diff options
author | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2010-04-20 10:21:30 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2010-04-21 09:58:17 +1000 |
commit | 2f1506cd82e0725ba00c7146a9a9b47824a5edcf (patch) | |
tree | ac92c983ab10842e82e229c00b697566c6f20028 /security | |
parent | 7233e3ee22b1506723411fe437bcf69f678e8cdd (diff) | |
download | op-kernel-dev-2f1506cd82e0725ba00c7146a9a9b47824a5edcf.zip op-kernel-dev-2f1506cd82e0725ba00c7146a9a9b47824a5edcf.tar.gz |
IMA: use audit_log_untrusted_string rather than %s
Convert all of the places IMA calls audit_log_format with %s into
audit_log_untrusted_string(). This is going to cause them all to get
quoted, but it should make audit log injection harder.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 33 |
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index babc500..778a735 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -255,6 +255,13 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, return result; } +static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value) +{ + audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value); + audit_log_format(ab, " "); +} + static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) { struct audit_buffer *ab; @@ -277,7 +284,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args); switch (token) { case Opt_measure: - audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "measure"); + ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure"); if (entry->action != UNKNOWN) result = -EINVAL; @@ -285,7 +292,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) entry->action = MEASURE; break; case Opt_dont_measure: - audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "dont_measure"); + ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_measure"); if (entry->action != UNKNOWN) result = -EINVAL; @@ -293,7 +300,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) entry->action = DONT_MEASURE; break; case Opt_func: - audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from); + ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from); if (entry->func) result = -EINVAL; @@ -313,7 +320,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC; break; case Opt_mask: - audit_log_format(ab, "mask=%s ", args[0].from); + ima_log_string(ab, "mask", args[0].from); if (entry->mask) result = -EINVAL; @@ -332,7 +339,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) entry->flags |= IMA_MASK; break; case Opt_fsmagic: - audit_log_format(ab, "fsmagic=%s ", args[0].from); + ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from); if (entry->fsmagic) { result = -EINVAL; @@ -345,7 +352,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC; break; case Opt_uid: - audit_log_format(ab, "uid=%s ", args[0].from); + ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from); if (entry->uid != -1) { result = -EINVAL; @@ -362,44 +369,44 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) } break; case Opt_obj_user: - audit_log_format(ab, "obj_user=%s ", args[0].from); + ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from); result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, LSM_OBJ_USER, AUDIT_OBJ_USER); break; case Opt_obj_role: - audit_log_format(ab, "obj_role=%s ", args[0].from); + ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from); result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE); break; case Opt_obj_type: - audit_log_format(ab, "obj_type=%s ", args[0].from); + ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from); result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE); break; case Opt_subj_user: - audit_log_format(ab, "subj_user=%s ", args[0].from); + ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from); result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, LSM_SUBJ_USER, AUDIT_SUBJ_USER); break; case Opt_subj_role: - audit_log_format(ab, "subj_role=%s ", args[0].from); + ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from); result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE); break; case Opt_subj_type: - audit_log_format(ab, "subj_type=%s ", args[0].from); + ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from); result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE, AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE); break; case Opt_err: + ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p); result = -EINVAL; - audit_log_format(ab, "UNKNOWN=%s ", p); break; } } |