, ia32_chattr_class);
+#endif
+ audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_DIR_WRITE, dir_class);
+ audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, chattr_class);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+__initcall(audit_classes_init);
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/audit_change_attr.h b/include/asm-generic/audit_change_attr.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb05bf6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/asm-generic/audit_change_attr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+__NR_chmod,
+__NR_fchmod,
+__NR_chown,
+__NR_fchown,
+__NR_lchown,
+__NR_setxattr,
+__NR_lsetxattr,
+__NR_fsetxattr,
+__NR_removexattr,
+__NR_lremovexattr,
+__NR_fremovexattr,
+__NR_fchownat,
+__NR_fchmodat,
+#ifdef __NR_chown32
+__NR_chown32,
+__NR_fchown32,
+__NR_lchown32,
+#endif
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/audit_dir_write.h b/include/asm-generic/audit_dir_write.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..161a7a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/asm-generic/audit_dir_write.h
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+__NR_rename,
+__NR_mkdir,
+__NR_rmdir,
+__NR_creat,
+__NR_link,
+__NR_unlink,
+__NR_symlink,
+__NR_mknod,
+__NR_mkdirat,
+__NR_mknodat,
+__NR_unlinkat,
+__NR_renameat,
+__NR_linkat,
+__NR_symlinkat,
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index e051ff9..b27d7de 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -122,10 +122,17 @@
/* Rule structure sizes -- if these change, different AUDIT_ADD and
* AUDIT_LIST commands must be implemented. */
#define AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS 64
+#define AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN 32
#define AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE 64
#define AUDIT_WORD(nr) ((__u32)((nr)/32))
#define AUDIT_BIT(nr) (1 << ((nr) - AUDIT_WORD(nr)*32))
+#define AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES 16
+#define AUDIT_CLASS_DIR_WRITE 0
+#define AUDIT_CLASS_DIR_WRITE_32 1
+#define AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR 2
+#define AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32 3
+
/* This bitmask is used to validate user input. It represents all bits that
* are currently used in an audit field constant understood by the kernel.
* If you are adding a new #define AUDIT_<whatever>, please ensure that
@@ -150,12 +157,17 @@
#define AUDIT_PERS 10
#define AUDIT_ARCH 11
#define AUDIT_MSGTYPE 12
-#define AUDIT_SE_USER 13 /* security label user */
-#define AUDIT_SE_ROLE 14 /* security label role */
-#define AUDIT_SE_TYPE 15 /* security label type */
-#define AUDIT_SE_SEN 16 /* security label sensitivity label */
-#define AUDIT_SE_CLR 17 /* security label clearance label */
+#define AUDIT_SUBJ_USER 13 /* security label user */
+#define AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE 14 /* security label role */
+#define AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE 15 /* security label type */
+#define AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN 16 /* security label sensitivity label */
+#define AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR 17 /* security label clearance label */
#define AUDIT_PPID 18
+#define AUDIT_OBJ_USER 19
+#define AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE 20
+#define AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE 21
+#define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW 22
+#define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH 23
/* These are ONLY useful when checking
* at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */
@@ -171,6 +183,8 @@
#define AUDIT_ARG2 (AUDIT_ARG0+2)
#define AUDIT_ARG3 (AUDIT_ARG0+3)
+#define AUDIT_FILTERKEY 210
+
#define AUDIT_NEGATE 0x80000000
/* These are the supported operators.
