Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights for this window:

   - improved AVC hashing for SELinux by John Brooks and Stephen Smalley

   - addition of an unconfined label to Smack

   - Smack documentation update

   - TPM driver updates"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (28 commits)
  lsm: copy comm before calling audit_log to avoid race in string printing
  tomoyo: Do not generate empty policy files
  tomoyo: Use if_changed when generating builtin-policy.h
  tomoyo: Use bin2c to generate builtin-policy.h
  selinux: increase avtab max buckets
  selinux: Use a better hash function for avtab
  selinux: convert avtab hash table to flex_array
  selinux: reconcile security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid() and mls_import_netlbl_cat()
  selinux: remove unnecessary pointer reassignment
  Smack: Updates for Smack documentation
  tpm/st33zp24/spi: Add missing device table for spi phy.
  tpm/st33zp24: Add proper wait for ordinal duration in case of irq mode
  smack: Fix gcc warning from unused smack_syslog_lock mutex in smackfs.c
  Smack: Allow an unconfined label in bringup mode
  Smack: getting the Smack security context of keys
  Smack: Assign smack_known_web as default smk_in label for kernel thread's socket
  tpm/tpm_infineon: Use struct dev_pm_ops for power management
  MAINTAINERS: Add Jason as designated reviewer for TPM
  tpm: Update KConfig text to include TPM2.0 FIFO chips
  tpm/st33zp24/dts/st33zp24-spi: Add dts documentation for st33zp24 spi phy
  ...

16 files changed, 324 insertions, 115 deletions

diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 69fdf3b..b526ddc 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static inline void print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
 static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 				   struct common_audit_data *a)
 {
-	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+	char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
 
 	/*
 	 * To keep stack sizes in check force programers to notice if they
@@ -220,8 +220,8 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 	 */
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(a->u) > sizeof(void *)*2);
 
-	audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(tsk));
-	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(current));
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, memcpy(comm, current->comm, sizeof(comm)));
 
 	switch (a->type) {
 	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE:
@@ -276,16 +276,19 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 		audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
 		break;
 	}
-	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK:
-		tsk = a->u.tsk;
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK: {
+		struct task_struct *tsk = a->u.tsk;
 		if (tsk) {
 			pid_t pid = task_pid_nr(tsk);
 			if (pid) {
+				char comm[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
 				audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", pid);
-				audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
+				audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
+				    memcpy(comm, tsk->comm, sizeof(comm)));
 			}
 		}
 		break;
+	}
 	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET:
 		if (a->u.net->sk) {
 			struct sock *sk = a->u.net->sk;
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index afcc0ae..3c17dda 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -724,12 +724,10 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
 	node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
-	if (unlikely(!node)) {
+	if (unlikely(!node))
 		node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
-	} else {
+	else
 		memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd));
-		avd = &node->ae.avd;
-	}
 
 	denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
 	if (unlikely(denied))
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index a3dd9fa..b64f277 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -25,10 +25,43 @@
 
 static struct kmem_cache *avtab_node_cachep;
 
-static inline int avtab_hash(struct avtab_key *keyp, u16 mask)
+/* Based on MurmurHash3, written by Austin Appleby and placed in the
+ * public domain.
+ */
+static inline int avtab_hash(struct avtab_key *keyp, u32 mask)
 {
-	return ((keyp->target_class + (keyp->target_type << 2) +
-		 (keyp->source_type << 9)) & mask);
+	static const u32 c1 = 0xcc9e2d51;
+	static const u32 c2 = 0x1b873593;
+	static const u32 r1 = 15;
+	static const u32 r2 = 13;
+	static const u32 m  = 5;
+	static const u32 n  = 0xe6546b64;
+
+	u32 hash = 0;
+
+#define mix(input) { \
+	u32 v = input; \
+	v *= c1; \
+	v = (v << r1) | (v >> (32 - r1)); \
+	v *= c2; \
+	hash ^= v; \
+	hash = (hash << r2) | (hash >> (32 - r2)); \
+	hash = hash * m + n; \
+}
+
+	mix(keyp->target_class);
+	mix(keyp->target_type);
+	mix(keyp->source_type);
+
+#undef mix
+
+	hash ^= hash >> 16;
+	hash *= 0x85ebca6b;
+	hash ^= hash >> 13;
+	hash *= 0xc2b2ae35;
+	hash ^= hash >> 16;
+
+	return hash & mask;
 }
 
