Merge tag 'v3.14' into next

Linux 3.14

17 files changed, 260 insertions, 158 deletions

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index e9c6ac7..beb86b5 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ config INTEL_TXT
 config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
 	int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
 	depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
-	default 32768 if ARM
+	default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
 	default 65536
 	help
 	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 8b4f24a..21e2b9c 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -757,7 +757,8 @@ static void cap_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 static int cap_xfrm_policy_alloc_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
-					  struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
+					  struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
+					  gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index 7c2a0a7..d3b6d2c 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -274,10 +274,9 @@ static void set_majmin(char *str, unsigned m)
 		sprintf(str, "%u", m);
 }
 
-static int devcgroup_seq_read(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css,
-			      struct cftype *cft, struct seq_file *m)
+static int devcgroup_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 {
-	struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup = css_to_devcgroup(css);
+	struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup = css_to_devcgroup(seq_css(m));
 	struct dev_exception_item *ex;
 	char maj[MAJMINLEN], min[MAJMINLEN], acc[ACCLEN];
 
@@ -679,7 +678,7 @@ static struct cftype dev_cgroup_files[] = {
 	},
 	{
 		.name = "list",
-		.read_seq_string = devcgroup_seq_read,
+		.seq_show = devcgroup_seq_show,
 		.private = DEVCG_LIST,
 	},
 	{ }	/* terminate */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index c38adcc..1683bbf 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -162,8 +162,7 @@ void ima_show_template_sig(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 }
 
 static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, u8 hash_algo,
-				       struct ima_field_data *field_data,
-				       bool size_limit)
+				       struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
 	/*
 	 * digest formats:
@@ -176,11 +175,10 @@ static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, u8 hash_algo,
 	enum data_formats fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST;
 	u32 offset = 0;
 
-	if (!size_limit) {
+	if (hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
 		fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO;
-		if (hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST)
-			offset += snprintf(buffer, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 1,
-					   "%s", hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
+		offset += snprintf(buffer, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 1, "%s",
+				   hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
 		buffer[offset] = ':';
 		offset += 2;
 	}
@@ -243,8 +241,8 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 	cur_digest = hash.hdr.digest;
 	cur_digestsize = hash.hdr.length;
 out:
-	return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize, -1,
-					   field_data, true);
+	return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
+					   HASH_ALGO__LAST, field_data);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -255,7 +253,7 @@ int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			    int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
-	u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = HASH_ALGO__LAST;
+	u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
 	u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
 
 	/* If iint is NULL, we are recording a violation. */
@@ -268,7 +266,7 @@ int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	hash_algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
 out:
 	return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
-					   hash_algo, field_data, false);
+					   hash_algo, field_data);
 }
 
 static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index d46cbc5..2fb2576 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1000,7 +1000,11 @@ static int keyring_detect_cycle_iterator(const void *object,
 
 	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
 
-	BUG_ON(key != ctx->match_data);
+	/* We might get a keyring with matching index-key that is nonetheless a
+	 * different keyring. */
+	if (key != ctx->match_data)
+		return 0;
+
 	ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EDEADLK);
 	return 1;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 15b6928..919cad9 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1317,9 +1317,11 @@ void security_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 
-int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
+int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+			       struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
+			       gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	return security_ops->xfrm_policy_alloc_security(ctxp, sec_ctx);
+	return security_ops->xfrm_policy_alloc_security(ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8b1656f..d58946d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 		if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
 			continue;
 		rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
-					     strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
+					     strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
@@ -2507,7 +2507,8 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 		if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
 			continue;
 		len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
-		rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
+		rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
@@ -2911,7 +2912,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc == -EINVAL) {
 		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
 			struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -3068,7 +3069,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 	if (!value || !size)
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
+	rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -5543,7 +5544,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 			str[size-1] = 0;
 			size--;
 		}
-		error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
+		error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
 			if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
 				struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -5652,7 +5653,7 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 
 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 {
-	return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
+	return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
 }
 
 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 8ed8daf..ce7852c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext,
 int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
 
 int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
-	u32 *out_sid);
+			    u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp);
 
 int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 				    u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags);
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 48c3cc9..9f05847 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@
 #include <net/flow.h>
 
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
-			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx);
+			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+			      gfp_t gfp);
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
 			      struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp);
 void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index 332ac8a..2df7b90 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/inet_diag.h>
 #include <linux/xfrm.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/sock_diag.h>
 
