Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - PKCS#7 support added to support signed kexec, also utilized for
     module signing.  See comments in 3f1e1bea.

     ** NOTE: this requires linking against the OpenSSL library, which
        must be installed, e.g.  the openssl-devel on Fedora **

   - Smack
      - add IPv6 host labeling; ignore labels on kernel threads
      - support smack labeling mounts which use binary mount data

   - SELinux:
      - add ioctl whitelisting (see
        http://kernsec.org/files/lss2015/vanderstoep.pdf)
      - fix mprotect PROT_EXEC regression caused by mm change

   - Seccomp:
      - add ptrace options for suspend/resume"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (57 commits)
  PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them
  Documentation/Changes: Now need OpenSSL devel packages for module signing
  scripts: add extract-cert and sign-file to .gitignore
  modsign: Handle signing key in source tree
  modsign: Use if_changed rule for extracting cert from module signing key
  Move certificate handling to its own directory
  sign-file: Fix warning about BIO_reset() return value
  PKCS#7: Add MODULE_LICENSE() to test module
  Smack - Fix build error with bringup unconfigured
  sign-file: Document dependency on OpenSSL devel libraries
  PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type
  KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7
  PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder
  modsign: Use extract-cert to process CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS
  extract-cert: Cope with multiple X.509 certificates in a single file
  sign-file: Generate CMS message as signature instead of PKCS#7
  PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652]
  X.509: Change recorded SKID & AKID to not include Subject or Issuer
  PKCS#7: Check content type and versions
  MAINTAINERS: The keyrings mailing list has moved
  ...

20 files changed, 1732 insertions, 362 deletions

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index bf4ec4647..e4523789 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -132,7 +132,6 @@ choice
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
-	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY_YAMA
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
 
 	help
@@ -151,9 +150,6 @@ choice
 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
 		bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
 
-	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
-		bool "Yama" if SECURITY_YAMA=y
-
 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
 		bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
 
@@ -165,7 +161,6 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY
 	default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
 	default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
 	default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
-	default "yama" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
 	default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
 
 endmenu
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 4ed9810..cccbf30 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -245,6 +245,21 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 		}
 		break;
 	}
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP: {
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		audit_log_d_path(ab, " path=", &a->u.op->path);
+
+		inode = a->u.op->path.dentry->d_inode;
+		if (inode) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " dev=");
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
+			audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
+		}
+
+		audit_log_format(ab, " ioctlcmd=%hx", a->u.op->cmd);
+		break;
+	}
 	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY: {
 		struct inode *inode;
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 75b85fd..46f405c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -56,18 +56,13 @@ int __init security_init(void)
 	pr_info("Security Framework initialized\n");
 
 	/*
-	 * Always load the capability module.
+	 * Load minor LSMs, with the capability module always first.
 	 */
 	capability_add_hooks();
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
-	/*
-	 * If Yama is configured for stacking load it next.
-	 */
 	yama_add_hooks();
-#endif
+
 	/*
-	 * Load the chosen module if there is one.
-	 * This will also find yama if it is stacking
+	 * Load all the remaining security modules.
 	 */
 	do_security_initcalls();
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 0b122b1..e60c79d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
 #include <linux/un.h>
 #include <net/af_unix.h>
@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ struct avc_entry {
 	u32			tsid;
 	u16			tclass;
 	struct av_decision	avd;
+	struct avc_xperms_node	*xp_node;
 };
 
 struct avc_node {
@@ -56,6 +58,16 @@ struct avc_node {
 	struct rcu_head		rhead;
 };
 
+struct avc_xperms_decision_node {
+	struct extended_perms_decision xpd;
+	struct list_head xpd_list; /* list of extended_perms_decision */
+};
+
+struct avc_xperms_node {
+	struct extended_perms xp;
+	struct list_head xpd_head; /* list head of extended_perms_decision */
+};
+
 struct avc_cache {
 	struct hlist_head	slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* head for avc_node->list */
 	spinlock_t		slots_lock[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* lock for writes */
@@ -80,6 +92,9 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats) = { 0 };
 static struct avc_cache avc_cache;
 static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks;
 static struct kmem_cache *avc_node_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_data_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_decision_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_cachep;
 
 static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 {
@@ -101,6 +116,7 @@ static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	BUG_ON(!tclass || tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
 	perms = secclass_map[tclass-1].perms;
 
 	audit_log_format(ab, " {");
@@ -149,7 +165,7 @@ static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcla
 		kfree(scontext);
 	}
 
-	BUG_ON(tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
+	BUG_ON(!tclass || tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
 	audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", secclass_map[tclass-1].name);
 }
 
@@ -170,7 +186,17 @@ void __init avc_init(void)
 	atomic_set(&avc_cache.lru_hint, 0);
 
 	avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node),
-					     0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+					0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+	avc_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_node",
+					sizeof(struct avc_xperms_node),
+					0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+	avc_xperms_decision_cachep = kmem_cache_create(
+					"avc_xperms_decision_node",
+					sizeof(struct avc_xperms_decision_node),
+					0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+	avc_xperms_data_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_data",
+					sizeof(struct extended_perms_data),
+					0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 
 	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "AVC INITIALIZED\n");
 }
@@ -205,9 +231,261 @@ int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
 			 slots_used, AVC_CACHE_SLOTS, max_chain_len);
 }
 
+/*
+ * using a linked list for extended_perms_decision lookup because the list is
+ * always small. i.e. less than 5, typically 1
+ */
+static struct extended_perms_decision *avc_xperms_decision_lookup(u8 driver,
+					struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+{
+	struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(xpd_node, &xp_node->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
+		if (xpd_node->xpd.driver == driver)
+			return &xpd_node->xpd;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int
+avc_xperms_has_perm(struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+					u8 perm, u8 which)
+{
+	unsigned int rc = 0;
+
+	if ((which == XPERMS_ALLOWED) &&
+			(xpd->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED))
+		rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->allowed->p, perm);
+	else if ((which == XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) &&
+			(xpd->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW))
+		rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->auditallow->p, perm);
+	else if ((which == XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) &&
+			(xpd->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT))
+		rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->dontaudit->p, perm);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void avc_xperms_allow_perm(struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node,
+				u8 driver, u8 perm)
+{
+	struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
+	security_xperm_set(xp_node->xp.drivers.p, driver);
+	xpd = avc_xperms_decision_lookup(driver, xp_node);
+	if (xpd && xpd->allowed)
+		security_xperm_set(xpd->allowed->p, perm);
+}
+
+static void avc_xperms_decision_free(struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node)
+{
+	struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
+
+	xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
+	if (xpd->allowed)
+		kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->allowed);
+	if (xpd->auditallow)
+		kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->auditallow);
+	if (xpd->dontaudit)
+		kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->dontaudit);
+	kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, xpd_node);
+}
+
+static void avc_xperms_free(struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+{
+	struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node, *tmp;
+
+	if (!xp_node)
+		return;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(xpd_node, tmp, &xp_node->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
+		list_del(&xpd_node->xpd_list);
+		avc_xperms_decision_free(xpd_node);
+	}
+	kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_cachep, xp_node);
+}
+
+static void avc_copy_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *dest,
+					struct extended_perms_decision *src)
+{
+	dest->driver = src->driver;
+	dest->used = src->used;
+	if (dest->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED)
+		memcpy(dest->allowed->p, src->allowed->p,
+				sizeof(src->allowed->p));
+	if (dest->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW)
+		memcpy(dest->auditallow->p, src->auditallow->p,
+				sizeof(src->auditallow->p));
+	if (dest->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
+		memcpy(dest->dontaudit->p, src->dontaudit->p,
+				sizeof(src->dontaudit->p));
+}
+
+/*
+ * similar to avc_copy_xperms_decision, but only copy decision
+ * information relevant to this perm
+ */
+static inline void avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(u8 perm,
+			struct extended_perms_decision *dest,
+			struct extended_perms_decision *src)
+{
+	/*
+	 * compute index of the u32 of the 256 bits (8 u32s) that contain this
+	 * command permission
+	 */
+	u8 i = perm >> 5;
+
+	dest->used = src->used;
+	if (dest->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED)
+		dest->allowed->p[i] = src->allowed->p[i];
+	if (dest->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW)
+		dest->auditallow->p[i] = src->auditallow->p[i];
+	if (dest->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
+		dest->dontaudit->p[i] = src->dontaudit->p[i];
+}
+
+static struct avc_xperms_decision_node
+		*avc_xperms_decision_alloc(u8 which)
+{
+	struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;
+	struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
+
+	xpd_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_decision_cachep,
+				GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+	if (!xpd_node)
+		return NULL;
+
+	xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
+	if (which & XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
+		xpd->allowed = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
+						GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+		if (!xpd->allowed)
+			goto error;
+	}
+	if (which & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
+		xpd->auditallow = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
+						GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+		if (!xpd->auditallow)
+			goto error;
+	}
+	if (which & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
+		xpd->dontaudit = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
+						GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+		if (!xpd->dontaudit)
+			goto error;
+	}
+	return xpd_node;
+error:
+	avc_xperms_decision_free(xpd_node);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int avc_add_xperms_decision(struct avc_node *node,
+			struct extended_perms_decision *src)
+{
+	struct avc_xperms_decision_node *dest_xpd;
+
+	node->ae.xp_node->xp.len++;
+	dest_xpd = avc_xperms_decision_alloc(src->used);
+	if (!dest_xpd)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	avc_copy_xperms_decision(&dest_xpd->xpd, src);
+	list_add(&dest_xpd->xpd_list, &node->ae.xp_node->xpd_head);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct avc_xperms_node *avc_xperms_alloc(void)
+{
+	struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
+
+	xp_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_cachep,
+				GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+	if (!xp_node)
+		return xp_node;
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
+	return xp_node;
+}
+
+static int avc_xperms_populate(struct avc_node *node,
+				struct avc_xperms_node *src)
+{
+	struct avc_xperms_node *dest;
+	struct avc_xperms_decision_node *dest_xpd;
+	struct avc_xperms_decision_node *src_xpd;
+
+	if (src->xp.len == 0)
+		return 0;
+	dest = avc_xperms_alloc();
+	if (!dest)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memcpy(dest->xp.drivers.p, src->xp.drivers.p, sizeof(dest->xp.drivers.p));
+	dest->xp.len = src->xp.len;
+
+	/* for each source xpd allocate a destination xpd and copy */
+	list_for_each_entry(src_xpd, &src->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
+		dest_xpd = avc_xperms_decision_alloc(src_xpd->xpd.used);
+		if (!dest_xpd)
+			goto error;
+		avc_copy_xperms_decision(&dest_xpd->xpd, &src_xpd->xpd);
+		list_add(&dest_xpd->xpd_list, &dest->xpd_head);
+	}
+	node->ae.xp_node = dest;
+	return 0;
+error:
+	avc_xperms_free(dest);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+
+}
+
+static inline u32 avc_xperms_audit_required(u32 requested,
+					struct av_decision *avd,
+					struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+					u8 perm,
+					int result,
+					u32 *deniedp)
+{
+	u32 denied, audited;
+
+	denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
+	if (unlikely(denied)) {
+		audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
+		if (audited && xpd) {
+			if (avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_DONTAUDIT))
+				audited &= ~requested;
+		}
+	} else if (result) {
+		audited = denied = requested;
+	} else {
+		audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
+		if (audited && xpd) {
+			if (!avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_AUDITALLOW))
+				audited &= ~requested;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*deniedp = denied;
+	return audited;
+}
+
+static inline int avc_xperms_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd,
+				struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+				u8 perm, int result,
+				struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	u32 audited, denied;
+
+	audited = avc_xperms_audit_required(
+			requested, avd, xpd, perm, result, &denied);
+	if (likely(!audited))
+		return 0;
+	return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+			audited, denied, result, ad, 0);
+}
+
 static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node = container_of(rhead, struct avc_node, rhead);
+	avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
 	kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
 	avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
 }
@@ -221,6 +499,7 @@ static void avc_node_delete(struct avc_node *node)
 
