summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat
-rw-r--r--Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt74
-rw-r--r--Documentation/security/keys.txt17
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c110
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c81
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h5
-rw-r--r--fs/cifs/cifsacl.c12
-rw-r--r--fs/nfs/idmap.c12
-rw-r--r--include/linux/cred.h17
-rw-r--r--include/linux/key.h1
-rw-r--r--kernel/cred.c127
-rw-r--r--kernel/seccomp.c13
-rw-r--r--net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c15
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c6
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c15
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c10
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c92
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c21
-rw-r--r--security/smack/Kconfig6
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c17
-rw-r--r--security/yama/yama_lsm.c88
20 files changed, 369 insertions, 370 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt b/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
index 597c3c5..1e469ef 100644
--- a/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
+++ b/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
@@ -95,12 +95,15 @@ SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
Results in the kernel sending a SIGSYS signal to the triggering
- task without executing the system call. The kernel will
- rollback the register state to just before the system call
- entry such that a signal handler in the task will be able to
- inspect the ucontext_t->uc_mcontext registers and emulate
- system call success or failure upon return from the signal
- handler.
+ task without executing the system call. siginfo->si_call_addr
+ will show the address of the system call instruction, and
+ siginfo->si_syscall and siginfo->si_arch will indicate which
+ syscall was attempted. The program counter will be as though
+ the syscall happened (i.e. it will not point to the syscall
+ instruction). The return value register will contain an arch-
+ dependent value -- if resuming execution, set it to something
+ sensible. (The architecture dependency is because replacing
+ it with -ENOSYS could overwrite some useful information.)
The SECCOMP_RET_DATA portion of the return value will be passed
as si_errno.
@@ -123,6 +126,18 @@ SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
the BPF program return value will be available to the tracer
via PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG.
+ The tracer can skip the system call by changing the syscall number
+ to -1. Alternatively, the tracer can change the system call
+ requested by changing the system call to a valid syscall number. If
+ the tracer asks to skip the system call, then the system call will
+ appear to return the value that the tracer puts in the return value
+ register.
+
+ The seccomp check will not be run again after the tracer is
+ notified. (This means that seccomp-based sandboxes MUST NOT
+ allow use of ptrace, even of other sandboxed processes, without
+ extreme care; ptracers can use this mechanism to escape.)
+
SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
Results in the system call being executed.
@@ -161,3 +176,50 @@ architecture supports both ptrace_event and seccomp, it will be able to
support seccomp filter with minor fixup: SIGSYS support and seccomp return
value checking. Then it must just add CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
to its arch-specific Kconfig.
+
+
+
+Caveats
+-------
+
+The vDSO can cause some system calls to run entirely in userspace,
+leading to surprises when you run programs on different machines that
+fall back to real syscalls. To minimize these surprises on x86, make
+sure you test with
+/sys/devices/system/clocksource/clocksource0/current_clocksource set to
+something like acpi_pm.
+
+On x86-64, vsyscall emulation is enabled by default. (vsyscalls are
+legacy variants on vDSO calls.) Currently, emulated vsyscalls will honor seccomp, with a few oddities:
+
+- A return value of SECCOMP_RET_TRAP will set a si_call_addr pointing to
+ the vsyscall entry for the given call and not the address after the
+ 'syscall' instruction. Any code which wants to restart the call
+ should be aware that (a) a ret instruction has been emulated and (b)
+ trying to resume the syscall will again trigger the standard vsyscall
+ emulation security checks, making resuming the syscall mostly
+ pointless.
+
+- A return value of SECCOMP_RET_TRACE will signal the tracer as usual,
+ but the syscall may not be changed to another system call using the
+ orig_rax register. It may only be changed to -1 order to skip the
+ currently emulated call. Any other change MAY terminate the process.
+ The rip value seen by the tracer will be the syscall entry address;
+ this is different from normal behavior. The tracer MUST NOT modify
+ rip or rsp. (Do not rely on other changes terminating the process.
+ They might work. For example, on some kernels, choosing a syscall
+ that only exists in future kernels will be correctly emulated (by
+ returning -ENOSYS).
+
+To detect this quirky behavior, check for addr & ~0x0C00 ==
+0xFFFFFFFFFF600000. (For SECCOMP_RET_TRACE, use rip. For
+SECCOMP_RET_TRAP, use siginfo->si_call_addr.) Do not check any other
+condition: future kernels may improve vsyscall emulation and current
+kernels in vsyscall=native mode will behave differently, but the
+instructions at 0xF...F600{0,4,8,C}00 will not be system calls in these
+cases.
+
+Note that modern systems are unlikely to use vsyscalls at all -- they
+are a legacy feature and they are considerably slower than standard
+syscalls. New code will use the vDSO, and vDSO-issued system calls
+are indistinguishable from normal system calls.
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
index 7d9ca92..7b4145d 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
@@ -994,6 +994,23 @@ payload contents" for more information.
reference pointer if successful.
+(*) A keyring can be created by:
+
+ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
+ const struct cred *cred,
+ key_perm_t perm,
+ unsigned long flags,
+ struct key *dest);
+
+ This creates a keyring with the given attributes and returns it. If dest
+ is not NULL, the new keyring will be linked into the keyring to which it
+ points. No permission checks are made upon the destination keyring.
