diff options
71 files changed, 1034 insertions, 250 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/dns_resolver.txt b/Documentation/networking/dns_resolver.txt index 7f531ad..d86adcd 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/dns_resolver.txt +++ b/Documentation/networking/dns_resolver.txt @@ -102,6 +102,10 @@ implemented in the module can be called after doing: If _expiry is non-NULL, the expiry time (TTL) of the result will be returned also. +The kernel maintains an internal keyring in which it caches looked up keys. +This can be cleared by any process that has the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability by +the use of KEYCTL_KEYRING_CLEAR on the keyring ID. + =============================== READING DNS KEYS FROM USERSPACE diff --git a/Documentation/security/00-INDEX b/Documentation/security/00-INDEX index 99b85d3..eeed1de 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/00-INDEX +++ b/Documentation/security/00-INDEX @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ SELinux.txt - how to get started with the SELinux security enhancement. Smack.txt - documentation on the Smack Linux Security Module. +Yama.txt + - documentation on the Yama Linux Security Module. apparmor.txt - documentation on the AppArmor security extension. credentials.txt diff --git a/Documentation/security/Yama.txt b/Documentation/security/Yama.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a9511f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/Yama.txt @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +Yama is a Linux Security Module that collects a number of system-wide DAC +security protections that are not handled by the core kernel itself. To +select it at boot time, specify "security=yama" (though this will disable +any other LSM). + +Yama is controlled through sysctl in /proc/sys/kernel/yama: + +- ptrace_scope + +============================================================== + +ptrace_scope: + +As Linux grows in popularity, it will become a larger target for +malware. One particularly troubling weakness of the Linux process +interfaces is that a single user is able to examine the memory and +running state of any of their processes. For example, if one application +(e.g. Pidgin) was compromised, it would be possible for an attacker to +attach to other running processes (e.g. Firefox, SSH sessions, GPG agent, +etc) to extract additional credentials and continue to expand the scope +of their attack without resorting to user-assisted phishing. + +This is not a theoretical problem. SSH session hijacking +(http://www.storm.net.nz/projects/7) and arbitrary code injection +(http://c-skills.blogspot.com/2007/05/injectso.html) attacks already +exist and remain possible if ptrace is allowed to operate as before. +Since ptrace is not commonly used by non-developers and non-admins, system +builders should be allowed the option to disable this debugging system. + +For a solution, some applications use prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, ...) to +specifically disallow such ptrace attachment (e.g. ssh-agent), but many +do not. A more general solution is to only allow ptrace directly from a +parent to a child process (i.e. direct "gdb EXE" and "strace EXE" still +work), or with CAP_SYS_PTRACE (i.e. "gdb --pid=PID", and "strace -p PID" +still work as root). + +For software that has defined application-specific relationships +between a debugging process and its inferior (crash handlers, etc), +prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, pid, ...) can be used. An inferior can declare which +other process (and its descendents) are allowed to call PTRACE_ATTACH +against it. Only one such declared debugging process can exists for +each inferior at a time. For example, this is used by KDE, Chromium, and +Firefox's crash handlers, and by Wine for allowing only Wine processes +to ptrace each other. If a process wishes to entirely disable these ptrace +restrictions, it can call prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY, ...) +so that any otherwise allowed process (even those in external pid namespaces) +may attach. + +The sysctl settings are: + +0 - classic ptrace permissions: a process can PTRACE_ATTACH to any other + process running under the same uid, as long as it is dumpable (i.e. + did not transition uids, start privileged, or have called + prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE...) already). + +1 - restricted ptrace: a process must have a predefined relationship + with the inferior it wants to call PTRACE_ATTACH on. By default, + this relationship is that of only its descendants when the above + classic criteria is also met. To change the relationship, an + inferior can call prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, debugger, ...) to declare + an allowed debugger PID to call PTRACE_ATTACH on the inferior. + +The original children-only logic was based on the restrictions in grsecurity. + +============================================================== diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt index fcbe7a7..7877170 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt +++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt @@ -554,6 +554,10 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are: process must have write permission on the keyring, and it must be a keyring (or else error ENOTDIR will result). + This function can also be used to clear special kernel keyrings if they + are appropriately marked if the user has CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. The + DNS resolver cache keyring is an example of this. + (*) Link a key into a keyring: diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig index 7fc75e4..a048199 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig @@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ menuconfig TCG_TPM tristate "TPM Hardware Support" depends on HAS_IOMEM - depends on EXPERIMENTAL select SECURITYFS ---help--- If you have a TPM security chip in your system, which diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c index 32362cf..ad7c732 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c @@ -1221,12 +1221,13 @@ ssize_t tpm_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, ret_size = atomic_read(&chip->data_pending); atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0); if (ret_size > 0) { /* relay data */ + ssize_t orig_ret_size = ret_size; if (size < ret_size) ret_size = size; mutex_lock(&chip->buffer_mutex); rc = copy_to_user(buf, chip->data_buffer, ret_size); - memset(chip->data_buffer, 0, ret_size); + memset(chip->data_buffer, 0, orig_ret_size); if (rc) ret_size = -EFAULT; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index 0105471..b1c5280 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -99,6 +99,8 @@ struct tpm_vendor_specific { wait_queue_head_t int_queue; }; +#define TPM_VID_INTEL 0x8086 + struct tpm_chip { struct device *dev; /* Device stuff */ diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c index 70fac9a..d2a70ca 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c @@ -367,7 +367,12 @@ static int probe_itpm(struct tpm_chip *chip) 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf1 }; size_t len = sizeof(cmd_getticks); - int rem_itpm = itpm; + bool rem_itpm = itpm; + u16 vendor = ioread16(chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_DID_VID(0)); + + /* probe only iTPMS */ + if (vendor != TPM_VID_INTEL) + return 0; itpm = 0; @@ -390,9 +395,6 @@ static int probe_itpm(struct tpm_chip *chip) out: itpm = rem_itpm; tpm_tis_ready(chip); - /* some TPMs need a break here otherwise they will not work - * correctly on the immediately subsequent command */ - msleep(chip->vendor.timeout_b); release_locality(chip, chip->vendor.locality, 0); return rc; @@ -508,7 +510,7 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, resource_size_t start, resource_size_t len, unsigned int irq) { u32 vendor, intfcaps, intmask; - int rc, i, irq_s, irq_e; + int rc, i, irq_s, irq_e, probe; struct tpm_chip *chip; if (!(chip = tpm_register_hardware(dev, &tpm_tis))) @@ -538,11 +540,12 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, resource_size_t start, vendor >> 16, ioread8(chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_RID(0))); if (!itpm) { - itpm = probe_itpm(chip); - if (itpm < 0) { + probe = probe_itpm(chip); + if (probe < 0) { rc = -ENODEV; goto out_err; } + itpm = (probe == 0) ? 0 : 1; } if (itpm) diff --git a/drivers/net/macvtap.c b/drivers/net/macvtap.c index 58dc117..0427c65 100644 --- a/drivers/net/macvtap.c +++ b/drivers/net/macvtap.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/wait.h> #include <linux/cdev.h> +#include <linux/idr.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c index 501b27c..1c6f700 100644 --- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c +++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include <linux/crypto.h> #include <linux/completion.h> #include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/idr.h> #include <asm/unaligned.h> #include <scsi/scsi_device.h> #include <scsi/iscsi_proto.h> diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c index 38cb7ce..1ee33a8 100644 --- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c +++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/crypto.h> +#include <linux/idr.h> #include <scsi/iscsi_proto.h> #include <target/target_core_base.h> #include <target/target_core_fabric.h> diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c index c1b2544..3cc1b25 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c @@ -556,6 +556,7 @@ init_cifs_idmap(void) /* instruct request_key() to use this special keyring as a cache for * the results it looks up */ + set_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR, &keyring->flags); cred->thread_keyring = keyring; cred->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING; root_cred = cred; diff --git a/fs/nfs/client.c b/fs/nfs/client.c index 31778f7..d4f772e 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/client.c +++ b/fs/nfs/client.c @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ #include <linux/inet.h> #include <linux/in6.