Merge tag 'keys-next-20170412' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next

12 files changed, 568 insertions, 49 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 106e855..06554c4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -81,18 +81,25 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct key_restriction *restriction;
 	int err = 0;
 
 	if (!init_keyring)
 		return 0;
 
+	restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_restriction), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!restriction)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;
+
 	keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0),
 				    KGIDT_INIT(0), cred,
 				    ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
 				     KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
 				     KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
 				    KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
-				    restrict_link_to_ima, NULL);
+				    restriction, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
 		err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
 		pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%d)\n",
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c
index 74a27995..073ddc9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/cred.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <keys/system_keyring.h>
 
 
@@ -27,15 +28,23 @@ struct key *ima_blacklist_keyring;
  */
 __init int ima_mok_init(void)
 {
+	struct key_restriction *restriction;
+
 	pr_notice("Allocating IMA blacklist keyring.\n");
 
+	restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_restriction), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!restriction)
+		panic("Can't allocate IMA blacklist restriction.");
+
+	restriction->check = restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted;
+
 	ima_blacklist_keyring = keyring_alloc(".ima_blacklist",
 				KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
 				(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
 				KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
 				KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH,
 				KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
-				restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted, NULL);
+				restriction, NULL);
 
 	if (IS_ERR(ima_blacklist_keyring))
 		panic("Can't allocate IMA blacklist keyring.");
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index d942c7c..6fd95f7 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ config KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
        bool "Diffie-Hellman operations on retained keys"
        depends on KEYS
        select MPILIB
+       select CRYPTO
+       select CRYPTO_HASH
        help
 	 This option provides support for calculating Diffie-Hellman
 	 public keys and shared secrets using values stored as keys
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
index 1fd4a16..57dff0c 100644
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ obj-y := \
 	request_key.o \
 	request_key_auth.o \
 	user_defined.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o
+compat-obj-$(CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS) += compat_dh.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o $(compat-obj-y)
 obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS) += persistent.o
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index 36c80bf..e87c89c 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -133,8 +133,13 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, u32, option,
 		return keyctl_get_persistent(arg2, arg3);
 
 	case KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE:
-		return keyctl_dh_compute(compat_ptr(arg2), compat_ptr(arg3),
-					 arg4, compat_ptr(arg5));
+		return compat_keyctl_dh_compute(compat_ptr(arg2),
+						compat_ptr(arg3),
+						arg4, compat_ptr(arg5));
+
+	case KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING:
+		return keyctl_restrict_keyring(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3),
+					       compat_ptr(arg4));
 