 static void avc_node_kill(struct avc_node *node)
 {
+	avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
 	kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
 	avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
 	atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
@@ -367,6 +646,7 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
  * @tsid: target security identifier
  * @tclass: target security class
  * @avd: resulting av decision
+ * @xp_node: resulting extended permissions
  *
  * Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair
  * (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass.
@@ -378,7 +658,9 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
  * the access vectors into a cache entry, returns
  * avc_node inserted. Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
  */
-static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
+static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				struct av_decision *avd,
+				struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
 {
 	struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
 	int hvalue;
@@ -391,10 +673,15 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_dec
 	if (node) {
 		struct hlist_head *head;
 		spinlock_t *lock;
+		int rc = 0;
 
 		hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
 		avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
-
+		rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, xp_node);
+		if (rc) {
+			kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+			return NULL;
+		}
 		head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
 		lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
 
@@ -523,14 +810,17 @@ out:
  * @perms : Permission mask bits
  * @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry
  * @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
+ * @xpd: extended_perms_decision to be added to the node
  *
  * if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT.
  * if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
  * otherwise, this function updates the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
  * will release later by RCU.
  */
-static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-			   u32 seqno)
+static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
+			u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 seqno,
+			struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+			u32 flags)
 {
 	int hvalue, rc = 0;
 	unsigned long flag;
@@ -574,9 +864,19 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 
 	avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae.avd);
 
+	if (orig->ae.xp_node) {
+		rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, orig->ae.xp_node);
+		if (rc) {
+			kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+	}
+
 	switch (event) {
 	case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT:
 		node->ae.avd.allowed |= perms;
+		if (node->ae.xp_node && (flags & AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS))
+			avc_xperms_allow_perm(node->ae.xp_node, driver, xperm);
 		break;
 	case AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE:
 	case AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE:
@@ -594,6 +894,9 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 	case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE:
 		node->ae.avd.auditdeny &= ~perms;
 		break;
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS:
+		avc_add_xperms_decision(node, xpd);
+		break;
 	}
 	avc_node_replace(node, orig);
 out_unlock:
@@ -665,18 +968,20 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
  * results in a bigger stack frame.
  */
 static noinline struct avc_node *avc_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-			 u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
+			 u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+			 struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
 {
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-	security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
+	security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node->xp);
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+	return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, xp_node);
 }
 
 static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-			 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-			 unsigned flags,
-			 struct av_decision *avd)
+				u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+				u8 driver, u8 xperm, unsigned flags,
+				struct av_decision *avd)
 {
 	if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
 		return -EACCES;
@@ -684,11 +989,91 @@ static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	if (selinux_enforcing && !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid,
-				tsid, tclass, avd->seqno);
+	avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, driver, xperm, ssid,
+				tsid, tclass, avd->seqno, NULL, flags);
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * The avc extended permissions logic adds an additional 256 bits of
+ * permissions to an avc node when extended permissions for that node are
+ * specified in the avtab. If the additional 256 permissions is not adequate,
+ * as-is the case with ioctls, then multiple may be chained together and the
+ * driver field is used to specify which set contains the permission.
+ */
+int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			u8 driver, u8 xperm, struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node;
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	u32 denied;
+	struct extended_perms_decision local_xpd;
+	struct extended_perms_decision *xpd = NULL;
+	struct extended_perms_data allowed;
+	struct extended_perms_data auditallow;
+	struct extended_perms_data dontaudit;
+	struct avc_xperms_node local_xp_node;
+	struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
+	int rc = 0, rc2;
+
+	xp_node = &local_xp_node;
+	BUG_ON(!requested);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+	if (unlikely(!node)) {
+		node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd, xp_node);
+	} else {
+		memcpy(&avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(avd));
+		xp_node = node->ae.xp_node;
+	}
+	/* if extended permissions are not defined, only consider av_decision */
+	if (!xp_node || !xp_node->xp.len)
+		goto decision;
+
+	local_xpd.allowed = &allowed;
+	local_xpd.auditallow = &auditallow;
+	local_xpd.dontaudit = &dontaudit;
+
+	xpd = avc_xperms_decision_lookup(driver, xp_node);
+	if (unlikely(!xpd)) {
+		/*
+		 * Compute the extended_perms_decision only if the driver
+		 * is flagged
+		 */
+		if (!security_xperm_test(xp_node->xp.drivers.p, driver)) {
+			avd.allowed &= ~requested;
+			goto decision;
+		}
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		security_compute_xperms_decision(ssid, tsid, tclass, driver,
+						&local_xpd);
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS, requested, driver, xperm,
+				ssid, tsid, tclass, avd.seqno, &local_xpd, 0);
+	} else {
+		avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(xperm, &local_xpd, xpd);
+	}
+	xpd = &local_xpd;
+
+	if (!avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, xperm, XPERMS_ALLOWED))
+		avd.allowed &= ~requested;
+
+decision:
+	denied = requested & ~(avd.allowed);
+	if (unlikely(denied))
+		rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, driver, xperm,
+				AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, &avd);
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	rc2 = avc_xperms_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+			&avd, xpd, xperm, rc, ad);
+	if (rc2)
+		return rc2;
+	return rc;
+}
 
 /**
  * avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing.
@@ -716,6 +1101,7 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 			 struct av_decision *avd)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node;
+	struct avc_xperms_node xp_node;
 	int rc = 0;
 	u32 denied;
 
@@ -725,13 +1111,13 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 
 	node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
 	if (unlikely(!node))
-		node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+		node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node);
 	else
 		memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd));
 
 	denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
 	if (unlikely(denied))
-		rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, flags, avd);
+		rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, 0, flags, avd);
 
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index cdf4c58..e4369d8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -254,10 +254,21 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 
-	spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
-	if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
+	/*
+	 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
+	 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
+	 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
+	 *
+	 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
+	 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
+	 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
+	 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
+	 */
+	if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
+		spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 		list_del_init(&isec->list);
-	spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+		spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
@@ -1698,6 +1709,32 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
+ */
+static int selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct inode *dir,
+					 const struct qstr *name,
+					 u16 tclass,
+					 u32 *_new_isid)
+{
+	const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+	const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = dir->i_security;
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+
+	if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
+	    (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
+		*_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+	} else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
+		   tsec->create_sid) {
+		*_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
+	} else {
+		return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
+					       name, _new_isid);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 		      struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -1714,7 +1751,6 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
 
 	sid = tsec->sid;
-	newsid = tsec->create_sid;
 
