diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2013-07-03 14:04:58 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2013-07-03 14:04:58 -0700 |
| commit | f39d420f672f99ad9a0fe7deb951a0030d4f0d9e (patch) | |
| tree | 450e229a4305362f72cc5461aab8af4f2f5d023e /security | |
| parent | fe489bf4505ae26d3c6d6a1f1d3064c2a9c5cd85 (diff) | |
| parent | 572e5b018ba68d634f30aef71cf04d85c884aa05 (diff) | |
| download | op-kernel-dev-f39d420f672f99ad9a0fe7deb951a0030d4f0d9e.zip op-kernel-dev-f39d420f672f99ad9a0fe7deb951a0030d4f0d9e.tar.gz | |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"In this update, Smack learns to love IPv6 and to mount a filesystem
with a transmutable hierarchy (i.e. security labels are inherited
from parent directory upon creation rather than creating process).
The rest of the changes are maintenance"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (37 commits)
tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: Remove unused header file
tpm: tpm_i2c_infinion: Don't modify i2c_client->driver
evm: audit integrity metadata failures
integrity: move integrity_audit_msg()
evm: calculate HMAC after initializing posix acl on tmpfs
maintainers: add Dmitry Kasatkin
Smack: Fix the bug smackcipso can't set CIPSO correctly
Smack: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference at smk_netlbl_mls()
Smack: Add smkfstransmute mount option
Smack: Improve access check performance
Smack: Local IPv6 port based controls
tpm: fix regression caused by section type conflict of tpm_dev_release() in ppc builds
maintainers: Remove Kent from maintainers
tpm: move TPM_DIGEST_SIZE defintion
tpm_tis: missing platform_driver_unregister() on error in init_tis()
security: clarify cap_inode_getsecctx description
apparmor: no need to delay vfree()
apparmor: fix fully qualified name parsing
apparmor: fix setprocattr arg processing for onexec
apparmor: localize getting the security context to a few macros
...
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
31 files changed, 949 insertions, 583 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index 3ae28db..031d2d9 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = { "HINT", "STATUS", "ERROR", - "KILLED" + "KILLED", "AUTO" }; diff --git a/security/apparmor/context.c b/security/apparmor/context.c index 8a9b502..d5af1d1 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/context.c +++ b/security/apparmor/context.c @@ -69,6 +69,23 @@ void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *new, const struct aa_task_cxt *old) } /** + * aa_get_task_profile - Get another task's profile + * @task: task to query (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: counted reference to @task's profile + */ +struct aa_profile *aa_get_task_profile(struct task_struct *task) +{ + struct aa_profile *p; + + rcu_read_lock(); + p = aa_get_profile(__aa_task_profile(task)); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return p; +} + +/** * aa_replace_current_profile - replace the current tasks profiles * @profile: new profile (NOT NULL) * @@ -76,7 +93,7 @@ void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *new, const struct aa_task_cxt *old) */ int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) { - struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cred()->security; + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cxt(); struct cred *new; BUG_ON(!profile); @@ -87,17 +104,13 @@ int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) if (!new) return -ENOMEM; - cxt = new->security; - if (unconfined(profile) || (cxt->profile->ns != profile->ns)) { + cxt = cred_cxt(new); + if (unconfined(profile) || (cxt->profile->ns != profile->ns)) /* if switching to unconfined or a different profile namespace * clear out context state */ - aa_put_profile(cxt->previous); - aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec); - cxt->previous = NULL; - cxt->onexec = NULL; - cxt->token = 0; - } + aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt); + /* be careful switching cxt->profile, when racing replacement it * is possible that cxt->profile->replacedby is the reference keeping * @profile valid, so make sure to get its reference before dropping @@ -123,7 +136,7 @@ int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile) if (!new) return -ENOMEM; - cxt = new->security; + cxt = cred_cxt(new); aa_get_profile(profile); aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec); cxt->onexec = profile; @@ -150,7 +163,7 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token) return -ENOMEM; BUG_ON(!profile); - cxt = new->security; + cxt = cred_cxt(new); if (!cxt->previous) { /* transfer refcount */ cxt->previous = cxt->profile; @@ -187,7 +200,7 @@ int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 token) if (!new) return -ENOMEM; - cxt = new->security; + cxt = cred_cxt(new); if (cxt->token != token) { abort_creds(new); return -EACCES; @@ -205,11 +218,10 @@ int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 token) aa_get_profile(cxt->profile); aa_put_profile(cxt->previous); } - /* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */ + /* ref has been transfered so avoid putting ref in clear_task_cxt */ cxt->previous = NULL; - cxt->token = 0; - aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec); - cxt->onexec = NULL; + /* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */ + aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt); commit_creds(new); return 0; diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index 859abda..01b7bd6 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -62,17 +62,14 @@ static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task, struct aa_profile *to_profile) { struct task_struct *tracer; - const struct cred *cred = NULL; struct aa_profile *tracerp = NULL; int error = 0; rcu_read_lock(); tracer = ptrace_parent(task); - if (tracer) { + if (tracer) /* released below */ - cred = get_task_cred(tracer); - tracerp = aa_cred_profile(cred); - } + tracerp = aa_get_task_profile(tracer); /* not ptraced */ if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerp)) @@ -82,8 +79,7 @@ static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task, out: rcu_read_unlock(); - if (cred) - put_cred(cred); + aa_put_profile(tracerp); return error; } @@ -360,7 +356,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (bprm->cred_prepared) return 0; - cxt = bprm->cred->security; + cxt = cred_cxt(bprm->cred); BUG_ON(!cxt); profile = aa_get_profile(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile)); @@ -443,6 +439,8 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } else { error = -ENOENT; info = "profile not found"; + /* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */ + perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC; } } } else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) { @@ -514,11 +512,7 @@ x_clear: cxt->profile = new_profile; /* clear out all temporary/transitional state from the context */ - aa_put_profile(cxt->previous); - aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec); - cxt->previous = NULL; - cxt->onexec = NULL; - cxt->token = 0; + aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt); audit: error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, @@ -557,7 +551,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile(); - struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = bprm->cred->security; + struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(bprm->cred); /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */ if ((new_cxt->profile == profile) || @@ -634,7 +628,7 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest) /* released below */ cred = get_current_cred(); - cxt = cred->security; + cxt = cred_cxt(cred); profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); previous_profile = cxt->previous; @@ -750,7 +744,6 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec, bool permtest) { const struct cred *cred; - struct aa_task_cxt *cxt; struct aa_profile *profile, *target = NULL; struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL; struct file_perms perms = {}; @@ -770,7 +763,6 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec, } cred = get_current_cred(); - cxt = cred->security; profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); /* diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h index 40aedd9..1ba2ca5 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #ifndef __APPARMOR_H #define __APPARMOR_H +#include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include "match.h" @@ -64,9 +65,18 @@ extern int apparmor_initialized __initdata; /* fn's in lib */ char *aa_split_fqname(char *args, char **ns_name); void aa_info_message(const char *str); -void *kvmalloc(size_t size); +void *__aa_kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags); void kvfree(void *buffer); +static inline void *kvmalloc(size_t size) +{ + return __aa_kvmalloc(size, 0); +} + +static inline void *kvzalloc(size_t size) +{ + return __aa_kvmalloc(size, __GFP_ZERO); +} /** * aa_strneq - compare null terminated @str to a non null terminated substring diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/context.h b/security/apparmor/include/context.h index a9cbee4..d44ba58 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/context.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/context.h @@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ #include "policy.h" +#define cred_cxt(X) (X)->security +#define current_cxt() cred_cxt(current_cred()) + /* struct aa_file_cxt - the AppArmor context the file was opened in * @perms: the permission the file was opened with * @@ -80,23 +83,8 @@ int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile); int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile); int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token); int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 cookie); +struct aa_profile *aa_get_task_profile(struct task_struct *task); -/** - * __aa_task_is_confined - determine if @task has any confinement - * @task: task to check confinement of (NOT NULL) - * - * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section - */ -static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task) -{ - struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = __task_cred(task)->security; - - BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile); - if (unconfined(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile))) - return 0; - - return 1; -} /** * aa_cred_profile - obtain cred's profiles @@ -108,12 +96,36 @@ static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task) */ static inline struct aa_profile *aa_cred_profile(const struct cred *cred) { - struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security; + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred); BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile); return aa_newest_version(cxt->profile); } /** + * __aa_task_profile - retrieve another task's profile + * @task: task to query (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: @task's profile without incrementing its ref count + * + * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section + */ +static inline struct aa_profile *__aa_task_profile(struct task_struct *task) +{ + return aa_cred_profile(__task_cred(task)); +} + +/** + * __aa_task_is_confined - determine if @task has any confinement + * @task: task to check confinement of (NOT NULL) + * + * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section + */ +static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task) +{ + return !unconfined(__aa_task_profile(task)); +} + +/** * __aa_current_profile - find the current tasks confining profile * * Returns: up to date confining profile or the ns unconfined profile (NOT NULL) @@ -136,7 +148,7 @@ static inline struct aa_profile *__aa_current_profile(void) */ static inline struct aa_profile *aa_current_profile(void) { - const struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cred()->security; + const struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cxt(); struct aa_profile *profile; BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile); @@ -151,4 +163,17 @@ static inline struct aa_profile *aa_current_profile(void) return profile; } +/** + * aa_clear_task_cxt_trans - clear transition tracking info from the cxt + * @cxt: task context to clear (NOT NULL) + */ +static inline void aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(struct aa_task_cxt *cxt) +{ + aa_put_profile(cxt->previous); + aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec); + cxt->previous = NULL; + cxt->onexec = NULL; + cxt->token = 0; +} + #endif /* __AA_CONTEXT_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h index 967b2de..2c922b8 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h @@ -186,11 +186,6 @@ static inline void aa_free_file_rules(struct aa_file_rules *rules) aa_free_domain_entries(&rules->trans); } -#define ACC_FMODE(x) (("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE]) | (((x) << 1) & 0x40)) - -/* from namei.c */ -#define MAP_OPEN_FLAGS(x) ((((x) + 1) & O_ACCMODE) ? (x) + 1 : (x)) - /** * aa_map_file_perms - map file flags to AppArmor permissions * @file: open file to map flags to AppArmor permissions @@ -199,8 +194,13 @@ static inline void aa_free_file_rules(struct aa_file_rules *rules) */ static inline u32 aa_map_file_to_perms(struct file *file) { - int flags = MAP_OPEN_FLAGS(file->f_flags); - u32 perms = ACC_FMODE(file->f_mode); + int flags = file->f_flags; + u32 perms = 0; + + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) + perms |= MAY_WRITE; + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) + perms |= MAY_READ; if ((flags & O_APPEND) && (perms & MAY_WRITE)) perms = (perms & ~MAY_WRITE) | MAY_APPEND; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h index 775843e..001c43a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * This file contains AppArmor policy dfa matching engine definitions. * * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE - * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd. * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as @@ -16,25 +16,30 @@ #define __AA_MATCH_H #include <linux/kref.h> -#include <linux/workqueue.h> #define DFA_NOMATCH 0 #define DFA_START 1 -#define DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK 0xffffffff -#define DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK 0xffffffff /** * The format used for transition tables is based on the GNU flex table * file format (--tables-file option; see Table File Format in the flex * info pages and the flex sources for documentation). The magic number * used in the header is 0x1B5E783D instead of 0xF13C57B1 though, because - * the YY_ID_CHK (check) and YY_ID_DEF (default) tables are used - * slightly differently (see the apparmor-parser package). + * new tables have been defined and others YY_ID_CHK (check) and YY_ID_DEF + * (default) tables are used slightly differently (see the apparmor-parser + * package). + * + * + * The data in the packed dfa is stored in network byte order, and the tables + * are arranged for flexibility. We convert the table data to host native + * byte order. + * + * The dfa begins with a table set header, and is followed by the actual + * tables. */ #define YYTH_MAGIC 0x1B5E783D -#define YYTH_DEF_RECURSE 0x1 /* DEF Table is recursive */ struct table_set_header { u32 th_magic; /* YYTH_MAGIC */ @@ -63,7 +68,7 @@ struct table_set_header { #define YYTD_DATA32 4 #define YYTD_DATA64 8 -/* Each ACCEPT2 table gets 6 dedicated flags, YYTD_DATAX define the +/* ACCEPT & ACCEPT2 tables gets 6 dedicated flags, YYTD_DATAX define the * first flags */ #define ACCEPT1_FLAGS(X) ((X) & 0x3f) diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h index bda4569..b25491a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h @@ -32,13 +32,13 @@ extern const char *const profile_mode_names[]; #define APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX 3 -#define COMPLAIN_MODE(_profile) \ - ((aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) || \ - ((_profile)->mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)) +#define PROFILE_MODE(_profile, _mode) \ + ((aa_g_profile_mode == (_mode)) || \ + ((_profile)->mode == (_mode))) -#define KILL_MODE(_profile) \ - ((aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) || \ - ((_profile)->mode == APPARMOR_KILL)) +#define COMPLAIN_MODE(_profile) PROFILE_MODE((_profile), APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) + +#define KILL_MODE(_profile) PROFILE_MODE((_profile), APPARMOR_KILL) #define PROFILE_IS_HAT(_profile) ((_profile)->flags & PFLAG_HAT) @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ struct aa_ns_acct { * @acct: accounting for the namespace * @unconfined: special unconfined profile for the namespace * @sub_ns: list of namespaces under the current namespace. + * @uniq_null: uniq value used for null learning profiles * * An aa_namespace defines the set profiles that are searched to determine * which profile to attach to a task. Profiles can not be shared between @@ -127,6 +128,7 @@ struct aa_namespace { struct aa_ns_acct acct; struct aa_profile *unconfined; struct list_head sub_ns; + atomic_t uniq_null; }; /* struct aa_policydb - match engine for a policy @@ -148,7 +150,6 @@ struct aa_policydb { * @rename: optional profile name that this profile renamed * @xmatch: optional extended matching for unconfined executables names * @xmatch_len: xmatch prefix len, used to determine xmatch priority - * @sid: the unique security id number of this profile * @audit: the auditing mode of the profile * @mode: the enforcement mode of the profile * @flags: flags controlling profile behavior @@ -184,7 +185,6 @@ struct aa_profile { struct aa_dfa *xmatch; int xmatch_len; - u32 sid; enum audit_mode audit; enum profile_mode mode; u32 flags; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h index 544aa6b..6bd5f33 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h @@ -21,6 +21,5 @@ int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_profile *profile, char **string); int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int test); int aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(char *fqname, bool onexec, int test); -int aa_setprocattr_permipc(char *fqname); #endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/sid.h b/security/apparmor/include/sid.h index 020db35..513ca0e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/sid.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/sid.h @@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ #include <linux/types.h> -struct aa_profile; +/* sid value that will not be allocated */ +#define AA_SID_INVALID 0 +#define AA_SID_ALLOC AA_SID_INVALID u32 aa_alloc_sid(void); void aa_free_sid(u32 sid); diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c index cf1071b..c51d226 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -95,23 +95,18 @@ int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee, * - tracer profile has CAP_SYS_PTRACE */ - struct aa_profile *tracer_p; - /* cred released below */ - const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tracer); + struct aa_profile *tracer_p = aa_get_task_profile(tracer); int error = 0; - tracer_p = aa_cred_profile(cred); if (!unconfined(tracer_p)) { - /* lcred released below */ - const struct cred *lcred = get_task_cred(tracee); - struct aa_profile *tracee_p = aa_cred_profile(lcred); + struct aa_profile *tracee_p = aa_get_task_profile(tracee); error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracer_p, tracee_p, mode); error = aa_audit_ptrace(tracer_p, tracee_p, error); - put_cred(lcred); + aa_put_profile(tracee_p); } - put_cred(cred); + aa_put_profile(tracer_p); return error; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c index 7430298..fcfe023 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lib.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c @@ -45,8 +45,10 @@ char *aa_split_fqname(char *fqname, char **ns_name) *ns_name = skip_spaces(&name[1]); if (split) { /* overwrite ':' with \0 */ - *split = 0; - name = skip_spaces(split + 1); + *split++ = 0; + if (strncmp(split, "//", 2) == 0) + split += 2; + name = skip_spaces(split); } else /* a ns name without a following profile is allowed */ name = NULL; @@ -75,15 +77,16 @@ void aa_info_message(const char *str) } /** - * kvmalloc - do allocation preferring kmalloc but falling back to vmalloc - * @size: size of allocation + * __aa_kvmalloc - do allocation preferring kmalloc but falling back to vmalloc + * @size: how many bytes of memory are required + * @flags: the type of memory to allocate (see kmalloc). * * Return: allocated buffer or NULL if failed * * It is possible that policy being loaded from the user is larger than * what can be allocated by kmalloc, in those cases fall back to vmalloc. */ -void *kvmalloc(size_t size) +void *__aa_kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) { void *buffer = NULL; @@ -92,32 +95,22 @@ void *kvmalloc(size_t size) /* do not attempt kmalloc if we need more than 16 pages at once */ if (size <= (16*PAGE_SIZE)) - buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_NOWARN); + buffer = kmalloc(size, flags | GFP_NOIO | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!buffer) { /* see kvfree for why size must be at least work_struct size * when allocated via vmalloc */ if (size < sizeof(struct work_struct)) size = sizeof(struct work_struct); - buffer = vmalloc(size); + if (flags & __GFP_ZERO) + buffer = vzalloc(size); + else + buffer = vmalloc(size); } return buffer; } /** - * do_vfree - workqueue routine for freeing vmalloced memory - * @work: data to be freed - * - * The work_struct is overlaid to the data being freed, as at the point - * the work is scheduled the data is no longer valid, be its freeing - * needs to be delayed until safe. - */ -static void do_vfree(struct work_struct *work) -{ - vfree(work); -} - -/** * kvfree - free an allocation do by kvmalloc * @buffer: buffer to free (MAYBE_NULL) * @@ -125,13 +118,8 @@ static void do_vfree(struct work_struct *work) */ void kvfree(void *buffer) { - if (is_vmalloc_addr(buffer)) { - /* Data is no longer valid so just use the allocated space - * as the work_struct - */ - struct work_struct *work = (struct work_struct *) buffer; - INIT_WORK(work, do_vfree); - schedule_work(work); - } else + if (is_vmalloc_addr(buffer)) + vfree(buffer); + else kfree(buffer); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index b21830e..2e2a0dd 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ int apparmor_initialized __initdata; */ static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred) { - aa_free_task_context(cred->security); - cred->security = NULL; + aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred)); + cred_cxt(cred) = NULL; } /* @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) if (!cxt) return -ENOMEM; - cred->security = cxt; + cred_cxt(cred) = cxt; return 0; } @@ -77,8 +77,8 @@ static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, if (!cxt) return -ENOMEM; - aa_dup_task_context(cxt, old->security); - new->security = cxt; + aa_dup_task_context(cxt, cred_cxt(old)); + cred_cxt(new) = cxt; return 0; } @@ -87,8 +87,8 @@ static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, */ static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { - const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = old->security; - struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = new->security; + const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = cred_cxt(old); + struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(new); aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt); } @@ -469,7 +469,6 @@ static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { - struct dentry *dentry; int mask = 0; if (!file || !file->f_security) @@ -486,7 +485,6 @@ static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot, if (prot & PROT_EXEC) mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP; - dentry = file->f_path.dentry; return common_file_perm(op, file, mask); } @@ -507,11 +505,9 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, char **value) { int error = -ENOENT; - struct aa_profile *profile; /* released below */ const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task); - struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security; - profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred); if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile), @@ -533,6 +529,8 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, void *value, size_t size) { + struct common_audit_data sa; + struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; char *command, *args = value; size_t arg_size; int error; @@ -576,30 +574,31 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) { error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC, AA_DO_TEST); - } else