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
diff --git a/security/keys/compat_dh.c b/security/keys/compat_dh.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6a659b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/compat_dh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/* 32-bit compatibility syscall for 64-bit systems for DH operations
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Perform the DH computation or DH based key derivation.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long compat_keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+			      char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+			      struct compat_keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
+{
+	struct keyctl_kdf_params kdfcopy;
+	struct compat_keyctl_kdf_params compat_kdfcopy;
+
+	if (!kdf)
+		return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, NULL);
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&compat_kdfcopy, kdf, sizeof(compat_kdfcopy)) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	kdfcopy.hashname = compat_ptr(compat_kdfcopy.hashname);
+	kdfcopy.otherinfo = compat_ptr(compat_kdfcopy.otherinfo);
+	kdfcopy.otherinfolen = compat_kdfcopy.otherinfolen;
+
+	return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, &kdfcopy);
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/dh.c b/security/keys/dh.c
index 893af4c..e603bd9 100644
--- a/security/keys/dh.c
+++ b/security/keys/dh.c
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
 #include <linux/mpi.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <keys/user-type.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
@@ -77,9 +79,146 @@ error:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
-		       char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
-		       void __user *reserved)
+struct kdf_sdesc {
+	struct shash_desc shash;
+	char ctx[];
+};
+
+static int kdf_alloc(struct kdf_sdesc **sdesc_ret, char *hashname)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc;
+	int size;
+
+	/* allocate synchronous hash */
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hashname, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		pr_info("could not allocate digest TFM handle %s\n", hashname);
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+	}
+
+	size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm);
+	sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sdesc)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	sdesc->shash.tfm = tfm;
+	sdesc->shash.flags = 0x0;
+
+	*sdesc_ret = sdesc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void kdf_dealloc(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc)
+{
+	if (!sdesc)
+		return;
+
+	if (sdesc->shash.tfm)
+		crypto_free_shash(sdesc->shash.tfm);
+
+	kzfree(sdesc);
+}
+
+/* convert 32 bit integer into its string representation */
+static inline void crypto_kw_cpu_to_be32(u32 val, u8 *buf)
+{
+	__be32 *a = (__be32 *)buf;
+
+	*a = cpu_to_be32(val);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Implementation of the KDF in counter mode according to SP800-108 section 5.1
+ * as well as SP800-56A section 5.8.1 (Single-step KDF).
+ *
+ * SP800-56A:
+ * The src pointer is defined as Z || other info where Z is the shared secret
+ * from DH and other info is an arbitrary string (see SP800-56A section
+ * 5.8.1.2).
+ */
+static int kdf_ctr(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
+		   u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen)
+{
+	struct shash_desc *desc = &sdesc->shash;
+	unsigned int h = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
+	int err = 0;
+	u8 *dst_orig = dst;
+	u32 i = 1;
+	u8 iteration[sizeof(u32)];
+
+	while (dlen) {
+		err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+		if (err)
+			goto err;
+
+		crypto_kw_cpu_to_be32(i, iteration);
+		err = crypto_shash_update(desc, iteration, sizeof(u32));
+		if (err)
+			goto err;
+
+		if (src && slen) {
+			err = crypto_shash_update(desc, src, slen);
+			if (err)
+				goto err;
+		}
+
+		if (dlen < h) {
+			u8 tmpbuffer[h];
+
+			err = crypto_shash_final(desc, tmpbuffer);
+			if (err)
+				goto err;
+			memcpy(dst, tmpbuffer, dlen);
+			memzero_explicit(tmpbuffer, h);
+			return 0;
+		} else {
+			err = crypto_shash_final(desc, dst);
+			if (err)
+				goto err;
+
+			dlen -= h;
+			dst += h;
+			i++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+err:
+	memzero_explicit(dst_orig, dlen);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc,
+				 char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+				 uint8_t *kbuf, size_t kbuflen)
+{
+	uint8_t *outbuf = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	outbuf = kmalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!outbuf) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	ret = kdf_ctr(sdesc, kbuf, kbuflen, outbuf, buflen);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
+
+	ret = buflen;
+	if (copy_to_user(buffer, outbuf, buflen) != 0)
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+
+err:
+	kzfree(outbuf);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+			 char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+			 struct keyctl_kdf_params *kdfcopy)
 {
 	long ret;
 	MPI base, private, prime, result;
@@ -88,6 +227,7 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
 	uint8_t *kbuf;
 	ssize_t keylen;
 	size_t resultlen;
+	struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc = NULL;
 
 	if (!params || (!buffer && buflen)) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -98,12 +238,34 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (reserved) {
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
+	if (kdfcopy) {
+		char *hashname;
+
+		if (buflen > KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OUTPUT_LEN ||
+		    kdfcopy->otherinfolen > KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OI_LEN) {
+			ret = -EMSGSIZE;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		/* get KDF name string */
+		hashname = strndup_user(kdfcopy->hashname, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
+		if (IS_ERR(hashname)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(hashname);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		/* allocate KDF from the kernel crypto API */
+		ret = kdf_alloc(&sdesc, hashname);
+		kfree(hashname);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
 	}
 