@@ -299,6 +313,7 @@ struct mqstat;
#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
#define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
#define AUDITSC_RESULT(x) ( ((long)(x))<0?AUDITSC_FAILURE:AUDITSC_SUCCESS )
+extern int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list);
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
/* These are defined in auditsc.c */
/* Public API */
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 8323e41..6aa33b8 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ struct audit_krule {
u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE];
u32 buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */
u32 field_count;
+ char *filterkey; /* ties events to rules */
struct audit_field *fields;
struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */
struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 4c99d2c..5b4e162 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
selinux_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
}
kfree(e->rule.fields);
+ kfree(e->rule.filterkey);
kfree(e);
}
@@ -278,6 +279,29 @@ static int audit_to_watch(struct audit_krule *krule, char *path, int len,
return 0;
}
+static __u32 *classes[AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES];
+
+int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list)
+{
+ __u32 *p = kzalloc(AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * sizeof(__u32), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ while (*list != ~0U) {
+ unsigned n = *list++;
+ if (n >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES) {
+ kfree(p);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ p[AUDIT_WORD(n)] |= AUDIT_BIT(n);
+ }
+ if (class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || classes[class]) {
+ kfree(p);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ classes[class] = p;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* Common user-space to kernel rule translation. */
static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule)
{
@@ -321,6 +345,22 @@ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule)
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
entry->rule.mask[i] = rule->mask[i];
+ for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES; i++) {
+ int bit = AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - i - 1;
+ __u32 *p = &entry->rule.mask[AUDIT_WORD(bit)];
+ __u32 *class;
+
+ if (!(*p & AUDIT_BIT(bit)))
+ continue;
+ *p &= ~AUDIT_BIT(bit);
+ class = classes[i];
+ if (class) {
+ int j;
+ for (j = 0; j < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; j++)
+ entry->rule.mask[j] |= class[j];
+ }
+ }
+
return entry;
exit_err:
@@ -469,11 +509,16 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
case AUDIT_ARG2:
case AUDIT_ARG3:
break;
- case AUDIT_SE_USER:
- case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
if (IS_ERR(str))
goto exit_free;
@@ -511,6 +556,16 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
if (err)
goto exit_free;
break;
+ case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ if (entry->rule.filterkey || f->val > AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN)
+ goto exit_free;
+ str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
+ if (IS_ERR(str))
+ goto exit_free;
+ entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
+ entry->rule.filterkey = str;
+ break;
default:
goto exit_free;
}
@@ -600,11 +655,16 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
data->fields[i] = f->type;
data->fieldflags[i] = f->op;
switch(f->type) {
- case AUDIT_SE_USER:
- case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str);
break;
@@ -612,6 +672,10 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->watch->path);
break;
+ case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
+ data->buflen += data->values[i] =
+ audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey);
+ break;
default:
data->values[i] = f->val;
}
@@ -639,11 +703,16 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
return 1;
switch(a->fields[i].type) {
- case AUDIT_SE_USER:
- case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str))
return 1;
break;
@@ -651,6 +720,11 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
if (strcmp(a->watch->path, b->watch->path))
return 1;
break;
+ case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
+ /* both filterkeys exist based on above type compare */
+ if (strcmp(a->filterkey, b->filterkey))
+ return 1;
+ break;
default:
if (a->fields[i].val != b->fields[i].val)
return 1;
@@ -730,6 +804,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old,
u32 fcount = old->field_count;
struct audit_entry *entry;
struct audit_krule *new;
+ char *fk;
int i, err = 0;
entry = audit_init_entry(fcount);
@@ -753,13 +828,25 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old,
* the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
switch (new->fields[i].type) {
- case AUDIT_SE_USER:
- case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
&old->fields[i]);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
+ fk = kstrdup(old->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(!fk))
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ else
+ new->filterkey = fk;
}
if (err) {
audit_free_rule(entry);
@@ -1245,6 +1332,34 @@ static void audit_list_rules(int pid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
}
+/* Log rule additions and removals */
+static void audit_log_rule_change(uid_t loginuid, u32 sid, char *action,
+ struct audit_krule *rule, int res)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+ if (!ab)
+ return;
+ audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u", loginuid);
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
+ audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
+ else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " %s rule key=", action);
+ if (rule->filterkey)
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, rule->filterkey);
+ else
+ audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
+ audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=%d", rule->listnr, res);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
/**
* audit_receive_filter - apply all rules to the specified message type
* @type: audit message type
@@ -1304,24 +1419,7 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
err = audit_add_rule(entry,
&audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
-
- if (sid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
- /* Maybe call audit_panic? */
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u ssid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d",
- loginuid, sid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
- } else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u subj=%s add rule to list=%d res=%d",
