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-rw-r--r--Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt20
-rw-r--r--fs/exec.c23
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/base.c6
-rw-r--r--include/linux/binfmts.h5
-rw-r--r--include/linux/sched.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/sysctl.h1
-rw-r--r--kernel/sys.c22
-rw-r--r--kernel/sysctl.c9
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c2
-rw-r--r--security/dummy.c2
10 files changed, 74 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 3515917..9f11d36 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
- shmmax [ sysv ipc ]
- shmmni
- stop-a [ SPARC only ]
+- suid_dumpable
- sysrq ==> Documentation/sysrq.txt
- tainted
- threads-max
@@ -300,6 +301,25 @@ kernel. This value defaults to SHMMAX.
==============================================================
+suid_dumpable:
+
+This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid
+or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are
+
+0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed
+ privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped
+1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is
+ owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is
+ intended for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked.
+2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped
+ readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove
+ such a dump but not access it directly. For security reasons
+ core dumps in this mode will not overwrite one another or
+ other files. This mode is appropriate when adminstrators are
+ attempting to debug problems in a normal environment.
+
+==============================================================
+
tainted:
Non-zero if the kernel has been tainted. Numeric values, which
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 3a4b35a..4887191 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -58,6 +58,9 @@
int core_uses_pid;
char core_pattern[65] = "core";
+int suid_dumpable = 0;
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable);
/* The maximal length of core_pattern is also specified in sysctl.c */
static struct linux_binfmt *formats;
@@ -864,6 +867,9 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid)
current->mm->dumpable = 1;
+ else
+ current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
+
name = bprm->filename;
/* Copies the binary name from after last slash */
@@ -884,7 +890,7 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
permission(bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode,MAY_READ, NULL) ||
(bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP)) {
suid_keys(current);
- current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+ current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
}
/* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
@@ -1432,6 +1438,8 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs)
struct inode * inode;
struct file * file;
int retval = 0;
+ int fsuid = current->fsuid;
+ int flag = 0;
binfmt = current->binfmt;
if (!binfmt || !binfmt->core_dump)
@@ -1441,6 +1449,16 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs)
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
goto fail;
}
+
+ /*
+ * We cannot trust fsuid as being the "true" uid of the
+ * process nor do we know its entire history. We only know it
+ * was tainted so we dump it as root in mode 2.
+ */
+ if (mm->dumpable == 2) { /* Setuid core dump mode */
+ flag = O_EXCL; /* Stop rewrite attacks */
+ current->fsuid = 0; /* Dump root private */
+ }
mm->dumpable = 0;
init_completion(&mm->core_done);
spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
@@ -1466,7 +1484,7 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs)
lock_kernel();
format_corename(corename, core_pattern, signr);
unlock_kernel();
- file = filp_open(corename, O_CREAT | 2 | O_NOFOLLOW | O_LARGEFILE, 0600);
+ file = filp_open(corename, O_CREAT | 2 | O_NOFOLLOW | O_LARGEFILE | flag, 0600);
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto fail_unlock;
inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
@@ -1491,6 +1509,7 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs)
close_fail:
filp_close(file, NULL);
fail_unlock:
+ current->fsuid = fsuid;
complete_all(&mm->core_done);
fail:
return retval;
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index e31903a..ace151f 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static int may_ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
(current->gid != task->gid)) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
goto out;
rmb();
- if (!task->mm->dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ if (task->mm->dumpable != 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
goto out;
if (security_ptrace(current, task))
goto out;
@@ -1113,7 +1113,9 @@ static int task_dumpable(struct task_struct *task)
if (mm)
dumpable = mm->dumpable;
task_unlock(task);
- return dumpable;
+ if(dumpable == 1)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h
index 7e736e2..c1e82c5 100644
--- a/include/linux/binfmts.h
+++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h
@@ -69,6 +69,11 @@ extern void remove_arg_zero(struct linux_binprm *);
extern int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *,struct pt_regs *);
extern int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm);
+extern int suid_dumpable;
+#define SUID_DUMP_DISABLE 0 /* No setuid dumping */