 static struct avtab_node*
@@ -46,8 +79,12 @@ avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
 		newnode->next = prev->next;
 		prev->next = newnode;
 	} else {
-		newnode->next = h->htable[hvalue];
-		h->htable[hvalue] = newnode;
+		newnode->next = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue);
+		if (flex_array_put_ptr(h->htable, hvalue, newnode,
+				       GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO)) {
+			kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, newnode);
+			return NULL;
+		}
 	}
 
 	h->nel++;
@@ -64,7 +101,7 @@ static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_dat
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
-	for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+	for (prev = NULL, cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue);
 	     cur;
 	     prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
 		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
@@ -104,7 +141,7 @@ avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datu
 	if (!h || !h->htable)
 		return NULL;
 	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
-	for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+	for (prev = NULL, cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue);
 	     cur;
 	     prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
 		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
@@ -135,7 +172,8 @@ struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key)
 		return NULL;
 
 	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
-	for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+	for (cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue); cur;
+	     cur = cur->next) {
 		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
 		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
 		    key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
@@ -170,7 +208,8 @@ avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key)
 		return NULL;
 
 	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
-	for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+	for (cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue); cur;
+	     cur = cur->next) {
 		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
 		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
 		    key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
@@ -228,15 +267,14 @@ void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
 		return;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++) {
-		cur = h->htable[i];
+		cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, i);
 		while (cur) {
 			temp = cur;
 			cur = cur->next;
 			kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, temp);
 		}
-		h->htable[i] = NULL;
 	}
-	kfree(h->htable);
+	flex_array_free(h->htable);
 	h->htable = NULL;
 	h->nslot = 0;
 	h->mask = 0;
@@ -251,7 +289,7 @@ int avtab_init(struct avtab *h)
 
 int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
 {
-	u16 mask = 0;
+	u32 mask = 0;
 	u32 shift = 0;
 	u32 work = nrules;
 	u32 nslot = 0;
@@ -270,7 +308,8 @@ int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
 		nslot = MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS;
 	mask = nslot - 1;
 
-	h->htable = kcalloc(nslot, sizeof(*(h->htable)), GFP_KERNEL);
+	h->htable = flex_array_alloc(sizeof(struct avtab_node *), nslot,
+				     GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
 	if (!h->htable)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -293,7 +332,7 @@ void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag)
 	max_chain_len = 0;
 	chain2_len_sum = 0;
 	for (i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++) {
-		cur = h->htable[i];
+		cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, i);
 		if (cur) {
 			slots_used++;
 			chain_len = 0;
@@ -534,7 +573,8 @@ int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp)
 		return rc;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < a->nslot; i++) {
-		for (cur = a->htable[i]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		for (cur = flex_array_get_ptr(a->htable, i); cur;
+		     cur = cur->next) {
 			rc = avtab_write_item(p, cur, fp);
 			if (rc)
 				return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index 63ce2f9..adb451c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
 #ifndef _SS_AVTAB_H_
 #define _SS_AVTAB_H_
 
+#include <linux/flex_array.h>
+
 struct avtab_key {
 	u16 source_type;	/* source type */
 	u16 target_type;	/* target type */
@@ -51,10 +53,10 @@ struct avtab_node {
 };
 
 struct avtab {
-	struct avtab_node **htable;
+	struct flex_array *htable;
 	u32 nel;	/* number of elements */
 	u32 nslot;      /* number of hash slots */
-	u16 mask;       /* mask to compute hash func */
+	u32 mask;       /* mask to compute hash func */
 
 };
 
