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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c14
-rw-r--r--include/linux/kernel.h25
-rw-r--r--kernel/module.c12
-rw-r--r--kernel/panic.c63
-rw-r--r--kernel/softlockup.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/sysctl.c67
6 files changed, 101 insertions, 82 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
index 8c3aca7..7ed9e07 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
@@ -282,6 +282,8 @@ static void __cpuinit smp_callin(void)
cpu_set(cpuid, cpu_callin_map);
}
+static int __cpuinitdata unsafe_smp;
+
/*
* Activate a secondary processor.
*/
@@ -397,7 +399,7 @@ static void __cpuinit smp_apply_quirks(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
goto valid_k7;
/* If we get here, not a certified SMP capable AMD system. */
- add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP);
+ unsafe_smp = 1;
}
valid_k7:
@@ -414,12 +416,10 @@ static void __cpuinit smp_checks(void)
* Don't taint if we are running SMP kernel on a single non-MP
* approved Athlon
*/
- if (tainted & TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP) {
- if (num_online_cpus())
- printk(KERN_INFO "WARNING: This combination of AMD"
- "processors is not suitable for SMP.\n");
- else
- tainted &= ~TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP;
+ if (unsafe_smp && num_online_cpus() > 1) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO "WARNING: This combination of AMD"
+ "processors is not suitable for SMP.\n");
+ add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP);
}
}
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
index 75d81f1..e971c55 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -235,9 +235,10 @@ extern int oops_in_progress; /* If set, an oops, panic(), BUG() or die() is in
extern int panic_timeout;
extern int panic_on_oops;
extern int panic_on_unrecovered_nmi;
-extern int tainted;
extern const char *print_tainted(void);
-extern void add_taint(unsigned);
+extern void add_taint(unsigned flag);
+extern int test_taint(unsigned flag);
+extern unsigned long get_taint(void);
extern int root_mountflags;
/* Values used for system_state */
@@ -250,16 +251,16 @@ extern enum system_states {
SYSTEM_SUSPEND_DISK,
} system_state;
-#define TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE (1<<0)
-#define TAINT_FORCED_MODULE (1<<1)
-#define TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP (1<<2)
-#define TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD (1<<3)
-#define TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK (1<<4)
-#define TAINT_BAD_PAGE (1<<5)
-#define TAINT_USER (1<<6)
-#define TAINT_DIE (1<<7)
-#define TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE (1<<8)
-#define TAINT_WARN (1<<9)
+#define TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE 0
+#define TAINT_FORCED_MODULE 1
+#define TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP 2
+#define TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD 3
+#define TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK 4
+#define TAINT_BAD_PAGE 5
+#define TAINT_USER 6
+#define TAINT_DIE 7
+#define TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE 8
+#define TAINT_WARN 9
extern void dump_stack(void) __cold;
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 9db1191..dd9ac6a 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static inline int strong_try_module_get(struct module *mod)
static inline void add_taint_module(struct module *mod, unsigned flag)
{
add_taint(flag);
- mod->taints |= flag;
+ mod->taints |= (1U << flag);
}
/*
@@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ static const char vermagic[] = VERMAGIC_STRING;
static int try_to_force_load(struct module *mod, const char *symname)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_FORCE_LOAD
- if (!(tainted & TAINT_FORCED_MODULE))
+ if (!test_taint(TAINT_FORCED_MODULE))
printk("%s: no version for \"%s\" found: kernel tainted.\n",
mod->name, symname);
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE);
@@ -1033,7 +1033,7 @@ static unsigned long resolve_symbol(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs,
const unsigned long *crc;
ret = find_symbol(name, &owner, &crc,
- !(mod->taints & TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE), true);
+ !(mod->taints & (1 << TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE)), true);
if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(ret)) {
/* use_module can fail due to OOM,
or module initialization or unloading */
@@ -1634,7 +1634,7 @@ static void set_license(struct module *mod, const char *license)
license = "unspecified";
if (!license_is_gpl_compatible(license)) {
- if (!(tainted & TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE))
+ if (!test_taint(TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE))
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: module license '%s' taints "
"kernel.\n", mod->name, license);
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE);
@@ -2552,9 +2552,9 @@ static char *module_flags(struct module *mod, char *buf)
mod->state == MODULE_STATE_GOING ||
mod->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING) {
buf[bx++] = '(';
- if (mod->taints & TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE)
+ if (mod->taints & (1 << TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE))
buf[bx++] = 'P';
- if (mod->taints & TAINT_FORCED_MODULE)
+ if (mod->taints & (1 << TAINT_FORCED_MODULE))
buf[bx++] = 'F';
/*
* TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD: could be added.
diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
index 12c5a0a..028013f 100644
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
int panic_on_oops;
-int tainted;
+static unsigned long tainted_mask;
static int pause_on_oops;
static int pause_on_oops_flag;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pause_on_oops_lock);
@@ -159,31 +159,60 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic);
* The string is overwritten by the next call to print_taint().