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/idr.h> #include <net/ipv6.h> #include <linux/nfs_xdr.h> #include <linux/sunrpc/bc_xprt.h> diff --git a/fs/nfs/idmap.c b/fs/nfs/idmap.c index 2c05f19..a1bbf77 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/idmap.c +++ b/fs/nfs/idmap.c @@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ int nfs_idmap_init(void) if (ret < 0) goto failed_put_key; + set_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR, &keyring->flags); cred->thread_keyring = keyring; cred->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING; id_resolver_cache = cred; diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c index a6b6217..67bbf6e 100644 --- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c +++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c @@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ #include <linux/poll.h> #include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/namei.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> #include "internal.h" static const struct dentry_operations proc_sys_dentry_operations; diff --git a/fs/quota/dquot.c b/fs/quota/dquot.c index 4674197..8b4f12b 100644 --- a/fs/quota/dquot.c +++ b/fs/quota/dquot.c @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/kmod.h> #include <linux/namei.h> #include <linux/capability.h> @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ #include <linux/backing-dev.h> #include <linux/rculist_bl.h> #include <linux/cleancache.h> +#include <linux/fsnotify.h> #include "internal.h" diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h index 5253471..1600ebf 100644 --- a/include/linux/key.h +++ b/include/linux/key.h @@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ struct key { #define KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA 3 /* set if key consumes quota */ #define KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT 4 /* set if key is being constructed in userspace */ #define KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE 5 /* set if key is negative */ +#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR 6 /* set if key can be cleared by root without permission */ /* the description string * - this is used to match a key against search criteria diff --git a/include/linux/prctl.h b/include/linux/prctl.h index 7ddc7f1..a0413ac 100644 --- a/include/linux/prctl.h +++ b/include/linux/prctl.h @@ -114,4 +114,11 @@ # define PR_SET_MM_START_BRK 6 # define PR_SET_MM_BRK 7 +/* + * Set specific pid that is allowed to ptrace the current task. + * A value of 0 mean "no process". + */ +#define PR_SET_PTRACER 0x59616d61 +# define PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY ((unsigned long)-1) + #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index c894938..673afbb 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -22,22 +22,36 @@ #ifndef __LINUX_SECURITY_H #define __LINUX_SECURITY_H -#include <linux/fs.h> -#include <linux/fsnotify.h> -#include <linux/binfmts.h> -#include <linux/dcache.h> -#include <linux/signal.h> -#include <linux/resource.h> -#include <linux/sem.h> -#include <linux/shm.h> -#include <linux/mm.h> /* PAGE_ALIGN */ -#include <linux/msg.h> -#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/key.h> -#include <linux/xfrm.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/slab.h> -#include <linux/xattr.h> -#include <net/flow.h> +#include <linux/err.h> + +struct linux_binprm; +struct cred; +struct rlimit; +struct siginfo; +struct sem_array; +struct sembuf; +struct kern_ipc_perm; +struct audit_context; +struct super_block; +struct inode; +struct dentry; +struct file; +struct vfsmount; +struct path; +struct qstr; +struct nameidata; +struct iattr; +struct fown_struct; +struct file_operations; +struct shmid_kernel; +struct msg_msg; +struct msg_queue; +struct xattr; +struct xfrm_sec_ctx; +struct mm_struct; /* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */ #define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10 @@ -49,6 +63,7 @@ struct ctl_table; struct audit_krule; struct user_namespace; +struct timezone; /* * These functions are in security/capability.c and are used @@ -131,18 +146,6 @@ struct request_sock; #define LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP 4 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU -/* - * If a hint addr is less than mmap_min_addr change hint to be as - * low as possible but still greater than mmap_min_addr - */ -static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint) -{ - hint &= PAGE_MASK; - if (((void *)hint != NULL) && - (hint < mmap_min_addr)) - return PAGE_ALIGN(mmap_min_addr); - return hint; -} extern int mmap_min_addr_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); #endif @@ -651,6 +654,10 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * manual page for definitions of the @clone_flags. * @clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared. * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @task_free: + * @task task being freed + * Handle release of task-related resources. (Note that this can be called + * from interrupt context.) * @cred_alloc_blank: * @cred points to the credentials. * @gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations. @@ -1493,6 +1500,7 @@ struct security_operations { int (*dentry_open) (struct file *file, const struct cred *cred); int (*task_create) (unsigned long clone_flags); + void (*task_free) (struct task_struct *task); int (*cred_alloc_blank) (struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp); void (*cred_free) (struct cred *cred); int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, @@ -1674,9 +1682,7 @@ int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb); int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry); int security_syslog(int type); int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz); -int security_vm_enough_memory(long pages); int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages); -int security_vm_enough_memory_kern(long pages); int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); @@ -1752,6 +1758,7 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, int security_file_receive(struct file *file); int security_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred); int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags); +void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task); int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp); void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred); int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp); @@ -1896,25 +1903,11 @@ static inline int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts, return cap_settime(ts, tz); } -static inline int security_vm_enough_memory(long pages) -{ - WARN_ON(current->mm == NULL); - return cap_vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages); -} - static inline int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { - WARN_ON(mm == NULL); return cap_vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); } -static inline int security_vm_enough_memory_kern(long pages) -{ - /* If current->mm is a kernel thread then we will pass NULL, - for this specific case that is fine */ - return cap_vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages); -} - static inline int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { return cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm); @@ -2245,6 +2238,9 @@ static inline int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) return 0; } +static inline void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) +{ } + static inline int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) { return 0; diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h index f84be9e..04bc0b3 100644 --- a/include/net/sock.h +++ b/include/net/sock.h @@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ #include <linux/memcontrol.h> #include <linux/res_counter.h> #include <linux/static_key.h> +#include <linux/aio.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/filter.h> #include <linux/rculist_nulls.h> diff --git a/ipc/msgutil.c b/ipc/msgutil.c index 5652101..26143d3 100644 --- a/ipc/msgutil.c +++ b/ipc/msgutil.c @@ -13,7 +13,9 @@ #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/ipc.h> +#include <linux/msg.h> #include <linux/ipc_namespace.h> +#include <linux/utsname.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include "util.h" diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c index 5791612..97b36ee 100644 --- a/kernel/cred.c +++ b/kernel/cred.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/keyctl.h> #include <linux/init_task.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/binfmts.h> #include <linux/cn_proc.h> #if 0 diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c index 0ed15fe..7ad335c 100644 --- a/kernel/exit.c +++ b/kernel/exit.c @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ #include <linux/hw_breakpoint.h> #include <linux/oom.h> #include <linux/writeback.h> +#include <linux/shm.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/unistd.h> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index c4f38a8..26a7138 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -193,6 +193,7 @@ void __put_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk) WARN_ON(atomic_read(&tsk->usage)); WARN_ON(tsk == current); + security_task_free(tsk); exit_creds(tsk); delayacct_tsk_free(tsk); put_signal_struct(tsk->signal); @@ -355,7 +356,7 @@ static int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm) charge = 0; if (mpnt->vm_flags & VM_ACCOUNT) { unsigned int len = (mpnt->vm_end - mpnt->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT; - if (security_vm_enough_memory(len)) + if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm(oldmm, len)) /* sic */ goto fail_nomem; charge = len; } diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c index a35cb8db..503d642 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/core.c +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ #include <linux/ftrace.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/init_task.h> +#include <linux/binfmts.h> #include <asm/tlb.h> #include <asm/irq_regs.h> diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index f487f25..11d5304 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ #include <linux/oom.h> #include <linux/kmod.h> #include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/binfmts.