 #include "flask.h"
 #include "av_permissions.h"
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] =
 {
 	{ TCPDIAG_GETSOCK,	NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
 	{ DCCPDIAG_GETSOCK,	NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY,	NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
 };
 
 static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] =
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 5122aff..d60c0ee 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(buf, size, &sid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(buf, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -731,11 +731,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -817,11 +819,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 		objname = namebuf;
 	}
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -878,11 +882,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -934,7 +940,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con) + 1, &sid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con) + 1, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -994,11 +1000,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index c0f4988..9c5cdc2ca 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -3338,10 +3338,10 @@ static int filename_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	buf[0] = ft->stype;
-	buf[1] = ft->ttype;
-	buf[2] = ft->tclass;
-	buf[3] = otype->otype;
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ft->stype);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ft->ttype);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(ft->tclass);
+	buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(otype->otype);
 
 	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
 	if (rc)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index fc5a63a..4bca494 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1232,6 +1232,10 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 	struct context context;
 	int rc = 0;
 
+	/* An empty security context is never valid. */
+	if (!scontext_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (!ss_initialized) {
 		int i;
 
@@ -1285,16 +1289,18 @@ out:
  * @scontext: security context
  * @scontext_len: length in bytes
  * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @gfp: context for the allocation
  *
  * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
  * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
  * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
  * memory is available, or 0 on success.
  */
-int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid)
+int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
+			    gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
-					    sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 0);
+					    sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2948,25 +2954,21 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 	struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
 	int match = 0;
 
-	if (!rule) {
-		audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
-			  "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
+	if (unlikely(!rule)) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
 		return -ENOENT;
 	}
 
 	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
-		audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
-			  "selinux_audit_rule_match: stale rule\n");
 		match = -ESTALE;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
-	if (!ctxt) {
-		audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
-			  "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+	if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			  sid);
 		match = -ENOENT;
 		goto out;
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 0462cb3..98b0426 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
  * xfrm_user_sec_ctx context.
  */
 static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
-				   struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+				   struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+				   gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	int rc;
 	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
@@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
 	if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len + 1, gfp);
 	if (!ctx)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
 	ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
 	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len);
 	ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0';
-	rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, &ctx->ctx_sid);
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
@@ -282,9 +283,10 @@ int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
  * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to xfrm_policy.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
-			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+			      gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx);
+	return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx, gfp);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -332,7 +334,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
 			     struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
 {
-	return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx);
+	return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx, GFP_KERNEL);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 364cc64..d072fd3 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -241,7 +241,8 @@ u32 smack_to_secid(const char *);
 extern int smack_cipso_direct;
 extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
 extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
-extern char *smack_onlycap;
+extern struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
+extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
 extern const char *smack_cipso_option;
 
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
@@ -312,7 +313,7 @@ static inline int smack_privileged(int cap)
 
 	if (!capable(cap))
 		return 0;
-	if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == skp->smk_known)
+	if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == skp)
 		return 1;
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index b0be893..14f52be 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -219,8 +219,6 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
  * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
  * @type: message type
  *
- * Require that the task has the floor label
- *
  * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
  */
 static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
@@ -231,7 +229,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
 	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 		return 0;
 
-	 if (skp != &smack_known_floor)
+	if (smack_syslog_label != NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)
 		rc = -EACCES;
 
 	return rc;
@@ -341,10 +339,12 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 	struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
 	struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
 	char *op;
 	char *commap;
 	char *nsp;
 	int transmute = 0;
+	int specified = 0;
 
 	if (sp->smk_initialized)
 		return 0;
@@ -359,34 +359,56 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 		if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSHAT, strlen(SMK_FSHAT)) == 0) {
 			op += strlen(SMK_FSHAT);
 			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
-			if (nsp != NULL)
+			if (nsp != NULL) {
 				sp->smk_hat = nsp;
+				specified = 1;
+			}
 		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSFLOOR, strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR)) == 0) {
 			op += strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR);
 			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
-			if (nsp != NULL)
+			if (nsp != NULL) {
 				sp->smk_floor = nsp;
+				specified = 1;
+			}
 		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSDEFAULT,
 				   strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT)) == 0) {
 			op += strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT);
 			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
-			if (nsp != NULL)
+			if (nsp != NULL) {
 				sp->smk_default = nsp;
+				specified = 1;
+			}
 		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSROOT, strlen(SMK_FSROOT)) == 0) {
 			op += strlen(SMK_FSROOT);
 			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
-			if (nsp != NULL)
+			if (nsp != NULL) {
 				sp->smk_root = nsp;
+				specified = 1;
+			}
 		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSTRANS, strlen(SMK_FSTRANS)) == 0) {
 			op += strlen(SMK_FSTRANS);
 			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
 			if (nsp != NULL) {
 				sp->smk_root = nsp;
 				transmute = 1;
+				specified = 1;
 			}
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+		/*
+		 * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
+		 */
+		if (specified)
+			return -EPERM;
+		/*
+		 * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
+		 */
+		skp = smk_of_current();
+		sp->smk_root = skp->smk_known;
+		sp->smk_default = skp->smk_known;
+	}
 	/*
 	 * Initialize the root inode.
 	 */
@@ -423,53 +445,6 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return rc;
 }
 
