diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/crypto_user.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/array.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/capability.h | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/cred.h | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/ptrace.h | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/security.h | 60 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/audit.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/capability.c | 80 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/ptrace.c | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/sched/core.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/core/rtnetlink.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/netlink/genetlink.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/capability.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 24 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 35 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 44 |
24 files changed, 120 insertions, 189 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/crypto_user.c b/crypto/crypto_user.c index 3ba6ef50..16f8693 100644 --- a/crypto/crypto_user.c +++ b/crypto/crypto_user.c @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static int crypto_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) type -= CRYPTO_MSG_BASE; link = &crypto_dispatch[type]; - if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if ((type == (CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG - CRYPTO_MSG_BASE) && diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c index 106be0d..a3cd8ca 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c @@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ pci_read_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, u8 *data = (u8*) buf; /* Several chips lock up trying to read undefined config space */ - if (security_capable(&init_user_ns, filp->f_cred, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) { + if (security_capable(filp->f_cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) { size = dev->cfg_size; } else if (dev->hdr_type == PCI_HEADER_TYPE_CARDBUS) { size = 128; diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c index 44f76e8..c77628a 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ scsi_nl_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb) goto next_msg; } - if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { err = -EPERM; goto next_msg; } diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c index 9252ee3..c602b8d 100644 --- a/fs/proc/array.c +++ b/fs/proc/array.c @@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, state = *get_task_state(task); vsize = eip = esp = 0; - permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ); + permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT); mm = get_task_mm(task); if (mm) { vsize = task_vsize(mm); diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index a63d13d..12d52de 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -380,7 +380,6 @@ struct user_namespace; struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void); extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set; -extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set; extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set; /* @@ -544,9 +543,10 @@ extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap); extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap); +extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, + struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); extern bool capable(int cap); extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); -extern bool task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap); extern bool nsown_capable(int cap); /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h index 4030896..adadf71 100644 --- a/include/linux/cred.h +++ b/include/linux/cred.h @@ -358,10 +358,12 @@ static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred) #define current_security() (current_cred_xxx(security)) #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS -#define current_user_ns() (current_cred_xxx(user_ns)) +#define current_user_ns() (current_cred_xxx(user_ns)) +#define task_user_ns(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), user_ns)) #else extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns; -#define current_user_ns() (&init_user_ns) +#define current_user_ns() (&init_user_ns) +#define task_user_ns(task) (&init_user_ns) #endif diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h index 800f113..a27e56c 100644 --- a/include/linux/ptrace.h +++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h @@ -127,8 +127,9 @@ extern void __ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child, struct task_struct *new_parent); extern void __ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child); extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer); -#define PTRACE_MODE_READ 1 -#define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH 2 +#define PTRACE_MODE_READ 0x01 +#define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH 0x02 +#define PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT 0x04 /* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */ extern int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode); /* Returns true on success, false on denial. */ diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 0ccceb9..83c18e8 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ struct user_namespace; * These functions are in security/capability.c and are used * as the default capabilities functions */ -extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit); +extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, int audit); extern int cap_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz); extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode); extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent); @@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx; struct seq_file; extern int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); -extern int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap); void reset_security_ops(void); @@ -799,12 +798,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * @skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message. * Return 0 if the information was successfully saved and message * is allowed to be transmitted. - * @netlink_recv: - * Check permission before processing the received netlink message in - * @skb. - * @skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message. - * @cap indicates the capability required - * Return 0 if permission is granted. * * Security hooks for Unix domain networking. * @@ -1268,7 +1261,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * @capable: * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated * credentials. - * @tsk contains the task_struct for the process. * @cred contains the credentials to use. * @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in * @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>. @@ -1392,8 +1384,8 @@ struct security_operations { const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted); - int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit); + int (*capable) (const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, int audit); int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb); int (*quota_on) (struct dentry *dentry); int (*syslog) (int type); @@ -1563,7 +1555,6 @@ struct security_operations { struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter); int (*netlink_send) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); - int (*netlink_recv) (struct sk_buff *skb, int cap); void (*d_instantiate) (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode); @@ -1675,12 +1666,10 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted); -int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred, - int cap); -int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, +int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); -int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); +int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap); int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb); int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry); int security_syslog(int type); @@ -1817,7 +1806,6 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode); int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value); int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size); int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); -int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap); int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen); int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid); void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen); @@ -1875,32 +1863,15 @@ static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new, return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted); } -static inline int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, - const struct cred *cred, int cap) -{ - return cap_capable(current, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); -} - -static inline int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) +static inline int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, + struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { - int ret; - - rcu_read_lock(); - ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); - rcu_read_unlock(); - return ret; + return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); } -static inline -int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) -{ - int ret; - - rcu_read_lock(); - ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), ns, cap, - SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); - rcu_read_unlock(); - return ret; +static inline int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, + struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { + return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); } static inline int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, @@ -2517,11 +2488,6 @@ static inline int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) return cap_netlink_send(sk, skb); } -static inline int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap) -{ - return cap_netlink_recv(skb, cap); -} - static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 2c1d6ab..57e3f51 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -601,13 +601,13 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type) case AUDIT_TTY_SET: case AUDIT_TRIM: case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV: - if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) + if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) err = -EPERM; break; case AUDIT_USER: case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG: case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2: - if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE)) + if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE)) err = -EPERM; break; default: /* bad msg */ diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index b463871..0fcf1c1 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -287,74 +287,84 @@ error: } /** - * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns + * has_ns_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns * @t: The task in question + * @ns: target user namespace * @cap: The capability to be tested for * * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability - * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not. + * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not. * * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. */ -bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap) +bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t, + struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { - int ret = security_real_capable(t, &init_user_ns, cap); + int ret; + + rcu_read_lock(); + ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap); + rcu_read_unlock(); return (ret == 0); } /** - * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns + * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns * @t: The task in question - * @ns: target user namespace * @cap: The capability to be tested for * * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability - * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not. + * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not. * * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. */ -bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) +bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap) { - int ret = security_real_capable(t, ns, cap); - - return (ret == 0); + return has_ns_capability(t, &init_user_ns, cap); } /** - * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) + * has_ns_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) + * in a specific user ns. * @t: The task in question + * @ns: target user namespace * @cap: The capability to be tested for * * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability - * currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not. Don't write an - * audit message for the check. + * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not. + * Do not write an audit message for the check. * * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. */ -bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) +bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, + struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { - int ret = security_real_capable_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap); + int ret; + + rcu_read_lock(); + ret = security_capable_noaudit(__task_cred(t), ns, cap); + rcu_read_unlock(); return (ret == 0); } /** - * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect + * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) in the + * initial user ns + * @t: The task in question * @cap: The capability to be tested for * - * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently - * available for use, false if not. + * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability + * currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not. Don't write an + * audit message for the check. * - * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the - * assumption that it's about to be used. + * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. */ -bool capable(int cap) +bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) { - return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap); + return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); /** * ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect @@ -374,7 +384,7 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) BUG(); } - if (security_capable(ns, current_cred(), cap) == 0) { + if (has_ns_capability(current, ns, cap)) { current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; return true; } @@ -383,18 +393,20 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); /** - * task_ns_capable - Determine whether current task has a superior - * capability targeted at a specific task's user namespace. - * @t: The task whose user namespace is targeted. - * @cap: The capability in question. + * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect + * @cap: The capability to be tested for + * + * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently + * available for use, false if not. * - * Return true if it does, false otherwise. + * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the + * assumption that it's about to be used. */ -bool task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap) +bool capable(int cap) { - return ns_capable(task_cred_xxx(t, user)->user_ns, cap); + return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(task_ns_capable); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); /** * nsown_capable - Check superior capability to one's own user_ns diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index 78ab24a..00ab2ca 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -172,6 +172,14 @@ int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state) return ret; } +static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode) +{ + if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) + return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE); + else + return has_ns_capability(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE); +} + int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred; @@ -198,7 +206,7 @@ int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) cred->gid == tcred->sgid && cred->gid == tcred->gid)) goto ok; - if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user->user_ns, mode)) goto ok; rcu_read_unlock(); return -EPERM; @@ -207,7 +215,7 @@ ok: smp_rmb(); if (task->mm) dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm); - if (!dumpable && !task_ns_capable(task, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + if (!dumpable && !ptrace_has_cap(task_user_ns(task), mode)) return -EPERM; return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode); @@ -277,7 +285,7 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request, task->ptrace = PT_PTRACED; if (seize) task->ptrace |= PT_SEIZED; - if (task_ns_capable(task, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + if (ns_capable(task_user_ns(task), CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) task->ptrace |= PT_PTRACE_CAP; __ptrace_link(task, current); diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c index fd7b25e..df00cb0 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/core.c +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c @@ -4330,7 +4330,7 @@ long sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, const struct cpumask *in_mask) goto out_free_cpus_allowed; } retval = -EPERM; - if (!check_same_owner(p) && !task_ns_capable(p, CAP_SYS_NICE)) + if (!check_same_owner(p) && !ns_capable(task_user_ns(p), CAP_SYS_NICE)) goto out_unlock; retval = security_task_setscheduler(p); diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c index dbf2dda..f16444b 100644 --- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c +++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c @@ -1960,7 +1960,7 @@ static int rtnetlink_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) sz_idx = type>>2; kind = type&3; - if (kind != 2 && security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + if (kind != 2 && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (kind == 2 && nlh->nlmsg_flags&NLM_F_DUMP) { diff --git a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c index 69975e0..1531135 100644 --- a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c +++ b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static inline void dnrmg_receive_user_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(*nlh) || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len) return; - if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM); /* Eventually we might send routing messages too */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c index a057fe6..94d45e1 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c @@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ __ipq_rcv_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) if (type <= IPQM_BASE) return; - if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM); spin_lock_bh(&queue_lock); diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c index fb80a23..a34c9e4 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c @@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ __ipq_rcv_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) if (type <= IPQM_BASE) return; - if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM); spin_lock_bh(&queue_lock); diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c index b4f8d84..4d70785 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static