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
 	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
@@ -1725,12 +1761,10 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
-		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
-					     &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
-		if (rc)
-			return rc;
-	}
+	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
+					   &newsid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
 	if (rc)
@@ -2704,32 +2738,14 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 					struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
 					u32 *ctxlen)
 {
-	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-	struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
-	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
-	struct inode *dir = d_backing_inode(dentry->d_parent);
 	u32 newsid;
 	int rc;
 
-	tsec = cred->security;
-	dsec = dir->i_security;
-	sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
-
-	if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
-		newsid = tsec->create_sid;
-	} else {
-		rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
-					     inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
-					     name,
-					     &newsid);
-		if (rc) {
-			printk(KERN_WARNING
-				"%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
-			       __func__, -rc);
-			return rc;
-		}
-	}
+	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
+					   inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
+					   &newsid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
 
 	return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
 }
@@ -2752,22 +2768,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	sid = tsec->sid;
 	newsid = tsec->create_sid;
 
-	if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
-	    (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
-		newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
-	else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
-		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
-					     inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
-					     qstr, &newsid);
-		if (rc) {
-			printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  "
-			       "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
-			       "ino=%ld)\n",
-			       __func__,
-			       -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
-			return rc;
-		}
-	}
+	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(
+		dir, qstr,
+		inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
+		&newsid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
 
 	/* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
 	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
@@ -3228,6 +3234,46 @@ static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
 	file_free_security(file);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
+ * operation to an inode.
+ */
+int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
+		u32 requested, u16 cmd)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
+	u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
+	int rc;
+	u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
+	u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
+	ad.u.op = &ioctl;
+	ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
+	ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
+
+	if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
+				SECCLASS_FD,
+				FD__USE,
+				&ad);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+			requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 			      unsigned long arg)
 {
@@ -3270,7 +3316,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	 * to the file's ioctl() function.
 	 */
 	default:
-		error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
+		error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
 	}
 	return error;
 }
@@ -4520,6 +4566,7 @@ static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority
 
 	sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
 	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
 	sk->sk_security = sksec;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 5973c32..0999df0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 }
 
 #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
+#define AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS 2	/* update extended permissions */
 int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 			 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 			 unsigned flags,
@@ -156,6 +157,10 @@ int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 		       struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
 		       int flags);
 
+int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+		u8 driver, u8 perm, struct common_audit_data *ad);
+
+
 u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
 
 #define AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT		1
@@ -166,6 +171,7 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE	32
 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE	64
 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE	128
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS		256
 
 int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 36993ad..6a681d2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -35,13 +35,14 @@
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS	27
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE	28
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES	29
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL	30
 
 /* Range of policy versions we understand*/
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN   POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
 #else
-#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL
 #endif
 
 /* Mask for just the mount related flags */
@@ -109,11 +110,38 @@ struct av_decision {
 	u32 flags;
 };
 
+#define XPERMS_ALLOWED 1
+#define XPERMS_AUDITALLOW 2
+#define XPERMS_DONTAUDIT 4
+
+#define security_xperm_set(perms, x) (perms[x >> 5] |= 1 << (x & 0x1f))
+#define security_xperm_test(perms, x) (1 & (perms[x >> 5] >> (x & 0x1f)))
+struct extended_perms_data {
+	u32 p[8];
+};
+
+struct extended_perms_decision {
+	u8 used;
+	u8 driver;
+	struct extended_perms_data *allowed;
+	struct extended_perms_data *auditallow;
+	struct extended_perms_data *dontaudit;
+};
+
+struct extended_perms {
+	u16 len;	/* length associated decision chain */
+	struct extended_perms_data drivers; /* flag drivers that are used */
+};
+
 /* definitions of av_decision.flags */
 #define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE	0x0001
 
 void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-			 u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
+			 u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+			 struct extended_perms *xperms);
+
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+			 u8 driver, struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
 
 void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 			     u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index b64f277..3628d3a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include "policydb.h"
 
 static struct kmem_cache *avtab_node_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avtab_xperms_cachep;
 
 /* Based on MurmurHash3, written by Austin Appleby and placed in the
  * public domain.
@@ -70,11 +71,24 @@ avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
 		  struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
 {
 	struct avtab_node *newnode;
+	struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
 	newnode = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (newnode == NULL)
 		return NULL;
 	newnode->key = *key;
-	newnode->datum = *datum;
+
+	if (key->specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+		xperms = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_xperms_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (xperms == NULL) {
+			kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, newnode);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		*xperms = *(datum->u.xperms);
+		newnode->datum.u.xperms = xperms;
+	} else {
+		newnode->datum.u.data = datum->u.data;
+	}
+
 	if (prev) {
 		newnode->next = prev->next;
 		prev->next = newnode;
@@ -107,8 +121,12 @@ static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_dat
 		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
 		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
 		    key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
-		    (specified & cur->key.specified))
+		    (specified & cur->key.specified)) {
+			/* extended perms may not be unique */
+			if (specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)
+				break;
 			return -EEXIST;
+		}
 		if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
 			break;
 		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
@@ -271,6 +289,9 @@ void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
 		while (cur) {
 			temp = cur;
 			cur = cur->next;
+			if (temp->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)
+				kmem_cache_free(avtab_xperms_cachep,
+						temp->datum.u.xperms);
 			kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, temp);
 		}
 	}
@@ -359,7 +380,10 @@ static uint16_t spec_order[] = {
 	AVTAB_AUDITALLOW,
 	AVTAB_TRANSITION,
 	AVTAB_CHANGE,
-	AVTAB_MEMBER
+	AVTAB_MEMBER,
+	AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED,
+	AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW,
+	AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT
 };
 
 int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
@@ -369,10 +393,11 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 {
 	__le16 buf16[4];
 	u16 enabled;
-	__le32 buf32[7];
 	u32 items, items2, val, vers = pol->policyvers;
 	struct avtab_key key;
 	struct avtab_datum datum;
+	struct avtab_extended_perms xperms;
+	__le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p)];
 	int i, rc;
 	unsigned set;
 
@@ -429,11 +454,15 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
+		if (val & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has extended permissions\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 
 		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
 			if (val & spec_order[i]) {
 				key.specified = spec_order[i] | enabled;
-				datum.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+				datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
 				rc = insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
 				if (rc)
 					return rc;
@@ -476,14 +505,42 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
-	if (rc) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
-		return rc;
+	if ((vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL) &&
+			(key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  avtab:  policy version %u does not "
+				"support extended permissions rules and one "
+				"was specified\n", vers);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+		memset(&xperms, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms));
+		rc = next_entry(&xperms.specified, fp, sizeof(u8));
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+			return rc;
+		}
+		rc = next_entry(&xperms.driver, fp, sizeof(u8));
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+			return rc;
+		}
+		rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p));
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+			return rc;
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p); i++)
+			xperms.perms.p[i] = le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]);
+		datum.u.xperms = &xperms;
+	} else {
+		rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+			return rc;
+		}
+		datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
 	}
-	datum.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
 	if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) &&
-	    !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.data)) {
+	    !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.u.data)) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -543,8 +600,9 @@ bad:
 int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
 {
 	__le16 buf16[4];
-	__le32 buf32[1];
+	__le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p)];
 	int rc;
+	unsigned int i;
 
 	buf16[0] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.source_type);
 	buf16[1] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_type);
@@ -553,8 +611,22 @@ int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
 	rc = put_entry(buf16, sizeof(u16), 4, fp);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
-	buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.data);
-	rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+
+	if (cur->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+		rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->specified, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->driver, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p); i++)
+			buf32[i] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i]);
+		rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32),
+				ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p), fp);
+	} else {
+		buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.data);
+		rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	}
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 	return 0;
@@ -588,9 +660,13 @@ void avtab_cache_init(void)
 	avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
 					      sizeof(struct avtab_node),
 					      0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+	avtab_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_extended_perms",
+						sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms),
+						0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 }
 
 void avtab_cache_destroy(void)
 {
 	kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_node_cachep);
+	kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_xperms_cachep);
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index adb451c..d946c9d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #ifndef _SS_AVTAB_H_
 #define _SS_AVTAB_H_
 
+#include "security.h"
 #include <linux/flex_array.h>
 
 struct avtab_key {
@@ -37,13 +38,43 @@ struct avtab_key {
 #define AVTAB_MEMBER		0x0020
 #define AVTAB_CHANGE		0x0040
 #define AVTAB_TYPE		(AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
+/* extended permissions */
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED	0x0100
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW	0x0200
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT	0x0400
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS		(AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED | \
+				AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW | \
+				AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
 #define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD   0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
 #define AVTAB_ENABLED		0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
 	u16 specified;	/* what field is specified */
 };
 
