Merge branch 'master' of /home/trondmy/kernel/linux-2.6/

12 files changed, 341 insertions, 123 deletions

diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 8cccccc..64f6da0 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -810,6 +810,11 @@ static void dummy_xfrm_policy_free_security(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
 {
 }
 
+static int dummy_xfrm_policy_delete_security(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int dummy_xfrm_state_alloc_security(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -819,6 +824,11 @@ static void dummy_xfrm_state_free_security(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
 }
 
+static int dummy_xfrm_state_delete_security(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int dummy_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -1024,8 +1034,10 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_clone_security);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_free_security);
+	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_delete_security);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_alloc_security);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_free_security);
+	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_delete_security);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_lookup);
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index f636f53..814ddc4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 config SECURITY_SELINUX
 	bool "NSA SELinux Support"
 	depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET
+	select NETWORK_SECMARK
 	default n
 	help
 	  This selects NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux).
@@ -95,3 +96,31 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE
 	  via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy.
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT
+	bool "NSA SELinux enable new secmark network controls by default"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default n
+	help
+	  This option determines whether the new secmark-based network
+	  controls will be enabled by default.  If not, the old internal
+	  per-packet controls will be enabled by default, preserving
+	  old behavior.
+
+	  If you enable the new controls, you will need updated
+	  SELinux userspace libraries, tools and policy.  Typically,
+	  your distribution will provide these and enable the new controls
+	  in the kernel they also distribute.
+
+	  Note that this option can be overriden at boot with the
+	  selinux_compat_net parameter, and after boot via
+	  /selinux/compat_net.  See Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+	  for details on this parameter.
+
+	  If you enable the new network controls, you will likely
+	  also require the SECMARK and CONNSECMARK targets, as
+	  well as any conntrack helpers for protocols which you
+	  wish to control.
+
+	  If you are unsure what do do here, select N.
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
index ae4c73e..9d7737d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/exports.c
+++ b/security/selinux/exports.c
@@ -72,3 +72,25 @@ void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid)
 	*sid = 0;
 }
 
+int selinux_string_to_sid(char *str, u32 *sid)
+{
+	if (selinux_enabled)
+		return security_context_to_sid(str, strlen(str), sid);
+	else {
+		*sid = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_string_to_sid);
+
+int selinux_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid)
+{
+	if (selinux_enabled) {
+		struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+
+		return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+				    PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_relabel_packet_permission);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 90b4cdc..54adc9d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
 
 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
+extern int selinux_compat_net;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
@@ -696,6 +697,8 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
 		return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
 	case PF_KEY:
 		return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
+	case PF_APPLETALK:
+		return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
 	}
 
 	return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
@@ -3214,47 +3217,17 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+		struct avc_audit_data *ad, u32 sock_sid, u16 sock_class,
+		u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
 {
-	u16 family;
-	char *addrp;
-	int len, err = 0;
+	int err = 0;
 	u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
-	u32 sock_sid = 0;
-	u16 sock_class = 0;
-	struct socket *sock;
-	struct net_device *dev;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
-
-	family = sk->sk_family;
-	if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
-		goto out;
-
-	/* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
-	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
-		family = PF_INET;
-
- 	read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
- 	sock = sk->sk_socket;
- 	if (sock) {
- 		struct inode *inode;
- 		inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
- 		if (inode) {
- 			struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- 			isec = inode->i_security;
- 			sock_sid = isec->sid;
- 			sock_class = isec->sclass;
- 		}
- 	}
- 	read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
- 	if (!sock_sid)
-  		goto out;
 
-	dev = skb->dev;
-	if (!dev)
+	if (!skb->dev)
 		goto out;
 
-	err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
+	err = sel_netif_sids(skb->dev, &if_sid, NULL);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -3277,44 +3250,88 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		break;
 	}
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-	ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
-	ad.u.net.family = family;
-
-	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-	err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, &ad);
+	err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 	
-	/* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
 	err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 	
-	err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, &ad);
+	err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
 	if (recv_perm) {
 		u32 port_sid;
 
-		/* Fixme: make this more efficient */
 		err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
-		                        sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad.u.net.sport),
+		                        sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
 		                        &port_sid);
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
 
 		err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
-				   sock_class, recv_perm, &ad);
+				   sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
 	}
 