+
+ Error EDQUOT can be returned if the keyring would overload the quota (pass
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA in flags if the keyring shouldn't be accounted
+ towards the user's quota). Error ENOMEM can also be returned.
+
+
(*) To check the validity of a key, this function can be called:
int validate_key(struct key *key);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
index 3a3e8c9..9a907a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
@@ -145,19 +145,6 @@ static int addr_to_vsyscall_nr(unsigned long addr)
return nr;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
-static int vsyscall_seccomp(struct task_struct *tsk, int syscall_nr)
-{
- if (!seccomp_mode(&tsk->seccomp))
- return 0;
- task_pt_regs(tsk)->orig_ax = syscall_nr;
- task_pt_regs(tsk)->ax = syscall_nr;
- return __secure_computing(syscall_nr);
-}
-#else
-#define vsyscall_seccomp(_tsk, _nr) 0
-#endif
-
static bool write_ok_or_segv(unsigned long ptr, size_t size)
{
/*
@@ -190,10 +177,9 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
unsigned long caller;
- int vsyscall_nr;
+ int vsyscall_nr, syscall_nr, tmp;
int prev_sig_on_uaccess_error;
long ret;
- int skip;
/*
* No point in checking CS -- the only way to get here is a user mode
@@ -225,56 +211,84 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
}
tsk = current;
- /*
- * With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV. We want to
- * preserve that behavior to make writing exploits harder.
- */
- prev_sig_on_uaccess_error = current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error;
- current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error = 1;
/*
+ * Check for access_ok violations and find the syscall nr.
+ *
* NULL is a valid user pointer (in the access_ok sense) on 32-bit and
* 64-bit, so we don't need to special-case it here. For all the
* vsyscalls, NULL means "don't write anything" not "write it at
* address 0".
*/
- ret = -EFAULT;
- skip = 0;
switch (vsyscall_nr) {
case 0:
- skip = vsyscall_seccomp(tsk, __NR_gettimeofday);
- if (skip)
- break;
-
if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(struct timeval)) ||
- !write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(struct timezone)))
- break;
+ !write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(struct timezone))) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto check_fault;
+ }
+
+ syscall_nr = __NR_gettimeofday;
+ break;
+
+ case 1:
+ if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(time_t))) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto check_fault;
+ }
+
+ syscall_nr = __NR_time;
+ break;
+
+ case 2:
+ if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(unsigned)) ||
+ !write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(unsigned))) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto check_fault;
+ }
+
+ syscall_nr = __NR_getcpu;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Handle seccomp. regs->ip must be the original value.
+ * See seccomp_send_sigsys and Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt.
+ *
+ * We could optimize the seccomp disabled case, but performance
+ * here doesn't matter.
+ */
+ regs->orig_ax = syscall_nr;
+ regs->ax = -ENOSYS;
+ tmp = secure_computing(syscall_nr);
+ if ((!tmp && regs->orig_ax != syscall_nr) || regs->ip != address) {
+ warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_DEBUG, regs,
+ "seccomp tried to change syscall nr or ip");
+ do_exit(SIGSYS);
+ }
+ if (tmp)
+ goto do_ret; /* skip requested */
+ /*
+ * With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV. We want to
+ * preserve that behavior to make writing exploits harder.
+ */
+ prev_sig_on_uaccess_error = current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error;
+ current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error = 1;
+
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ switch (vsyscall_nr) {
+ case 0:
ret = sys_gettimeofday(
(struct timeval __user *)regs->di,
(struct timezone __user *)regs->si);
break;
case 1:
- skip = vsyscall_seccomp(tsk, __NR_time);
- if (skip)
- break;
-
- if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(time_t)))
- break;
-
ret = sys_time((time_t __user *)regs->di);
break;
case 2:
- skip = vsyscall_seccomp(tsk, __NR_getcpu);
- if (skip)
- break;
-
- if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(unsigned)) ||
- !write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(unsigned)))
- break;
-
ret = sys_getcpu((unsigned __user *)regs->di,
(unsigned __user *)regs->si,
NULL);
@@ -283,12 +297,7 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error = prev_sig_on_uaccess_error;
- if (skip) {