-	keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.prime, buflen, &prime);
+	/*
+	 * If the caller requests postprocessing with a KDF, allow an
+	 * arbitrary output buffer size since the KDF ensures proper truncation.
+	 */
+	keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.prime, kdfcopy ? SIZE_MAX : buflen, &prime);
 	if (keylen < 0 || !prime) {
 		/* buflen == 0 may be used to query the required buffer size,
 		 * which is the prime key length.
@@ -133,12 +295,25 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
 		goto error3;
 	}
 
-	kbuf = kmalloc(resultlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	/* allocate space for DH shared secret and SP800-56A otherinfo */
+	kbuf = kmalloc(kdfcopy ? (resultlen + kdfcopy->otherinfolen) : resultlen,
+		       GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!kbuf) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto error4;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Concatenate SP800-56A otherinfo past DH shared secret -- the
+	 * input to the KDF is (DH shared secret || otherinfo)
+	 */
+	if (kdfcopy && kdfcopy->otherinfo &&
+	    copy_from_user(kbuf + resultlen, kdfcopy->otherinfo,
+			   kdfcopy->otherinfolen) != 0) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto error5;
+	}
+
 	ret = do_dh(result, base, private, prime);
 	if (ret)
 		goto error5;
@@ -147,12 +322,17 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
 	if (ret != 0)
 		goto error5;
 
-	ret = nbytes;
-	if (copy_to_user(buffer, kbuf, nbytes) != 0)
-		ret = -EFAULT;
+	if (kdfcopy) {
+		ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(sdesc, buffer, buflen, kbuf,
+					    resultlen + kdfcopy->otherinfolen);
+	} else {
+		ret = nbytes;
+		if (copy_to_user(buffer, kbuf, nbytes) != 0)
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+	}
 
 error5:
-	kfree(kbuf);
+	kzfree(kbuf);
 error4:
 	mpi_free(result);
 error3:
@@ -162,5 +342,21 @@ error2:
 error1:
 	mpi_free(prime);
 out:
+	kdf_dealloc(sdesc);
 	return ret;
 }
+
+long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+		       char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+		       struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
+{
+	struct keyctl_kdf_params kdfcopy;
+
+	if (!kdf)
+		return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, NULL);
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&kdfcopy, kdf, sizeof(kdfcopy)) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, &kdfcopy);
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index 4478925..15b9ddf 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -229,6 +229,9 @@ continue_scanning:
 				set_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags);
 				key->perm = 0;
 				goto skip_dead_key;
+			} else if (key->type == &key_type_keyring &&
+				   key->restrict_link) {
+				goto found_restricted_keyring;
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -334,6 +337,14 @@ found_unreferenced_key:
 	gc_state |= KEY_GC_REAP_AGAIN;
 	goto maybe_resched;
 
+	/* We found a restricted keyring and need to update the restriction if
+	 * it is associated with the dead key type.
+	 */
+found_restricted_keyring:
+	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+	keyring_restriction_gc(key, key_gc_dead_keytype);
+	goto maybe_resched;
+
 	/* We found a keyring and we need to check the payload for links to
 	 * dead or expired keys.  We don't flag another reap immediately as we
 	 * have to wait for the old payload to be destroyed by RCU before we
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 6bee06a..c0f8682 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/task_work.h>
 #include <linux/keyctl.h>
 #include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
 
 struct iovec;
 