-	if (!err)
-		err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb);
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	u16 family;
+	u16 sock_class = 0;
+	char *addrp;
+	int len, err = 0;
+	u32 sock_sid = 0;
+	struct socket *sock;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+	family = sk->sk_family;
+	if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
+		family = PF_INET;
+
+ 	read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ 	sock = sk->sk_socket;
+ 	if (sock) {
+ 		struct inode *inode;
+ 		inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
+ 		if (inode) {
+ 			struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ 			isec = inode->i_security;
+ 			sock_sid = isec->sid;
+ 			sock_class = isec->sclass;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ 	if (!sock_sid)
+  		goto out;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]";
+	ad.u.net.family = family;
+
+	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (selinux_compat_net)
+		err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, sock_sid,
+						  sock_class, family,
+						  addrp, len);
+	else
+		err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
 
+	err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb);
 out:	
 	return err;
 }
@@ -3454,42 +3471,18 @@ out:
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
 
-static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
-                                              struct sk_buff **pskb,
-                                              const struct net_device *in,
-                                              const struct net_device *out,
-                                              int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
-                                              u16 family)
+static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
+					    struct inode_security_struct *isec,
+					    struct avc_audit_data *ad,
+					    u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
 {
-	char *addrp;
-	int len, err = NF_ACCEPT;
+	int err;
 	u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
-	struct sock *sk;
-	struct socket *sock;
-	struct inode *inode;
-	struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
-	struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
 	
-	sk = skb->sk;
-	if (!sk)
-		goto out;
-		
-	sock = sk->sk_socket;
-	if (!sock)
-		goto out;
-		
-	inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
-	if (!inode)
-		goto out;
-
 	err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
-	isec = inode->i_security;
-	
 	switch (isec->sclass) {
 	case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
 		netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
@@ -3509,55 +3502,88 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
 		break;
 	}
 
-
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-	ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
-	ad.u.net.family = family;
-
-	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp,
-				&len, 0) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
-	if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
-		goto out;
-
-	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF,
-	                   netif_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
-	if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
+	if (err)
 		goto out;
 		
-	/* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
-	err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len,
-				&node_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
-	if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+	err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
+	if (err)
 		goto out;
 	
-	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE,
-	                   node_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
-	if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
+	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
 	if (send_perm) {
 		u32 port_sid;
 		
-		/* Fixme: make this more efficient */
 		err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
 		                        sk->sk_type,
 		                        sk->sk_protocol,
-		                        ntohs(ad.u.net.dport),
-		                        &port_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
-		if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+		                        ntohs(ad->u.net.dport),
+		                        &port_sid);
+		if (err)
 			goto out;
 
 		err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
-		                   send_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
+				   send_perm, ad);
 	}
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
+                                              struct sk_buff **pskb,
+                                              const struct net_device *in,
+                                              const struct net_device *out,
+                                              int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
+                                              u16 family)
+{
+	char *addrp;
+	int len, err = 0;
+	struct sock *sk;
+	struct socket *sock;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
 
-	if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+	sk = skb->sk;
+	if (!sk)
 		goto out;
 
-	err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb);
+	sock = sk->sk_socket;
+	if (!sock)
+		goto out;
+
+	inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
+	if (!inode)
+		goto out;
+
+	isec = inode->i_security;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
+	ad.u.net.family = family;
+
+	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (selinux_compat_net)
+		err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, isec, &ad,
+						       family, addrp, len);
+	else
+		err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+				   PACKET__SEND, &ad);
 
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb);
 out:
-	return err;
+	return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
 }
 
 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
@@ -4374,8 +4400,10 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.xfrm_policy_alloc_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
 	.xfrm_policy_clone_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
 	.xfrm_policy_free_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
+	.xfrm_policy_delete_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
 	.xfrm_state_alloc_security =	selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
 	.xfrm_state_free_security =	selinux_xfrm_state_free,
+	.xfrm_state_delete_security =	selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
 	.xfrm_policy_lookup = 		selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
 #endif
 };
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
index b0e6b12..a68fdd5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
@@ -29,3 +29,4 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index 591e98d..70ee65a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -239,3 +239,6 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, "sendto")
    S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, "recvfrom")
    S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, "setcontext")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, "send")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, "recv")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, "relabelto")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index d7f02ed..1d9cf3d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -933,3 +933,29 @@
 #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__SEND_MSG   0x00100000UL
 #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__NAME_BIND  0x00200000UL
 