if (strcmp(command, "permipc") == 0) { - error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args); - } else { - struct common_audit_data sa; - struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; - sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE; - sa.aad = &aad; - aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR; - aad.info = name; - aad.error = -EINVAL; - return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, - __aa_current_profile(), GFP_KERNEL, - &sa, NULL); - } + } else + goto fail; } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) { - error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC, - !AA_DO_TEST); - } else { + if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0) + error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC, + !AA_DO_TEST); + else + goto fail; + } else /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */ return -EINVAL; - } + if (!error) error = size; return error; + +fail: + sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE; + sa.aad = &aad; + aad.profile = aa_current_profile(); + aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR; + aad.info = name; + aad.error = -EINVAL; + aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL); + return -EINVAL; } static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, @@ -886,7 +885,7 @@ static int __init set_init_cxt(void) return -ENOMEM; cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined); - cred->security = cxt; + cred_cxt(cred) = cxt; return 0; } @@ -915,8 +914,11 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) error = register_security(&apparmor_ops); if (error) { + struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred; + aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred)); + cred_cxt(cred) = NULL; AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n"); - goto set_init_cxt_out; + goto register_security_out; } /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ @@ -930,9 +932,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) return error; -set_init_cxt_out: - aa_free_task_context(current->real_cred->security); - register_security_out: aa_free_root_ns(); diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c index 90971a8..727eb42 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/match.c +++ b/security/apparmor/match.c @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * This file contains AppArmor dfa based regular expression matching engine * * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE - * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd. * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ #include "include/apparmor.h" #include "include/match.h" +#define base_idx(X) ((X) & 0xffffff) + /** * unpack_table - unpack a dfa table (one of accept, default, base, next check) * @blob: data to unpack (NOT NULL) @@ -30,7 +32,7 @@ * * Returns: pointer to table else NULL on failure * - * NOTE: must be freed by kvfree (not kmalloc) + * NOTE: must be freed by kvfree (not kfree) */ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize) { @@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize) if (bsize < tsize) goto out; - table = kvmalloc(tsize); + table = kvzalloc(tsize); if (table) { *table = th; if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8) @@ -137,8 +139,7 @@ static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags) for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) { if (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count) goto out; - /* TODO: do check that DEF state recursion terminates */ - if (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] + 255 >= trans_count) { + if (base_idx(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i]) + 255 >= trans_count) { printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor DFA next/check upper " "bounds error\n"); goto out; @@ -314,7 +315,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa); /* default is direct to next state */ for (; len; len--) { - pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) *str++]; + pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++]; if (check[pos] == state) state = next[pos]; else @@ -323,7 +324,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, } else { /* default is direct to next state */ for (; len; len--) { - pos = base[state] + (u8) *str++; + pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++; if (check[pos] == state) state = next[pos]; else @@ -364,7 +365,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa); /* default is direct to next state */ while (*str) { - pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) *str++]; + pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++]; if (check[pos] == state) state = next[pos]; else @@ -373,7 +374,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, } else { /* default is direct to next state */ while (*str) { - pos = base[state] + (u8) *str++; + pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++; if (check[pos] == state) state = next[pos]; else @@ -409,14 +410,14 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa); /* default is direct to next state */ - pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) c]; + pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) c]; if (check[pos] == state) state = next[pos]; else state = def[state]; } else { /* default is direct to next state */ - pos = base[state] + (u8) c; + pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) c; if (check[pos] == state) state = next[pos]; else diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c index e91ffee..35b394a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/path.c +++ b/security/apparmor/path.c @@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int get_name_to_buffer(struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer, if (info && error) { if (error == -ENOENT) *info = "Failed name lookup - deleted entry"; - else if (error == -ESTALE) + else if (error == -EACCES) *info = "Failed name lookup - disconnected path"; else if (error == -ENAMETOOLONG) *info = "Failed name lookup - name too long"; diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index 8132003..0f345c4 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -87,7 +87,6 @@ #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/policy_unpack.h" #include "include/resource.h" -#include "include/sid.h" /* root profile namespace */ @@ -292,7 +291,6 @@ static struct aa_namespace *alloc_namespace(const char *prefix, if (!ns->unconfined) goto fail_unconfined; - ns->unconfined->sid = aa_alloc_sid(); ns->unconfined->flags = PFLAG_UNCONFINED | PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR | PFLAG_IMMUTABLE; @@ -303,6 +301,8 @@ static struct aa_namespace *alloc_namespace(const char *prefix, */ ns->unconfined->ns = aa_get_namespace(ns); + atomic_set(&ns->uniq_null, 0); + return ns; fail_unconfined: @@ -497,7 +497,6 @@ static void __replace_profile(struct aa_profile *old, struct aa_profile *new) /* released when @new is freed */ new->parent = aa_get_profile(old->parent); new->ns = aa_get_namespace(old->ns); - new->sid = old->sid; __list_add_profile(&policy->profiles, new); /* inherit children */ list_for_each_entry_safe(child, tmp, &old->base.profiles, base.list) { @@ -636,83 +635,6 @@ void __init aa_free_root_ns(void) } /** - * aa_alloc_profile - allocate, initialize and return a new profile - * @hname: name of the profile (NOT NULL) - * - * Returns: refcount profile or NULL on failure - */ -struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *hname) -{ - struct aa_profile *profile; - - /* freed by free_profile - usually through aa_put_profile */ - profile = kzalloc(sizeof(*profile), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!profile) - return NULL; - - if (!policy_init(&profile->base, NULL, hname)) { - kzfree(profile); - return NULL; - } - - /* refcount released by caller */ - return profile; -} - -/** - * aa_new_null_profile - create a new null-X learning profile - * @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created (NOT NULL) - * @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat - * - * Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode. The name of - * the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-sid. - * - * null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not - * hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when - * not in use. - * - * Returns: new refcounted profile else NULL on failure - */ -struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, int hat) -{ - struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; - char *name; - u32 sid = aa_alloc_sid(); - - /* freed below */ - name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 2 + 7 + 8, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!name) - goto fail; - sprintf(name, "%s//null-%x", parent->base.hname, sid); - - profile = aa_alloc_profile(name); - kfree(name); - if (!profile) - goto fail; - - profile->sid = sid; - profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN; - profile->flags = PFLAG_NULL; - if (hat) - profile->flags |= PFLAG_HAT; - - /* released on free_profile */ - profile->parent = aa_get_profile(parent); - profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(parent->ns); - - write_lock(&profile->ns->lock); - __list_add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile); - write_unlock(&profile->ns->lock); - - /* refcount released by caller */ - return profile; - -fail: - aa_free_sid(sid); - return NULL; -} - -/** * free_profile - free a profile * @profile: the profile to free (MAYBE NULL) * @@ -749,7 +671,6 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps); aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits); - aa_free_sid(profile->sid); aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch); aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa); @@ -790,6 +711,81 @@ void aa_free_profile_kref(struct kref *kref) free_profile(p); } +/** + * aa_alloc_profile - allocate, initialize and return a new profile + * @hname: name of the profile (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: refcount profile or NULL on failure + */ +struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *hname) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + + /* freed by free_profile - usually through aa_put_profile */ + profile = kzalloc(sizeof(*profile), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!profile) + return NULL; + + if (!policy_init(&profile->base, NULL, hname)) { + kzfree(profile); + return NULL; + } + + /* refcount released by caller */ + return profile; +} + +/** + * aa_new_null_profile - create a new null-X learning profile + * @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created (NOT NULL) + * @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat + * + * Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode. The name of + * the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-<uniq>. + * + * null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not + * hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when + * not in use. + * + * Returns: new refcounted profile else NULL on failure + */ +struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, int hat) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; + char *name; + int uniq = atomic_inc_return(&parent->ns->uniq_null); + + /* freed below */ + name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 2 + 7 + 8, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!name) + goto fail; + sprintf(name, "%s//null-%x", parent->base.hname, uniq); + + profile = aa_alloc_profile(name); + kfree(name); + if (!profile) + goto fail; + + profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN; + profile->flags = PFLAG_NULL; + if (hat) + profile->flags |= PFLAG_HAT; + + /* released on free_profile */ + profile->parent = aa_get_profile(parent); + profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(parent->ns); + + write_lock(&profile->ns->lock); + __list_add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile); + write_unlock(&profile->ns->lock); + + /* refcount released by caller */ + return profile; + +fail: + return NULL; +} + /* TODO: profile accounting - setup in remove */ /** @@ -972,7 +968,6 @@ static void __add_new_profile(struct aa_namespace *ns, struct aa_policy *policy, profile->parent = aa_get_profile((struct aa_profile *) policy); __list_add_profile(&policy->profiles, profile); /* released on free_profile */ - profile->sid = aa_alloc_sid(); profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(ns); } @@ -1110,14 +1105,8 @@ audit: if (!error) { if (rename_profile) __replace_profile(rename_profile, new_profile); - if (old_profile) { - /* when there are both rename and old profiles - * inherit old profiles sid - */ - if (rename_profile) - aa_free_sid(new_profile->sid); + if (old_profile) __replace_profile(old_profile, new_profile); - } if (!