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/processor.h> @@ -936,6 +936,19 @@ void vm_stat_account(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags, #endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */ /* + * If a hint addr is less than mmap_min_addr change hint to be as + * low as possible but still greater than mmap_min_addr + */ +static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint) +{ + hint &= PAGE_MASK; + if (((void *)hint != NULL) && + (hint < mmap_min_addr)) + return PAGE_ALIGN(mmap_min_addr); + return hint; +} + +/* * The caller must hold down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem). */ @@ -1235,7 +1248,7 @@ munmap_back: */ if (accountable_mapping(file, vm_flags)) { charged = len >> PAGE_SHIFT; - if (security_vm_enough_memory(charged)) + if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm(mm, charged)) return -ENOMEM; vm_flags |= VM_ACCOUNT; } @@ -2180,7 +2193,7 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len) if (mm->map_count > sysctl_max_map_count) return -ENOMEM; - if (security_vm_enough_memory(len >> PAGE_SHIFT)) + if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm(mm, len >> PAGE_SHIFT)) return -ENOMEM; /* Can we just expand an old private anonymous mapping? */ diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c index f437d05..142ef4a 100644 --- a/mm/mprotect.c +++ b/mm/mprotect.c @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, if (!(oldflags & (VM_ACCOUNT|VM_WRITE|VM_HUGETLB| VM_SHARED|VM_NORESERVE))) { charged = nrpages; - if (security_vm_enough_memory(charged)) + if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm(mm, charged)) return -ENOMEM; newflags |= VM_ACCOUNT; } diff --git a/mm/mremap.c b/mm/mremap.c index 87bb839..db8d983 100644 --- a/mm/mremap.c +++ b/mm/mremap.c @@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ static struct vm_area_struct *vma_to_resize(unsigned long addr, if (vma->vm_flags & VM_ACCOUNT) { unsigned long charged = (new_len - old_len) >> PAGE_SHIFT; - if (security_vm_enough_memory(charged)) + if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm(mm, charged)) goto Efault; *p = charged; } @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static inline struct shmem_sb_info *SHMEM_SB(struct super_block *sb) static inline int shmem_acct_size(unsigned long flags, loff_t size) { return (flags & VM_NORESERVE) ? - 0 : security_vm_enough_memory_kern(VM_ACCT(size)); + 0 : security_vm_enough_memory_mm(current->mm, VM_ACCT(size)); } static inline void shmem_unacct_size(unsigned long flags, loff_t size) @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static inline void shmem_unacct_size(unsigned long flags, loff_t size) static inline int shmem_acct_block(unsigned long flags) { return (flags & VM_NORESERVE) ? - security_vm_enough_memory_kern(VM_ACCT(PAGE_CACHE_SIZE)) : 0; + security_vm_enough_memory_mm(current->mm, VM_ACCT(PAGE_CACHE_SIZE)) : 0; } static inline void shmem_unacct_blocks(unsigned long flags, long pages) diff --git a/mm/swapfile.c b/mm/swapfile.c index 00a962c..6bf67ab 100644 --- a/mm/swapfile.c +++ b/mm/swapfile.c @@ -1563,6 +1563,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(swapoff, const char __user *, specialfile) if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; + BUG_ON(!current->mm); + pathname = getname(specialfile); err = PTR_ERR(pathname); if (IS_ERR(pathname)) @@ -1590,7 +1592,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(swapoff, const char __user *, specialfile) spin_unlock(&swap_lock); goto out_dput; } - if (!security_vm_enough_memory(p->pages)) + if (!security_vm_enough_memory_mm(current->mm, p->pages)) vm_unacct_memory(p->pages); else { err = -ENOMEM; diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c index fa000d2..c73bba3 100644 --- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c +++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c @@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ static int __init init_dns_resolver(void) /* instruct request_key() to use this special keyring as a cache for * the results it looks up */ + set_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR, &keyring->flags); cred->thread_keyring = keyring; cred->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING; dns_resolver_cache = cred; diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 51bd5a0..ccc61f8 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig source security/smack/Kconfig source security/tomoyo/Kconfig source security/apparmor/Kconfig +source security/yama/Kconfig source security/integrity/Kconfig @@ -196,6 +197,7 @@ choice default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY_YAMA default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC help @@ -214,6 +216,9 @@ choice config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA + bool "Yama" if SECURITY_YAMA=y + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls" @@ -225,6 +230,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + default "yama" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC endmenu diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index a5e502f..c26c81e 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama # always enable default capabilities obj-y += commoncap.o @@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/built-in.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o # Object integrity file lists diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile index 2dafe50..806bd19 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h # to # [1] = "dac_override", quiet_cmd_make-caps = GEN $@ -cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\ +cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *const capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\ sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e '/CAP_FS_MASK/d' \ -e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\ echo "};" >> $@ @@ -28,25 +28,38 @@ cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\ # [RLIMIT_STACK] = "stack", # # and build a second integer table (with the second sed cmd), that maps -# RLIMIT defines to the order defined in asm-generic/resource.h Thi is +# RLIMIT defines to the order defined in asm-generic/resource.h This is # required by policy load to map policy ordering of RLIMITs to internal # ordering for architectures that redefine an RLIMIT. # Transforms lines from # #define RLIMIT_STACK 3 /* max stack size */ # to # RLIMIT_STACK, +# +# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping. +# Transforms lines from +# #define RLIMIT_FSIZE 1 /* Maximum filesize */ +# #define RLIMIT_STACK 3 /* max stack size */ +# to +# #define AA_FS_RLIMIT_MASK "fsize stack" quiet_cmd_make-rlim = GEN $@ -cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ;\ +cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \ + > $@ ;\ sed $< >> $@ -r -n \ -e 's/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_([A-Z0-9_]+)).*/[\1] = "\L\2",/p';\ echo "};" >> $@ ;\ - echo "static const int rlim_map[] = {" >> $@ ;\ + echo "static const int rlim_map[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" >> $@ ;\ sed -r -n "s/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]+).*/\1,/p" $< >> $@ ;\ - echo "};" >> $@ + echo "};" >> $@ ; \ + echo -n '\#define AA_FS_RLIMIT_MASK "' >> $@ ;\ + sed -r -n 's/^\# ?define[ \t]+RLIMIT_([A-Z0-9_]+).*/\L\1/p' $< | \ + tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@ $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h -$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h +$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \ + $(src)/Makefile $(call cmd,make-caps) -$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h +$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h \ + $(src)/Makefile $(call cmd,make-rlim) diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index e39df6d..16c15ec 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -18,12 +18,14 @@ #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/namei.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> #include "include/apparmor.h" #include "include/apparmorfs.h" #include "include/audit.h" #include "include/context.h" #include "include/policy.h" +#include "include/resource.h" /** * aa_simple_write_to_buffer - common routine for getting policy from user @@ -142,38 +144,166 @@ static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profile_remove = { .llseek = default_llseek, }; -/** Base file system setup **/ +static int aa_fs_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) +{ + struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file = seq->private; + + if (!fs_file) + return 0; -static struct dentry *aa_fs_dentry __initdata; + switch (fs_file->v_type) { + case AA_FS_TYPE_BOOLEAN: + seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", fs_file->v.boolean ? "yes" : "no"); + break; + case AA_FS_TYPE_STRING: + seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", fs_file->v.string); + break; + case AA_FS_TYPE_U64: + seq_printf(seq, "%#08lx\n", fs_file->v.u64); + break; + default: + /* Ignore unpritable entry types. */ + break; + } + + return 0; +} -static void __init aafs_remove(const char *name) +static int aa_fs_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { - struct dentry *dentry; + return single_open(file, aa_fs_seq_show, inode->i_private); +} + +const struct file_operations aa_fs_seq_file_ops = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .open = aa_fs_seq_open, + .read = seq_read, + .llseek = seq_lseek, + .release = single_release, +}; + +/** Base file system setup **/ + +static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_file[] = { + AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", "create read write exec append mmap_exec " \ + "link lock"), + { } +}; - dentry = lookup_one_len(name, aa_fs_dentry, strlen(name)); - if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) { - securityfs_remove(dentry); - dput(dentry); +static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = { + AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hat", 1), + AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hatv", 1), + AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_onexec", 1), + AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_profile", 1), + { } +}; + +static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = { + AA_FS_DIR("domain", aa_fs_entry_domain), + AA_FS_DIR("file", aa_fs_entry_file), + AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK), + AA_FS_DIR("rlimit", aa_fs_entry_rlimit), + { } +}; + +static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_apparmor[] = { + AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".load", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_load), + AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".replace", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_replace), + AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".remove", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_remove), + AA_FS_DIR("features", aa_fs_entry_features), + { } +}; + +static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry = + AA_FS_DIR("apparmor", aa_fs_entry_apparmor); + +/** + * aafs_create_file - create a file entry in the apparmor securityfs + * @fs_file: aa_fs_entry to build an entry for (NOT NULL) + * @parent: the parent dentry in the securityfs + * + * Use aafs_remove_file to remove entries created with this fn. + */ +static int __init aafs_create_file(struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file, + struct dentry *parent) +{ + int error = 0; + + fs_file->dentry = securityfs_create_file(fs_file->name, + S_IFREG | fs_file->mode, + parent, fs_file, + fs_file->file_ops); + if (IS_ERR(fs_file->dentry)) { + error = PTR_ERR(fs_file->dentry); + fs_file->dentry = NULL; } + return error; } /** - * aafs_create - create an entry in the apparmor filesystem - * @name: name of the entry (NOT NULL) - * @mask: file permission mask of the file - * @fops: file operations for the file (NOT NULL) + * aafs_create_dir - recursively create a directory entry in the securityfs + * @fs_dir: aa_fs_entry (and all child entries) to build (NOT NULL) + * @parent: the parent dentry in the securityfs * - * Used aafs_remove to remove entries created with this fn. + * Use aafs_remove_dir to remove entries created with this fn. */ -static int __init aafs_create(const char *name, umode_t mask, - const struct file_operations *fops) +static int __init aafs_create_dir(struct aa_fs_entry *fs_dir, + struct dentry *parent) { - struct dentry *dentry; + int error; + struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file; - dentry = securityfs_create_file(name, S_IFREG | mask, aa_fs_dentry, - NULL, fops); + fs_dir->dentry = securityfs_create_dir(fs_dir->name, parent); + if (IS_ERR(fs_dir->dentry)) { + error = PTR_ERR(fs_dir->dentry); + fs_dir->dentry = NULL; + goto failed; + } - return IS_ERR(dentry) ? PTR_ERR(dentry) : 0; + for (fs_file = fs_dir->v.files; fs_file->name; ++fs_file) { + if (fs_file->v_type == AA_FS_TYPE_DIR) + error = aafs_create_dir(fs_file, fs_dir->dentry); + else + error = aafs_create_file(fs_file, fs_dir->dentry); + if (error) + goto failed; + } + + return 0; + +failed: + return error; +} + +/** + * aafs_remove_file - drop a single file entry in the apparmor securityfs + * @fs_file: aa_fs_entry to detach from the securityfs (NOT NULL) + */ +static void __init aafs_remove_file(struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file) +{ + if (!fs_file->dentry) + return; + + securityfs_remove(fs_file->dentry); + fs_file->dentry = NULL; +} + +/** + * aafs_remove_dir - recursively drop a directory entry from the securityfs + * @fs_dir: aa_fs_entry (and all child entries) to detach (NOT NULL) + */ +static void __init aafs_remove_dir(struct aa_fs_entry *fs_dir) +{ + struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file; + + for (fs_file = fs_dir->v.files; fs_file->name; ++fs_file) { + if (fs_file->v_type == AA_FS_TYPE_DIR) + aafs_remove_dir(fs_file); + else + aafs_remove_file(fs_file); + } + + aafs_remove_file(fs_dir); } /** @@ -183,14 +313,7 @@ static int __init aafs_create(const char *name, umode_t mask, */ void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void) { - if (aa_fs_dentry) { - aafs_remove(".remove"); - aafs_remove(".replace"); - aafs_remove(".load"); - - securityfs_remove(aa_fs_dentry); - aa_fs_dentry = NULL; - } + aafs_remove_dir(&aa_fs_entry); } /** @@ -207,25 +330,13 @@ static int __init aa_create_aafs(void) if (!apparmor_initialized) return 0; - if (aa_fs_dentry) { + if (aa_fs_entry.dentry) { AA_ERROR("%s: AppArmor securityfs already exists\n", __func__); return -EEXIST; } - aa_fs_dentry = securityfs_create_dir("apparmor", NULL); - if (IS_ERR(aa_fs_dentry)) { - error = PTR_ERR(aa_fs_dentry); - aa_fs_dentry = NULL; - goto error; - } - - error = aafs_create(".load", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_load); - if (error) - goto error; - error = aafs_create(".replace", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_replace); - if (error) - goto error; - error = aafs_create(".remove", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_remove); + /* Populate fs tree. */ + error = aafs_create_dir(&aa_fs_entry, NULL); if (error) goto error; diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index f3fafed..5ff6777 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ #include "include/audit.h" #include "include/policy.h" -const char *op_table[] = { +const char *const op_table[] = { "null", "sysctl", @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ const char *op_table[] = { "profile_remove" }; -const char *audit_mode_names[] = { +const char *const audit_mode_names[] = { "normal", "quiet_denied", "quiet", @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ const char *audit_mode_names[] = { "all" }; -static char *aa_audit_type[] = { +static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = { "AUDIT", "ALLOWED", "DENIED", @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static char *aa_audit_type[] = { "STATUS", "ERROR", "KILLED" + "AUTO" }; /* diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index c1e18ba..7c69599 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -372,13 +372,12 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) state = profile->file.start; /* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */ - error = aa_get_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, &buffer, - &name); + error = aa_path_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, &buffer, + &name, &info); if (error) { if (profile->flags & (PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR | PFLAG_UNCONFINED)) error = 0; - info = "Exec failed name resolution"; name = bprm->filename; goto audit; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c index 7312db7..3022c0f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/file.c +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -173,8 +173,6 @@ static u32 map_old_perms(u32 old) if (old & 0x40) /* AA_EXEC_MMAP */ new |= AA_EXEC_MMAP; - new |= AA_MAY_META_READ; - return new; } @@ -212,6 +210,7 @@ static struct file_perms compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state)); perms.xindex = dfa_other_xindex(dfa, state); } + perms.allow |= AA_MAY_META_READ; /* change_profile wasn't determined by ownership in old mapping */ if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x80000000) @@ -279,22 +278,16 @@ int aa_path_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, int error; flags |= profile->path_flags | (S_ISDIR(cond->mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0); - error = aa_get_name(path, flags, &buffer, &name); + error = aa_path_name(path, flags, &buffer, &name, &info); if (error) { if (error == -ENOENT && is_deleted(path->dentry)) { /* Access to open files that are deleted are * give a pass (implicit delegation) */ error = 0; + info = NULL; perms.allow = request; - } else if (error == -ENOENT) - info = "Failed name lookup - deleted entry"; - else if (error == -ESTALE) - info = "Failed name lookup - disconnected path"; - else if (error == -ENAMETOOLONG) - info = "Failed name lookup - name too long"; - else - info = "Failed name lookup"; + } } else { aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, name, cond, &perms); @@ -365,12 +358,14 @@ int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry, lperms = nullperms; /* buffer freed below, lname is pointer in buffer */ - error = aa_get_name(&link, profile->path_flags, &buffer, &lname); + error = aa_path_name(&link, profile->path_flags, &buffer, &lname, + &info); if (error) goto audit; /* buffer2 freed below, tname is pointer in buffer2 */ - error = aa_get_name(&target, profile->path_flags, &buffer2, &tname); + error = aa_path_name(&target, profile->path_flags, &buffer2, &tname, + &info); if (error) goto audit; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h index df36495..40aedd9 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h @@ -19,6 +19,19 @@ #include "match.h" +/* + * Class of mediation types in the AppArmor policy db + */ +#define AA_CLASS_ENTRY 0 +#define AA_CLASS_UNKNOWN 1 +#define AA_CLASS_FILE 2 +#define AA_CLASS_CAP 3 +#define AA_CLASS_NET 4 +#define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS 5 +#define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN 6 + +#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DOMAIN + /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */ extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; extern bool aa_g_audit_header; @@ -81,7 +94,7 @@ static inline unsigned int aa_dfa_null_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start) { /* the null transition only needs the string's null terminator byte */ - return aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, start, "", 1); + return aa_dfa_next(dfa, start, 0); } static inline bool mediated_filesystem(struct inode *inode) diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h index cb1e93a..7ea4769 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h @@ -15,6 +15,50 @@ #ifndef __AA_APPARMORFS_H #define __AA_APPARMORFS_H +enum aa_fs_type { + AA_FS_TYPE_BOOLEAN, + AA_FS_TYPE_STRING, + AA_FS_TYPE_U64, + AA_FS_TYPE_FOPS, + AA_FS_TYPE_DIR, +}; + +struct aa_fs_entry; + +struct aa_fs_entry { + const char *name; + struct dentry *dentry; + umode_t mode; + enum aa_fs_type v_type; + union { + bool boolean; + char *string; + unsigned long u64; + struct aa_fs_entry *files; + } v; + const struct file_operations *file_ops; +}; + +extern const struct file_operations aa_fs_seq_file_ops; + +#define AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN(_name, _value) \ + { .name = (_name), .mode = 0444, \ + .