+/*
+ * For operations that require more than the 32 permissions provided by the avc
+ * extended permissions may be used to provide 256 bits of permissions.
+ */
+struct avtab_extended_perms {
+/* These are not flags. All 256 values may be used */
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION	0x01
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER	0x02
+	/* extension of the avtab_key specified */
+	u8 specified; /* ioctl, netfilter, ... */
+	/*
+	 * if 256 bits is not adequate as is often the case with ioctls, then
+	 * multiple extended perms may be used and the driver field
+	 * specifies which permissions are included.
+	 */
+	u8 driver;
+	/* 256 bits of permissions */
+	struct extended_perms_data perms;
+};
+
 struct avtab_datum {
-	u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
+	union {
+		u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
+		struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
+	} u;
 };
 
 struct avtab_node {
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index 62c6773..18643bf 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 
 #include "security.h"
 #include "conditional.h"
+#include "services.h"
 
 /*
  * cond_evaluate_expr evaluates a conditional expr
@@ -612,21 +613,39 @@ int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp)
 
 	return 0;
 }
+
+void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+		struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
+{
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+
+	if (!ctab || !key || !xpermd)
+		return;
+
+	for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
+			node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
+		if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED)
+			services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
+	}
+	return;
+
+}
 /* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional
  * av table, and if so, add them to the result
  */
-void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd)
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+		struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms)
 {
 	struct avtab_node *node;
 
-	if (!ctab || !key || !avd)
+	if (!ctab || !key || !avd || !xperms)
 		return;
 
 	for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
 				node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
 		if ((u16)(AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
 		    (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
-			avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
+			avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
 		if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
 		    (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
 			/* Since a '0' in an auditdeny mask represents a
@@ -634,10 +653,13 @@ void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decisi
 			 * the '&' operand to ensure that all '0's in the mask
 			 * are retained (much unlike the allow and auditallow cases).
 			 */
-			avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
+			avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
 		if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
 		    (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
-			avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
+			avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
+		if ((node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) &&
+				(node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
+			services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
 	}
 	return;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
index 4d1f874..ddb43e7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
@@ -73,8 +73,10 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
 int cond_write_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr);
 int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp);
 
-void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd);
-
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+		struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms);
+void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+		struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
 int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node);
 
 #endif /* _CONDITIONAL_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 74aa224..992a315 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -148,6 +148,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
 		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
 		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
 	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
+	},
 };
 
 static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 9e2d820..b7df12b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -93,9 +93,10 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
 				    u32 *scontext_len);
 
 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
-				      struct context *tcontext,
-				      u16 tclass,
-				      struct av_decision *avd);
+					struct context *tcontext,
+					u16 tclass,
+					struct av_decision *avd,
+					struct extended_perms *xperms);
 
 struct selinux_mapping {
 	u16 value; /* policy value */
@@ -565,7 +566,8 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
 		context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
 					  tcontext,
 					  tclass,
-					  &lo_avd);
+					  &lo_avd,
+					  NULL);
 		if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
 			return;		/* no masked permission */
 		masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
@@ -580,7 +582,8 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
 		context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
 					  &lo_tcontext,
 					  tclass,
-					  &lo_avd);
+					  &lo_avd,
+					  NULL);
 		if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
 			return;		/* no masked permission */
 		masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
@@ -596,7 +599,8 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
 		context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
 					  &lo_tcontext,
 					  tclass,
-					  &lo_avd);
+					  &lo_avd,
+					  NULL);
 		if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
 			return;		/* no masked permission */
 		masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
@@ -613,13 +617,39 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
 }
 
 /*
- * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
- * the permissions in a particular class.
+ * flag which drivers have permissions
+ * only looking for ioctl based extended permssions
+ */
+void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
+		struct extended_perms *xperms,
+		struct avtab_node *node)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+		/* if one or more driver has all permissions allowed */
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms->drivers.p); i++)
+			xperms->drivers.p[i] |= node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+	} else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+		/* if allowing permissions within a driver */
+		security_xperm_set(xperms->drivers.p,
+					node->datum.u.xperms->driver);
+	}
+
+	/* If no ioctl commands are allowed, ignore auditallow and auditdeny */
+	if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED)
+		xperms->len = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context
+ * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
  */
 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
-				      struct context *tcontext,
-				      u16 tclass,
-				      struct av_decision *avd)
+					struct context *tcontext,
+					u16 tclass,
+					struct av_decision *avd,
+					struct extended_perms *xperms)
 {
 	struct constraint_node *constraint;
 	struct role_allow *ra;
@@ -633,6 +663,10 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	avd->allowed = 0;
 	avd->auditallow = 0;
 	avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+	if (xperms) {
+		memset(&xperms->drivers, 0, sizeof(xperms->drivers));
+		xperms->len = 0;
+	}
 
 	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
 		if (printk_ratelimit())
@@ -647,7 +681,7 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	 * this permission check, then use it.
 	 */
 	avkey.target_class = tclass;
-	avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
+	avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS;
 	sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!sattr);
 	tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
@@ -660,15 +694,18 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 			     node;
 			     node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
 				if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
-					avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
+					avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
 				else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
-					avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
+					avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
 				else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
-					avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
+					avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
+				else if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
+					services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
 			}
 
 			/* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
-			cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
+			cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
+					avd, xperms);
 
 		}
 	}
@@ -899,6 +936,139 @@ static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
 	avd->flags = 0;
 }
 
+void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
+					struct avtab_node *node)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+		if (xpermd->driver != node->datum.u.xperms->driver)
+			return;
+	} else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+		if (!security_xperm_test(node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p,
+					xpermd->driver))
+			return;
+	} else {
+		BUG();
+	}
+
+	if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
+		xpermd->used |= XPERMS_ALLOWED;
+		if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+			memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff,
+					sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+		}
+		if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+			for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->allowed->p); i++)
+				xpermd->allowed->p[i] |=
+					node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+		}
+	} else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
+		xpermd->used |= XPERMS_AUDITALLOW;
+		if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+			memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0xff,
+					sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
+		}
+		if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+			for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->auditallow->p); i++)
+				xpermd->auditallow->p[i] |=
+					node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+		}
+	} else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
+		xpermd->used |= XPERMS_DONTAUDIT;
+		if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+			memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0xff,
+					sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
+		}
+		if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+			for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->dontaudit->p); i++)
+				xpermd->dontaudit->p[i] |=
+					node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+		}
+	} else {
+		BUG();
+	}
+}
+
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid,
+				u32 tsid,
+				u16 orig_tclass,
+				u8 driver,
+				struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
+{
+	u16 tclass;
+	struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
+	struct avtab_key avkey;
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+	struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
+	struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
+	unsigned int i, j;
+
+	xpermd->driver = driver;
+	xpermd->used = 0;
+	memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+	memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
+	memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	if (!ss_initialized)
+		goto allow;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	if (!scontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, ssid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, tsid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+	if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
+		if (policydb.allow_unknown)
+			goto allow;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+
+	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux:  Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	avkey.target_class = tclass;
+	avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS;
+	sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
+				scontext->type - 1);
+	BUG_ON(!sattr);
+	tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
+				tcontext->type - 1);
+	BUG_ON(!tattr);
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
+			avkey.source_type = i + 1;
+			avkey.target_type = j + 1;
+			for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
+			     node;
+			     node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
+				services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
+
+			cond_compute_xperms(&policydb.te_cond_avtab,
+						&avkey, xpermd);
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	return;
+allow:
+	memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+	goto out;
+}
 
 /**
  * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
@@ -906,6 +1076,7 @@ static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
  * @tsid: target security identifier
  * @tclass: target security class
  * @avd: access vector decisions
+ * @xperms: extended permissions
  *
  * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
  * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
@@ -913,13 +1084,15 @@ static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
 void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
 			 u32 tsid,
 			 u16 orig_tclass,
-			 struct av_decision *avd)
+			 struct av_decision *avd,
+			 struct extended_perms *xperms)
 {
 	u16 tclass;
 	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
 
 	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 	avd_init(avd);
+	xperms->len = 0;
 	if (!ss_initialized)
 		goto allow;
 
@@ -947,7 +1120,7 @@ void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
 			goto allow;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
+	context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, xperms);
 	map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
 out:
 	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
@@ -993,7 +1166,7 @@ void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
+	context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, NULL);
  out:
 	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return;
@@ -1515,7 +1688,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 
 	if (avdatum) {
 		/* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
-		newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
+		newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data;
 	}
 
 	/* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
index e8d907e..6abcd87 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
@@ -11,5 +11,11 @@
 
 extern struct policydb policydb;
 
+void services_compute_xperms_drivers(struct extended_perms *xperms,
+				struct avtab_node *node);
+
+void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
+					struct avtab_node *node);
+
 #endif	/* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 244e035..fff0c61 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -17,12 +17,27 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/in.h>
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/rculist.h>
 #include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
 
 /*
+ * Use IPv6 port labeling if IPv6 is enabled and secmarks
+ * are not being used.
+ */
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
+#define SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING 1
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
+#define SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING 1
+#endif
+
+/*
  * Smack labels were limited to 23 characters for a long time.
  */
 #define SMK_LABELLEN	24
@@ -118,15 +133,30 @@ struct smack_rule {
 };
 