- if ((long)regs->ax <= 0L) /* seccomp errno emulation */
- goto do_ret;
- goto done; /* seccomp trace/trap */
- }
-
+check_fault:
if (ret == -EFAULT) {
/* Bad news -- userspace fed a bad pointer to a vsyscall. */
warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_INFO, regs,
@@ -311,7 +320,6 @@ do_ret:
/* Emulate a ret instruction. */
regs->ip = caller;
regs->sp += 8;
-done:
return true;
sigsegv:
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
index 7da840d..9978609 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
@@ -38,8 +38,6 @@ static struct vio_device_id tpm_ibmvtpm_device_table[] = {
};
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(vio, tpm_ibmvtpm_device_table);
-DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(wq);
-
/**
* ibmvtpm_send_crq - Send a CRQ request
* @vdev: vio device struct
@@ -83,6 +81,7 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
{
struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm;
u16 len;
+ int sig;
ibmvtpm = (struct ibmvtpm_dev *)chip->vendor.data;
@@ -91,22 +90,23 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
return 0;
}
- wait_event_interruptible(wq, ibmvtpm->crq_res.len != 0);
+ sig = wait_event_interruptible(ibmvtpm->wq, ibmvtpm->res_len != 0);
+ if (sig)
+ return -EINTR;
+
+ len = ibmvtpm->res_len;
- if (count < ibmvtpm->crq_res.len) {
+ if (count < len) {
dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev,
"Invalid size in recv: count=%ld, crq_size=%d\n",
- count, ibmvtpm->crq_res.len);
+ count, len);
return -EIO;
}
spin_lock(&ibmvtpm->rtce_lock);
- memcpy((void *)buf, (void *)ibmvtpm->rtce_buf, ibmvtpm->crq_res.len);
- memset(ibmvtpm->rtce_buf, 0, ibmvtpm->crq_res.len);
- ibmvtpm->crq_res.valid = 0;
- ibmvtpm->crq_res.msg = 0;
- len = ibmvtpm->crq_res.len;
- ibmvtpm->crq_res.len = 0;
+ memcpy((void *)buf, (void *)ibmvtpm->rtce_buf, len);
+ memset(ibmvtpm->rtce_buf, 0, len);
+ ibmvtpm->res_len = 0;
spin_unlock(&ibmvtpm->rtce_lock);
return len;
}
@@ -273,7 +273,6 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_remove(struct vio_dev *vdev)
int rc = 0;
free_irq(vdev->irq, ibmvtpm);
- tasklet_kill(&ibmvtpm->tasklet);
do {
if (rc)
@@ -372,7 +371,6 @@ static int ibmvtpm_reset_crq(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
static int tpm_ibmvtpm_resume(struct device *dev)
{
struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm = ibmvtpm_get_data(dev);
- unsigned long flags;
int rc = 0;
do {
@@ -387,10 +385,11 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_resume(struct device *dev)
return rc;
}
- spin_lock_irqsave(&ibmvtpm->lock, flags);
- vio_disable_interrupts(ibmvtpm->vdev);
- tasklet_schedule(&ibmvtpm->tasklet);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ibmvtpm->lock, flags);
+ rc = vio_enable_interrupts(ibmvtpm->vdev);
+ if (rc) {
+ dev_err(dev, "Error vio_enable_interrupts rc=%d\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
rc = ibmvtpm_crq_send_init(ibmvtpm);
if (rc)
@@ -467,7 +466,7 @@ static struct ibmvtpm_crq *ibmvtpm_crq_get_next(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
if (crq->valid & VTPM_MSG_RES) {
if (++crq_q->index == crq_q->num_entry)
crq_q->index = 0;
- rmb();
+ smp_rmb();
} else
crq = NULL;
return crq;
@@ -535,11 +534,9 @@ static void ibmvtpm_crq_process(struct ibmvtpm_crq *crq,
ibmvtpm->vtpm_version = crq->data;
return;
case VTPM_TPM_COMMAND_RES:
- ibmvtpm->crq_res.valid = crq->valid;
- ibmvtpm->crq_res.msg = crq->msg;
- ibmvtpm->crq_res.len = crq->len;
- ibmvtpm->crq_res.data = crq->data;
- wake_up_interruptible(&wq);
+ /* len of the data in rtce buffer */
+ ibmvtpm->res_len = crq->len;
+ wake_up_interruptible(&ibmvtpm->wq);
return;
default:
return;
@@ -559,38 +556,19 @@ static void ibmvtpm_crq_process(struct ibmvtpm_crq *crq,
static irqreturn_t ibmvtpm_interrupt(int irq, void *vtpm_instance)
{
struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm = (struct ibmvtpm_dev *) vtpm_instance;
- unsigned long flags;
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(&ibmvtpm->lock, flags);
- vio_disable_interrupts(ibmvtpm->vdev);
- tasklet_schedule(&ibmvtpm->tasklet);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ibmvtpm->lock, flags);
-
- return IRQ_HANDLED;
-}
-
-/**
- * ibmvtpm_tasklet - Interrupt handler tasklet
- * @data: ibm vtpm device struct
- *
- * Returns:
- * Nothing
- **/
-static void ibmvtpm_tasklet(void *data)
-{
- struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm = data;
struct ibmvtpm_crq *crq;
- unsigned long flags;
- spin_lock_irqsave(&ibmvtpm->lock, flags);
+ /* while loop is needed for initial setup (get version and
+ * get rtce_size). There should be only one tpm request at any
+ * given time.