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_BOOLEAN, .v.boolean = (_value), \ + .file_ops = &aa_fs_seq_file_ops } +#define AA_FS_FILE_STRING(_name, _value) \ + { .name = (_name), .mode = 0444, \ + .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_STRING, .v.string = (_value), \ + .file_ops = &aa_fs_seq_file_ops } +#define AA_FS_FILE_U64(_name, _value) \ + { .name = (_name), .mode = 0444, \ + .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_U64, .v.u64 = (_value), \ + .file_ops = &aa_fs_seq_file_ops } +#define AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(_name, _mode, _fops) \ + { .name = (_name), .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_FOPS, \ + .mode = (_mode), .file_ops = (_fops) } +#define AA_FS_DIR(_name, _value) \ + { .name = (_name), .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_DIR, .v.files = (_value) } + extern void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void); #endif /* __AA_APPARMORFS_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index 1951786..4ba78c2 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -25,11 +25,9 @@ struct aa_profile; -extern const char *audit_mode_names[]; +extern const char *const audit_mode_names[]; #define AUDIT_MAX_INDEX 5 -#define AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO 0 /* auto choose audit message type */ - enum audit_mode { AUDIT_NORMAL, /* follow normal auditing of accesses */ AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED, /* quiet all denied access messages */ @@ -45,10 +43,11 @@ enum audit_type { AUDIT_APPARMOR_HINT, AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR, - AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL + AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL, + AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO }; -extern const char *op_table[]; +extern const char *const op_table[]; enum aa_ops { OP_NULL, diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h index ab8c6d8..f98fd47 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static inline u16 dfa_map_xindex(u16 mask) index |= AA_X_NAME; } else if (old_index == 3) { index |= AA_X_NAME | AA_X_CHILD; - } else { + } else if (old_index) { index |= AA_X_TABLE; index |= old_index - 4; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h index a4a8639..775843e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h @@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, const char *str, int len); unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, const char *str); +unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, + const char c); + void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref); /** diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/path.h b/security/apparmor/include/path.h index 27b327a..286ac75 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/path.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/path.h @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum path_flags { PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED = 0x10000, /* mediate deleted paths */ }; -int aa_get_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name); +int aa_path_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, + const char **name, const char **info); #endif /* __AA_PATH_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h index aeda5cf..bda4569 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ #include "file.h" #include "resource.h" -extern const char *profile_mode_names[]; +extern const char *const profile_mode_names[]; #define APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX 3 #define COMPLAIN_MODE(_profile) \ @@ -129,6 +129,17 @@ struct aa_namespace { struct list_head sub_ns; }; +/* struct aa_policydb - match engine for a policy + * dfa: dfa pattern match + * start: set of start states for the different classes of data + */ +struct aa_policydb { + /* Generic policy DFA specific rule types will be subsections of it */ + struct aa_dfa *dfa; + unsigned int start[AA_CLASS_LAST + 1]; + +}; + /* struct aa_profile - basic confinement data * @base - base components of the profile (name, refcount, lists, lock ...) * @parent: parent of profile @@ -143,6 +154,7 @@ struct aa_namespace { * @flags: flags controlling profile behavior * @path_flags: flags controlling path generation behavior * @size: the memory consumed by this profiles rules + * @policy: general match rules governing policy * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions * @caps: capabilities for the profile * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile @@ -179,6 +191,7 @@ struct aa_profile { u32 path_flags; int size; + struct aa_policydb policy; struct aa_file_rules file; struct aa_caps caps; struct aa_rlimit rlimits; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/resource.h b/security/apparmor/include/resource.h index 02baec7..d3f4cf0 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/resource.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/resource.h @@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ #include <linux/resource.h> #include <linux/sched.h> +#include "apparmorfs.h" + struct aa_profile; /* struct aa_rlimit - rlimit settings for the profile @@ -32,6 +34,8 @@ struct aa_rlimit { struct rlimit limits[RLIM_NLIMITS]; }; +extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_rlimit[]; + int aa_map_resource(int resource); int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *, unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim); diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c index 94de6b4..90971a8 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/match.c +++ b/security/apparmor/match.c @@ -335,12 +335,12 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, } /** - * aa_dfa_next_state - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at + * aa_dfa_match - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against (NOT NULL) * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL) * - * aa_dfa_next_state will match @str against the dfa and return the state it + * aa_dfa_match will match @str against the dfa and return the state it * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting * label, or as the start state of a continuing match. * @@ -349,5 +349,79 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, const char *str) { - return aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, start, str, strlen(str)); + u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa); + u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa); + u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa); + u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa); + unsigned int state = start, pos; + + if (state == 0) + return 0; + + /* current state is <state>, matching character *str */ + if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) { + /* Equivalence class table defined */ + u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa); + /* default is direct to next state */ + while (*str) { + pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) *str++]; + if (check[pos] == state) + state = next[pos]; + else + state = def[state]; + } + } else { + /* default is direct to next state */ + while (*str) { + pos = base[state] + (u8) *str++; + if (check[pos] == state) + state = next[pos]; + else + state = def[state]; + } + } + + return state; +} + +/** + * aa_dfa_next - step one character to the next state in the dfa + * @dfa: the dfa to tranverse (NOT NULL) + * @state: the state to start in + * @c: the input character to transition on + * + * aa_dfa_match will step through the dfa by one input character @c + * + * Returns: state reach after input @c + */ +unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, + const char c) +{ + u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa); + u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa); + u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa); + u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa); + unsigned int pos; + + /* current state is <state>, matching character *str */ + if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) { + /* Equivalence class table defined */ + u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa); + /* default is direct to next state */ + + pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) c]; + if (check[pos] == state) + state = next[pos]; + else + state = def[state]; + } else { + /* default is direct to next state */ + pos = base[state] + (u8) c; + if (check[pos] == state) + state = next[pos]; + else + state = def[state]; + } + + return state; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c index 9d070a7..2daeea4 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/path.c +++ b/security/apparmor/path.c @@ -83,31 +83,29 @@ static int d_namespace_path(struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen, struct path root; get_fs_root(current->fs, &root); res = __d_path(path, &root, buf, buflen); - if (res && !IS_ERR(res)) { - /* everything's fine */ - *name = res; - path_put(&root); - goto ok; - } path_put(&root); - connected = 0; + } else { + res = d_absolute_path(path, buf, buflen); + if (!our_mnt(path->mnt)) + connected = 0; } - res = d_absolute_path(path, buf, buflen); - - *name = res; /* handle error conditions - and still allow a partial path to * be returned. */ - if (IS_ERR(res)) { - error = PTR_ERR(res); - *name = buf; - goto out; - } - if (!our_mnt(path->mnt)) + if (!res || IS_ERR(res)) { connected = 0; + res = dentry_path_raw(path->dentry, buf, buflen); + if (IS_ERR(res)) { + error = PTR_ERR(res); + *name = buf; + goto out; + }; + } else if (!our_mnt(path->mnt)) + connected = 0; + + *name = res; -ok: /* Handle two cases: * 1. A deleted dentry && profile is not allowing mediation of deleted * 2. On some filesystems, newly allocated dentries appear to the @@ -138,7 +136,7 @@ ok: /* disconnected path, don't return pathname starting * with '/' */ - error = -ESTALE; + error = -EACCES; if (*res == '/') *name = res + 1; } @@ -159,7 +157,7 @@ out: * Returns: %0 else error on failure */ static int get_name_to_buffer(struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer, - int size, char **name) + int size, char **name, const char **info) { int adjust = (flags & PATH_IS_DIR) ? 