 /*
- * An entry in the table identifying hosts.
+ * An entry in the table identifying IPv4 hosts.
  */
-struct smk_netlbladdr {
+struct smk_net4addr {
 	struct list_head	list;
-	struct sockaddr_in	smk_host;	/* network address */
+	struct in_addr		smk_host;	/* network address */
 	struct in_addr		smk_mask;	/* network mask */
+	int			smk_masks;	/* mask size */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_label;	/* label */
+};
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+/*
+ * An entry in the table identifying IPv6 hosts.
+ */
+struct smk_net6addr {
+	struct list_head	list;
+	struct in6_addr		smk_host;	/* network address */
+	struct in6_addr		smk_mask;	/* network mask */
+	int			smk_masks;	/* mask size */
 	struct smack_known	*smk_label;	/* label */
 };
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
 
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
 /*
  * An entry in the table identifying ports.
  */
@@ -137,12 +167,31 @@ struct smk_port_label {
 	struct smack_known	*smk_in;	/* inbound label */
 	struct smack_known	*smk_out;	/* outgoing label */
 };
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
 
 struct smack_onlycap {
 	struct list_head	list;
 	struct smack_known	*smk_label;
 };
 
+/* Super block security struct flags for mount options */
+#define FSDEFAULT_MNT	0x01
+#define FSFLOOR_MNT	0x02
+#define FSHAT_MNT	0x04
+#define FSROOT_MNT	0x08
+#define FSTRANS_MNT	0x10
+
+#define NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS	5
+
+enum {
+	Opt_error = -1,
+	Opt_fsdefault = 1,
+	Opt_fsfloor = 2,
+	Opt_fshat = 3,
+	Opt_fsroot = 4,
+	Opt_fstransmute = 5,
+};
+
 /*
  * Mount options
  */
@@ -152,6 +201,7 @@ struct smack_onlycap {
 #define SMK_FSROOT	"smackfsroot="
 #define SMK_FSTRANS	"smackfstransmute="
 
+#define SMACK_DELETE_OPTION	"-DELETE"
 #define SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION 	"-CIPSO"
 
 /*
@@ -234,10 +284,6 @@ struct smk_audit_info {
 	struct smack_audit_data sad;
 #endif
 };
-/*
- * These functions are in smack_lsm.c
- */
-struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *);
 
 /*
  * These functions are in smack_access.c
@@ -267,7 +313,6 @@ extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
 extern struct smack_known *smack_unconfined;
 #endif
-extern struct smack_known smack_cipso_option;
 extern int smack_ptrace_rule;
 
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
@@ -279,7 +324,10 @@ extern struct smack_known smack_known_web;
 
 extern struct mutex	smack_known_lock;
 extern struct list_head smack_known_list;
-extern struct list_head smk_netlbladdr_list;
+extern struct list_head smk_net4addr_list;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+extern struct list_head smk_net6addr_list;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
 
 extern struct mutex     smack_onlycap_lock;
 extern struct list_head smack_onlycap_list;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 00f6b38..bc1053f 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -639,6 +639,12 @@ int smack_privileged(int cap)
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
 	struct smack_onlycap *sop;
 
+	/*
+	 * All kernel tasks are privileged
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
+		return 1;
+
 	if (!capable(cap))
 		return 0;
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index a143328..996c889 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
 #include <linux/msg.h>
 #include <linux/shm.h>
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
 #include "smack.h"
 
 #define TRANS_TRUE	"TRUE"
@@ -50,12 +51,21 @@
 #define SMK_RECEIVING	1
 #define SMK_SENDING	2
 
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
 LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
-#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif
 static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache;
 int smack_enabled;
 
+static const match_table_t smk_mount_tokens = {
+	{Opt_fsdefault, SMK_FSDEFAULT "%s"},
+	{Opt_fsfloor, SMK_FSFLOOR "%s"},
+	{Opt_fshat, SMK_FSHAT "%s"},
+	{Opt_fsroot, SMK_FSROOT "%s"},
+	{Opt_fstransmute, SMK_FSTRANS "%s"},
+	{Opt_error, NULL},
+};
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
 static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
 	"Bringup Error",	/* Unused */
@@ -281,7 +291,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
  *
  * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
  */
-struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
+static struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
 {
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
 
@@ -577,76 +587,197 @@ static int smack_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *smackopts)
 }
 
 /**
- * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
+ * smack_parse_opts_str - parse Smack specific mount options
+ * @options: mount options string
+ * @opts: where to store converted mount opts
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ *
+ * converts Smack specific mount options to generic security option format
+ */
+static int smack_parse_opts_str(char *options,
+		struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
+{
+	char *p;
+	char *fsdefault = NULL;
+	char *fsfloor = NULL;
+	char *fshat = NULL;
+	char *fsroot = NULL;
+	char *fstransmute = NULL;
+	int rc = -ENOMEM;
+	int num_mnt_opts = 0;
+	int token;
+
+	opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
+
+	if (!options)
+		return 0;
+
+	while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
+		substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+
+		if (!*p)
+			continue;
+
+		token = match_token(p, smk_mount_tokens, args);
+
+		switch (token) {
+		case Opt_fsdefault:
+			if (fsdefault)
+				goto out_opt_err;
+			fsdefault = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+			if (!fsdefault)
+				goto out_err;
+			break;
+		case Opt_fsfloor:
+			if (fsfloor)
+				goto out_opt_err;
+			fsfloor = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+			if (!fsfloor)
+				goto out_err;
+			break;
+		case Opt_fshat:
+			if (fshat)
+				goto out_opt_err;
+			fshat = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+			if (!fshat)
+				goto out_err;
+			break;
+		case Opt_fsroot:
+			if (fsroot)
+				goto out_opt_err;
+			fsroot = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+			if (!fsroot)
+				goto out_err;
+			break;
+		case Opt_fstransmute:
+			if (fstransmute)
+				goto out_opt_err;
+			fstransmute = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+			if (!fstransmute)
+				goto out_err;
+			break;
+		default:
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			pr_warn("Smack:  unknown mount option\n");
+			goto out_err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!opts->mnt_opts)
+		goto out_err;
+
+	opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
+			GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
+		kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (fsdefault) {
+		opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsdefault;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSDEFAULT_MNT;
+	}
+	if (fsfloor) {
+		opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsfloor;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSFLOOR_MNT;
+	}
+	if (fshat) {
+		opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fshat;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSHAT_MNT;
+	}
+	if (fsroot) {
+		opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsroot;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSROOT_MNT;
+	}
+	if (fstransmute) {
+		opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fstransmute;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSTRANS_MNT;
+	}
+
+	opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
+	return 0;
+
+out_opt_err:
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount options\n");
+
+out_err:
+	kfree(fsdefault);
+	kfree(fsfloor);
+	kfree(fshat);
+	kfree(fsroot);
+	kfree(fstransmute);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_set_mnt_opts - set Smack specific mount options
  * @sb: the file system superblock
- * @flags: the mount flags
- * @data: the smack mount options
+ * @opts: Smack mount options
+ * @kern_flags: mount option from kernel space or user space
+ * @set_kern_flags: where to store converted mount opts
  *
  * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
+ *
+ * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set Smack mount
+ * labels.
  */
-static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
+static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
+		struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
+		unsigned long kern_flags,
+		unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 {
 	struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
 	struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
-	char *op;
-	char *commap;
+	int i;
+	int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
 	int transmute = 0;
-	int specified = 0;
 
 	if (sp->smk_initialized)
 		return 0;
 
 	sp->smk_initialized = 1;
 
-	for (op = data; op != NULL; op = commap) {
-		commap = strchr(op, ',');
-		if (commap != NULL)
-			*commap++ = '\0';
-
-		if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSHAT, strlen(SMK_FSHAT)) == 0) {
-			op += strlen(SMK_FSHAT);
-			skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
+	for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
+		switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
+		case FSDEFAULT_MNT:
+			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
 			if (IS_ERR(skp))
 				return PTR_ERR(skp);
-			sp->smk_hat = skp;
-			specified = 1;
-
-		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSFLOOR, strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR)) == 0) {
-			op += strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR);
-			skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
+			sp->smk_default = skp;
+			break;
+		case FSFLOOR_MNT:
+			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
 			if (IS_ERR(skp))
 				return PTR_ERR(skp);
 			sp->smk_floor = skp;
-			specified = 1;
-
-		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSDEFAULT,
-				   strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT)) == 0) {
-			op += strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT);
-			skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
+			break;
+		case FSHAT_MNT:
+			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
 			if (IS_ERR(skp))
 				return PTR_ERR(skp);
-			sp->smk_default = skp;
-			specified = 1;
-
-		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSROOT, strlen(SMK_FSROOT)) == 0) {
-			op += strlen(SMK_FSROOT);
-			skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
+			sp->smk_hat = skp;
+			break;
+		case FSROOT_MNT:
+			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
 			if (IS_ERR(skp))
 				return PTR_ERR(skp);
 			sp->smk_root = skp;
-			specified = 1;
-
-		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSTRANS, strlen(SMK_FSTRANS)) == 0) {
-			op += strlen(SMK_FSTRANS);
-			skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
+			break;
+		case FSTRANS_MNT:
+			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
 			if (IS_ERR(skp))
 				return PTR_ERR(skp);
 			sp->smk_root = skp;
 			transmute = 1;
-			specified = 1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -654,7 +785,7 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 		/*
 		 * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
 		 */
-		if (specified)
+		if (num_opts)
 			return -EPERM;
 		/*
 		 * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
@@ -663,6 +794,7 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 		sp->smk_root = skp;
 		sp->smk_default = skp;
 	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Initialize the root inode.
 	 */
@@ -682,6 +814,37 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 }
 