+#define SUID_DUMP_USER 1 /* Dump as user of process */
+#define SUID_DUMP_ROOT 2 /* Dump as root */
+
/* Stack area protections */
#define EXSTACK_DEFAULT 0 /* Whatever the arch defaults to */
#define EXSTACK_DISABLE_X 1 /* Disable executable stacks */
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index b58afd9..901742f 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ struct mm_struct {
unsigned long saved_auxv[42]; /* for /proc/PID/auxv */
- unsigned dumpable:1;
+ unsigned dumpable:2;
cpumask_t cpu_vm_mask;
/* Architecture-specific MM context */
diff --git a/include/linux/sysctl.h b/include/linux/sysctl.h
index a17745c..614e939 100644
--- a/include/linux/sysctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/sysctl.h
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ enum
KERN_UNKNOWN_NMI_PANIC=66, /* int: unknown nmi panic flag */
KERN_BOOTLOADER_TYPE=67, /* int: boot loader type */
KERN_RANDOMIZE=68, /* int: randomize virtual address space */
+ KERN_SETUID_DUMPABLE=69, /* int: behaviour of dumps for setuid core */
};
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index f006632..0a2c8cd 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid)
}
if (new_egid != old_egid)
{
- current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+ current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
smp_wmb();
}
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setgid(gid_t gid)
{
if(old_egid != gid)
{
- current->mm->dumpable=0;
+ current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
smp_wmb();
}
current->gid = current->egid = current->sgid = current->fsgid = gid;
@@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setgid(gid_t gid)
{
if(old_egid != gid)
{
- current->mm->dumpable=0;
+ current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
smp_wmb();
}
current->egid = current->fsgid = gid;
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ static int set_user(uid_t new_ruid, int dumpclear)
if(dumpclear)
{
- current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+ current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
smp_wmb();
}
current->uid = new_ruid;
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
if (new_euid != old_euid)
{
- current->mm->dumpable=0;
+ current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
smp_wmb();
}
current->fsuid = current->euid = new_euid;
@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setuid(uid_t uid)
if (old_euid != uid)
{
- current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+ current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
smp_wmb();
}
current->fsuid = current->euid = uid;
@@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
if (euid != current->euid)
{
- current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+ current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
smp_wmb();
}
current->euid = euid;
@@ -798,7 +798,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
if (egid != (gid_t) -1) {
if (egid != current->egid)
{
- current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+ current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
smp_wmb();
}
current->egid = egid;
@@ -845,7 +845,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid)
{
if (uid != old_fsuid)
{
- current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+ current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
smp_wmb();
}
current->fsuid = uid;
@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid)
{
if (gid != old_fsgid)
{
- current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+ current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
smp_wmb();
}
current->fsgid = gid;
@@ -1652,7 +1652,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
error = 1;
break;
case PR_SET_DUMPABLE:
- if (arg2 != 0 && arg2 != 1) {
+ if (arg2 < 0 || arg2 > 2) {
error = -EINVAL;
break;
}
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 701d12c..24a4d12 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ extern int sysctl_overcommit_ratio;
extern int max_threads;
extern int sysrq_enabled;
extern int core_uses_pid;
+extern int suid_dumpable;
extern char core_pattern[];
extern int cad_pid;
extern int pid_max;
@@ -950,6 +951,14 @@ static ctl_table fs_table[] = {
.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
},
#endif
+ {
+ .ctl_name = KERN_SETUID_DUMPABLE,
+ .procname = "suid_dumpable",
+ .data = &suid_dumpable,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+ },
{ .ctl_name = 0 }
};
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 849b8c3..04c12f5 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid ||
!cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) {
- current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+ current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
if (unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index b32eff1..6ff8875 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static void dummy_bprm_free_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
static void dummy_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
{
if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) {
- current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+ current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
if ((unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) && !capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
bprm->e_uid = current->uid;
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