1 : 0; int error = d_namespace_path(path, buffer, size - adjust, name, flags); @@ -171,15 +169,27 @@ static int get_name_to_buffer(struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer, */ strcpy(&buffer[size - 2], "/"); + if (info && error) { + if (error == -ENOENT) + *info = "Failed name lookup - deleted entry"; + else if (error == -ESTALE) + *info = "Failed name lookup - disconnected path"; + else if (error == -ENAMETOOLONG) + *info = "Failed name lookup - name too long"; + else + *info = "Failed name lookup"; + } + return error; } /** - * aa_get_name - compute the pathname of a file + * aa_path_name - compute the pathname of a file * @path: path the file (NOT NULL) * @flags: flags controlling path name generation * @buffer: buffer that aa_get_name() allocated (NOT NULL) * @name: Returns - the generated path name if !error (NOT NULL) + * @info: Returns - information on why the path lookup failed (MAYBE NULL) * * @name is a pointer to the beginning of the pathname (which usually differs * from the beginning of the buffer), or NULL. If there is an error @name @@ -192,7 +202,8 @@ static int get_name_to_buffer(struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer, * * Returns: %0 else error code if could retrieve name */ -int aa_get_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name) +int aa_path_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name, + const char **info) { char *buf, *str = NULL; int size = 256; @@ -206,7 +217,7 @@ int aa_get_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name) if (!buf) return -ENOMEM; - error = get_name_to_buffer(path, flags, buf, size, &str); + error = get_name_to_buffer(path, flags, buf, size, &str, info); if (error != -ENAMETOOLONG) break; @@ -214,6 +225,7 @@ int aa_get_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name) size <<= 1; if (size > aa_g_path_max) return -ENAMETOOLONG; + *info = NULL; } *buffer = buf; *name = str; diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index 4f0eade..9064143 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ /* root profile namespace */ struct aa_namespace *root_ns; -const char *profile_mode_names[] = { +const char *const profile_mode_names[] = { "enforce", "complain", "kill", @@ -749,6 +749,7 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) aa_free_sid(profile->sid); aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch); + aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa); aa_put_profile(profile->replacedby); diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index 741dd13..25fd51e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) * @new: profile if it has been allocated (MAYBE NULL) * @name: name of the profile being manipulated (MAYBE NULL) * @info: any extra info about the failure (MAYBE NULL) - * @e: buffer position info (NOT NULL) + * @e: buffer position info * @error: error code * * Returns: %0 or error @@ -95,7 +95,8 @@ static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *name, struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile(); struct common_audit_data sa; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); - sa.aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start; + if (e) + sa.aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start; sa.aad.iface.target = new; sa.aad.name = name; sa.aad.info = info; @@ -468,7 +469,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e) { struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; const char *name = NULL; - int error = -EPROTO; + int i, error = -EPROTO; kernel_cap_t tmpcap; u32 tmp; @@ -554,11 +555,35 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e) goto fail; if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.extended.cap[1]), NULL)) goto fail; + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) + goto fail; } if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile)) goto fail; + if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) { + /* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */ + profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e); + if (IS_ERR(profile->policy.dfa)) { + error = PTR_ERR(profile->policy.dfa); + profile->policy.dfa = NULL; + goto fail; + } + if (!unpack_u32(e, &profile->policy.start[0], "start")) + /* default start state */ + profile->policy.start[0] = DFA_START; + /* setup class index */ + for (i = AA_CLASS_FILE; i <= AA_CLASS_LAST; i++) { + profile->policy.start[i] = + aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa, + profile->policy.start[0], + i); + } + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) + goto fail; + } + /* get file rules */ profile->file.dfa = unpack_dfa(e); if (IS_ERR(profile->file.dfa)) { diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c index a4136c1..72c25a4f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/resource.c +++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c @@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ */ #include "rlim_names.h" +struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_rlimit[] = { + AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", AA_FS_RLIMIT_MASK), + { } +}; + /* audit callback for resource specific fields */ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 2f680eb..5bb21b1 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -358,6 +358,10 @@ static int cap_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) return 0; } +static void cap_task_free(struct task_struct *task) +{ +} + static int cap_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) { return 0; @@ -954,6 +958,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_open); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_free); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_alloc_blank); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_free); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_prepare); diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 7ce191e..0cf4b53 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include <linux/prctl.h> #include <linux/securebits.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> +#include <linux/binfmts.h> /* * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 4f554f20..35664fe 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ config IMA select CRYPTO_HMAC select CRYPTO_MD5 select CRYPTO_SHA1 - select TCG_TPM if !S390 && !UML - select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM + select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM && !UML + select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86 help The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c index 2ad942f..21e96bf 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c @@ -61,6 +61,6 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id); audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino); } - audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !result ? 0 : 1); + audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !result); audit_log_end(ab); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index d45061d..d8edff2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = { {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC, @@ -417,7 +418,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN)) result = -EINVAL; - audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !!result); + audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result); audit_log_end(ab); return result; } diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 0b3f5d7..6523599 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -388,11 +388,24 @@ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid) keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE); if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) { ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref); + + /* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keyrings */ + if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) + goto error; + if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR, + &key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref)->flags)) + goto clear; + goto error_put; + } + goto error; } +clear: ret = keyring_clear(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref)); - +error_put: key_ref_put(keyring_ref); error: return ret; diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 1068cb1..be7ecb2 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -657,7 +657,8 @@ try_again: goto error; down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem); - if (cred->request_key_auth->flags & KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) { + if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, + &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) { key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED); key = NULL; } else { diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index d754249..bf619ff 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ #include <linux/integrity.h> #include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/evm.h> +#include <linux/fsnotify.h> +#include <net/flow.h> #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2 @@ -187,25 +189,11 @@ int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz) return security_ops->settime(ts, tz); } -int security_vm_enough_memory(long pages) -{ - WARN_ON(current->mm == NULL); - return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages); -} - int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { - WARN_ON(mm == NULL); return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); } -int security_vm_enough_memory_kern(long pages) -{ - /* If current->mm is a kernel thread then we will pass NULL, - for this specific case that is fine */ - return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages); -} - int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { return security_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm); @@ -729,6 +717,11 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags); } +void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) +{ + security_ops->task_free(task); +} + int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) { return security_ops->cred_alloc_blank(cred, gfp); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 6a3683e..3049299 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ #include <linux/syslog.