 /**
+ * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
+ * @sb: the file system superblock
+ * @flags: the mount flags
+ * @data: the smack mount options
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
+ */
+static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	char *options = data;
+	struct security_mnt_opts opts;
+
+	security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
+
+	if (!options)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = smack_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_err;
+
+out:
+	rc = smack_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
+
+out_err:
+	security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
  * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
  * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
  *
@@ -2113,7 +2276,7 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 }
 
 /**
-* smack_host_label - check host based restrictions
+* smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
 * @sip: the object end
 *
 * looks for host based access restrictions
@@ -2124,30 +2287,96 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 *
 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
 */
-static struct smack_known *smack_host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
+static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
 {
-	struct smk_netlbladdr *snp;
+	struct smk_net4addr *snp;
 	struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
 
 	if (siap->s_addr == 0)
 		return NULL;
 
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_netlbladdr_list, list)
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list)
+		/*
+		 * we break after finding the first match because
+		 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
+		 * so we have found the most specific match
+		 */
+		if (snp->smk_host.s_addr ==
+		    (siap->s_addr & snp->smk_mask.s_addr))
+			return snp->smk_label;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+/*
+ * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address
+ * @sip: the address
+ *
+ * Returns boolean true if this is the localhost address
+ */
+static bool smk_ipv6_localhost(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
+{
+	__be16 *be16p = (__be16 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
+	__be32 *be32p = (__be32 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
+
+	if (be32p[0] == 0 && be32p[1] == 0 && be32p[2] == 0 && be16p[6] == 0 &&
+	    ntohs(be16p[7]) == 1)
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+* smack_ipv6host_label - check host based restrictions
+* @sip: the object end
+*
+* looks for host based access restrictions
+*
+* This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
+* hosts.  The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
+* taken before calling this function.
+*
+* Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
+*/
+static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
+{
+	struct smk_net6addr *snp;
+	struct in6_addr *sap = &sip->sin6_addr;
+	int i;
+	int found = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * It's local. Don't look for a host label.
+	 */
+	if (smk_ipv6_localhost(sip))
+		return NULL;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
 		/*
 		* we break after finding the first match because
 		* the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
 		* so we have found the most specific match
 		*/
-		if ((&snp->smk_host.sin_addr)->s_addr ==
-		    (siap->s_addr & (&snp->smk_mask)->s_addr)) {
-			/* we have found the special CIPSO option */
-			if (snp->smk_label == &smack_cipso_option)
-				return NULL;
-			return snp->smk_label;
+		for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+			/*
+			 * If the label is NULL the entry has
+			 * been renounced. Ignore it.
+			 */
+			if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
+				continue;
+			if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) !=
+			    snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
+				found = 0;
+				break;
+			}
 		}
+		if (found)
+			return snp->smk_label;
+	}
 
 	return NULL;
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
 
 /**
  * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
@@ -2211,7 +2440,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	hkp = smack_host_label(sap);
+	hkp = smack_ipv4host_label(sap);
 	if (hkp != NULL) {
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 		struct lsm_network_audit net;
@@ -2236,7 +2465,42 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
 	return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl);
 }
 
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+/**
+ * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access
+ * @subject: subject Smack label
+ * @object: object Smack label
+ * @address: address
+ * @act: the action being taken
+ *
+ * Check an IPv6 access
+ */
+static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
+				struct smack_known *object,
+				struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+#endif
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+	ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6;
+	ad.a.u.net->dport = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
+	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
+		ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
+	else
+		ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
+#endif
+	rc = smk_access(subject, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
 /**
  * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
  * @sock: socket
@@ -2320,48 +2584,43 @@ static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
 static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
 				int act)
 {
-	__be16 *bep;
-	__be32 *be32p;
 	struct smk_port_label *spp;
 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
-	struct smack_known *skp;
-	unsigned short port = 0;
+	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
+	unsigned short port;
 	struct smack_known *object;
-	struct smk_audit_info ad;
-	int rc;
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
-	struct lsm_network_audit net;
-#endif
 
 	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
-		skp = smack_net_ambient;
+		skp = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
 		object = ssp->smk_in;
 	} else {
 		skp = ssp->smk_out;
-		object = smack_net_ambient;
+		object = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Get the IP address and port from the address.
+	 * The other end is a single label host.
 	 */
-	port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
-	bep = (__be16 *)(&address->sin6_addr);
-	be32p = (__be32 *)(&address->sin6_addr);
+	if (skp != NULL && object != NULL)
+		return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
+	if (skp == NULL)
+		skp = smack_net_ambient;
+	if (object == NULL)
+		object = smack_net_ambient;
 
 	/*
 	 * It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
 	 */
-	if (be32p[0] || be32p[1] || be32p[2] || bep[6] || ntohs(bep[7]) != 1)
-		goto auditout;
+	if (!smk_ipv6_localhost(address))
+		return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
 
 	/*
 	 * It's local so the send check has to have passed.
 	 */
-	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
-		skp = &smack_known_web;
-		goto auditout;
-	}
+	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
+		return 0;
 
+	port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
 	list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
 		if (spp->smk_port != port)
 			continue;
@@ -2371,22 +2630,9 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
 		break;
 	}
 
-auditout:
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
-	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
-	ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
-	ad.a.u.net->dport = port;
-	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
-		ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
-	else
-		ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
-#endif
-	rc = smk_access(skp, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
-	rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 port check", skp, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
-	return rc;
+	return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
 }
-#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
 
 /**
  * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
@@ -2447,10 +2693,10 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 	} else
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
 	if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
 		smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
-#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -2492,7 +2738,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 	return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
 }
 
-#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
 /**
  * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
  * @sock: the socket
@@ -2506,14 +2752,11 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 				int addrlen)
 {
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 	if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
 		smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
-#endif
-
 	return 0;
 }
-#endif /* !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
 
 /**
  * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
@@ -2529,6 +2772,13 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
 				int addrlen)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+	struct smack_known *rsp;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+#endif
 
 	if (sock->sk == NULL)
 		return 0;
@@ -2542,10 +2792,15 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
 	case PF_INET6:
 		if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
 			return -EINVAL;
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
-		rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap,
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+		rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
+		if (rsp != NULL)
+			rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
 						SMK_CONNECTING);
-#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+		rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
+#endif
 		break;
 	}
 	return rc;
@@ -3431,9 +3686,13 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 				int size)
 {
 	struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 	struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
-#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	struct smack_known *rsp;
+#endif
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -3447,9 +3706,15 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 		rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
 		break;
 	case AF_INET6:
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+		rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap);
+		if (rsp != NULL)
+			rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sap,
+						SMK_CONNECTING);
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
 		rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
-#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif
 		break;
 	}
 	return rc;
@@ -3663,10 +3928,12 @@ access_check:
 		proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
 		if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP)
 			break;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
 		if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
 			skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
 		else
+			skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
+		if (skp == NULL)
 			skp = smack_net_ambient;
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 		smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
@@ -3677,9 +3944,10 @@ access_check:
 		rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 		rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
 					MAY_WRITE, rc);
-#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING */
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
 		rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
 		break;
 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
 	}
@@ -3777,13 +4045,11 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
 		}
 		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
 		break;
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 	case PF_INET6:
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
 		s = skb->secmark;
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif
 		break;
-#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
 	}
 	*secid = s;
 	if (s == 0)
@@ -3906,7 +4172,7 @@ access_check:
 	hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
 	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	hskp = smack_host_label(&addr);
+	hskp = smack_ipv4host_label(&addr);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	if (hskp == NULL)
@@ -4254,7 +4520,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = {
+static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
@@ -4264,6 +4530,8 @@ struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, smack_sb_kern_mount),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, smack_parse_opts_str),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, smack_bprm_committing_creds),
@@ -4356,9 +4624,9 @@ struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
-#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+#endif
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
@@ -4453,7 +4721,16 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	printk(KERN_INFO "Smack:  Initializing.\n");
+	pr_info("Smack:  Initializing.\n");
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+	pr_info("Smack:  Netfilter enabled.\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+	pr_info("Smack:  IPv6 port labeling enabled.\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+	pr_info("Smack:  IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
+#endif
 
 	/*
 	 * Set the security state for the initial task.
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 2716d02..c20b154 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include "smack.h"
 
+#define BEBITS	(sizeof(__be32) * 8)
 /*
  * smackfs pseudo filesystem.
  */
@@ -40,7 +41,7 @@ enum smk_inos {
 	SMK_DOI		= 5,	/* CIPSO DOI */
 	SMK_DIRECT	= 6,	/* CIPSO level indicating direct label */
 	SMK_AMBIENT	= 7,	/* internet ambient label */
-	SMK_NETLBLADDR	= 8,	/* single label hosts */
+	SMK_NET4ADDR	= 8,	/* single label hosts */
 	SMK_ONLYCAP	= 9,	/* the only "capable" label */
 	SMK_LOGGING	= 10,	/* logging */
 	SMK_LOAD_SELF	= 11,	/* task specific rules */
@@ -57,6 +58,9 @@ enum smk_inos {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
 	SMK_UNCONFINED	= 22,	/* define an unconfined label */
 #endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	SMK_NET6ADDR	= 23,	/* single label IPv6 hosts */
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -64,7 +68,10 @@ enum smk_inos {
  */
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_cipso_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ambient_lock);
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_net4addr_lock);
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_net6addr_lock);
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
 