-/**
- * smack_sb_mount - Smack check for mounting
- * @dev_name: unused
- * @path: mount point
- * @type: unused
- * @flags: unused
- * @data: unused
- *
- * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem
- * being mounted on, an error code otherwise.
- */
-static int smack_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
-			  const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
-{
-	struct superblock_smack *sbp = path->dentry->d_sb->s_security;
-	struct smk_audit_info ad;
-
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
-	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
-
-	return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
-}
-
-/**
- * smack_sb_umount - Smack check for unmounting
- * @mnt: file system to unmount
- * @flags: unused
- *
- * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem
- * being unmounted, an error code otherwise.
- */
-static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
-{
-	struct superblock_smack *sbp;
-	struct smk_audit_info ad;
-	struct path path;
-
-	path.dentry = mnt->mnt_root;
-	path.mnt = mnt;
-
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
-	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, path);
-
-	sbp = path.dentry->d_sb->s_security;
-	return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
-}
-
 /*
  * BPRM hooks
  */
@@ -837,31 +812,43 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 				const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	int check_priv = 0;
+	int check_import = 0;
+	int check_star = 0;
 	int rc = 0;
 
+	/*
+	 * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr
+	 */
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
-		if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
-			rc = -EPERM;
-		/*
-		 * check label validity here so import wont fail on
-		 * post_setxattr
-		 */
-		if (size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL ||
-		    smk_import(value, size) == NULL)
-			rc = -EINVAL;
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
+		check_priv = 1;
+		check_import = 1;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
+		   strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
+		check_priv = 1;
+		check_import = 1;
+		check_star = 1;
 	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
-		if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
-			rc = -EPERM;
+		check_priv = 1;
 		if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
 		    strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 	} else
 		rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
 
+	if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		rc = -EPERM;
+
+	if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
+		skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+		if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
+		    (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
@@ -1364,7 +1351,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
 	int may = 0;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
 	/*
 	 * This code relies on bitmasks.
@@ -2847,8 +2834,17 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 			if (rc >= 0)
 				transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
 		}
-		isp->smk_task = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
-		isp->smk_mmap = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
+		/*
+		 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
+		 */
+		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
+		if (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)
+			skp = NULL;
+		isp->smk_task = skp;
+		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
+		if (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)
+			skp = NULL;
+		isp->smk_mmap = skp;
 
 		dput(dp);
 		break;
@@ -3620,9 +3616,8 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	char *rule = vrule;
 
-	if (!rule) {
-		audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
-			  "Smack: missing rule\n");
+	if (unlikely(!rule)) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
 		return -ENOENT;
 	}
 
@@ -3743,8 +3738,6 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.sb_copy_data = 		smack_sb_copy_data,
 	.sb_kern_mount = 		smack_sb_kern_mount,
 	.sb_statfs = 			smack_sb_statfs,
-	.sb_mount = 			smack_sb_mount,
-	.sb_umount = 			smack_sb_umount,
 
 	.bprm_set_creds =		smack_bprm_set_creds,
 	.bprm_committing_creds =	smack_bprm_committing_creds,
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 160aa08e..3198cfe 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ enum smk_inos {
 	SMK_CIPSO2	= 17,	/* load long label -> CIPSO mapping */
 	SMK_REVOKE_SUBJ	= 18,	/* set rules with subject label to '-' */
 	SMK_CHANGE_RULE	= 19,	/* change or add rules (long labels) */
+	SMK_SYSLOG	= 20,	/* change syslog label) */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ enum smk_inos {
  */
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_cipso_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ambient_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_syslog_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock);
 
 /*
@@ -90,7 +92,13 @@ int smack_cipso_mapped = SMACK_CIPSO_MAPPED_DEFAULT;
  * everyone. It is expected that the hat (^) label
  * will be used if any label is used.
  */
-char *smack_onlycap;
+struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
+
+/*
+ * If this value is set restrict syslog use to the label specified.
+ * It can be reset via smackfs/syslog
+ */
+struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
 