int nfnetlink_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) const struct nfnetlink_subsystem *ss; int type, err; - if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; /* All the messages must at least contain nfgenmsg */ diff --git a/net/netlink/genetlink.c b/net/netlink/genetlink.c index a403b61..c29d256 100644 --- a/net/netlink/genetlink.c +++ b/net/netlink/genetlink.c @@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ static int genl_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if ((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) && - security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) { diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index 637f11a..66b84fb 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -2290,7 +2290,7 @@ static int xfrm_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) link = &xfrm_dispatch[type]; /* All operations require privileges, even GET */ - if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if ((type == (XFRM_MSG_GETSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE) || diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 68d50c5..97ce8fa 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -136,16 +136,16 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, return 0; } -static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit) +static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, int audit) { struct aa_profile *profile; /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */ - int error = cap_capable(task, cred, ns, cap, audit); + int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit); if (!error) { profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); if (!unconfined(profile)) - error = aa_capable(task, profile, cap, audit); + error = aa_capable(current, profile, cap, audit); } return error; } diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 3b5883b..2f680eb 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -998,7 +998,6 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semctl); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semop); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, netlink_send); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, netlink_recv); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, d_instantiate); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, getprocattr); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, setprocattr); diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index ee4f848..7ce191e 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -56,17 +56,8 @@ int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) return 0; } -int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap) -{ - if (!cap_raised(current_cap(), cap)) - return -EPERM; - return 0; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv); - /** * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability - * @tsk: The task to query * @cred: The credentials to use * @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability * @cap: The capability to check for @@ -80,8 +71,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv); * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case. */ -int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, - struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit) +int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, + int cap, int audit) { for (;;) { /* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */ @@ -222,9 +213,8 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP * capability */ - if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), - current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP, - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0) + if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user->user_ns, + CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0) return 0; return 1; } @@ -874,7 +864,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, & (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/ || ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/ || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/ - || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), + || (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/ /* @@ -940,7 +930,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { int cap_sys_admin = 0; - if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, + if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0) cap_sys_admin = 1; return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); @@ -967,7 +957,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, int ret = 0; if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { - ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO, + ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */ if (ret == 0) diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 214502c..d754249 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -155,35 +155,16 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, effective, inheritable, permitted); } -int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred, +int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { - return security_ops->capable(current, cred, ns, cap, - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); } -int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, - int cap) +int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap) { - const struct cred *cred; - int ret; - - cred = get_task_cred(tsk); - ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); - put_cred(cred); - return ret; -} - -int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) -{ - const struct cred *cred; - int ret; - - cred = get_task_cred(tsk); - ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); - put_cred(cred); - return ret; + return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); } int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) @@ -994,12 +975,6 @@ int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) return security_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb); } -int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap) -{ - return security_ops->netlink_recv(skb, cap); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_netlink_recv); - int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { return security_ops->secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 7cd4c3a..6a3683e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -1415,8 +1415,7 @@ static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk, #endif /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ -static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk, - const struct cred *cred, +static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, int cap, int audit) { struct common_audit_data ad; @@ -1427,7 +1426,7 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk, int rc; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP); - ad.tsk = tsk; + ad.tsk = current; ad.u.cap = cap; switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) { @@ -1811,7 +1810,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, if (rc) return rc; - if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) { + if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) { u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 csid = task_sid(child); return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL); @@ -1868,16 +1867,16 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook. */ -static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit) +static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, int audit) { int rc; - rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit); + rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit); if (rc) return rc; - return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit); + return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit); } static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) @@ -1954,8 +1953,7 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0; - rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), - &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, + rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); if (rc == 0) cap_sys_admin = 1; @@ -2859,8 +2857,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the * in-core context value, not a denial. */ - error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), - &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, + error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); if (!error) error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context, @@ -2993,8 +2990,8 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, case KDSKBENT: case KDSKBSENT: - error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG, - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG, + SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); break; /* default case assumes that the command will go @@ -4718,24 +4715,6 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb); } -static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability) -{ - int err; - struct common_audit_data ad; - u32 sid; - - err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability); - if (err) - return err; - - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP); - ad.u.cap = capability; - - security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); - return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, - CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad); -} - static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task, struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, u16 sclass) @@ -5464,7 +5443,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory, .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send, - .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv, .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds, .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds, |