 /*
  * This is the "ambient" label for network traffic.
@@ -118,7 +125,10 @@ int smack_ptrace_rule = SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT;
  * can write to the specified label.
  */
 
-LIST_HEAD(smk_netlbladdr_list);
+LIST_HEAD(smk_net4addr_list);
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+LIST_HEAD(smk_net6addr_list);
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
 
 /*
  * Rule lists are maintained for each label.
@@ -129,7 +139,7 @@ struct smack_master_list {
 	struct smack_rule	*smk_rule;
 };
 
-LIST_HEAD(smack_rule_list);
+static LIST_HEAD(smack_rule_list);
 
 struct smack_parsed_rule {
 	struct smack_known	*smk_subject;
@@ -140,11 +150,6 @@ struct smack_parsed_rule {
 
 static int smk_cipso_doi_value = SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT;
 
-struct smack_known smack_cipso_option = {
-	.smk_known	= SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION,
-	.smk_secid	= 0,
-};
-
 /*
  * Values for parsing cipso rules
  * SMK_DIGITLEN: Length of a digit field in a rule.
@@ -1047,92 +1052,90 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_cipso2_ops = {
  * Seq_file read operations for /smack/netlabel
  */
 
-static void *netlbladdr_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+static void *net4addr_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
 {
-	return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smk_netlbladdr_list);
+	return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smk_net4addr_list);
 }
 
-static void *netlbladdr_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+static void *net4addr_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
 {
-	return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smk_netlbladdr_list);
+	return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smk_net4addr_list);
 }
-#define BEBITS	(sizeof(__be32) * 8)
 
 /*
  * Print host/label pairs
  */
-static int netlbladdr_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+static int net4addr_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 {
 	struct list_head *list = v;
-	struct smk_netlbladdr *skp =
-			list_entry_rcu(list, struct smk_netlbladdr, list);
-	unsigned char *hp = (char *) &skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr;
-	int maskn;
-	u32 temp_mask = be32_to_cpu(skp->smk_mask.s_addr);
-
-	for (maskn = 0; temp_mask; temp_mask <<= 1, maskn++);
+	struct smk_net4addr *skp =
+			list_entry_rcu(list, struct smk_net4addr, list);
+	char *kp = SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION;
 
-	seq_printf(s, "%u.%u.%u.%u/%d %s\n",
-		hp[0], hp[1], hp[2], hp[3], maskn, skp->smk_label->smk_known);
+	if (skp->smk_label != NULL)
+		kp = skp->smk_label->smk_known;
+	seq_printf(s, "%pI4/%d %s\n", &skp->smk_host.s_addr,
+			skp->smk_masks, kp);
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static const struct seq_operations netlbladdr_seq_ops = {
-	.start = netlbladdr_seq_start,
-	.next  = netlbladdr_seq_next,
-	.show  = netlbladdr_seq_show,
+static const struct seq_operations net4addr_seq_ops = {
+	.start = net4addr_seq_start,
+	.next  = net4addr_seq_next,
+	.show  = net4addr_seq_show,
 	.stop  = smk_seq_stop,
 };
 
 /**
- * smk_open_netlbladdr - open() for /smack/netlabel
+ * smk_open_net4addr - open() for /smack/netlabel
  * @inode: inode structure representing file
  * @file: "netlabel" file pointer
  *
- * Connect our netlbladdr_seq_* operations with /smack/netlabel
+ * Connect our net4addr_seq_* operations with /smack/netlabel
  * file_operations
  */
-static int smk_open_netlbladdr(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+static int smk_open_net4addr(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
-	return seq_open(file, &netlbladdr_seq_ops);
+	return seq_open(file, &net4addr_seq_ops);
 }
 
 /**
- * smk_netlbladdr_insert
+ * smk_net4addr_insert
  * @new : netlabel to insert
  *
- * This helper insert netlabel in the smack_netlbladdrs list
+ * This helper insert netlabel in the smack_net4addrs list
  * sorted by netmask length (longest to smallest)
- * locked by &smk_netlbladdr_lock in smk_write_netlbladdr
+ * locked by &smk_net4addr_lock in smk_write_net4addr
  *
  */
-static void smk_netlbladdr_insert(struct smk_netlbladdr *new)
+static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)
 {
-	struct smk_netlbladdr *m, *m_next;
+	struct smk_net4addr *m;
+	struct smk_net4addr *m_next;
 
-	if (list_empty(&smk_netlbladdr_list)) {
-		list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_netlbladdr_list);
+	if (list_empty(&smk_net4addr_list)) {
+		list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_net4addr_list);
 		return;
 	}
 
-	m = list_entry_rcu(smk_netlbladdr_list.next,
-			   struct smk_netlbladdr, list);
+	m = list_entry_rcu(smk_net4addr_list.next,
+			   struct smk_net4addr, list);
 
 	/* the comparison '>' is a bit hacky, but works */
-	if (new->smk_mask.s_addr > m->smk_mask.s_addr) {
-		list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_netlbladdr_list);
+	if (new->smk_masks > m->smk_masks) {
+		list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_net4addr_list);
 		return;
 	}
 
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(m, &smk_netlbladdr_list, list) {
-		if (list_is_last(&m->list, &smk_netlbladdr_list)) {
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(m, &smk_net4addr_list, list) {
+		if (list_is_last(&m->list, &smk_net4addr_list)) {
 			list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
 			return;
 		}
 		m_next = list_entry_rcu(m->list.next,
-					struct smk_netlbladdr, list);
-		if (new->smk_mask.s_addr > m_next->smk_mask.s_addr) {
+					struct smk_net4addr, list);
+		if (new->smk_masks > m_next->smk_masks) {
 			list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
 			return;
 		}
@@ -1141,28 +1144,29 @@ static void smk_netlbladdr_insert(struct smk_netlbladdr *new)
 
 
 /**
- * smk_write_netlbladdr - write() for /smack/netlabel
+ * smk_write_net4addr - write() for /smack/netlabel
  * @file: file pointer, not actually used
  * @buf: where to get the data from
  * @count: bytes sent
  * @ppos: where to start
  *
- * Accepts only one netlbladdr per write call.
+ * Accepts only one net4addr per write call.
  * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
  */
-static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	struct smk_netlbladdr *snp;
+	struct smk_net4addr *snp;
 	struct sockaddr_in newname;
 	char *smack;
-	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
 	char *data;
 	char *host = (char *)&newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
 	int rc;
 	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
 	struct in_addr mask;
 	unsigned int m;
+	unsigned int masks;
 	int found;
 	u32 mask_bits = (1<<31);
 	__be32 nsa;
@@ -1200,7 +1204,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	data[count] = '\0';
 
 	rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd/%u %s",
-		&host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], &m, smack);
+		&host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], &masks, smack);
 	if (rc != 6) {
 		rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd %s",
 			&host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], smack);
@@ -1209,8 +1213,9 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			goto free_out;
 		}
 		m = BEBITS;
+		masks = 32;
 	}
-	if (m > BEBITS) {
+	if (masks > BEBITS) {
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto free_out;
 	}
@@ -1225,16 +1230,16 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			goto free_out;
 		}
 	} else {
-		/* check known options */
-		if (strcmp(smack, smack_cipso_option.smk_known) == 0)
-			skp = &smack_cipso_option;
-		else {
+		/*
+		 * Only the -CIPSO option is supported for IPv4
+		 */
+		if (strcmp(smack, SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION) != 0) {
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 			goto free_out;
 		}
 	}
 
-	for (temp_mask = 0; m > 0; m--) {
+	for (m = masks, temp_mask = 0; m > 0; m--) {
 		temp_mask |= mask_bits;
 		mask_bits >>= 1;
 	}
@@ -1245,14 +1250,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	 * Only allow one writer at a time. Writes should be
 	 * quite rare and small in any case.
 	 */
-	mutex_lock(&smk_netlbladdr_lock);
+	mutex_lock(&smk_net4addr_lock);
 
 	nsa = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
 	/* try to find if the prefix is already in the list */
 	found = 0;
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_netlbladdr_list, list) {
-		if (snp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr == nsa &&
-		    snp->smk_mask.s_addr == mask.s_addr) {
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list) {
+		if (snp->smk_host.s_addr == nsa && snp->smk_masks == masks) {
 			found = 1;
 			break;
 		}
@@ -1265,17 +1269,20 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			rc = -ENOMEM;
 		else {
 			rc = 0;
-			snp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+			snp->smk_host.s_addr = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
 			snp->smk_mask.s_addr = mask.s_addr;
 			snp->smk_label = skp;
-			smk_netlbladdr_insert(snp);
+			snp->smk_masks = masks;
+			smk_net4addr_insert(snp);
 		}
 	} else {
-		/* we delete the unlabeled entry, only if the previous label
-		 * wasn't the special CIPSO option */
-		if (snp->smk_label != &smack_cipso_option)
+		/*
+		 * Delete the unlabeled entry, only if the previous label
+		 * wasn't the special CIPSO option
+		 */
+		if (snp->smk_label != NULL)
 			rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(&init_net, NULL,
-					&snp->smk_host.sin_addr, &snp->smk_mask,
+					&snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask,
 					PF_INET, &audit_info);
 		else
 			rc = 0;
@@ -1287,15 +1294,15 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	 * this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
 	 * but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
 	 */
-	if (rc == 0 && skp != &smack_cipso_option)
+	if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL)
 		rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
-			&snp->smk_host.sin_addr, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
+			&snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
 			snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
 
 	if (rc == 0)
 		rc = count;
 