(old_profile || rename_profile)) __add_new_profile(ns, policy, new_profile); } @@ -1167,14 +1156,12 @@ ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(char *fqname, size_t size) if (fqname[0] == ':') { char *ns_name; name = aa_split_fqname(fqname, &ns_name); - if (ns_name) { - /* released below */ - ns = aa_find_namespace(root, ns_name); - if (!ns) { - info = "namespace does not exist"; - error = -ENOENT; - goto fail; - } + /* released below */ + ns = aa_find_namespace(root, ns_name); + if (!ns) { + info = "namespace does not exist"; + error = -ENOENT; + goto fail; } } else /* released below */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index 329b1fd..6dac7d7 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ #include "include/match.h" #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/policy_unpack.h" -#include "include/sid.h" /* * The AppArmor interface treats data as a type byte followed by the @@ -290,6 +289,9 @@ static int unpack_strdup(struct aa_ext *e, char **string, const char *name) return res; } +#define DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK 0xffffffff +#define DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK 0xffffffff + /** * verify_accept - verify the accept tables of a dfa * @dfa: dfa to verify accept tables of (NOT NULL) diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c index 1b41c54..6c93901 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c +++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c @@ -163,9 +163,3 @@ int aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(char *fqname, bool onexec, int test) name = aa_split_fqname(fqname, &ns_name); return aa_change_profile(ns_name, name, onexec, test); } - -int aa_setprocattr_permipc(char *fqname) -{ - /* TODO: add ipc permission querying */ - return -ENOTSUPP; -} diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c index e1f3d7e..748bf0c 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/resource.c +++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <linux/audit.h> #include "include/audit.h" +#include "include/context.h" #include "include/resource.h" #include "include/policy.h" @@ -90,17 +91,25 @@ int aa_map_resource(int resource) int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task, unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) { + struct aa_profile *task_profile; int error = 0; + rcu_read_lock(); + task_profile = aa_get_profile(aa_cred_profile(__task_cred(task))); + rcu_read_unlock(); + /* TODO: extend resource control to handle other (non current) - * processes. AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption - * that the task is setting the resource of the current process + * profiles. AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption + * that the task is setting the resource of a task confined with + * the same profile. */ - if ((task != current->group_leader) || + if (profile != task_profile || (profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) && new_rlim->rlim_max > profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max)) error = -EACCES; + aa_put_profile(task_profile); + return audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, error); } diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig index 4bb3a77..245c6d9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig @@ -17,6 +17,21 @@ config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are usually only added from initramfs. +config INTEGRITY_AUDIT + bool "Enables integrity auditing support " + depends on INTEGRITY && AUDIT + default y + help + In addition to enabling integrity auditing support, this + option adds a kernel parameter 'integrity_audit', which + controls the level of integrity auditing messages. + 0 - basic integrity auditing messages (default) + 1 - additional integrity auditing messages + + Additional informational integrity auditing messages would + be enabled by specifying 'integrity_audit=1' on the kernel + command line. + config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS boolean "Enable asymmetric keys support" depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile index ebb6409..0f9cffb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ # obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity.o +obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT) += integrity_audit.o obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index cdbde17..df0fa45 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/crypto.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/integrity.h> #include <linux/evm.h> @@ -24,6 +25,9 @@ int evm_initialized; +static char *integrity_status_msg[] = { + "pass", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown" +}; char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)"; char *evm_hash = "sha1"; int evm_hmac_version = CONFIG_EVM_HMAC_VERSION; @@ -262,9 +266,15 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)) return 0; - return -EPERM; + goto out; } evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); +out: + if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS) + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode, + dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", + integrity_status_msg[evm_status], + -EPERM, 0); return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM; } @@ -357,6 +367,9 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)) return 0; + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode, + dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", + integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0); return -EPERM; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index d232c73..39196ab 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -38,18 +38,6 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX that IMA uses to maintain the integrity aggregate of the measurement list. If unsure, use the default 10. -config IMA_AUDIT - bool "Enables auditing support" - depends on IMA - depends on AUDIT - default y - help - This option adds a kernel parameter 'ima_audit', which - allows informational auditing messages to be enabled - at boot. If this option is selected, informational integrity - auditing messages can be enabled with 'ima_audit=1' on - the kernel command line. - config IMA_LSM_RULES bool depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile index 3f2ca6b..56dfee7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile @@ -7,5 +7,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ ima_policy.o -ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT) += ima_audit.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index a41c9c1..b3dd616 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -62,20 +62,6 @@ struct ima_queue_entry { }; extern struct list_head ima_measurements; /* list of all measurements */ -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT -/* declarations */ -void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, - const unsigned char *fname, const char *op, - const char *cause, int result, int info); -#else -static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, - const unsigned char *fname, - const char *op, const char *cause, - int result, int info) -{ -} -#endif - /* Internal IMA function definitions */ int ima_init(void); void ima_cleanup(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 84c37c4..c42fb7a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -113,5 +113,19 @@ static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT +/* declarations */ +void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *fname, const char *op, + const char *cause, int result, int info); +#else +static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *fname, + const char *op, const char *cause, + int result, int info) +{ +} +#endif + /* set during initialization */ extern int iint_initialized; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c index c586faa..d7efb30 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c +++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c @@ -13,20 +13,20 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/gfp.h> #include <linux/audit.h> -#include "ima.h" +#include "integrity.h" -static int ima_audit; +static int integrity_audit_info; /* ima_audit_setup - enable informational auditing messages */ -static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str) +static int __init integrity_audit_setup(char *str) { unsigned long audit; if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit)) - ima_audit = audit ? 1 : 0; + integrity_audit_info = audit ? 1 : 0; return 1; } -__setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup); +__setup("integrity_audit=", integrity_audit_setup); void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *fname, const char *op, @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, { struct audit_buffer *ab; - if (!ima_audit && audit_info == 1) /* Skip informational messages */ + if (!integrity_audit_info && audit_info == 1) /* Skip info messages */ return; ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno); diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index 8ad30955..339614c 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -29,6 +29,38 @@ #define SMK_LONGLABEL 256 /* + * This is the repository for labels seen so that it is + * not necessary to keep allocating tiny chuncks of memory + * and so that they can be shared. + * + * Labels are never modified in place. Anytime a label + * is imported (e.g. xattrset on a file) the list is checked + * for it and it is added if it doesn't exist. The address + * is passed out in either case. Entries are added, but + * never deleted. + * + * Since labels are hanging around anyway it doesn't + * hurt to maintain a secid for those awkward situations + * where kernel components that ought to use LSM independent + * interfaces don't. The secid should go away when all of + * these components have been repaired. + * + * The cipso value associated with the label gets stored here, too. + * + * Keep the access rules for this subject label here so that + * the entire set of rules does not need to be examined every + * time. + */ +struct smack_known { + struct list_head list; + char *smk_known; + u32 smk_secid; + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr smk_netlabel; /* on wire labels */ + struct list_head smk_rules; /* access rules */ + struct mutex smk_rules_lock; /* lock for rules */ +}; + +/* * Maximum number of bytes for the levels in a CIPSO IP option. * Why 23? CIPSO is constrained to 30, so a 32 byte buffer is * bigger than can be used, and 24 is the next lower multiple @@ -46,25 +78,25 @@ struct superblock_smack { }; struct socket_smack { - char *smk_out; /* outbound label */ - char *smk_in; /* inbound label */ - char *smk_packet; /* TCP peer label */ + struct smack_known *smk_out; /* outbound label */ + char *smk_in; /* inbound label */ + char *smk_packet; /* TCP peer label */ }; /* * Inode smack data */ struct inode_smack { - char *smk_inode; /* label of the fso */ - char *smk_task; /* label of the task */ - char *smk_mmap; /* label of the mmap domain */ - struct mutex smk_lock; /* initialization lock */ - int smk_flags; /* smack inode flags */ + char *smk_inode; /* label of the fso */ + struct smack_known *smk_task; /* label of the task */ + struct smack_known *smk_mmap; /* label of the mmap domain */ + struct mutex smk_lock; /* initialization lock */ + int smk_flags; /* smack inode flags */ }; struct task_smack { - char *smk_task; /* label for access control */ - char *smk_forked; /* label when forked */ + struct smack_known *smk_task; /* label for access control */ + struct smack_known *smk_forked; /* label when forked */ struct list_head smk_rules; /* per task access rules */ struct mutex smk_rules_lock; /* lock for the rules */ }; @@ -78,7 +110,7 @@ struct task_smack { */ struct smack_rule { struct list_head list; - char *smk_subject; + struct smack_known *smk_subject; char *smk_object; int smk_access; }; @@ -94,35 +126,14 @@ struct smk_netlbladdr { }; /* - * This is the repository for labels seen so that it is - * not necessary to keep allocating tiny chuncks of memory - * and so that they can be shared. - * - * Labels are never modified in place. Anytime a label - * is imported (e.g. xattrset on a file) the list is checked - * for it and it is added if it doesn't exist. The address - * is passed out in either case. Entries are added, but - * never deleted. - * - * Since labels are hanging around anyway it doesn't - * hurt to maintain a secid for those awkward situations - * where kernel components that ought to use LSM independent - * interfaces don't. The secid should go away when all of - * these components have been repaired. - * - * The cipso value associated with the label gets stored here, too. - * - * Keep the access rules for this subject label here so that - * the entire set of rules does not need to be examined every - * time. + * An entry in the table identifying ports. */ -struct smack_known { - struct list_head list; - char *smk_known; - u32 smk_secid; - struct netlbl_lsm_secattr smk_netlabel; /* on wire labels */ - struct list_head smk_rules; /* access rules */ - struct mutex smk_rules_lock; /* lock for rules */ +struct smk_port_label { + struct list_head list; + struct sock *smk_sock; /* socket initialized on */ + unsigned short smk_port; /* the port number */ + char *smk_in; /* incoming label */ + struct smack_known *smk_out; /* outgoing label */ }; /* @@ -132,6 +143,7 @@ struct smack_known { #define SMK_FSFLOOR "smackfsfloor=" #define SMK_FSHAT "smackfshat=" #define SMK_FSROOT "smackfsroot=" +#define SMK_FSTRANS "smackfstransmute=" #define SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION "-CIPSO" @@ -203,9 +215,9 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *); * These functions are in smack_access.c */ int smk_access_entry(char *, char *, struct list_head *); -int smk_access(char *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *); +int smk_access(struct smack_known *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *); int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *); -char *smack_from_secid(const u32); +struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32); char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len); int smk_netlbl_mls(int, char *, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *, int); char *smk_import(const char *, int); @@ -218,7 +230,7 @@ u32 smack_to_secid(const char *); */ extern int smack_cipso_direct; extern int smack_cipso_mapped; -extern char *smack_net_ambient; +extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient; extern char *smack_onlycap; extern const char *smack_cipso_option; @@ -254,17 +266,17 @@ static inline char *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp) } /* - * Present a pointer to the smack label in an task blob. + * Present a pointer to the smack label entry in an task blob. */ -static inline char *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp) +static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp) { return tsp->smk_task; } /* - * Present a pointer to the forked smack label in an task blob. + * Present a pointer to the forked smack label entry in an task blob. */ -static inline char *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp) +static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp) { return tsp->smk_forked; } @@ -272,7 +284,7 @@ static inline char *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp) /* * Present a pointer to the smack label in the current task blob. */ -static inline char *smk_of_current(void) +static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_current(void) { return smk_of_task(current_security()); } @@ -283,9 +295,11 @@ static inline char *smk_of_current(void) */ static inline int smack_privileged(int cap) { + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); + if (!capable(cap)) return 0; - if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == smk_of_current()) + if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == skp->smk_known) return 1; return 0; } diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index 2e397a8..6a0377f 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label, list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, rule_list, list) { if (srp->smk_object == object_label && - srp->smk_subject == subject_label) { + srp->smk_subject->smk_known == subject_label) { may = srp->smk_access; break; } @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label, /** * smk_access - determine if a subject has a specific access to an object - * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label + * @subject_known: a pointer to the subject's Smack label entry * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label * @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format * @a : a pointer to the audit data @@ -115,10 +115,9 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label, * * Smack labels are shared on smack_list */ -int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request, - struct smk_audit_info *a) +int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject_known, char *object_label, + int request, struct smk_audit_info *a) { - struct smack_known *skp; int may = MAY_NOT; int rc = 0; @@ -127,7 +126,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request, * * A star subject can't access any object. */ - if (subject_label == smack_known_star.smk_known) { + if (subject_known == &smack_known_star) { rc = -EACCES; goto out_audit; } @@ -137,7 +136,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request, * An internet subject can access any object. */ if (object_label == smack_known_web.smk_known || - subject_label == smack_known_web.smk_known) + subject_known == &smack_known_web) goto out_audit; /* * A star object can be accessed by any subject. @@ -148,7 +147,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request, * An object can be accessed in any way by a subject * with the same label. */ - if (subject_label == object_label) + if (subject_known->smk_known == object_label) goto out_audit; /* * A hat subject can read any object. @@ -157,7 +156,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request, if ((request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request) { if (object_label == smack_known_floor.smk_known) goto out_audit; - if (subject_label == smack_known_hat.smk_known) + if (subject_known == &smack_known_hat) goto out_audit; } /* @@ -167,9 +166,9 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request, * good. A negative response from smk_access_entry() * indicates there is no entry for this pair. */ - skp = smk_find_entry(subject_label); rcu_read_lock(); - may = smk_access_entry(subject_label, object_label, &skp->smk_rules); + may = smk_access_entry(subject_known->smk_known, object_label, + &subject_known->smk_rules); rcu_read_unlock(); if (may > 0 && (request & may) == request) @@ -179,7 +178,8 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request, out_audit: #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT if (a) - smack_log(subject_label, object_label, request, rc, a); + smack_log(subject_known->smk_known, object_label, request, + rc, a); #endif return rc; } @@ -198,20 +198,21 @@ out_audit: int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a) { struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); - char *sp = smk_of_task(tsp); + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(tsp); int may; int rc; /* * Check the global rule list */ - rc = smk_access(sp, obj_label, mode, NULL); + rc = smk_access(skp, obj_label, mode, NULL); if (rc == 0) { /* * If there is an entry in the task's rule list * it can further restrict access. */ - may = smk_access_entry(sp, obj_label, &tsp->smk_rules); + may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, obj_label, + &tsp->smk_rules); if (may < 0) goto out_audit; if ((mode & may) == mode) @@ -228,7 +229,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a) out_audit: #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT if (a) - smack_log(sp, obj_label, mode, rc, a); + smack_log(skp->smk_known, obj_label, mode, rc, a); #endif return rc; } @@ -402,6 +403,8 @@ int smk_netlbl_mls(int level, char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, sap->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT; sap->attr.mls.lvl = level; sap->attr.mls.cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!sap->attr.mls.cat) + return -ENOMEM; sap->attr.mls.cat->startbit = 0; for (cat = 1, cp = catset, byte = 0; byte < len; cp++, byte++) @@ -513,10 +516,10 @@ char *smk_import(const char *string, int len) * smack_from_secid - find the Smack label associated with a secid * @secid: an integer that might be associated with a Smack label * - * Returns a pointer to the appropriate Smack label if there is one, + * Returns a pointer to the appropriate Smack label entry if there is one, * otherwise a pointer to the invalid Smack label. */ -char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid) +struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid) { struct smack_known *skp; @@ -524,7 +527,7 @@ char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid) list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) { if (skp->smk_secid == secid) { rcu_read_unlock(); - return skp->smk_known; + return skp; } } @@ -533,7 +536,7 @@ char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid) * of a secid that is not on the list. */ rcu_read_unlock(); - return smack_known_invalid.smk_known; + return &smack_known_invalid; } /** diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index d52c780..6a08330 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -27,10 +27,13 @@ #include <linux/ip.h> #include <linux/tcp.h> #include <linux/udp.h> +#include <linux/dccp.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h> #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h> +#include <net/ip.h> +#include <net/ipv6.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/magic.h> #include <linux/dcache.h> @@ -45,6 +48,12 @@ #define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE" #define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4 +#define SMK_CONNECTING 0 +#define SMK_RECEIVING 1 +#define SMK_SENDING 2 + +LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list); + /** * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file. * @ip: a pointer to the inode @@ -53,11 +62,12 @@ * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label * or NULL if there was no label to fetch. */ -static char *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp) +static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip, + struct dentry *dp) { int rc; char *buffer; - char *result = NULL; + struct smack_known *skp = NULL; if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL) return NULL; @@ -68,11 +78,11 @@ static char *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp) rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL); if (rc > 0) - result = smk_import(buffer, rc); + skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc); kfree(buffer); - return result; + return skp; } /** @@ -102,7 +112,8 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack) * * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available */ -static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(char *task, char *forked, gfp_t gfp) +static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task, + struct smack_known *forked, gfp_t gfp) { struct task_smack *tsp; @@ -164,17 +175,17 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode) { int rc; struct smk_audit_info ad; - char *tsp; + struct smack_known *skp; rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode); if (rc != 0) return rc; - tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp)); + skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp)); smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp); - rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, MAY_READWRITE, &ad); return rc; } @@ -190,17 +201,17 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp) { int rc; struct smk_audit_info ad; - char *tsp; + struct smack_known *skp; rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp); if (rc != 0) return