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/msg.h> +#include <linux/shm.h> #include "avc.h" #include "objsec.h" diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index e8af5b0b..cd667b4 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ #include <linux/magic.h> #include <linux/dcache.h> #include <linux/personality.h> +#include <linux/msg.h> +#include <linux/shm.h> +#include <linux/binfmts.h> #include "smack.h" #define task_security(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), security)) diff --git a/security/tomoyo/audit.c b/security/tomoyo/audit.c index 5ca47ea..7ef9fa3 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/audit.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/audit.c @@ -446,11 +446,11 @@ void tomoyo_read_log(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) * tomoyo_poll_log - Wait for an audit log. * * @file: Pointer to "struct file". - * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table". + * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table". Maybe NULL. * * Returns POLLIN | POLLRDNORM when ready to read an audit log. */ -int tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) +unsigned int tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) { if (tomoyo_log_count) return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c index c47d3ce..8656b16 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/common.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c @@ -1069,7 +1069,7 @@ static int tomoyo_write_task(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param) * * @domainname: The name of domain. * - * Returns 0. + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ @@ -1081,7 +1081,7 @@ static int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname) name.name = domainname; tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name); if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) - return 0; + return -EINTR; /* Is there an active domain? */ list_for_each_entry_rcu(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) { /* Never delete tomoyo_kernel_domain */ @@ -1164,15 +1164,16 @@ static int tomoyo_write_domain(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) bool is_select = !is_delete && tomoyo_str_starts(&data, "select "); unsigned int profile; if (*data == '<') { + int ret = 0; domain = NULL; if (is_delete) - tomoyo_delete_domain(data); + ret = tomoyo_delete_domain(data); else if (is_select) domain = tomoyo_find_domain(data); else domain = tomoyo_assign_domain(data, false); head->w.domain = domain; - return 0; + return ret; } if (!domain) return -EINVAL; @@ -2111,7 +2112,7 @@ static struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain_by_qid struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL; spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_query_list, list) { - if (ptr->serial != serial || ptr->answer) + if (ptr->serial != serial) continue; domain = ptr->domain; break; @@ -2130,28 +2131,13 @@ static struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain_by_qid * * Waits for access requests which violated policy in enforcing mode. */ -static int tomoyo_poll_query(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) +static unsigned int tomoyo_poll_query(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) { - struct list_head *tmp; - bool found = false; - u8 i; - for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { - spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); - list_for_each(tmp, &tomoyo_query_list) { - struct tomoyo_query *ptr = - list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list); - if (ptr->answer) - continue; - found = true; - break; - } - spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); - if (found) - return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; - if (i) - break; - poll_wait(file, &tomoyo_query_wait, wait); - } + if (!list_empty(&tomoyo_query_list)) + return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; + poll_wait(file, &tomoyo_query_wait, wait); + if (!list_empty(&tomoyo_query_list)) + return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; return 0; } @@ -2175,8 +2161,6 @@ static void tomoyo_read_query(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); list_for_each(tmp, &tomoyo_query_list) { struct tomoyo_query *ptr = list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list); - if (ptr->answer) - continue; if (pos++ != head->r.query_index) continue; len = ptr->query_len; @@ -2194,8 +2178,6 @@ static void tomoyo_read_query(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); list_for_each(tmp, &tomoyo_query_list) { struct tomoyo_query *ptr = list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list); - if (ptr->answer) - continue; if (pos++ != head->r.query_index) continue; /* @@ -2243,8 +2225,10 @@ static int tomoyo_write_answer(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) struct tomoyo_query *ptr = list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list); if (ptr->serial != serial) continue; - if (!ptr->answer) - ptr->answer = answer; + ptr->answer = answer; + /* Remove from tomoyo_query_list. */ + if (ptr->answer) + list_del_init(&ptr->list); break; } spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); @@ -2477,18 +2461,17 @@ int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file) * tomoyo_poll_control - poll() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. * * @file: Pointer to "struct file". - * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table". + * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table". Maybe NULL. * - * Waits for read readiness. - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query is handled by /usr/sbin/tomoyo-queryd and - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit is handled by /usr/sbin/tomoyo-auditd. + * Returns POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM if ready to read/write, + * POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM otherwise. */ -int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) +unsigned int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) { struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data; - if (!head->poll) - return -ENOSYS; - return head->poll(file, wait); + if (head->poll) + return head->poll(file, wait) | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM; + return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM; } /** diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h index 9512222..30fd983 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/common.h +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h @@ -788,7 +788,7 @@ struct tomoyo_acl_param { struct tomoyo_io_buffer { void (*read) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *); int (*write) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *); - int (*poll) (struct file *file, poll_table *wait); + unsigned int (*poll) (struct file *file, poll_table *wait); /* Exclusive lock for this structure. */ struct mutex io_sem; char __user *read_user_buf; @@ -981,8 +981,8 @@ int tomoyo_path_number_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path, unsigned long number); int tomoyo_path_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path, const char *target); -int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait); -int tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait); +unsigned int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait); +unsigned int tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait); int tomoyo_socket_bind_permission(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int addr_len); int tomoyo_socket_connect_permission(struct socket *sock, diff --git a/security/tomoyo/mount.c b/security/tomoyo/mount.c index bee09d0..fe00cdf 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/mount.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/mount.c @@ -199,30 +199,32 @@ int tomoyo_mount_permission(char *dev_name, struct path *path, if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) { type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_REMOUNT]; flags &= ~MS_REMOUNT; - } - if (flags & MS_MOVE) { - type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE]; - flags &= ~MS_MOVE; - } - if (flags & MS_BIND) { + } else if (flags & MS_BIND) { type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_BIND]; flags &= ~MS_BIND; - } - if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE) { - type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE]; - flags &= ~MS_UNBINDABLE; - } - if (flags & MS_PRIVATE) { + } else if (flags & MS_SHARED) { + if (flags & (MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE)) + return -EINVAL; + type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SHARED]; + flags &= ~MS_SHARED; + } else if (flags & MS_PRIVATE) { + if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE)) + return -EINVAL; type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_PRIVATE]; flags &= ~MS_PRIVATE; - } - if (flags & MS_SLAVE) { + } else if (flags & MS_SLAVE) { + if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_UNBINDABLE)) + return -EINVAL; type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SLAVE]; flags &= ~MS_SLAVE; - } - if (flags & MS_SHARED) { - type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SHARED]; - flags &= ~MS_SHARED; + } else if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE) { + if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE)) + return -EINVAL; + type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE]; + flags &= ~MS_UNBINDABLE; + } else if (flags & MS_MOVE) { + type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE]; + flags &= ~MS_MOVE; } if (!type) type = "<NULL>"; diff --git a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c index 482b2a5..8592f2fc 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c @@ -157,9 +157,10 @@ static int tomoyo_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) * tomoyo_poll - poll() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. * * @file: Pointer to "struct file". - * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table". + * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table". Maybe NULL. * - * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + * Returns POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM if ready to read/write, + * POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM otherwise. */ static unsigned int tomoyo_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) { diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 0000000..51d6709 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/yama/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +config SECURITY_YAMA + bool "Yama support" + depends on SECURITY + select SECURITYFS + select SECURITY_PATH + default n + help + This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional + system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary + access controls. Currently available is ptrace scope restriction. + Further information can be found in Documentation/security/Yama.txt. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. diff --git a/security/yama/Makefile b/security/yama/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8b5e065 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/yama/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) := yama.o + +yama-y := yama_lsm.o diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5737238 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c @@ -0,0 +1,323 @@ +/* + * Yama Linux Security Module + * + * Author: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Canonical, Ltd. + * Copyright (C) 2011 The Chromium OS Authors. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as + * published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + */ + +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/sysctl.h> +#include <linux/ptrace.h> +#include <linux/prctl.h> +#include <linux/ratelimit.h> + +static int ptrace_scope = 1; + +/* describe a ptrace relationship for potential exception */ +struct ptrace_relation { + struct task_struct *tracer; + struct task_struct *tracee; + struct list_head node; +}; + +static LIST_HEAD(ptracer_relations); +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ptracer_relations_lock); + +/** + * yama_ptracer_add - add/replace an exception for this tracer/tracee pair + * @tracer: the task_struct of the process doing the ptrace + * @tracee: the task_struct of the process to be ptraced + * + * Each tracee can have, at most, one tracer registered. Each time this + * is called, the prior registered tracer will be replaced for the tracee. + * + * Returns 0 if relationship was added, -ve on error. + */ +static int yama_ptracer_add(struct task_struct *tracer, + struct task_struct *tracee) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ptrace_relation *added; + struct ptrace_relation *entry, *relation = NULL; + + added = kmalloc(sizeof(*added), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!added) + return -ENOMEM; + + spin_lock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock); + list_for_each_entry(entry, &ptracer_relations, node) + if (entry->tracee == tracee) { + relation = entry; + break; + } + if (!relation) { + relation = added; + relation->tracee = tracee; + list_add(&relation->node, &ptracer_relations); + } + relation->tracer = tracer; + + spin_unlock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock); + if (added != relation) + kfree(added); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * yama_ptracer_del - remove exceptions related to the given tasks + * @tracer: remove any relation where tracer task matches + * @tracee: remove any relation where tracee task matches + */ +static void yama_ptracer_del(struct task_struct *tracer, + struct task_struct *tracee) +{ + struct ptrace_relation *relation, *safe; + + spin_lock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock); + list_for_each_entry_safe(relation, safe, &ptracer_relations, node) + if (relation->tracee == tracee || + (tracer && relation->tracer == tracer)) { + list_del(&relation->node); + kfree(relation); + } + spin_unlock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock); +} + +/** + * yama_task_free - check for task_pid to remove from exception list + * @task: task being removed + */ +static void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task) +{ + yama_ptracer_del(task, task); +} + +/** + * yama_task_prctl - check for Yama-specific prctl operations + * @option: operation + * @arg2: argument + * @arg3: argument + * @arg4: argument + * @arg5: argument + * + * Return 0 on success, -ve on error. -ENOSYS is returned when Yama + * does not handle the given option. + */ +static int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) +{ + int rc; + struct task_struct *myself = current; + + rc = cap_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); + if (rc != -ENOSYS) + return rc; + + switch (option) { + case PR_SET_PTRACER: + /* Since a thread can call prctl(), find the group leader + * before calling _add() or _del() on it, since we want + * process-level granularity of control. The tracer group + * leader checking is handled later when walking the ancestry + * at the time of PTRACE_ATTACH check. + */ + rcu_read_lock(); + if (!thread_group_leader(myself)) + myself = rcu_dereference(myself->group_leader); + get_task_struct(myself); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + if (arg2 == 0) { + yama_ptracer_del(NULL, myself); + rc = 0; + } else if (arg2 == PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY) { + rc = yama_ptracer_add(NULL, myself); + } else { + struct task_struct *tracer; + + rcu_read_lock(); + tracer = find_task_by_vpid(arg2); + if (tracer) + get_task_struct(tracer); + else + rc = -EINVAL; + rcu_read_unlock(); + + if (tracer) { + rc = yama_ptracer_add(tracer, myself); + put_task_struct(tracer); + } + } + + put_task_struct(myself); + break; + } + + return rc; +} + +/** + * task_is_descendant - walk up a process family tree looking for a match + * @parent: the process to compare against while walking up from child + * @child: the process to start from while looking upwards for parent + * + * Returns 1 if child is a descendant of parent, 0 if not. + */ +static int task_is_descendant(struct task_struct *parent, + struct task_struct *child) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct task_struct *walker = child; + + if (!parent || !child) + return 0; + + rcu_read_lock(); + if (!thread_group_leader(parent)) + parent = rcu_dereference(parent->group_leader); + while (walker->pid > 0) { + if (!thread_group_leader(walker)) + walker = rcu_dereference(walker->group_leader); + if (walker == parent) { + rc = 1; + break; + } + walker = rcu_dereference(walker->real_parent); + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * ptracer_exception_found - tracer registered as exception for this tracee + * @tracer: the task_struct of the process attempting ptrace + * @tracee: the task_struct of the process to be ptraced + * + * Returns 1 if tracer has is ptracer exception ancestor for tracee. + */ +static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer, + struct task_struct *tracee) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ptrace_relation *relation; + struct task_struct *parent = NULL; + bool found = false; + + spin_lock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock); + rcu_read_lock(); + if (!thread_group_leader(tracee)) + tracee = rcu_dereference(tracee->group_leader); + list_for_each_entry(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) + if (relation->tracee == tracee) { + parent = relation->tracer; + found = true; + break; + } + + if (found && (parent == NULL || task_is_descendant(parent, tracer))) + rc = 1; + rcu_read_unlock(); + spin_unlock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * yama_ptrace_access_check - validate PTRACE_ATTACH calls + * @child: task that current task is attempting to ptrace + * @mode: ptrace attach mode + * + * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error. + */ +static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, + unsigned int mode) +{ + int rc; + + /* If standard caps disallows it, so does Yama. We should + * only tighten restrictions further. + */ + rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* require ptrace target be a child of ptracer on attach */ + if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH && + ptrace_scope && + !task_is_descendant(current, child) && + !ptracer_exception_found(current, child) && + !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + rc = -EPERM; + + if (rc) { + char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; + printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE "ptrace of non-child" + " pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n", + child->pid, + get_task_comm(name, current), + current->pid); + } + + return rc; +} + +static struct security_operations yama_ops = { + .name = "yama", + + .ptrace_access_check = yama_ptrace_access_check, + .task_prctl = yama_task_prctl, + .task_free = yama_task_free, +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +static int zero; +static int one = 1; + +struct ctl_path yama_sysctl_path[] = { + { .procname = "kernel", }, + { .procname = "yama", }, + { } +}; + +static struct ctl_table yama_sysctl_table[] = { + { + .procname = "ptrace_scope", + .data = &ptrace_scope, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = &zero, + .extra2 = &one, + }, + { } +}; +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ + +static __init int yama_init(void) +{ + if (!security_module_enable(&yama_ops)) + return 0; + + printk(KERN_INFO "Yama: becoming mindful.\n"); + + if (register_security(&yama_ops)) + panic("Yama: kernel registration failed.\n"); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL + if (!register_sysctl_paths(yama_sysctl_path, yama_sysctl_table)) + panic("Yama: sysctl registration failed.\n"); +#endif + + return 0; +} + +security_initcall(yama_init); |