-	mutex_unlock(&smk_netlbladdr_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&smk_net4addr_lock);
 
 free_out:
 	kfree(smack);
@@ -1305,14 +1312,279 @@ free_data_out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static const struct file_operations smk_netlbladdr_ops = {
-	.open           = smk_open_netlbladdr,
+static const struct file_operations smk_net4addr_ops = {
+	.open           = smk_open_net4addr,
 	.read		= seq_read,
 	.llseek         = seq_lseek,
-	.write		= smk_write_netlbladdr,
+	.write		= smk_write_net4addr,
 	.release        = seq_release,
 };
 
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/netlabel6
+ */
+
+static void *net6addr_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smk_net6addr_list);
+}
+
+static void *net6addr_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smk_net6addr_list);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Print host/label pairs
+ */
+static int net6addr_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+	struct smk_net6addr *skp =
+			 list_entry(list, struct smk_net6addr, list);
+
+	if (skp->smk_label != NULL)
+		seq_printf(s, "%pI6/%d %s\n", &skp->smk_host, skp->smk_masks,
+				skp->smk_label->smk_known);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations net6addr_seq_ops = {
+	.start = net6addr_seq_start,
+	.next  = net6addr_seq_next,
+	.show  = net6addr_seq_show,
+	.stop  = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_net6addr - open() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "netlabel" file pointer
+ *
+ * Connect our net6addr_seq_* operations with /smack/netlabel
+ * file_operations
+ */
+static int smk_open_net6addr(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &net6addr_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_net6addr_insert
+ * @new : entry to insert
+ *
+ * This inserts an entry in the smack_net6addrs list
+ * sorted by netmask length (longest to smallest)
+ * locked by &smk_net6addr_lock in smk_write_net6addr
+ *
+ */
+static void smk_net6addr_insert(struct smk_net6addr *new)
+{
+	struct smk_net6addr *m_next;
+	struct smk_net6addr *m;
+
+	if (list_empty(&smk_net6addr_list)) {
+		list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_net6addr_list);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	m = list_entry_rcu(smk_net6addr_list.next,
+			   struct smk_net6addr, list);
+
+	if (new->smk_masks > m->smk_masks) {
+		list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_net6addr_list);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(m, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
+		if (list_is_last(&m->list, &smk_net6addr_list)) {
+			list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
+			return;
+		}
+		m_next = list_entry_rcu(m->list.next,
+					struct smk_net6addr, list);
+		if (new->smk_masks > m_next->smk_masks) {
+			list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_net6addr - write() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Accepts only one net6addr per write call.
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_net6addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct smk_net6addr *snp;
+	struct in6_addr newname;
+	struct in6_addr fullmask;
+	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
+	char *smack;
+	char *data;
+	int rc = 0;
+	int found = 0;
+	int i;
+	unsigned int scanned[8];
+	unsigned int m;
+	unsigned int mask = 128;
+
+	/*
+	 * Must have privilege.
+	 * No partial writes.
+	 * Enough data must be present.
+	 * "<addr/mask, as a:b:c:d:e:f:g:h/e><space><label>"
+	 * "<addr, as a:b:c:d:e:f:g:h><space><label>"
+	 */
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (data == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+		goto free_data_out;
+	}
+
+	smack = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (smack == NULL) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto free_data_out;
+	}
+
+	data[count] = '\0';
+
+	i = sscanf(data, "%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x/%u %s",
+			&scanned[0], &scanned[1], &scanned[2], &scanned[3],
+			&scanned[4], &scanned[5], &scanned[6], &scanned[7],
+			&mask, smack);
+	if (i != 10) {
+		i = sscanf(data, "%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x %s",
+				&scanned[0], &scanned[1], &scanned[2],
+				&scanned[3], &scanned[4], &scanned[5],
+				&scanned[6], &scanned[7], smack);
+		if (i != 9) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto free_out;
+		}
+	}
+	if (mask > 128) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto free_out;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+		if (scanned[i] > 0xffff) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto free_out;
+		}
+		newname.s6_addr16[i] = htons(scanned[i]);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If smack begins with '-', it is an option, don't import it
+	 */
+	if (smack[0] != '-') {
+		skp = smk_import_entry(smack, 0);
+		if (skp == NULL) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto free_out;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Only -DELETE is supported for IPv6
+		 */
+		if (strcmp(smack, SMACK_DELETE_OPTION) != 0) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto free_out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0, m = mask; i < 8; i++) {
+		if (m >= 16) {
+			fullmask.s6_addr16[i] = 0xffff;
+			m -= 16;
+		} else if (m > 0) {
+			fullmask.s6_addr16[i] = (1 << m) - 1;
+			m = 0;
+		} else
+			fullmask.s6_addr16[i] = 0;
+		newname.s6_addr16[i] &= fullmask.s6_addr16[i];
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Only allow one writer at a time. Writes should be
+	 * quite rare and small in any case.
+	 */
+	mutex_lock(&smk_net6addr_lock);
+	/*
+	 * Try to find the prefix in the list
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
+		if (mask != snp->smk_masks)
+			continue;
+		for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+			if (newname.s6_addr16[i] !=
+			    snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
+				found = 0;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (found == 1)
+			break;
+	}
+	if (found == 0) {
+		snp = kzalloc(sizeof(*snp), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (snp == NULL)
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+		else {
+			snp->smk_host = newname;
+			snp->smk_mask = fullmask;
+			snp->smk_masks = mask;
+			snp->smk_label = skp;
+			smk_net6addr_insert(snp);
+		}
+	} else {
+		snp->smk_label = skp;
+	}
+
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = count;
+
+	mutex_unlock(&smk_net6addr_lock);
+
+free_out:
+	kfree(smack);
+free_data_out:
+	kfree(data);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_net6addr_ops = {
+	.open           = smk_open_net6addr,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek         = seq_lseek,
+	.write		= smk_write_net6addr,
+	.release        = seq_release,
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
 /**
  * smk_read_doi - read() for /smack/doi
  * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
@@ -2320,11 +2592,7 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_revoke_subj_ops = {
  */
 static int smk_init_sysfs(void)
 {
-	int err;
-	err = sysfs_create_mount_point(fs_kobj, "smackfs");
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-	return 0;
+	return sysfs_create_mount_point(fs_kobj, "smackfs");
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2519,8 +2787,8 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 			"direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		[SMK_AMBIENT] = {
 			"ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-		[SMK_NETLBLADDR] = {
-			"netlabel", &smk_netlbladdr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_NET4ADDR] = {
+			"netlabel", &smk_net4addr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		[SMK_ONLYCAP] = {
 			"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		[SMK_LOGGING] = {
@@ -2552,6 +2820,10 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 		[SMK_UNCONFINED] = {
 			"unconfined", &smk_unconfined_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 #endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+		[SMK_NET6ADDR] = {
+			"ipv6host", &smk_net6addr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
 		/* last one */
 			{""}
 	};
diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig
index 3123e1d..90c605e 100644
--- a/security/yama/Kconfig
+++ b/security/yama/Kconfig
@@ -6,14 +6,7 @@ config SECURITY_YAMA
 	  This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional
 	  system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary
 	  access controls. Currently available is ptrace scope restriction.
+	  Like capabilities, this security module stacks with other LSMs.
 	  Further information can be found in Documentation/security/Yama.txt.
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-
-config SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
-	bool "Yama stacked with other LSMs"
-	depends on SECURITY_YAMA
-	default n
-	help
-	  When Yama is built into the kernel, force it to stack with the
-	  selected primary LSM.
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 5ebb896..d3c19c9 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -353,11 +353,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, yama_task_free),
 };
 
-void __init yama_add_hooks(void)
-{
-	security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks));
-}
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
 static int yama_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 				void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -396,26 +391,18 @@ static struct ctl_table yama_sysctl_table[] = {
 	},
 	{ }
 };
-#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
-
-static __init int yama_init(void)
+static void __init yama_init_sysctl(void)
 {
-#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
-	/*
-	 * If yama is being stacked this is already taken care of.
-	 */
-	if (!security_module_enable("yama"))
-		return 0;
-	yama_add_hooks();
-#endif
-	pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
 	if (!register_sysctl_paths(yama_sysctl_path, yama_sysctl_table))
 		panic("Yama: sysctl registration failed.\n");
-#endif
-
-	return 0;
 }
+#else
+static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
 
-security_initcall(yama_init);
+void __init yama_add_hooks(void)
+{
+	pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
+	security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks));
+	yama_init_sysctl();
+}