@@ -168,6 +169,8 @@ extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork);
 extern struct work_struct key_gc_work;
 extern unsigned key_gc_delay;
 extern void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit);
+extern void keyring_restriction_gc(struct key *keyring,
+				   struct key_type *dead_type);
 extern void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at);
 extern void key_schedule_gc_links(void);
 extern void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype);
@@ -250,6 +253,9 @@ struct iov_iter;
 extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t,
 					  struct iov_iter *,
 					  key_serial_t);
+extern long keyctl_restrict_keyring(key_serial_t id,
+				    const char __user *_type,
+				    const char __user *_restriction);
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
 extern long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t, key_serial_t);
 extern unsigned persistent_keyring_expiry;
@@ -262,15 +268,34 @@ static inline long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t uid, key_serial_t destring)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
 extern long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *, char __user *,
-			      size_t, void __user *);
+			      size_t, struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *);
+extern long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *, char __user *,
+				size_t, struct keyctl_kdf_params *);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT
+extern long compat_keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+				char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+				struct compat_keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf);
+#endif
+#define KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OUTPUT_LEN	1024	/* max length of KDF output */
+#define KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OI_LEN		64	/* max length of otherinfo */
 #else
 static inline long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
 				     char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
-				     void __user *reserved)
+				     struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT
+static inline long compat_keyctl_dh_compute(
+				struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+				char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+				struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 #endif
+#endif
 
 /*
  * Debugging key validation
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index b4958b3..455c04d 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -201,12 +201,15 @@ serial_exists:
  * @cred: The credentials specifying UID namespace.
  * @perm: The permissions mask of the new key.
  * @flags: Flags specifying quota properties.
- * @restrict_link: Optional link restriction method for new keyrings.
+ * @restrict_link: Optional link restriction for new keyrings.
  *
  * Allocate a key of the specified type with the attributes given.  The key is
  * returned in an uninstantiated state and the caller needs to instantiate the
  * key before returning.
  *
+ * The restrict_link structure (if not NULL) will be freed when the
+ * keyring is destroyed, so it must be dynamically allocated.
+ *
  * The user's key count quota is updated to reflect the creation of the key and
  * the user's key data quota has the default for the key type reserved.  The
  * instantiation function should amend this as necessary.  If insufficient
@@ -225,9 +228,7 @@ serial_exists:
 struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 		      kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, const struct cred *cred,
 		      key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags,
-		      int (*restrict_link)(struct key *,
-					   const struct key_type *,
-					   const union key_payload *))
+		      struct key_restriction *restrict_link)
 {
 	struct key_user *user = NULL;
 	struct key *key;
@@ -499,19 +500,23 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
 	}
 
 	if (keyring) {
-		if (keyring->restrict_link) {
-			ret = keyring->restrict_link(keyring, key->type,
-						     &prep.payload);
-			if (ret < 0)
-				goto error;
-		}
 		ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto error;
+
+		if (keyring->restrict_link && keyring->restrict_link->check) {
+			struct key_restriction *keyres = keyring->restrict_link;
+
+			ret = keyres->check(keyring, key->type, &prep.payload,
+					    keyres->key);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				goto error_link_end;
+		}
 	}
 
 	ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, authkey, &edit);
 
+error_link_end:
 	if (keyring)
 		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
 
@@ -806,9 +811,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	struct key *keyring, *key = NULL;
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
 	int ret;
-	int (*restrict_link)(struct key *,
-			     const struct key_type *,
-			     const union key_payload *) = NULL;
+	struct key_restriction *restrict_link = NULL;
 
 	/* look up the key type to see if it's one of the registered kernel
 	 * types */
@@ -854,20 +857,21 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	}
 	index_key.desc_len = strlen(index_key.description);
 
-	if (restrict_link) {
-		ret = restrict_link(keyring, index_key.type, &prep.payload);
-		if (ret < 0) {
-			key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
-			goto error_free_prep;
-		}
-	}
-
 	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &index_key, &edit);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
 		goto error_free_prep;
 	}
 
+	if (restrict_link && restrict_link->check) {
+		ret = restrict_link->check(keyring, index_key.type,
+					   &prep.payload, restrict_link->key);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
+			goto error_link_end;
+		}
+	}
+
 	/* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have
 	 * to modify the keyring */
 	ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 52c3453..10fcea1 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1583,6 +1583,59 @@ error_keyring:
 }
 