 /*
  * Certain IP addresses may be designated as single label hosts.
@@ -301,7 +309,8 @@ static int smk_perm_from_str(const char *string)
  * @import: if non-zero, import labels
  * @len: label length limit
  *
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL on failure and -ENOENT when either subject
+ * or object is missing.
  */
 static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 				const char *access1, const char *access2,
@@ -314,28 +323,28 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 	if (import) {
 		rule->smk_subject = smk_import_entry(subject, len);
 		if (rule->smk_subject == NULL)
-			return -1;
+			return -EINVAL;
 
 		rule->smk_object = smk_import(object, len);
 		if (rule->smk_object == NULL)
-			return -1;
+			return -EINVAL;
 	} else {
 		cp = smk_parse_smack(subject, len);
 		if (cp == NULL)
-			return -1;
+			return -EINVAL;
 		skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
 		kfree(cp);
 		if (skp == NULL)
-			return -1;
+			return -ENOENT;
 		rule->smk_subject = skp;
 
 		cp = smk_parse_smack(object, len);
 		if (cp == NULL)
-			return -1;
+			return -EINVAL;
 		skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
 		kfree(cp);
 		if (skp == NULL)
-			return -1;
+			return -ENOENT;
 		rule->smk_object = skp->smk_known;
 	}
 
@@ -381,6 +390,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_parse_long_rule(char *data, struct smack_parsed_rule *rule,
 {
 	ssize_t cnt = 0;
 	char *tok[4];
+	int rc;
 	int i;
 
 	/*
@@ -405,10 +415,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_parse_long_rule(char *data, struct smack_parsed_rule *rule,
 	while (i < 4)
 		tok[i++] = NULL;
 
-	if (smk_fill_rule(tok[0], tok[1], tok[2], tok[3], rule, import, 0))
-		return -1;
-
-	return cnt;
+	rc = smk_fill_rule(tok[0], tok[1], tok[2], tok[3], rule, import, 0);
+	return rc == 0 ? cnt : rc;
 }
 
 #define SMK_FIXED24_FMT	0	/* Fixed 24byte label format */
@@ -1603,7 +1611,7 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_ambient_ops = {
 };
 
 /**
- * smk_read_onlycap - read() for /smack/onlycap
+ * smk_read_onlycap - read() for smackfs/onlycap
  * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
  * @buf: where to put the result
  * @cn: maximum to send along
@@ -1622,7 +1630,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_onlycap(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 		return 0;
 
 	if (smack_onlycap != NULL)
-		smack = smack_onlycap;
+		smack = smack_onlycap->smk_known;
 
 	asize = strlen(smack) + 1;
 
@@ -1633,7 +1641,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_onlycap(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 }
 
 /**
- * smk_write_onlycap - write() for /smack/onlycap
+ * smk_write_onlycap - write() for smackfs/onlycap
  * @file: file pointer, not actually used
  * @buf: where to get the data from
  * @count: bytes sent
@@ -1656,7 +1664,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	 * explicitly for clarity. The smk_access() implementation
 	 * would use smk_access(smack_onlycap, MAY_WRITE)
 	 */
-	if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != skp->smk_known)
+	if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != skp)
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1676,7 +1684,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
 		rc = -EFAULT;
 	else
-		smack_onlycap = smk_import(data, count);
+		smack_onlycap = smk_import_entry(data, count);
 
 	kfree(data);
 	return rc;
@@ -1856,11 +1864,12 @@ static ssize_t smk_user_access(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		res = smk_parse_long_rule(data, &rule, 0, 3);
 	}
 
-	if (res < 0)
+	if (res >= 0)
+		res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object,
+				 rule.smk_access1, NULL);
+	else if (res != -ENOENT)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object,
-				rule.smk_access1, NULL);
 	data[0] = res == 0 ? '1' : '0';
 	data[1] = '\0';
 
@@ -2143,7 +2152,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_change_rule(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	/*
 	 * Must have privilege.
 	 */
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL,
@@ -2158,12 +2167,89 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_change_rule_ops = {
 };
 
 /**
- * smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock
+ * smk_read_syslog - read() for smackfs/syslog
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @cn: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_syslog(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				size_t cn, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	ssize_t rc = -EINVAL;
+	int asize;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (smack_syslog_label == NULL)
+		skp = &smack_known_star;
+	else
+		skp = smack_syslog_label;
+
+	asize = strlen(skp->smk_known) + 1;
+
+	if (cn >= asize)
+		rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos, skp->smk_known,
+						asize);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_syslog - write() for smackfs/syslog
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_syslog(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *data;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	int rc = count;
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (data == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+	else {
+		skp = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+		if (skp == NULL)
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+		else
+			smack_syslog_label = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+	}
+
+	kfree(data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_syslog_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_syslog,
+	.write		= smk_write_syslog,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * smk_fill_super - fill the smackfs superblock
  * @sb: the empty superblock
  * @data: unused
  * @silent: unused
  *
- * Fill in the well known entries for /smack
+ * Fill in the well known entries for the smack filesystem
  *
  * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
  */
@@ -2208,6 +2294,8 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 			S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		[SMK_CHANGE_RULE] = {
 			"change-rule", &smk_change_rule_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_SYSLOG] = {
+			"syslog", &smk_syslog_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		/* last one */
 			{""}
 	};