+ */
while ((crq = ibmvtpm_crq_get_next(ibmvtpm)) != NULL) {
ibmvtpm_crq_process(crq, ibmvtpm);
crq->valid = 0;
- wmb();
+ smp_wmb();
}
- vio_enable_interrupts(ibmvtpm->vdev);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ibmvtpm->lock, flags);
+ return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
/**
@@ -650,9 +628,6 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev,
goto reg_crq_cleanup;
}
- tasklet_init(&ibmvtpm->tasklet, (void *)ibmvtpm_tasklet,
- (unsigned long)ibmvtpm);
-
rc = request_irq(vio_dev->irq, ibmvtpm_interrupt, 0,
tpm_ibmvtpm_driver_name, ibmvtpm);
if (rc) {
@@ -666,13 +641,14 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev,
goto init_irq_cleanup;
}
+ init_waitqueue_head(&ibmvtpm->wq);
+
crq_q->index = 0;
ibmvtpm->dev = dev;
ibmvtpm->vdev = vio_dev;
chip->vendor.data = (void *)ibmvtpm;
- spin_lock_init(&ibmvtpm->lock);
spin_lock_init(&ibmvtpm->rtce_lock);
rc = ibmvtpm_crq_send_init(ibmvtpm);
@@ -689,7 +665,6 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev,
return rc;
init_irq_cleanup:
- tasklet_kill(&ibmvtpm->tasklet);
do {
rc1 = plpar_hcall_norets(H_FREE_CRQ, vio_dev->unit_address);
} while (rc1 == H_BUSY || H_IS_LONG_BUSY(rc1));
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h
index 4296eb4..bd82a79 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h
@@ -38,13 +38,12 @@ struct ibmvtpm_dev {
struct vio_dev *vdev;
struct ibmvtpm_crq_queue crq_queue;
dma_addr_t crq_dma_handle;
- spinlock_t lock;
- struct tasklet_struct tasklet;
u32 rtce_size;
void __iomem *rtce_buf;
dma_addr_t rtce_dma_handle;
spinlock_t rtce_lock;
- struct ibmvtpm_crq crq_res;
+ wait_queue_head_t wq;
+ u16 res_len;
u32 vtpm_version;
};
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
index 75c1ee69..5cbd00e 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
@@ -346,19 +346,15 @@ init_cifs_idmap(void)
if (!cred)
return -ENOMEM;
- keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, ".cifs_idmap", 0, 0, cred,
- (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+ keyring = keyring_alloc(".cifs_idmap", 0, 0, cred,
+ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto failed_put_cred;
}
- ret = key_instantiate_and_link(keyring, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto failed_put_key;
-
ret = register_key_type(&cifs_idmap_key_type);
if (ret < 0)
goto failed_put_key;
diff --git a/fs/nfs/idmap.c b/fs/nfs/idmap.c
index 9cc4a3f..bc3968fa 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/idmap.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/idmap.c
@@ -193,19 +193,15 @@ static int nfs_idmap_init_keyring(void)
if (!cred)
return -ENOMEM;
- keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, ".id_resolver", 0, 0, cred,
- (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+ keyring = keyring_alloc(".id_resolver", 0, 0, cred,
+ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto failed_put_cred;
}
- ret = key_instantiate_and_link(keyring, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto failed_put_key;
-
ret = register_key_type(&key_type_id_resolver);
if (ret < 0)
goto failed_put_key;
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index ebbed2c..0142aac 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -77,21 +77,6 @@ extern int in_group_p(kgid_t);
extern int in_egroup_p(kgid_t);
/*
- * The common credentials for a thread group
- * - shared by CLONE_THREAD
- */
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-struct thread_group_cred {
- atomic_t usage;
- pid_t tgid; /* thread group process ID */
- spinlock_t lock;
- struct key __rcu *session_keyring; /* keyring inherited over fork */
- struct key *process_keyring; /* keyring private to this process */
- struct rcu_head rcu; /* RCU deletion hook */
-};
-#endif
-
-/*
* The security context of a task
*
* The parts of the context break down into two categories:
@@ -139,6 +124,8 @@ struct cred {
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
unsigned char jit_keyring; /* default keyring to attach requested
* keys to */
+ struct key __rcu *session_keyring; /* keyring inherited over fork */
+ struct key *process_keyring; /* keyring private to this process */
struct key *thread_keyring; /* keyring private to this thread */
struct key *request_key_auth; /* assumed request_key authority */
struct thread_group_cred *tgcred; /* thread-group shared credentials */
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 2393b1c..4dfde11 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -265,6 +265,7 @@ extern int key_unlink(struct key *keyring,
extern struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,
const struct cred *cred,
+ key_perm_t perm,
unsigned long flags,
struct key *dest);
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 48cea3d..8888afb 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -30,17 +30,6 @@
static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar;
/*
- * The common credentials for the initial task's thread group
- */
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-static struct thread_group_cred init_tgcred = {
- .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
- .tgid = 0,
- .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(init_cred.tgcred.lock),
-};
-#endif
-
-/*
* The initial credentials for the initial task
*/
struct cred init_cred = {
@@ -65,9 +54,6 @@ struct cred init_cred = {
.user = INIT_USER,
.user_ns = &init_user_ns,
.group_info = &init_groups,
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
- .tgcred = &init_tgcred,
-#endif
};
static inline void set_cred_subscribers(struct cred *cred, int n)
@@ -96,36 +82,6 @@ static inline void alter_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *_cred, int n)
}
/*
- * Dispose of the shared task group credentials
- */
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-static void release_tgcred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
-{
- struct thread_group_cred *tgcred =
- container_of(rcu, struct thread_group_cred, rcu);
-
- BUG_ON(atomic_read(&tgcred->usage) != 0);
-
- key_put(tgcred->session_keyring);
- key_put(tgcred->process_keyring);
- kfree(tgcred);
-}
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Release a set of thread group credentials.