 /*
+ * Apply a restriction to a given keyring.
+ *
+ * The caller must have Setattr permission to change keyring restrictions.
+ *
+ * The requested type name may be a NULL pointer to reject all attempts
+ * to link to the keyring. If _type is non-NULL, _restriction can be
+ * NULL or a pointer to a string describing the restriction. If _type is
+ * NULL, _restriction must also be NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful.
+ */
+long keyctl_restrict_keyring(key_serial_t id, const char __user *_type,
+			     const char __user *_restriction)
+{
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	bool link_reject = !_type;
+	char type[32];
+	char *restriction = NULL;
+	long ret;
+
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
+		return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+
+	if (_type) {
+		ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+	}
+
+	if (_restriction) {
+		if (!_type) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		restriction = strndup_user(_restriction, PAGE_SIZE);
+		if (IS_ERR(restriction)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(restriction);
+			goto error;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = keyring_restrict(key_ref, link_reject ? NULL : type, restriction);
+	kfree(restriction);
+
+error:
+	key_ref_put(key_ref);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
  * The key control system call
  */
 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
@@ -1691,7 +1744,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
 	case KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE:
 		return keyctl_dh_compute((struct keyctl_dh_params __user *) arg2,
 					 (char __user *) arg3, (size_t) arg4,
-					 (void __user *) arg5);
+					 (struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *) arg5);
+
+	case KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING:
+		return keyctl_restrict_keyring((key_serial_t) arg2,
+					       (const char __user *) arg3,
+					       (const char __user *) arg4);
 
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 3d95f7d..4d1678e4 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -394,6 +394,13 @@ static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring)
 		write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock);
 	}
 
+	if (keyring->restrict_link) {
+		struct key_restriction *keyres = keyring->restrict_link;
+
+		key_put(keyres->key);
+		kfree(keyres);
+	}
+
 	assoc_array_destroy(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops);
 }
 
@@ -492,9 +499,7 @@ static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
 struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,
 			  const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm,
 			  unsigned long flags,
-			  int (*restrict_link)(struct key *,
-					       const struct key_type *,
-					       const union key_payload *),
+			  struct key_restriction *restrict_link,
 			  struct key *dest)
 {
 	struct key *keyring;
@@ -519,17 +524,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_alloc);
  * @keyring: The keyring being added to.
  * @type: The type of key being added.
  * @payload: The payload of the key intended to be added.
+ * @data: Additional data for evaluating restriction.
  *
  * Reject the addition of any links to a keyring.  It can be overridden by
  * passing KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION to key_instantiate_and_link() when
  * adding a key to a keyring.
  *
- * This is meant to be passed as the restrict_link parameter to
- * keyring_alloc().
+ * This is meant to be stored in a key_restriction structure which is passed
+ * in the restrict_link parameter to keyring_alloc().
  */
 int restrict_link_reject(struct key *keyring,
 			 const struct key_type *type,
-			 const union key_payload *payload)
+			 const union key_payload *payload,
+			 struct key *restriction_key)
 {
 	return -EPERM;
 }
@@ -940,6 +947,111 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search);
 