rc; - tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp)); + skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp)); smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp); - rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, MAY_READWRITE, &ad); return rc; } @@ -215,12 +226,12 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp) static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file) { int rc = 0; - char *sp = smk_of_current(); + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; - if (sp != smack_known_floor.smk_known) + if (skp != &smack_known_floor) rc = -EACCES; return rc; @@ -250,8 +261,9 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) sbsp->smk_default = smack_known_floor.smk_known; sbsp->smk_floor = smack_known_floor.smk_known; sbsp->smk_hat = smack_known_hat.smk_known; - sbsp->smk_initialized = 0; - + /* + * smk_initialized will be zero from kzalloc. + */ sb->s_security = sbsp; return 0; @@ -295,6 +307,8 @@ static int smack_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *smackopts) dp = smackopts; else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp) dp = smackopts; + else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSTRANS) == cp) + dp = smackopts; else dp = otheropts; @@ -330,8 +344,9 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) char *op; char *commap; char *nsp; + int transmute = 0; - if (sp->smk_initialized != 0) + if (sp->smk_initialized) return 0; sp->smk_initialized = 1; @@ -362,6 +377,13 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) nsp = smk_import(op, 0); if (nsp != NULL) sp->smk_root = nsp; + } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSTRANS, strlen(SMK_FSTRANS)) == 0) { + op += strlen(SMK_FSTRANS); + nsp = smk_import(op, 0); + if (nsp != NULL) { + sp->smk_root = nsp; + transmute = 1; + } } } @@ -369,11 +391,15 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) * Initialize the root inode. */ isp = inode->i_security; - if (isp == NULL) + if (inode->i_security == NULL) { inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root); - else + isp = inode->i_security; + } else isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root; + if (transmute) + isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE; + return 0; } @@ -524,7 +550,9 @@ static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) { - inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(smk_of_current()); + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); + + inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp->smk_known); if (inode->i_security == NULL) return -ENOMEM; return 0; @@ -557,9 +585,8 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, char **name, void **value, size_t *len) { - struct smack_known *skp; struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security; - char *csp = smk_of_current(); + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); char *isp = smk_of_inode(inode); char *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir); int may; @@ -571,9 +598,8 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, } if (value) { - skp = smk_find_entry(csp); rcu_read_lock(); - may = smk_access_entry(csp, dsp, &skp->smk_rules); + may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp, &skp->smk_rules); rcu_read_unlock(); /* @@ -862,29 +888,31 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { - char *nsp; + struct smack_known *skp; struct inode_smack *isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security; + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) { + isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE; + return; + } + + skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) { - nsp = smk_import(value, size); - if (nsp != NULL) - isp->smk_inode = nsp; + if (skp != NULL) + isp->smk_inode = skp->smk_known; else isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known; } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) { - nsp = smk_import(value, size); - if (nsp != NULL) - isp->smk_task = nsp; + if (skp != NULL) + isp->smk_task = skp; else - isp->smk_task = smack_known_invalid.smk_known; + isp->smk_task = &smack_known_invalid; } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) { - nsp = smk_import(value, size); - if (nsp != NULL) - isp->smk_mmap = nsp; + if (skp != NULL) + isp->smk_mmap = skp; else - isp->smk_mmap = smack_known_invalid.smk_known; - } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) - isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE; + isp->smk_mmap = &smack_known_invalid; + } return; } @@ -990,7 +1018,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0) isp = ssp->smk_in; else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) - isp = ssp->smk_out; + isp = ssp->smk_out->smk_known; else return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -1070,7 +1098,9 @@ static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) */ static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) { - file->f_security = smk_of_current(); + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); + + file->f_security = skp->smk_known; return 0; } @@ -1181,10 +1211,9 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long flags) { struct smack_known *skp; + struct smack_known *mkp; struct smack_rule *srp; struct task_smack *tsp; - char *sp; - char *msmack; char *osmack; struct inode_smack *isp; int may; @@ -1198,11 +1227,10 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file, isp = file_inode(file)->i_security; if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL) return 0; - msmack = isp->smk_mmap; + mkp = isp->smk_mmap; tsp = current_security(); - sp = smk_of_current(); - skp = smk_find_entry(sp); + skp = smk_of_current(); rc = 0; rcu_read_lock(); @@ -1216,13 +1244,13 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file, /* * Matching labels always allows access. */ - if (msmack == osmack) + if (mkp->smk_known == osmack) continue; /* * If there is a matching local rule take * that into account as well. */ - may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject, osmack, + may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known, osmack, &tsp->smk_rules); if (may == -ENOENT) may = srp->smk_access; @@ -1240,8 +1268,8 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file, * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject * can't have as much access as current. */ - skp = smk_find_entry(msmack); - mmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &skp->smk_rules); + mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, osmack, + &mkp->smk_rules); if (mmay == -ENOENT) { rc = -EACCES; break; @@ -1250,7 +1278,8 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file, * If there is a local entry it modifies the * potential access, too. */ - tmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &tsp->smk_rules); + tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, osmack, + &tsp->smk_rules); if (tmay != -ENOENT) mmay &= tmay; @@ -1279,7 +1308,9 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file, */ static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) { - file->f_security = smk_of_current(); + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); + + file->f_security = skp->smk_known; return 0; } @@ -1297,9 +1328,10 @@ static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, struct fown_struct *fown, int signum) { + struct smack_known *skp; + struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security); struct file *file; int rc; - char *tsp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security); struct smk_audit_info ad; /* @@ -1308,13 +1340,14 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner); /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */ - rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL); + skp = smk_find_entry(file->f_security); + rc = smk_access(skp, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, NULL); if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) rc = 0; smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk); - smack_log(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad); + smack_log(file->f_security, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad); return rc; } @@ -1469,12 +1502,12 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) { struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security; - char *smack = smack_from_secid(secid); + struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid); - if (smack == NULL) + if (skp == NULL) return -EINVAL; - new_tsp->smk_task = smack; + new_tsp->smk_task = skp; return 0; } @@ -1492,8 +1525,8 @@ static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security; struct task_smack *tsp = new->security; - tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode; - tsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode; + tsp->smk_forked = smk_find_entry(isp->smk_inode); + tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked; return 0; } @@ -1509,10 +1542,11 @@ static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access, const char *caller) { struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p)); smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p); - return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), access, &ad); + return smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, access, &ad); } /** @@ -1558,7 +1592,9 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) */ static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) { - *secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_task(task_security(p))); + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p)); + + *secid = skp->smk_secid; } /** @@ -1662,6 +1698,8 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid) { struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct smack_known *skp; + struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(task_security(p)); smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p); @@ -1670,15 +1708,14 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, * can write the receiver. */ if (secid == 0) - return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE, - &ad); + return smk_curacc(tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad); /* * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing * we can't take privilege into account. */ - return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), - smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE, &ad); + skp = smack_from_secid(secid); + return smk_access(skp, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad); } /** @@ -1710,7 +1747,9 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) { struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security; - isp->smk_inode = smk_of_task(task_security(p)); + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p)); + + isp->smk_inode = skp->smk_known; } /* @@ -1729,15 +1768,15 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) */ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags) { - char *csp = smk_of_current(); + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); struct socket_smack *ssp; ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags); if (ssp == NULL) return -ENOMEM; - ssp->smk_in = csp; - ssp->smk_out = csp; + ssp->smk_in = skp->smk_known; + ssp->smk_out = skp; ssp->smk_packet = NULL; sk->sk_security = ssp; @@ -1824,7 +1863,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled) labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET) netlbl_sock_delattr(sk); else { - skp = smk_find_entry(ssp->smk_out); + skp = ssp->smk_out; rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel); } @@ -1847,6 +1886,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled) */ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap) { + struct smack_known *skp; int rc; int sk_lbl; char *hostsp; @@ -1865,7 +1905,8 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap) ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr; #endif sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET; - rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + skp = ssp->smk_out; + rc = smk_access(skp, hostsp, MAY_WRITE, &ad); } else { sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET; rc = 0; @@ -1878,6 +1919,155 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap) } /** + * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management + * @sock: socket + * @address: address + * + * Create or update the port list