Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

Pull second set of VFS changes from Al Viro:
 "Assorted f_pos race fixes, making do_splice_direct() safe to call with
  i_mutex on parent, O_TMPFILE support, Jeff's locks.c series,
  ->d_hash/->d_compare calling conventions changes from Linus, misc
  stuff all over the place."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
  Document ->tmpfile()
  ext4: ->tmpfile() support
  vfs: export lseek_execute() to modules
  lseek_execute() doesn't need an inode passed to it
  block_dev: switch to fixed_size_llseek()
  cpqphp_sysfs: switch to fixed_size_llseek()
  tile-srom: switch to fixed_size_llseek()
  proc_powerpc: switch to fixed_size_llseek()
  ubi/cdev: switch to fixed_size_llseek()
  pci/proc: switch to fixed_size_llseek()
  isapnp: switch to fixed_size_llseek()
  lpfc: switch to fixed_size_llseek()
  locks: give the blocked_hash its own spinlock
  locks: add a new "lm_owner_key" lock operation
  locks: turn the blocked_list into a hashtable
  locks: convert fl_link to a hlist_node
  locks: avoid taking global lock if possible when waking up blocked waiters
  locks: protect most of the file_lock handling with i_lock
  locks: encapsulate the fl_link list handling
  locks: make "added" in __posix_lock_file a bool
  ...

2 files changed, 19 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 6c491a6..e9508d5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
 static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
 {
 	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
-	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
 	int must_measure;
 	bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5c6f2cd..db1fca9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1547,6 +1547,18 @@ static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
 }
 
+/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
+static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+				     struct file *file,
+				     u32 av)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+	ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad, 0);
+}
+
 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
    access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
    descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
@@ -2141,14 +2153,14 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
 			struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
 
 			/* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
-			   Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather
-			   than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
-			   file may belong to another process and we are only
-			   interested in the inode-based check here. */
+			   Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
+			   rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
+			   open file may belong to another process and we are
+			   only interested in the inode-based check here. */
 			file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
 						struct tty_file_private, list);
 			file = file_priv->file;
-			if (path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
+			if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
 				drop_tty = 1;
 		}
 		spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
@@ -3259,7 +3271,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 	 * new inode label or new policy.
 	 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
 	 */
-	return path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, open_file_to_av(file));
+	return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
 }
 
 /* task security operations */