@@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified
 void avtab_cache_init(void);
 void avtab_cache_destroy(void);
 
-#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 11
+#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 16
 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
 
 #endif	/* _SS_AVTAB_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index d307b37..e108884 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -654,19 +654,15 @@ int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
 
 	rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&context->range.level[0].cat,
 				   secattr->attr.mls.cat);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		goto import_netlbl_cat_failure;
-
-	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[1].cat,
-			 &context->range.level[0].cat);
-	if (rc != 0)
+	if (rc)
 		goto import_netlbl_cat_failure;
+	memcpy(&context->range.level[1].cat, &context->range.level[0].cat,
+	       sizeof(context->range.level[0].cat));
 
 	return 0;
 
 import_netlbl_cat_failure:
 	ebitmap_destroy(&context->range.level[0].cat);
-	ebitmap_destroy(&context->range.level[1].cat);
 	return rc;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index a1d3944..9e2d820 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3179,13 +3179,9 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 		ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
 		mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
 		if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
-			rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
-						   secattr->attr.mls.cat);
+			rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(&ctx_new, secattr);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
-			memcpy(&ctx_new.range.level[1].cat,
-			       &ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
-			       sizeof(ctx_new.range.level[0].cat));
 		}
 		rc = -EIDRM;
 		if (!mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new))
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 67ccb7b..49eada6 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ struct task_smack {
 #define	SMK_INODE_INSTANT	0x01	/* inode is instantiated */
 #define	SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE	0x02	/* directory is transmuting */
 #define	SMK_INODE_CHANGED	0x04	/* smack was transmuted */
+#define	SMK_INODE_IMPURE	0x08	/* involved in an impure transaction */
 
 /*
  * A label access rule.
@@ -193,6 +194,10 @@ struct smk_port_label {
 #define MAY_LOCK	0x00002000	/* Locks should be writes, but ... */
 #define MAY_BRINGUP	0x00004000	/* Report use of this rule */
 
+#define SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW		1	/* Allow bringup mode */
+#define SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT	2	/* Allow unconfined label */
+#define SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT		3	/* Allow unconfined label */
+
 /*
  * Just to make the common cases easier to deal with
  */
@@ -254,6 +259,9 @@ extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
 extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
 extern struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
 extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+extern struct smack_known *smack_unconfined;
+#endif
 extern struct smack_known smack_cipso_option;
 extern int smack_ptrace_rule;
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 1158430..0f410fc 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -130,7 +130,8 @@ int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject, struct smack_known *object,
 
 	/*
 	 * Hardcoded comparisons.
-	 *
+	 */
+	/*
 	 * A star subject can't access any object.
 	 */
 	if (subject == &smack_known_star) {
@@ -189,10 +190,20 @@ int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject, struct smack_known *object,
 	 * succeed because of "b" rules.
 	 */
 	if (may & MAY_BRINGUP)
-		rc = MAY_BRINGUP;
+		rc = SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW;
 #endif
 
 out_audit:
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		if (object == smack_unconfined)
+			rc = SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT;
+		if (subject == smack_unconfined)
+			rc = SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT;
+	}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	if (a)
 		smack_log(subject->smk_known, object->smk_known,
@@ -338,19 +349,16 @@ static void smack_log_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	       int result, struct smk_audit_info *ad)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+	char request_buffer[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 5];
+#else
 	char request_buffer[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+#endif
 	struct smack_audit_data *sad;
 	struct common_audit_data *a = &ad->a;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
-	/*
-	 * The result may be positive in bringup mode.
-	 */
-	if (result > 0)
-		result = 0;
-#endif
 	/* check if we have to log the current event */
-	if (result != 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED) == 0)
+	if (result < 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED) == 0)
 		return;
 	if (result == 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT) == 0)
 		return;
@@ -364,6 +372,21 @@ void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	smack_str_from_perm(request_buffer, request);
 	sad->subject = subject_label;
 	sad->object  = object_label;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+	/*
+	 * The result may be positive in bringup mode.
+	 * A positive result is an allow, but not for normal reasons.
+	 * Mark it as successful, but don't filter it out even if
+	 * the logging policy says to do so.
+	 */
+	if (result == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT)
+		strcat(request_buffer, "(US)");
+	else if (result == SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		strcat(request_buffer, "(UO)");
+
+	if (result > 0)
+		result = 0;
+#endif
 	sad->request = request_buffer;
 	sad->result  = result;
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 1511965..69fdc38 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -57,6 +57,13 @@ static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache;
 int smack_enabled;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
+	"Bringup Error",	/* Unused */
+	"Bringup",		/* SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW */
+	"Unconfined Subject",	/* SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT */
+	"Unconfined Object",	/* SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT */
+};
+
 static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
 {
 	int i = 0;
@@ -87,9 +94,11 @@ static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
 