- */
-static void release_tgcred(struct cred *cred)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
- struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = cred->tgcred;
-
- if (atomic_dec_and_test(&tgcred->usage))
- call_rcu(&tgcred->rcu, release_tgcred_rcu);
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
* The RCU callback to actually dispose of a set of credentials
*/
static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
@@ -150,9 +106,10 @@ static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
#endif
security_cred_free(cred);
+ key_put(cred->session_keyring);
+ key_put(cred->process_keyring);
key_put(cred->thread_keyring);
key_put(cred->request_key_auth);
- release_tgcred(cred);
if (cred->group_info)
put_group_info(cred->group_info);
free_uid(cred->user);
@@ -246,15 +203,6 @@ struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void)
if (!new)
return NULL;
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
- new->tgcred = kzalloc(sizeof(*new->tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!new->tgcred) {
- kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, new);
- return NULL;
- }
- atomic_set(&new->tgcred->usage, 1);
-#endif
-
atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
new->magic = CRED_MAGIC;
@@ -308,9 +256,10 @@ struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
get_user_ns(new->user_ns);
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ key_get(new->session_keyring);
+ key_get(new->process_keyring);
key_get(new->thread_keyring);
key_get(new->request_key_auth);
- atomic_inc(&new->tgcred->usage);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
@@ -334,39 +283,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds);
*/
struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
{
- struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = NULL;
struct cred *new;
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
- tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!tgcred)
- return NULL;
-#endif
-
new = prepare_creds();
- if (!new) {
- kfree(tgcred);
+ if (!new)
return new;
- }
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
/* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */
key_put(new->thread_keyring);
new->thread_keyring = NULL;
- /* create a new per-thread-group creds for all this set of threads to
- * share */
- memcpy(tgcred, new->tgcred, sizeof(struct thread_group_cred));
-
- atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
- spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
-
/* inherit the session keyring; new process keyring */
- key_get(tgcred->session_keyring);
- tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
-
- release_tgcred(new);
- new->tgcred = tgcred;
+ key_put(new->process_keyring);
+ new->process_keyring = NULL;
#endif
return new;
@@ -383,9 +313,6 @@ struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
*/
int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
- struct thread_group_cred *tgcred;
-#endif
struct cred *new;
int ret;
@@ -425,22 +352,12 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
}
- /* we share the process and session keyrings between all the threads in
- * a process - this is slightly icky as we violate COW credentials a
- * bit */
+ /* The process keyring is only shared between the threads in a process;
+ * anything outside of those threads doesn't inherit.
+ */
if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) {
- tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!tgcred) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto error_put;
- }
- atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
- spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
- tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
- tgcred->session_keyring = key_get(new->tgcred->session_keyring);
-
- release_tgcred(new);
- new->tgcred = tgcred;
+ key_put(new->process_keyring);
+ new->process_keyring = NULL;
}
#endif
@@ -643,9 +560,6 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
*/
struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
- struct thread_group_cred *tgcred;
-#endif
const struct cred *old;
struct cred *new;
@@ -653,14 +567,6 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
if (!new)
return NULL;
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
- tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!tgcred) {
- kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, new);
- return NULL;
- }
-#endif
-
kdebug("prepare_kernel_cred() alloc %p", new);
if (daemon)
@@ -678,13 +584,10 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
get_group_info(new->group_info);
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
- atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
- spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
- tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
- tgcred->session_keyring = NULL;
- new->tgcred = tgcred;
- new->request_key_auth = NULL;
+ new->session_keyring = NULL;
+ new->process_keyring = NULL;
new->thread_keyring = NULL;
+ new->request_key_auth = NULL;
new->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING;
#endif
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index ee376be..5af44b5 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -396,25 +396,29 @@ int __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: {
int data;
+ struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
ret = seccomp_run_filters(this_syscall);
data = ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
ret &= SECCOMP_RET_ACTION;
switch (ret) {
case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
/* Set the low-order 16-bits as a errno. */
- syscall_set_return_value(current, task_pt_regs(current),
+ syscall_set_return_value(current, regs,
-data, 0);
goto skip;
case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
/* Show the handler the original registers. */
- syscall_rollback(current, task_pt_regs(current));
+ syscall_rollback(current, regs);
/* Let the filter pass back 16 bits of data. */
seccomp_send_sigsys(this_syscall, data);
goto skip;
case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
/* Skip these calls if there is no tracer. */
- if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP))
+ if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) {
+ syscall_set_return_value(current, regs,
+ -ENOSYS, 0);
goto skip;
+ }
/* Allow the BPF to provide the event message */
ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, data);
/*
@@ -425,6 +429,9 @@ int __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