*/
+struct tnt {
+ u8 bit;
+ char true;
+ char false;
+};
+
+static const struct tnt tnts[] = {
+ { TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE, 'P', 'G' },
+ { TAINT_FORCED_MODULE, 'F', ' ' },
+ { TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP, 'S', ' ' },
+ { TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD, 'R', ' ' },
+ { TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, 'M', ' ' },
+ { TAINT_BAD_PAGE, 'B', ' ' },
+ { TAINT_USER, 'U', ' ' },
+ { TAINT_DIE, 'D', ' ' },
+ { TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE, 'A', ' ' },
+ { TAINT_WARN, 'W', ' ' },
+};
+
const char *print_tainted(void)
{
- static char buf[20];
- if (tainted) {
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Tainted: %c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c",
- tainted & TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE ? 'P' : 'G',
- tainted & TAINT_FORCED_MODULE ? 'F' : ' ',
- tainted & TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP ? 'S' : ' ',
- tainted & TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD ? 'R' : ' ',
- tainted & TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK ? 'M' : ' ',
- tainted & TAINT_BAD_PAGE ? 'B' : ' ',
- tainted & TAINT_USER ? 'U' : ' ',
- tainted & TAINT_DIE ? 'D' : ' ',
- tainted & TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE ? 'A' : ' ',
- tainted & TAINT_WARN ? 'W' : ' ');
- }
- else
+ static char buf[ARRAY_SIZE(tnts) + sizeof("Tainted: ") + 1];
+
+ if (tainted_mask) {
+ char *s;
+ int i;
+
+ s = buf + sprintf(buf, "Tainted: ");
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tnts); i++) {
+ const struct tnt *t = &tnts[i];
+ *s++ = test_bit(t->bit, &tainted_mask) ?
+ t->true : t->false;
+ }
+ *s = 0;
+ } else
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Not tainted");
return(buf);
}
+int test_taint(unsigned flag)
+{
+ return test_bit(flag, &tainted_mask);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(test_taint);
+
+unsigned long get_taint(void)
+{
+ return tainted_mask;
+}
+
void add_taint(unsigned flag)
{
debug_locks = 0; /* can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore */
- tainted |= flag;
+ set_bit(flag, &tainted_mask);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_taint);
diff --git a/kernel/softlockup.c b/kernel/softlockup.c
index cb838ee..3953e4a 100644
--- a/kernel/softlockup.c
+++ b/kernel/softlockup.c
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static void check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks(int this_cpu)
* If the system crashed already then all bets are off,
* do not report extra hung tasks:
*/
- if ((tainted & TAINT_DIE) || did_panic)
+ if (test_taint(TAINT_DIE) || did_panic)
return;
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index cfc5295..ec88fcc 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ extern int max_lock_depth;
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
static int proc_do_cad_pid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
-static int proc_dointvec_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
+static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
#endif
@@ -379,10 +379,9 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
{
.procname = "tainted",
- .data = &tainted,
- .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .maxlen = sizeof(long),
.mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_taint,
+ .proc_handler = &proc_taint,
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_LATENCYTOP
@@ -2228,49 +2227,39 @@ int proc_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
NULL,NULL);
}
-#define OP_SET 0
-#define OP_AND 1
-#define OP_OR 2
-
-static int do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv(int *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
- int *valp,
- int write, void *data)
-{
- int op = *(int *)data;
- if (write) {
- int val = *negp ? -*lvalp : *lvalp;
- switch(op) {
- case OP_SET: *valp = val; break;
- case OP_AND: *valp &= val; break;
- case OP_OR: *valp |= val; break;
- }
- } else {
- int val = *valp;
- if (val < 0) {
- *negp = -1;
- *lvalp = (unsigned long)-val;
- } else {
- *negp = 0;
- *lvalp = (unsigned long)val;
- }
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
/*
- * Taint values can only be increased
+ * Taint values can only be increased
+ * This means we can safely use a temporary.
*/
-static int proc_dointvec_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
+static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
- int op;
+ struct ctl_table t;
+ unsigned long tmptaint = get_taint();
+ int err;
if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- op = OP_OR;
- return do_proc_dointvec(table,write,filp,buffer,lenp,ppos,
- do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv,&op);
+ t = *table;
+ t.data = &tmptaint;
+ err = proc_doulongvec_minmax(&t, write, filp, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+ if (write) {
+ /*
+ * Poor man's atomic or. Not worth adding a primitive
+ * to everyone's atomic.h for this
+ */
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < BITS_PER_LONG && tmptaint >> i; i++) {
+ if ((tmptaint >> i) & 1)
+ add_taint(i);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return err;
}
struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param {
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