 	if (rc <= 0)
 		return rc;
+	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		rc = 0;
 
 	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
-	pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) %s\n",
+	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
 		sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note);
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -106,9 +115,11 @@ static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
 
 	if (rc <= 0)
 		return rc;
+	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		rc = 0;
 
 	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
-	pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n",
+	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
 		tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known,
 		acc, current->comm, note);
 	return 0;
@@ -126,9 +137,11 @@ static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
 
 	if (rc <= 0)
 		return rc;
+	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		rc = 0;
 
 	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
-	pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n",
+	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
 		tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
 		current->comm, otp->comm);
 	return 0;
@@ -141,14 +154,25 @@ static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
 static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
 {
 	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
 	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
 
+	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
+		pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
+			inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
+
 	if (rc <= 0)
 		return rc;
+	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		rc = 0;
+	if (rc == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT &&
+	    (mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))
+		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_IMPURE;
 
 	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
-	pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
-		tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
+
+	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+		tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc,
 		inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -162,13 +186,20 @@ static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
 	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
 	struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
 	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
 
+	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
+		pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
+			inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
+
 	if (rc <= 0)
 		return rc;
+	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		rc = 0;
 
 	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
-	pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n",
+	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
 		sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
 		inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
 		current->comm);
@@ -185,13 +216,20 @@ static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
 	struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
 	struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_inode;
+	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
 	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
 
+	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
+		pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
+			inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
+
 	if (rc <= 0)
 		return rc;
+	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		rc = 0;
 
 	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
-	pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n",
+	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
 		sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
 		inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
 		current->comm);
@@ -2449,7 +2487,21 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 				    int type, int protocol, int kern)
 {
-	if (family != PF_INET || sock->sk == NULL)
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+
+	if (sock->sk == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
+		ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
+		ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
+	}
+
+	if (family != PF_INET)
 		return 0;
 	/*
 	 * Set the outbound netlbl.
@@ -3983,6 +4035,36 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 	rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
 	return rc;
 }
+
+/*
+ * smack_key_getsecurity - Smack label tagging the key
+ * @key points to the key to be queried
+ * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
+ * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
+ * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
+ * an error.
+ * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
+ */
+static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
+	size_t length;
+	char *copy;
+
+	if (key->security == NULL) {
+		*_buffer = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	copy = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (copy == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	length = strlen(copy) + 1;
+
+	*_buffer = copy;
+	return length;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 /*
@@ -4307,6 +4389,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.key_alloc = 			smack_key_alloc,
 	.key_free = 			smack_key_free,
 	.key_permission = 		smack_key_permission,
+	.key_getsecurity =		smack_key_getsecurity,
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
  /* Audit hooks */
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index bce4e8f..06f719e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ enum smk_inos {
 	SMK_CHANGE_RULE	= 19,	/* change or add rules (long labels) */
 	SMK_SYSLOG	= 20,	/* change syslog label) */
 	SMK_PTRACE	= 21,	/* set ptrace rule */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+	SMK_UNCONFINED	= 22,	/* define an unconfined label */
+#endif
 };
 