*/
if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
break;
+ if (syscall_get_nr(current, regs) < 0)
+ goto skip; /* Explicit request to skip. */
+
return 0;
case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
return 0;
diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
index 8aa4b11..0a69d07 100644
--- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
+++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
@@ -259,20 +259,16 @@ static int __init init_dns_resolver(void)
if (!cred)
return -ENOMEM;
- keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, ".dns_resolver",
- GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred,
- (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+ keyring = keyring_alloc(".dns_resolver",
+ GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred,
+ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto failed_put_cred;
}
- ret = key_instantiate_and_link(keyring, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto failed_put_key;
-
ret = register_key_type(&key_type_dns_resolver);
if (ret < 0)
goto failed_put_key;
@@ -304,3 +300,4 @@ static void __exit exit_dns_resolver(void)
module_init(init_dns_resolver)
module_exit(exit_dns_resolver)
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index a15c9da..8fb7c7b 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -854,13 +854,13 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
/* if the client doesn't provide, decide on the permissions we want */
if (perm == KEY_PERM_UNDEF) {
perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;
- perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_LINK | KEY_USR_SETATTR;
+ perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
if (ktype->read)
- perm |= KEY_POS_READ | KEY_USR_READ;
+ perm |= KEY_POS_READ;
if (ktype == &key_type_keyring || ktype->update)
- perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE;
+ perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;
}
/* allocate a new key */
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 5d34b4e..4b5c948 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1132,12 +1132,12 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id,
ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov);
if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ goto err;
if (ret == 0)
goto no_payload_free;
ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, ioc, ret, ringid);
-
+err:
if (iov != iovstack)
kfree(iov);
return ret;
@@ -1495,7 +1495,8 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
goto error_keyring;
newwork = &cred->rcu;
- cred->tgcred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r);
+ cred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r);
+ keyring_r = NULL;
init_task_work(newwork, key_change_session_keyring);
me = current;
@@ -1519,7 +1520,7 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
mycred = current_cred();
pcred = __task_cred(parent);
if (mycred == pcred ||
- mycred->tgcred->session_keyring == pcred->tgcred->session_keyring) {
+ mycred->session_keyring == pcred->session_keyring) {
ret = 0;
goto unlock;
}
@@ -1535,9 +1536,9 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
goto unlock;
/* the keyrings must have the same UID */
- if ((pcred->tgcred->session_keyring &&
- !uid_eq(pcred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid)) ||
- !uid_eq(mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid))
+ if ((pcred->session_keyring &&
+ !uid_eq(pcred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid)) ||
+ !uid_eq(mycred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid))
goto unlock;
/* cancel an already pending keyring replacement */
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 6e42df1..6ece7f2 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -257,17 +257,14 @@ error:
* Allocate a keyring and link into the destination keyring.
*/
struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,
- const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags,
- struct key *dest)
+ const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm,
+ unsigned long flags, struct key *dest)
{
struct key *keyring;
int ret;
keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, description,
- uid, gid, cred,
- (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL,
- flags);
-
+ uid, gid, cred, perm, flags);
if (!IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(keyring, NULL, 0, dest, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
@@ -278,6 +275,7 @@ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,
return keyring;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_alloc);
/**
* keyring_search_aux - Search a keyring tree for a key matching some criteria
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 86468f3..58dfe08 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -45,10 +45,12 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)
struct user_struct *user;
const struct cred *cred;
struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;
+ key_perm_t user_keyring_perm;
char buf[20];
int ret;
uid_t uid;
+ user_keyring_perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL;
cred = current_cred();
user = cred->user;
uid = from_kuid(cred->user_ns, user->uid);
@@ -73,8 +75,8 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)
uid_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
- cred, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
- NULL);
+ cred, user_keyring_perm,
+ KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);
goto error;
@@ -89,7 +91,8 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)
if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
session_keyring =
keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
- cred, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ cred, user_keyring_perm,
+ KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);
goto error_release;
@@ -130,6 +133,7 @@ int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
struct key *keyring;
keyring = keyring_alloc("_tid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
+ KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
@@ -170,27 +174,18 @@ static int install_thread_keyring(void)
int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
{
struct key *keyring;
- int ret;
- if (new->tgcred->process_keyring)
+ if (new->process_keyring)
return -EEXIST;
- keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid,
- new, KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
+ keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
+ KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
+ KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
- spin_lock_irq(&new->tgcred->lock);
- if (!new->tgcred->process_keyring) {
- new->tgcred->process_keyring = keyring;
- keyring = NULL;
- ret = 0;
- } else {
- ret = -EEXIST;
- }
- spin_unlock_irq(&new->tgcred->lock);
- key_put(keyring);
- return ret;
+ new->process_keyring = keyring;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -231,11 +226,12 @@ int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)
/* create an empty session keyring */
if (!keyring) {
flags = KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN;
- if (cred->tgcred->session_keyring)
+ if (cred->session_keyring)
flags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA;
- keyring = keyring_alloc("_ses", cred->uid, cred->gid,
- cred, flags, NULL);
+ keyring = keyring_alloc("_ses", cred->uid, cred->gid, cred,
+ KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
+ flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
} else {
@@ -243,17 +239,11 @@ int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)
}
/* install the keyring */
- spin_lock_irq(&cred->tgcred->lock);
- old = cred->tgcred->session_keyring;
- rcu_assign_pointer(cred->tgcred->session_keyring, keyring);
- spin_unlock_irq(&cred->tgcred->lock);
-
- /* we're using RCU on the pointer, but there's no point synchronising
- * on it if it didn't previously point to anything */
- if (old) {
- synchronize_rcu();
+ old = cred->session_keyring;
+ rcu_assign_pointer(cred->session_keyring, keyring);
+
+ if (old)
key_put(old);
- }
return 0;
}
@@ -368,9 +358,9 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
}
/* search the process keyring second */
- if (cred->tgcred->process_keyring) {
+ if (cred->process_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
- make_key_ref(cred->tgcred->process_keyring, 1),
+ make_key_ref(cred->process_keyring, 1),
cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
@@ -389,12 +379,10 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
}
/* search the session keyring */
- if (cred->tgcred->session_keyring) {
+ if (cred->session_keyring) {
rcu_read_lock();
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
- make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(
- cred->tgcred->session_keyring),
- 1),
+ make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring), 1),
cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -564,7 +552,7 @@ try_again:
break;
case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:
- if (!cred->tgcred->process_keyring) {
+ if (!cred->process_keyring) {
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
goto error;
@@ -576,13 +564,13 @@ try_again:
goto reget_creds;
}
- key = cred->tgcred->process_keyring;
+ key = cred->process_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:
- if (!cred->tgcred->session_keyring) {
+ if (!cred->session_keyring) {
/* always install a session keyring upon access if one
* doesn't exist yet */
ret = install_user_keyrings();
@@ -597,7 +585,7 @@ try_again:
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
goto reget_creds;
- } else if (cred->tgcred->session_keyring ==
+ } else if (cred->session_keyring ==
cred->user->session_keyring &&
lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) {
ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
@@ -607,7 +595,7 @@ try_again:
}
rcu_read_lock();
- key = rcu_dereference(cred->tgcred->session_keyring);
+ key = rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring);
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
rcu_read_unlock();
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
@@ -767,12 +755,6 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
struct key *keyring;
long ret, serial;
- /* only permit this if there's a single thread in the thread group -
- * this avoids us having to adjust the creds on all threads and risking
- * ENOMEM */
- if (!current_is_single_threaded())
- return -EMLINK;
-
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -784,7 +766,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- serial = new->tgcred->session_keyring->serial;
+ serial = new->session_keyring->serial;
ret = commit_creds(new);
if (ret == 0)
ret = serial;
@@ -798,8 +780,10 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
keyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false);
if (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {
/* not found - try and create a new one */
- keyring = keyring_alloc(name, old->uid, old->gid, old,
- KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ keyring = keyring_alloc(
+ name, old->uid, old->gid, old,
+ KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_LINK,
+ KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
@@ -807,6 +791,9 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
} else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
+ } else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto error2;
}
/* we've got a keyring - now to install it */
@@ -863,8 +850,7 @@ void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork)
new->jit_keyring = old->jit_keyring;
new->thread_keyring = key_get(old->thread_keyring);
- new->tgcred->tgid = old->tgcred->tgid;
- new->tgcred->process_keyring = key_get(old->tgcred->process_keyring);
+ new->process_keyring = key_get(old->process_keyring);
security_transfer_creds(new, old);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 66e2118..4bd6bdb7 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,
cred = get_current_cred();
keyring = keyring_alloc(desc, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
+ KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
put_cred(cred);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
@@ -150,12 +151,12 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,
cred->thread_keyring ? cred->thread_keyring->serial : 0);
prkey = 0;
- if (cred->tgcred->process_keyring)
- prkey = cred->tgcred->process_keyring->serial;
+ if (cred->process_keyring)
+ prkey = cred->process_keyring->serial;
sprintf(keyring_str[1], "%d", prkey);
rcu_read_lock();
- session = rcu_dereference(cred->tgcred->session_keyring);
+ session = rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring);
if (!session)
session = cred->user->session_keyring;
sskey = session->serial;
@@ -297,14 +298,14 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
- dest_keyring = key_get(cred->tgcred->process_keyring);
+ dest_keyring = key_get(cred->process_keyring);
