diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c | 47 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c | 40 |
2 files changed, 27 insertions, 60 deletions
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c index 0828cf6..23b509d 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c @@ -112,47 +112,26 @@ gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, if (sealalg != 0xffff) goto out; - - /* there are several mappings of seal algorithms to sign algorithms, - but few enough that we can try them all. */ - - if ((ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_NONE && signalg > 1) || - (ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_1 && signalg != SGN_ALG_3) || - (ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_DES3KD && - signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD)) + if (signalg != SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5) goto out; /* compute the checksum of the message */ /* initialize the the cksum */ - switch (signalg) { - case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5: - checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5; - break; - default: - ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5; + + ret = make_checksum(checksum_type, ptr - 2, 8, + message_buffer, 0, &md5cksum); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = krb5_encrypt(ctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, + md5cksum.data, 16); + if (ret) goto out; - } - switch (signalg) { - case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5: - ret = make_checksum(checksum_type, ptr - 2, 8, - message_buffer, 0, &md5cksum); - if (ret) - goto out; - - ret = krb5_encrypt(ctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, - md5cksum.data, 16); - if (ret) - goto out; - - if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8)) { - ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG; - goto out; - } - break; - default: - ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8)) { + ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG; goto out; } diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c index eee49f4..a7d5c13 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c @@ -253,6 +253,8 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) if (sealalg == 0xffff) goto out; + if (signalg != SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5) + goto out; /* in the current spec, there is only one valid seal algorithm per key type, so a simple comparison is ok */ @@ -276,34 +278,20 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) /* compute the checksum of the message */ /* initialize the the cksum */ - switch (signalg) { - case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5: - checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5; - break; - default: - ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5; + + ret = make_checksum(checksum_type, ptr - 2, 8, buf, + ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base, &md5cksum); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, + md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len); + if (ret) goto out; - } - switch (signalg) { - case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5: - ret = make_checksum(checksum_type, ptr - 2, 8, buf, - ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base, &md5cksum); - if (ret) - goto out; - - ret = krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, - md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len); - if (ret) - goto out; - - if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8)) { - ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG; - goto out; - } - break; - default: - ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8)) { + ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG; goto out; } |