 /*
@@ -61,7 +64,6 @@ enum smk_inos {
  */
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_cipso_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ambient_lock);
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_syslog_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock);
 
 /*
@@ -95,6 +97,16 @@ int smack_cipso_mapped = SMACK_CIPSO_MAPPED_DEFAULT;
  */
 struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+/*
+ * Allow one label to be unconfined. This is for
+ * debugging and application bring-up purposes only.
+ * It is bad and wrong, but everyone seems to expect
+ * to have it.
+ */
+struct smack_known *smack_unconfined;
+#endif
+
 /*
  * If this value is set restrict syslog use to the label specified.
  * It can be reset via smackfs/syslog
@@ -1717,6 +1729,85 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_onlycap_ops = {
 	.llseek		= default_llseek,
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+/**
+ * smk_read_unconfined - read() for smackfs/unconfined
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @cn: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_unconfined(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+					size_t cn, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *smack = "";
+	ssize_t rc = -EINVAL;
+	int asize;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (smack_unconfined != NULL)
+		smack = smack_unconfined->smk_known;
+
+	asize = strlen(smack) + 1;
+
+	if (cn >= asize)
+		rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos, smack, asize);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_unconfined - write() for smackfs/unconfined
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_unconfined(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+					size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *data;
+	int rc = count;
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (data == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/*
+	 * Should the null string be passed in unset the unconfined value.
+	 * This seems like something to be careful with as usually
+	 * smk_import only expects to return NULL for errors. It
+	 * is usually the case that a nullstring or "\n" would be
+	 * bad to pass to smk_import but in fact this is useful here.
+	 *
+	 * smk_import will also reject a label beginning with '-',
+	 * so "-confine" will also work.
+	 */
+	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+	else
+		smack_unconfined = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+
+	kfree(data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_unconfined_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_unconfined,
+	.write		= smk_write_unconfined,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP */
+
 /**
  * smk_read_logging - read() for /smack/logging
  * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
@@ -2384,6 +2475,10 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 			"syslog", &smk_syslog_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		[SMK_PTRACE] = {
 			"ptrace", &smk_ptrace_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+		[SMK_UNCONFINED] = {
+			"unconfined", &smk_unconfined_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+#endif
 		/* last one */
 			{""}
 	};
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/.gitignore b/security/tomoyo/.gitignore
index 5caf1a6..dc0f220 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/.gitignore
+++ b/security/tomoyo/.gitignore
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 builtin-policy.h
-policy/
+policy/*.conf
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Kconfig b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig
index 604e718..404dce6 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/Kconfig
+++ b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ config SECURITY_TOMOYO
 	select SECURITY_PATH
 	select SECURITY_NETWORK
 	select SRCU
+	select BUILD_BIN2C
 	default n
 	help
 	  This selects TOMOYO Linux, pathname-based access control.
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Makefile b/security/tomoyo/Makefile
index 56a0c7b..65dbcb2 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/Makefile
+++ b/security/tomoyo/Makefile
@@ -1,48 +1,15 @@
 obj-y = audit.o common.o condition.o domain.o environ.o file.o gc.o group.o load_policy.o memory.o mount.o network.o realpath.o securityfs_if.o tomoyo.o util.o
 