if (dest_keyring)
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:
rcu_read_lock();
dest_keyring = key_get(
- rcu_dereference(cred->tgcred->session_keyring));
+ rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring));
rcu_read_unlock();
if (dest_keyring)
@@ -347,6 +348,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
unsigned long prealloc;
struct key *key;
+ key_perm_t perm;
key_ref_t key_ref;
int ret;
@@ -355,8 +357,15 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
*_key = NULL;
mutex_lock(&user->cons_lock);
+ perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;
+ perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
+ if (type->read)
+ perm |= KEY_POS_READ;
+ if (type == &key_type_keyring || type->update)
+ perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;
+
key = key_alloc(type, description, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
- KEY_POS_ALL, flags);
+ perm, flags);
if (IS_ERR(key))
goto alloc_failed;
diff --git a/security/smack/Kconfig b/security/smack/Kconfig
index 603b087..e69de9c 100644
--- a/security/smack/Kconfig
+++ b/security/smack/Kconfig
@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
config SECURITY_SMACK
bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Support"
- depends on NETLABEL && SECURITY_NETWORK
+ depends on NET
+ depends on INET
+ depends on SECURITY
+ select NETLABEL
+ select SECURITY_NETWORK
default n
help
This selects the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 99929a5..76a5dca 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -2063,6 +2063,19 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_revoke_subj_ops = {
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
+static struct kset *smackfs_kset;
+/**
+ * smk_init_sysfs - initialize /sys/fs/smackfs
+ *
+ */
+static int smk_init_sysfs(void)
+{
+ smackfs_kset = kset_create_and_add("smackfs", NULL, fs_kobj);
+ if (!smackfs_kset)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock
* @sb: the empty superblock
@@ -2183,6 +2196,10 @@ static int __init init_smk_fs(void)
if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
return 0;
+ err = smk_init_sysfs();
+ if (err)
+ printk(KERN_ERR "smackfs: sysfs mountpoint problem.\n");
+
err = register_filesystem(&smk_fs_type);
if (!err) {
smackfs_mount = kern_mount(&smk_fs_type);
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index b4c2984..2663145 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#define YAMA_SCOPE_DISABLED 0
#define YAMA_SCOPE_RELATIONAL 1
@@ -29,12 +30,37 @@ static int ptrace_scope = YAMA_SCOPE_RELATIONAL;
struct ptrace_relation {
struct task_struct *tracer;
struct task_struct *tracee;
+ bool invalid;
struct list_head node;
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
};
static LIST_HEAD(ptracer_relations);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ptracer_relations_lock);
+static void yama_relation_cleanup(struct work_struct *work);
+static DECLARE_WORK(yama_relation_work, yama_relation_cleanup);
+
+/**
+ * yama_relation_cleanup - remove invalid entries from the relation list
+ *
+ */
+static void yama_relation_cleanup(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct ptrace_relation *relation;
+
+ spin_lock(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) {
+ if (relation->invalid) {
+ list_del_rcu(&relation->node);
+ kfree_rcu(relation, rcu);
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ spin_unlock(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+}
+
/**
* yama_ptracer_add - add/replace an exception for this tracer/tracee pair
* @tracer: the task_struct of the process doing the ptrace
@@ -48,32 +74,34 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ptracer_relations_lock);
static int yama_ptracer_add(struct task_struct *tracer,
struct task_struct *tracee)
{
- int rc = 0;
- struct ptrace_relation *added;
- struct ptrace_relation *entry, *relation = NULL;
+ struct ptrace_relation *relation, *added;
added = kmalloc(sizeof(*added), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!added)
return -ENOMEM;
- spin_lock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock);
- list_for_each_entry(entry, &ptracer_relations, node)
- if (entry->tracee == tracee) {
- relation = entry;
- break;
+ added->tracee = tracee;
+ added->tracer = tracer;
+ added->invalid = false;
+
+ spin_lock(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) {
+ if (relation->invalid)
+ continue;
+ if (relation->tracee == tracee) {
+ list_replace_rcu(&relation->node, &added->node);
+ kfree_rcu(relation, rcu);
+ goto out;
}
- if (!relation) {
- relation = added;
- relation->tracee = tracee;
- list_add(&relation->node, &ptracer_relations);
}
- relation->tracer = tracer;
- spin_unlock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock);
- if (added != relation)
- kfree(added);
+ list_add_rcu(&added->node, &ptracer_relations);
- return rc;
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ spin_unlock(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+ return 0;
}
/**
@@ -84,16 +112,23 @@ static int yama_ptracer_add(struct task_struct *tracer,
static void yama_ptracer_del(struct task_struct *tracer,
struct task_struct *tracee)
{
- struct ptrace_relation *relation, *safe;
+ struct ptrace_relation *relation;
+ bool marked = false;
- spin_lock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock);
- list_for_each_entry_safe(relation, safe, &ptracer_relations, node)
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) {
+ if (relation->invalid)
+ continue;
if (relation->tracee == tracee ||
(tracer && relation->tracer == tracer)) {
- list_del(&relation->node);
- kfree(relation);
+ relation->invalid = true;
+ marked = true;
}
- spin_unlock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (marked)
+ schedule_work(&yama_relation_work);
}
/**
@@ -217,21 +252,22 @@ static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer,
struct task_struct *parent = NULL;
bool found = false;
- spin_lock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock);
rcu_read_lock();
if (!thread_group_leader(tracee))
tracee = rcu_dereference(tracee->group_leader);
- list_for_each_entry(relation, &ptracer_relations, node)
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) {
+ if (relation->invalid)
+ continue;
if (relation->tracee == tracee) {
parent = relation->tracer;
found = true;
break;
}
+ }
if (found && (parent == NULL || task_is_descendant(parent, tracer)))
rc = 1;
rcu_read_unlock();
- spin_unlock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock);
return rc;
}
OpenPOWER on IntegriCloud