diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/capability.h | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/init_task.h | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/prctl.h | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/sched.h | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/securebits.h | 25 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/security.h | 16 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/sys.c | 27 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/capability.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 103 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/dummy.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 |
12 files changed, 141 insertions, 60 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index 7d50ff6..eaab759 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct { * Add any capability from current's capability bounding set * to the current process' inheritable set * Allow taking bits out of capability bounding set + * Allow modification of the securebits for a process */ #define CAP_SETPCAP 8 @@ -490,8 +491,6 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set; int capable(int cap); int __capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap); -extern long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap); - #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ #endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/init_task.h b/include/linux/init_task.h index 37a6f5b..bf6b8a6 100644 --- a/include/linux/init_task.h +++ b/include/linux/init_task.h @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include <linux/ipc.h> #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> +#include <linux/securebits.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> #define INIT_FDTABLE \ @@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ extern struct group_info init_groups; .cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET, \ .cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET, \ .cap_bset = CAP_INIT_BSET, \ - .keep_capabilities = 0, \ + .securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT, \ .user = INIT_USER, \ .comm = "swapper", \ .thread = INIT_THREAD, \ diff --git a/include/linux/prctl.h b/include/linux/prctl.h index 5c80b19..5ad7919 100644 --- a/include/linux/prctl.h +++ b/include/linux/prctl.h @@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ # define PR_UNALIGN_NOPRINT 1 /* silently fix up unaligned user accesses */ # define PR_UNALIGN_SIGBUS 2 /* generate SIGBUS on unaligned user access */ -/* Get/set whether or not to drop capabilities on setuid() away from uid 0 */ +/* Get/set whether or not to drop capabilities on setuid() away from + * uid 0 (as per security/commoncap.c) */ #define PR_GET_KEEPCAPS 7 #define PR_SET_KEEPCAPS 8 @@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ #define PR_GET_SECCOMP 21 #define PR_SET_SECCOMP 22 -/* Get/set the capability bounding set */ +/* Get/set the capability bounding set (as per security/commoncap.c) */ #define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23 #define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24 @@ -73,4 +74,8 @@ # define PR_TSC_ENABLE 1 /* allow the use of the timestamp counter */ # define PR_TSC_SIGSEGV 2 /* throw a SIGSEGV instead of reading the TSC */ +/* Get/set securebits (as per security/commoncap.c) */ +#define PR_GET_SECUREBITS 27 +#define PR_SET_SECUREBITS 28 + #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h index 9a4f3e6..024d72b 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched.h +++ b/include/linux/sched.h @@ -68,7 +68,6 @@ struct sched_param { #include <linux/smp.h> #include <linux/sem.h> #include <linux/signal.h> -#include <linux/securebits.h> #include <linux/fs_struct.h> #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/completion.h> @@ -1133,7 +1132,7 @@ struct task_struct { gid_t gid,egid,sgid,fsgid; struct group_info *group_info; kernel_cap_t cap_effective, cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_bset; - unsigned keep_capabilities:1; + unsigned securebits; struct user_struct *user; #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS struct key *request_key_auth; /* assumed request_key authority */ diff --git a/include/linux/securebits.h b/include/linux/securebits.h index 5b06178..c1f19db 100644 --- a/include/linux/securebits.h +++ b/include/linux/securebits.h @@ -3,28 +3,39 @@ #define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000 -extern unsigned securebits; - /* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks *of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is 0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the inheritable bitmask of the executable file. */ -#define SECURE_NOROOT 0 +#define SECURE_NOROOT 0 +#define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED 1 /* make bit-0 immutable */ /* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixes" to be compatible with old programs relying on set*uid to loose privileges. When unset, setuid doesn't change privileges. */ -#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2 +#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2 +#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED 3 /* make bit-2 immutable */ + +/* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after + transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by + bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both + bit 4 and 5 will create a barrier through exec that no exec()'d + child can use this feature again. */ +#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS 4 +#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED 5 /* make bit-4 immutable */ /* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specify whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the setting is fixed or not. A setting which is fixed cannot be changed from user-level. */ +#define issecure_mask(X) (1 << (X)) +#define issecure(X) (issecure_mask(X) & current->securebits) -#define issecure(X) ( (1 << (X+1)) & SECUREBITS_DEFAULT ? \ - (1 << (X)) & SECUREBITS_DEFAULT : \ - (1 << (X)) & securebits ) +#define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \ + issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \ + issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) +#define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS (SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1) #endif /* !_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 53a3453..e6299e5 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -34,8 +34,6 @@ #include <linux/xfrm.h> #include <net/flow.h> -extern unsigned securebits; - /* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */ #define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10 @@ -61,6 +59,8 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry); extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry); extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags); extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p); +extern int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p); extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp); extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio); extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice); @@ -720,7 +720,9 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * @arg3 contains a argument. * @arg4 contains a argument. * @arg5 contains a argument. - * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @rc_p contains a pointer to communicate back the forced return code + * Return 0 if permission is granted, and non-zero if the security module + * has taken responsibility (setting *rc_p) for the prctl call. * @task_reparent_to_init: * Set the security attributes in @p->security for a kernel thread that * is being reparented to the init task. @@ -1420,7 +1422,7 @@ struct security_operations { int (*task_wait) (struct task_struct * p); int (*task_prctl) (int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, - unsigned long arg5); + unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p); void (*task_reparent_to_init) (struct task_struct * p); void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); @@ -1684,7 +1686,7 @@ int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid); int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p); int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, - unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p); void