diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/cred.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/ptrace.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/sched/core.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 12 |
4 files changed, 25 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h index ebbed2c..856d262 100644 --- a/include/linux/cred.h +++ b/include/linux/cred.h @@ -357,10 +357,8 @@ static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred) extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns; #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS #define current_user_ns() (current_cred_xxx(user_ns)) -#define task_user_ns(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), user_ns)) #else #define current_user_ns() (&init_user_ns) -#define task_user_ns(task) (&init_user_ns) #endif diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index 1f5e55d..7b09b88 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -215,8 +215,12 @@ ok: smp_rmb(); if (task->mm) dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm); - if (!dumpable && !ptrace_has_cap(task_user_ns(task), mode)) + rcu_read_lock(); + if (!dumpable && !ptrace_has_cap(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, mode)) { + rcu_read_unlock(); return -EPERM; + } + rcu_read_unlock(); return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode); } @@ -280,8 +284,10 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request, if (seize) flags |= PT_SEIZED; - if (ns_capable(task_user_ns(task), CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + rcu_read_lock(); + if (ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) flags |= PT_PTRACE_CAP; + rcu_read_unlock(); task->ptrace = flags; __ptrace_link(task, current); diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c index 2d8927f..2f5eb18 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/core.c +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c @@ -4029,8 +4029,14 @@ long sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, const struct cpumask *in_mask) goto out_free_cpus_allowed; } retval = -EPERM; - if (!check_same_owner(p) && !ns_capable(task_user_ns(p), CAP_SYS_NICE)) - goto out_unlock; + if (!check_same_owner(p)) { + rcu_read_lock(); + if (!ns_capable(__task_cred(p)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE)) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + goto out_unlock; + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + } retval = security_task_setscheduler(p); if (retval) diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c index b4c2984..0e72239 100644 --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c @@ -262,14 +262,18 @@ int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, /* No additional restrictions. */ break; case YAMA_SCOPE_RELATIONAL: + rcu_read_lock(); if (!task_is_descendant(current, child) && !ptracer_exception_found(current, child) && - !ns_capable(task_user_ns(child), CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + !ns_capable(__task_cred(child)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) rc = -EPERM; + rcu_read_unlock(); break; case YAMA_SCOPE_CAPABILITY: - if (!ns_capable(task_user_ns(child), CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + rcu_read_lock(); + if (!ns_capable(__task_cred(child)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) rc = -EPERM; + rcu_read_unlock(); break; case YAMA_SCOPE_NO_ATTACH: default: @@ -307,8 +311,10 @@ int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) /* Only disallow PTRACE_TRACEME on more aggressive settings. */ switch (ptrace_scope) { case YAMA_SCOPE_CAPABILITY: - if (!ns_capable(task_user_ns(parent), CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + rcu_read_lock(); + if (!ns_capable(__task_cred(parent)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) rc = -EPERM; + rcu_read_unlock(); break; case YAMA_SCOPE_NO_ATTACH: rc = -EPERM; |
