diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 77 |
2 files changed, 69 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt index fd248a31..db97ff1 100644 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ parameter is applicable: EDD BIOS Enhanced Disk Drive Services (EDD) is enabled EFI EFI Partitioning (GPT) is enabled EIDE EIDE/ATAPI support is enabled. + EVM Extended Verification Module FB The frame buffer device is enabled. GCOV GCOV profiling is enabled. HW Appropriate hardware is enabled. @@ -750,6 +751,11 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. This option is obsoleted by the "netdev=" option, which has equivalent usage. See its documentation for details. + evm= [EVM] + Format: { "fix" } + Permit 'security.evm' to be updated regardless of + current integrity status. + failslab= fail_page_alloc= fail_make_request=[KNL] diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index eb07f9d..94d66af 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -37,13 +37,25 @@ char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = { NULL }; +static int evm_fixmode; +static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str) +{ + if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) + evm_fixmode = 1; + return 0; +} +__setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode); + /* * evm_verify_hmac - calculate and compare the HMAC with the EVM xattr * * Compute the HMAC on the dentry's protected set of extended attributes - * and compare it against the stored security.evm xattr. (For performance, - * use the previoulsy retrieved xattr value and length to calculate the - * HMAC.) + * and compare it against the stored security.evm xattr. + * + * For performance: + * - use the previoulsy retrieved xattr value and length to calculate the + * HMAC.) + * - cache the verification result in the iint, when available. * * Returns integrity status */ @@ -54,9 +66,10 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) { struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data; + enum integrity_status evm_status; int rc; - if (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) + if (iint && iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) return iint->evm_status; /* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */ @@ -71,18 +84,21 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, sizeof xattr_data, GFP_NOFS); if (rc < 0) goto err_out; - iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; - return iint->evm_status; + evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; + goto out; err_out: switch (rc) { case -ENODATA: /* file not labelled */ - iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL; + evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL; break; default: - iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; + evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; } - return iint->evm_status; +out: + if (iint) + iint->evm_status = evm_status; + return evm_status; } static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name) @@ -157,6 +173,22 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, return 0; } +/* + * evm_verify_current_integrity - verify the dentry's metadata integrity + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * + * Verify and return the dentry's metadata integrity. The exceptions are + * before EVM is initialized or in 'fix' mode. + */ +static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + + if (!evm_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode) + return 0; + return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); +} + /** * evm_inode_setxattr - protect the EVM extended attribute * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry @@ -164,13 +196,22 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length * - * Prevent 'security.evm' from being modified + * Updating 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that + * the current value is valid. */ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { - return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, - xattr_value_len); + + enum integrity_status evm_status; + int ret; + + ret = evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, + xattr_value_len); + if (ret) + return ret; + evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); + return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM; } /** @@ -178,11 +219,19 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * - * Prevent 'security.evm' from being removed. + * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that + * the current value is valid. */ int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { - return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); + enum integrity_status evm_status; + int ret; + + ret = evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); + if (ret) + return ret; + evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); + return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM; } /** |