+static struct key_restriction *keyring_restriction_alloc(
+	key_restrict_link_func_t check)
+{
+	struct key_restriction *keyres =
+		kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_restriction), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (!keyres)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	keyres->check = check;
+
+	return keyres;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Semaphore to serialise restriction setup to prevent reference count
+ * cycles through restriction key pointers.
+ */
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(keyring_serialise_restrict_sem);
+
+/*
+ * Check for restriction cycles that would prevent keyring garbage collection.
+ * keyring_serialise_restrict_sem must be held.
+ */
+static bool keyring_detect_restriction_cycle(const struct key *dest_keyring,
+					     struct key_restriction *keyres)
+{
+	while (keyres && keyres->key &&
+	       keyres->key->type == &key_type_keyring) {
+		if (keyres->key == dest_keyring)
+			return true;
+
+		keyres = keyres->key->restrict_link;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * keyring_restrict - Look up and apply a restriction to a keyring
+ *
+ * @keyring: The keyring to be restricted
+ * @restriction: The restriction options to apply to the keyring
+ */
+int keyring_restrict(key_ref_t keyring_ref, const char *type,
+		     const char *restriction)
+{
+	struct key *keyring;
+	struct key_type *restrict_type = NULL;
+	struct key_restriction *restrict_link;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
+	key_check(keyring);
+
+	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
+		return -ENOTDIR;
+
+	if (!type) {
+		restrict_link = keyring_restriction_alloc(restrict_link_reject);
+	} else {
+		restrict_type = key_type_lookup(type);
+
+		if (IS_ERR(restrict_type))
+			return PTR_ERR(restrict_type);
+
+		if (!restrict_type->lookup_restriction) {
+			ret = -ENOENT;
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		restrict_link = restrict_type->lookup_restriction(restriction);
+	}
+
+	if (IS_ERR(restrict_link)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(restrict_link);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	down_write(&keyring->sem);
+	down_write(&keyring_serialise_restrict_sem);
+
+	if (keyring->restrict_link)
+		ret = -EEXIST;
+	else if (keyring_detect_restriction_cycle(keyring, restrict_link))
+		ret = -EDEADLK;
+	else
+		keyring->restrict_link = restrict_link;
+
+	up_write(&keyring_serialise_restrict_sem);
+	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		key_put(restrict_link->key);
+		kfree(restrict_link);
+	}
+
+error:
+	if (restrict_type)
+		key_type_put(restrict_type);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_restrict);
+
 /*
  * Search the given keyring for a key that might be updated.
  *
@@ -1220,9 +1332,10 @@ void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
  */
 static int __key_link_check_restriction(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
 {
-	if (!keyring->restrict_link)
+	if (!keyring->restrict_link || !keyring->restrict_link->check)
 		return 0;
-	return keyring->restrict_link(keyring, key->type, &key->payload);
+	return keyring->restrict_link->check(keyring, key->type, &key->payload,
+					     keyring->restrict_link->key);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1426,3 +1539,53 @@ do_gc:
 	up_write(&keyring->sem);
 	kleave(" [gc]");
 }
+
+/*
+ * Garbage collect restriction pointers from a keyring.
+ *
+ * Keyring restrictions are associated with a key type, and must be cleaned
+ * up if the key type is unregistered. The restriction is altered to always
+ * reject additional keys so a keyring cannot be opened up by unregistering
+ * a key type.
+ *
+ * Not called with any keyring locks held. The keyring's key struct will not
+ * be deallocated under us as only our caller may deallocate it.
+ *
+ * The caller is required to hold key_types_sem and dead_type->sem. This is
+ * fulfilled by key_gc_keytype() holding the locks on behalf of
+ * key_garbage_collector(), which it invokes on a workqueue.
+ */
+void keyring_restriction_gc(struct key *keyring, struct key_type *dead_type)
+{
+	struct key_restriction *keyres;
+
+	kenter("%x{%s}", keyring->serial, keyring->description ?: "");
+
+	/*
+	 * keyring->restrict_link is only assigned at key allocation time
+	 * or with the key type locked, so the only values that could be
+	 * concurrently assigned to keyring->restrict_link are for key
+	 * types other than dead_type. Given this, it's ok to check
+	 * the key type before acquiring keyring->sem.
+	 */
+	if (!dead_type || !keyring->restrict_link ||
+	    keyring->restrict_link->keytype != dead_type) {
+		kleave(" [no restriction gc]");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Lock the keyring to ensure that a link is not in progress */
+	down_write(&keyring->sem);
+
+	keyres = keyring->restrict_link;
+
+	keyres->check = restrict_link_reject;
+
+	key_put(keyres->key);
+	keyres->key = NULL;
+	keyres->keytype = NULL;
+
+	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+
+	kleave(" [restriction gc]");
+}