- loginuid, ctx, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
- kfree(ctx);
- } else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d",
- loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+ audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sid, "add", &entry->rule, !err);
if (err)
audit_free_rule(entry);
@@ -1337,24 +1435,8 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
err = audit_del_rule(entry,
&audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
-
- if (sid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
- /* Maybe call audit_panic? */
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u ssid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d",
- loginuid, sid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
- } else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u subj=%s remove rule from list=%d res=%d",
- loginuid, ctx, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
- kfree(ctx);
- } else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d",
- loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+ audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sid, "remove", &entry->rule,
+ !err);
audit_free_rule(entry);
break;
@@ -1514,11 +1596,16 @@ static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule)
for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
switch (f->type) {
- case AUDIT_SE_USER:
- case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
return 1;
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index dc5e3f0..ae40ac8 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ struct audit_context {
int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
int name_count;
struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
+ char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
struct dentry * pwd;
struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
@@ -320,11 +321,11 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (ctx)
result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
break;
- case AUDIT_SE_USER:
- case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
/* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
match for now to avoid losing information that
@@ -341,6 +342,46 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
ctx);
}
break;
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
+ also applies here */
+ if (f->se_rule) {
+ /* Find files that match */
+ if (name) {
+ result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
+ name->osid, f->type, f->op,
+ f->se_rule, ctx);
+ } else if (ctx) {
+ for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
+ if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
+ ctx->names[j].osid,
+ f->type, f->op,
+ f->se_rule, ctx)) {
+ ++result;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* Find ipc objects that match */
+ if (ctx) {
+ struct audit_aux_data *aux;
+ for (aux = ctx->aux; aux;
+ aux = aux->next) {
+ if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
+ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
+ if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
+ ++result;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ break;
case AUDIT_ARG0:
case AUDIT_ARG1:
case AUDIT_ARG2:
@@ -348,11 +389,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (ctx)
result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
break;
+ case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
+ /* ignore this field for filtering */
+ result = 1;
+ break;
}
if (!result)
return 0;
}
+ if (rule->filterkey)
+ ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
switch (rule->action) {
case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
@@ -627,6 +674,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
}
audit_free_names(context);
audit_free_aux(context);
+ kfree(context->filterkey);
kfree(context);
context = previous;
} while (context);
@@ -735,6 +783,11 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
+ if (context->filterkey) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
audit_log_end(ab);
for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
@@ -1060,6 +1113,8 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
} else {
audit_free_names(context);
audit_free_aux(context);
+ kfree(context->filterkey);
+ context->filterkey = NULL;
tsk->audit_context = context;
}
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index e9548bc..d2e80e6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1845,15 +1845,20 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
return -ENOTSUPP;
switch (field) {
- case AUDIT_SE_USER:
- case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
/* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
return -EINVAL;
break;
- case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
/* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1874,29 +1879,34 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
switch (field) {
- case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
if (!userdatum)
rc = -EINVAL;
else
tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
break;
- case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
if (!roledatum)
rc = -EINVAL;
else
tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
break;
- case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
if (!typedatum)
rc = -EINVAL;
else
tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
break;
- case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
break;
}
@@ -1948,7 +1958,8 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
/* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
without a match */
switch (field) {
- case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
switch (op) {
case AUDIT_EQUAL:
match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
@@ -1958,7 +1969,8 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
break;
}
break;
- case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
switch (op) {
case AUDIT_EQUAL:
match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
@@ -1968,7 +1980,8 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
break;
}
break;
- case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
switch (op) {
case AUDIT_EQUAL:
match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
@@ -1978,9 +1991,12 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
break;
}
break;
- case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
- level = (field == AUDIT_SE_SEN ?
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
+ field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
&ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
switch (op) {
case AUDIT_EQUAL:
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