security_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p); void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag); @@ -2271,9 +2273,9 @@ static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p) static inline int security_task_prctl (int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, - unsigned long arg5) + unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p) { - return 0; + return cap_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg3, arg5, rc_p); } static inline void security_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p) diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index 6a0cc71..f2a4513 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -1632,10 +1632,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_umask(int mask) asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) { - long error; + long uninitialized_var(error); - error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); - if (error) + if (security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, &error)) return error; switch (option) { @@ -1688,17 +1687,6 @@ asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, error = -EINVAL; break; - case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS: - if (current->keep_capabilities) - error = 1; - break; - case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS: - if (arg2 != 0 && arg2 != 1) { - error = -EINVAL; - break; - } - current->keep_capabilities = arg2; - break; case PR_SET_NAME: { struct task_struct *me = current; unsigned char ncomm[sizeof(me->comm)]; @@ -1732,17 +1720,6 @@ asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, case PR_SET_SECCOMP: error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2); break; - - case PR_CAPBSET_READ: - if (!cap_valid(arg2)) - return -EINVAL; - return !!cap_raised(current->cap_bset, arg2); - case PR_CAPBSET_DROP: -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES - return cap_prctl_drop(arg2); -#else - return -EINVAL; -#endif case PR_GET_TSC: error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2); break; diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 2c6e06d..38ac54e 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = { .task_setioprio = cap_task_setioprio, .task_setnice = cap_task_setnice, .task_post_setuid = cap_task_post_setuid, + .task_prctl = cap_task_prctl, .task_reparent_to_init = cap_task_reparent_to_init, .syslog = cap_syslog, diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 8529057..e8c3f5e 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -24,11 +24,8 @@ #include <linux/hugetlb.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/sched.h> - -/* Global security state */ - -unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */ -EXPORT_SYMBOL(securebits); +#include <linux/prctl.h> +#include <linux/securebits.h> int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { @@ -368,7 +365,7 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */ - current->keep_capabilities = 0; + current->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); } int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm) @@ -448,7 +445,7 @@ static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid (int old_ruid, int old_euid, { if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) && (current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0 && current->suid != 0) && - !current->keep_capabilities) { + !issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) { cap_clear (current->cap_permitted); cap_clear (current->cap_effective); } @@ -547,7 +544,7 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice) * this task could get inconsistent info. There can be no * racing writer bc a task can only change its own caps. */ -long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap) +static long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap) { if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP)) return -EPERM; @@ -556,6 +553,7 @@ long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap) cap_lower(current->cap_bset, cap); return 0; } + #else int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp) @@ -572,12 +570,99 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice) } #endif +int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p) +{ + long error = 0; + + switch (option) { + case PR_CAPBSET_READ: + if (!cap_valid(arg2)) + error = -EINVAL; + else + error = !!cap_raised(current->cap_bset, arg2); + break; +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES + case PR_CAPBSET_DROP: + error = cap_prctl_drop(arg2); + break; + + /* + * The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a + * system from legacy UID=0 based privilege (when filesystem + * capabilities are not in use) to a system using filesystem + * capabilities only - as the POSIX.1e draft intended. + * + * Note: + * + * PR_SET_SECUREBITS = + * issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED) + * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) + * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED) + * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) + * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED) + * + * will ensure that the current process and all of its + * children will be locked into a pure + * capability-based-privilege environment. + */ + case PR_SET_SECUREBITS: + if ((((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1) + & (current->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/ + || ((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS + & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/ + || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/ + || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0)) { /*[4]*/ + /* + * [1] no changing of bits that are locked + * [2] no unlocking of locks + * [3] no setting of unsupported bits + * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about + * the "sendmail capabilities bug") + */ + error = -EPERM; /* cannot change a locked bit */ + } else { + current->securebits = arg2; + } + break; + case PR_GET_SECUREBITS: + error = current->securebits; + break; + +#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ + + case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS: + if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) + error = 1; + break; + case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS: + if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */ + error = -EINVAL; + else if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)) + error = -EPERM; + else if (arg2) + current->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); + else + current->securebits &= + ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); + break; + + default: + /* No functionality available - continue with default */ + return 0; + } + + /* Functionality provided */ + *rc_p = error; + return 1; +} + void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p) { cap_set_init_eff(p->cap_effective); cap_clear(p->cap_inheritable); cap_set_full(p->cap_permitted); - p->keep_capabilities = 0; + p->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; return; } diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c index b0232bb..58d4dd1 100644 --- a/security/dummy.c +++ b/security/dummy.c @@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ static int dummy_task_kill (struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, } static int dummy_task_prctl (int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, - unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 8a285c7..d5cb589 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -733,9 +733,9 @@ int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) } int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, - unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p) { - return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); + return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p); } void security_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 308e2cf..04acb5a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3303,12 +3303,13 @@ static int selinux_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, - unsigned long arg5) + unsigned long arg5, + long *rc_p) { /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify the state of the current process. */ - return 0; + return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p); } static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) |