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__IOCTL                   0x00000001UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__READ                    0x00000002UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__WRITE                   0x00000004UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__CREATE                  0x00000008UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__GETATTR                 0x00000010UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SETATTR                 0x00000020UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__LOCK                    0x00000040UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RELABELFROM             0x00000080UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RELABELTO               0x00000100UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__APPEND                  0x00000200UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__BIND                    0x00000400UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__CONNECT                 0x00000800UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__LISTEN                  0x00001000UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__ACCEPT                  0x00002000UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__GETOPT                  0x00004000UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SETOPT                  0x00008000UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                0x00010000UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RECVFROM                0x00020000UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SENDTO                  0x00040000UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                0x00080000UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                0x00100000UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__NAME_BIND               0x00200000UL
+
+#define PACKET__SEND                              0x00000001UL
+#define PACKET__RECV                              0x00000002UL
+#define PACKET__RELABELTO                         0x00000004UL
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
index 77b2c59..3aec75f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
@@ -58,3 +58,5 @@
     S_("nscd")
     S_("association")
     S_("netlink_kobject_uevent_socket")
+    S_("appletalk_socket")
+    S_("packet")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/flask.h b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
index eb9f508..a0eb9e2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/flask.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@
 #define SECCLASS_NSCD                                    53
 #define SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION                             54
 #define SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET           55
+#define SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET                        56
+#define SECCLASS_PACKET                                  57
 
 /*
  * Security identifier indices for initial entities
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index c10f1fc..c96498a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -9,8 +9,10 @@
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new);
 void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp);
 int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
 void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir);
 
 /*
@@ -49,7 +51,7 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	return NF_ACCEPT;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk)
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index a4efc96..2e73d32 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -38,6 +38,14 @@
 
 unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT
+#define SELINUX_COMPAT_NET_VALUE 0
+#else
+#define SELINUX_COMPAT_NET_VALUE 1
+#endif
+
+int selinux_compat_net = SELINUX_COMPAT_NET_VALUE;
+
 static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
 {
 	selinux_checkreqprot = simple_strtoul(str,NULL,0) ? 1 : 0;
@@ -45,6 +53,13 @@ static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
 }
 __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
 
+static int __init selinux_compat_net_setup(char *str)
+{
+	selinux_compat_net = simple_strtoul(str,NULL,0) ? 1 : 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("selinux_compat_net=", selinux_compat_net_setup);
+
 
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(sel_mutex);
 
@@ -85,6 +100,7 @@ enum sel_inos {
 	SEL_AVC,	/* AVC management directory */
 	SEL_MEMBER,	/* compute polyinstantiation membership decision */
 	SEL_CHECKREQPROT, /* check requested protection, not kernel-applied one */
+	SEL_COMPAT_NET,	/* whether to use old compat network packet controls */
 };
 
 #define TMPBUFLEN	12
@@ -364,6 +380,55 @@ static struct file_operations sel_checkreqprot_ops = {
 	.write		= sel_write_checkreqprot,
 };
 
+static ssize_t sel_read_compat_net(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				   size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", selinux_compat_net);
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_compat_net(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
+				    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *page;
+	ssize_t length;
+	int new_value;
+
+	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY);
+	if (length)
+		return length;
+
+	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (*ppos != 0) {
+		/* No partial writes. */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	length = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	selinux_compat_net = new_value ? 1 : 0;
+	length = count;
+out:
+	free_page((unsigned long) page);
+	return length;
+}
+static struct file_operations sel_compat_net_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_compat_net,
+	.write		= sel_write_compat_net,
+};
+
 /*
  * Remaining nodes use transaction based IO methods like nfsd/nfsctl.c
  */
@@ -1219,6 +1284,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
 		[SEL_DISABLE] = {"disable", &sel_disable_ops, S_IWUSR},
 		[SEL_MEMBER] = {"member", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
 		[SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SEL_COMPAT_NET] = {"compat_net", &sel_compat_net_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		/* last one */ {""}
 	};
 	ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index abe99d8..6633fb0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -132,10 +132,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_us
 		goto out;
 
 	/*
-	 * Does the subject have permission to set security or permission to
-	 * do the relabel?
-	 * Must be permitted to relabel from default socket type (process type)
-	 * to specified context
+	 * Does the subject have permission to set security context?
 	 */
 	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
 			  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
@@ -201,6 +198,23 @@ void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
 }
 
 /*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled policies.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (ctx)
+		rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+				  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+				  ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
  * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers sec_ctx spec to
  * xfrm_state.
  */
@@ -292,6 +306,23 @@ u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return SECSID_NULL;
 }
 
+ /*
+  * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs.
+  */
+int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (ctx)
+		rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+				  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+				  ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
 /*
  * LSM hook that controls access to unlabelled packets.  If
  * a xfrm_state is authorizable (defined by macro) then it was
@@ -356,18 +387,12 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
 
 			if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
-				goto accept;
+				goto out;
 		}
 	}
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
 			  ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, NULL);
-	if (rc)
-		goto drop;
-
-accept:
-	return NF_ACCEPT;
-
-drop:
-	return NF_DROP;
+out:
+	return rc;
 }