-$(obj)/policy/profile.conf:
-	@mkdir -p $(obj)/policy/
-	@echo Creating an empty policy/profile.conf
-	@touch $@
-
-$(obj)/policy/exception_policy.conf:
-	@mkdir -p $(obj)/policy/
-	@echo Creating a default policy/exception_policy.conf
-	@echo initialize_domain /sbin/modprobe from any >> $@
-	@echo initialize_domain /sbin/hotplug from any >> $@
-
-$(obj)/policy/domain_policy.conf:
-	@mkdir -p $(obj)/policy/
-	@echo Creating an empty policy/domain_policy.conf
-	@touch $@
-
-$(obj)/policy/manager.conf:
-	@mkdir -p $(obj)/policy/
-	@echo Creating an empty policy/manager.conf
-	@touch $@
-
-$(obj)/policy/stat.conf:
-	@mkdir -p $(obj)/policy/
-	@echo Creating an empty policy/stat.conf
-	@touch $@
-
-$(obj)/builtin-policy.h: $(obj)/policy/profile.conf $(obj)/policy/exception_policy.conf $(obj)/policy/domain_policy.conf $(obj)/policy/manager.conf $(obj)/policy/stat.conf
-	@echo Generating built-in policy for TOMOYO 2.5.x.
-	@echo "static char tomoyo_builtin_profile[] __initdata =" > $@.tmp
-	@sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' -e 's/\"/\\"/g' -e 's/\(.*\)/"\1\\n"/' < $(obj)/policy/profile.conf >> $@.tmp
-	@echo "\"\";" >> $@.tmp
-	@echo "static char tomoyo_builtin_exception_policy[] __initdata =" >> $@.tmp
-	@sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' -e 's/\"/\\"/g' -e 's/\(.*\)/"\1\\n"/' < $(obj)/policy/exception_policy.conf >> $@.tmp
-	@echo "\"\";" >> $@.tmp
-	@echo "static char tomoyo_builtin_domain_policy[] __initdata =" >> $@.tmp
-	@sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' -e 's/\"/\\"/g' -e 's/\(.*\)/"\1\\n"/' < $(obj)/policy/domain_policy.conf >> $@.tmp
-	@echo "\"\";" >> $@.tmp
-	@echo "static char tomoyo_builtin_manager[] __initdata =" >> $@.tmp
-	@sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' -e 's/\"/\\"/g' -e 's/\(.*\)/"\1\\n"/' < $(obj)/policy/manager.conf >> $@.tmp
-	@echo "\"\";" >> $@.tmp
-	@echo "static char tomoyo_builtin_stat[] __initdata =" >> $@.tmp
-	@sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' -e 's/\"/\\"/g' -e 's/\(.*\)/"\1\\n"/' < $(obj)/policy/stat.conf >> $@.tmp
-	@echo "\"\";" >> $@.tmp
-	@mv $@.tmp $@
+targets += builtin-policy.h
+define do_policy
+echo "static char tomoyo_builtin_$(1)[] __initdata ="; \
+$(objtree)/scripts/basic/bin2c <$(firstword $(wildcard $(obj)/policy/$(1).conf $(srctree)/$(src)/policy/$(1).conf.default) /dev/null); \
+echo ";"
+endef
+quiet_cmd_policy  = POLICY  $@
+      cmd_policy  = ($(call do_policy,profile); $(call do_policy,exception_policy); $(call do_policy,domain_policy); $(call do_policy,manager); $(call do_policy,stat)) >$@
+
+$(obj)/builtin-policy.h: $(wildcard $(obj)/policy/*.conf $(src)/policy/*.conf.default) FORCE
+	$(call if_changed,policy)
 
 $(obj)/common.o: $(obj)/builtin-policy.h
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default b/security/tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2678df4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+initialize_domain /sbin/modprobe from any
+initialize_domain /sbin/hotplug from any
diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig
index 20ef514..3123e1d 100644
--- a/security/yama/Kconfig
+++ b/security/yama/Kconfig
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
 config SECURITY_YAMA
 	bool "Yama support"
 	depends on SECURITY
-	select SECURITYFS
-	select SECURITY_PATH
 	default n
 	help
 	  This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 13c88fbc..24aae2a 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -379,20 +379,17 @@ static struct security_operations yama_ops = {
 static int yama_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 				void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	int rc;
+	struct ctl_table table_copy;
 
 	if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	rc = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
 	/* Lock the max value if it ever gets set. */
-	if (write && *(int *)table->data == *(int *)table->extra2)
-		table->extra1 = table->extra2;
+	table_copy = *table;
+	if (*(int *)table_copy.data == *(int *)table_copy.extra2)
+		table_copy.extra1 = table_copy.extra2;
 
-	return rc;
+	return proc_dointvec_minmax(&table_copy, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
 }
 
 static int zero;