entry + */ +static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address) +{ + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; + struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6; + struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + struct smk_port_label *spp; + unsigned short port = 0; + + if (address == NULL) { + /* + * This operation is changing the Smack information + * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port + * as well. + */ + list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) { + if (sk != spp->smk_sock) + continue; + spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in; + spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out; + return; + } + /* + * A NULL address is only used for updating existing + * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK. + */ + return; + } + + addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; + port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); + /* + * This is a special case that is safely ignored. + */ + if (port == 0) + return; + + /* + * Look for an existing port list entry. + * This is an indication that a port is getting reused. + */ + list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) { + if (spp->smk_port != port) + continue; + spp->smk_port = port; + spp->smk_sock = sk; + spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in; + spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out; + return; + } + + /* + * A new port entry is required. + */ + spp = kzalloc(sizeof(*spp), GFP_KERNEL); + if (spp == NULL) + return; + + spp->smk_port = port; + spp->smk_sock = sk; + spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in; + spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out; + + list_add(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list); + return; +} + +/** + * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access + * @sock: socket + * @address: address + * + * Create or update the port list entry + */ +static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *address, + int act) +{ + __be16 *bep; + __be32 *be32p; + struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6; + struct smk_port_label *spp; + struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security; + struct smack_known *skp; + unsigned short port = 0; + char *object; + struct smk_audit_info ad; +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + struct lsm_network_audit net; +#endif + + if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) { + skp = smack_net_ambient; + object = ssp->smk_in; + } else { + skp = ssp->smk_out; + object = smack_net_ambient->smk_known; + } + + /* + * Get the IP address and port from the address. + */ + addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; + port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); + bep = (__be16 *)(&addr6->sin6_addr); + be32p = (__be32 *)(&addr6->sin6_addr); + + /* + * It's remote, so port lookup does no good. + */ + if (be32p[0] || be32p[1] || be32p[2] || bep[6] || ntohs(bep[7]) != 1) + goto auditout; + + /* + * It's local so the send check has to have passed. + */ + if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) { + skp = &smack_known_web; + goto auditout; + } + + list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) { + if (spp->smk_port != port) + continue; + object = spp->smk_in; + if (act == SMK_CONNECTING) + ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out->smk_known; + break; + } + +auditout: + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); + ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family; + ad.a.u.net->dport = port; + if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) + ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr; + else + ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = addr6->sin6_addr; +#endif + return smk_access(skp, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad); +} + +/** * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs * @inode: the object * @name: attribute name @@ -1892,7 +2082,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap) static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { - char *sp; + struct smack_known *skp; struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security; struct socket_smack *ssp; struct socket *sock; @@ -1901,12 +2091,12 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0) return -EACCES; - sp = smk_import(value, size); - if (sp == NULL) + skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); + if (skp == NULL) return -EINVAL; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) { - nsp->smk_inode = sp; + nsp->smk_inode = skp->smk_known; nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT; return 0; } @@ -1923,10 +2113,10 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0) - ssp->smk_in = sp; + ssp->smk_in = skp->smk_known; else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) { - ssp->smk_out = sp; - if (sock->sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX) { + ssp->smk_out = skp; + if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) { rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET); if (rc != 0) printk(KERN_WARNING @@ -1936,6 +2126,9 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, } else return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) + smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL); + return 0; } @@ -1963,6 +2156,25 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, } /** + * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information. + * @sock: the socket + * @address: the port address + * @addrlen: size of the address + * + * Records the label bound to a port. + * + * Returns 0 + */ +static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, + int addrlen) +{ + if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) + smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address); + + return 0; +} + +/** * smack_socket_connect - connect access check * @sock: the socket * @sap: the other end @@ -1975,12 +2187,24 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap, int addrlen) { - if (sock->sk == NULL || sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET) + int rc = 0; + + if (sock->sk == NULL) return 0; - if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) - return -EINVAL; - return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap); + switch (sock->sk->sk_family) { + case PF_INET: + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) + return -EINVAL; + rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap); + break; + case PF_INET6: + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) + return -EINVAL; + rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_CONNECTING); + break; + } + return rc; } /** @@ -2011,7 +2235,9 @@ static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags) */ static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) { - msg->security = smk_of_current(); + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); + + msg->security = skp->smk_known; return 0; } @@ -2046,8 +2272,9 @@ static char *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp) static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) { struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm; + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); - isp->security = smk_of_current(); + isp->security = skp->smk_known; return 0; } @@ -2169,8 +2396,9 @@ static char *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma) static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) { struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm; + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); - isp->security = smk_of_current(); + isp->security = skp->smk_known; return 0; } @@ -2287,8 +2515,9 @@ static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops, static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) { struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm; + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); - kisp->security = smk_of_current(); + kisp->security = skp->smk_known; return 0; } @@ -2460,8 +2689,8 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) struct super_block *sbp; struct superblock_smack *sbsp; struct inode_smack *isp; - char *csp = smk_of_current(); - char *fetched; + struct smack_known *skp; + struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current(); char *final; char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE]; int transflag = 0; @@ -2528,7 +2757,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) * Programs that change smack have to treat the * pty with respect. */ - final = csp; + final = ckp->smk_known; break; case SOCKFS_MAGIC: /* @@ -2583,9 +2812,9 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) * Get the dentry for xattr. */ dp = dget(opt_dentry); - fetched = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp); - if (fetched != NULL) - final = fetched; + skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp); + if (skp != NULL) + final = skp->smk_known; /* * Transmuting directory @@ -2625,7 +2854,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) } if (final == NULL) - isp->smk_inode = csp; + isp->smk_inode = ckp->smk_known; else isp->smk_inode = final; @@ -2648,13 +2877,14 @@ unlockandout: */ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) { + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p)); char *cp; int slen; if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0) return -EINVAL; - cp = kstrdup(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), GFP_KERNEL); + cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); if (cp == NULL) return -ENOMEM; @@ -2680,7 +2910,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, { struct task_smack *tsp; struct cred *new; - char *newsmack; + struct smack_known *skp; /* * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous @@ -2698,14 +2928,14 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0) return -EINVAL; - newsmack = smk_import(value, size); - if (newsmack == NULL) + skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); + if (skp == NULL) return -EINVAL; /* * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label. */ - if (newsmack == smack_known_web.smk_known) + if (skp == &smack_known_web) return -EPERM; new = prepare_creds(); @@ -2713,7 +2943,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, return -ENOMEM; tsp = new->security; - tsp->smk_task = newsmack; + tsp->smk_task = skp; commit_creds(new); return size; @@ -2731,6 +2961,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) { + struct smack_known *skp; struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security; struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security; struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security; @@ -2744,15 +2975,17 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other); #endif - if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) - rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) { + skp = ssp->smk_out; + rc = smk_access(skp, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + } /* * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC. */ if (rc == 0) { - nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out; - ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out; + nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out->smk_known; + ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out->smk_known; } return rc; @@ -2770,8 +3003,8 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) { struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security; + struct smack_known *skp; struct smk_audit_info ad; - int rc = 0; #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT struct lsm_network_audit net; @@ -2780,10 +3013,11 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk); #endif - if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) - rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + return 0; - return rc; + skp = ssp->smk_out; + return smk_access(skp, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); } /** @@ -2792,22 +3026,32 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) * @msg: the message * @size: the size of the message * - * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination - * host. This is only a question if the destination is a single - * label host. + * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host. + * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host. + * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port. */ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) { struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name; + struct sockaddr *sap = (struct sockaddr *) msg->msg_name; + int rc = 0; /* * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL */ - if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != AF_INET) + if (sip == NULL) return 0; - return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip); + switch (sip->sin_family) { + case AF_INET: + rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip); + break; + case AF_INET6: + rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING); + break; + } + return rc; } /** @@ -2815,13 +3059,12 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, * @sap: netlabel secattr * @ssp: socket security information * - * Returns a pointer to a Smack label found on the label list. + * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list. */ -static char *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, - struct socket_smack *ssp) +static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, + struct socket_smack *ssp) { - struct smack_known *kp; - char *sp; + struct smack_known *skp; int found = 0; if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) { @@ -2836,11 +3079,11 @@ static char *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, * ambient value. */ rcu_read_lock(); - list_for_each_entry(kp, &smack_known_list, list) { - if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != kp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl) + list_for_each_entry(skp, &smack_known_list, list) { + if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl) continue; if (memcmp(sap->attr.mls.cat, - kp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat, + skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat, SMK_CIPSOLEN) != 0) continue; found = 1; @@ -2849,17 +3092,17 @@ static char *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, rcu_read_unlock(); if (found) - return kp->smk_known; + return skp; if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == smack_known_star.smk_known) - return smack_known_web.smk_known; - return smack_known_star.smk_known; + return &smack_known_web; + return &smack_known_star; } if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) { /* * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid. */ - sp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid); + skp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid); /* * This has got to be a bug because it is * impossible to specify a fallback without @@ -2867,8 +3110,8 @@ static char *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, * it has a secid, and the only way to get a * secid is from a fallback. */ - BUG_ON(sp == NULL); - return sp; + BUG_ON(skp == NULL); + return skp; } /* * Without guidance regarding the smack value @@ -2878,6 +3121,54 @@ static char *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, return smack_net_ambient; } +static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr *sap) +{ + struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap; + u8 nexthdr; + int offset; + int proto = -EINVAL; + struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h; + struct ipv6hdr *ip6; + __be16 frag_off; + struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; + struct udphdr _udph, *uh; + struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; + + sip->sin6_port = 0; + + offset = skb_network_offset(skb); + ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h); + if (ip6 == NULL) + return -EINVAL; + sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr; + + nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr; + offset += sizeof(_ipv6h); + offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off); + if (offset < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + proto = nexthdr; + switch (proto) { + case IPPROTO_TCP: + th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); + if (th != NULL) + sip->sin6_port = th->source; + break; + case IPPROTO_UDP: + uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); + if (uh != NULL) + sip->sin6_port = uh->source; + break; + case IPPROTO_DCCP: + dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); + if (dh != NULL) + sip->sin6_port = dh->dccph_sport; + break; + } + return proto; +} + /** * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check * @sk: socket @@ -2889,43 +3180,52 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security; - char *csp; - int rc; + struct smack_known *skp; + struct sockaddr sadd; + int rc = 0; struct smk_audit_info ad; #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT struct lsm_network_audit net; #endif - if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6) - return 0; - - /* - * Translate what netlabel gave us. - */ - netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); + switch (sk->sk_family) { + case PF_INET: + /* + * Translate what netlabel gave us. + */ + netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); - rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr); - if (rc == 0) - csp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp); - else - csp = smack_net_ambient; + rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr); + if (rc == 0) + skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp); + else + skp = smack_net_ambient; - netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); + netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT - smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); - ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family; - ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; - ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL); + smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); + ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family; + ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; + ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL); #endif - /* - * Receiving a packet requires that the other end - * be able to write here. Read access is not required. - * This is the simplist possible security model - * for networking. - */ - rc = smk_access(csp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); - if (rc != 0) - netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0); + /* + * Receiving a packet requires that the other end + * be able to write here. Read access is not required. + * This is the simplist possible security model + * for networking. + */ + rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + if (rc != 0) + netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0); + break; + case PF_INET6: + rc = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd); + if (rc == IPPROTO_UDP || rc == IPPROTO_TCP) + rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING); + else + rc = 0; + break; + } return rc; } @@ -2979,7 +3279,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, { struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL; - char *sp; + struct smack_known *skp; int family = PF_UNSPEC; u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */ int rc; @@ -2995,7 +3295,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, if (family == PF_UNIX) { ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; - s = smack_to_secid(ssp->smk_out); + s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid; } else if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) { /* * Translate what netlabel gave us. @@ -3005,8 +3305,8 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr); if (rc == 0) { - sp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp); - s = smack_to_secid(sp); + skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp); + s = skp->smk_secid; } netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); } @@ -3027,13 +3327,15 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) { struct socket_smack *ssp; + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); if (sk == NULL || (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)) return; ssp = sk->sk_security; - ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = smk_of_current(); + ssp->smk_in = skp->smk_known; + ssp->smk_out = skp; /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */ } @@ -3055,7 +3357,6 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; struct sockaddr_in addr; struct iphdr *hdr; - char *sp; char *hsp; int rc; struct smk_audit_info ad; @@ -3063,16 +3364,24 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsm_network_audit net; #endif - /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ - if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) - family = PF_INET; + if (family == PF_INET6) { + /* + * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving + * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel + * processing on IPv6. + */ + if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) + family = PF_INET; + else + return 0; + } netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr); if (rc == 0) - sp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp); + skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp); else - sp = smack_known_huh.smk_known; + skp = &smack_known_huh; netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT @@ -3085,7 +3394,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write * here. Read access is not required. */ - rc = smk_access(sp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); if (rc != 0) return rc; @@ -3093,7 +3402,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it. */ - req->peer_secid = smack_to_secid(sp); + req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid; /* * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here @@ -3106,10 +3415,9 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, hsp = smack_host_label(&addr); rcu_read_unlock(); - if (hsp == NULL) { - skp = smk_find_entry(sp); + if (hsp == NULL) rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &skp->smk_netlabel); - } else + else netlbl_req_delattr(req); return rc; @@ -3126,10 +3434,12 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, const struct request_sock *req) { struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security; + struct smack_known *skp; - if (req->peer_secid != 0) - ssp->smk_packet = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid); - else + if (req->peer_secid != 0) { + skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid); + ssp->smk_packet = skp->smk_known; + } else ssp->smk_packet = NULL; } @@ -3155,7 +3465,9 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags) { - key->security = smk_of_task(cred->security); + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(cred->security); + + key->security = skp->smk_known; return 0; } @@ -3184,7 +3496,7 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, { struct key *keyp; struct smk_audit_info ad; - char *tsp = smk_of_task(cred->security); + struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(cred->security); keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); if (keyp == NULL) @@ -3198,15 +3510,14 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, /* * This should not occur */ - if (tsp == NULL) + if (tkp == NULL) return -EACCES; #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY); ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial; ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description; #endif - return smk_access(tsp, keyp->security, - MAY_READWRITE, &ad); + return smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE, &ad); } #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ @@ -3288,7 +3599,7 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule, struct audit_context *actx) { - char *smack; + struct smack_known *skp; char *rule = vrule; if (!rule) { @@ -3300,7 +3611,7 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule, if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER) return 0; - smack = smack_from_secid(secid); + skp = smack_from_secid(secid); /* * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs, @@ -3308,9 +3619,9 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule, * label. */ if (op == Audit_equal) - return (rule == smack); + return (rule == skp->smk_known); if (op == Audit_not_equal) - return (rule != smack); + return (rule != skp->smk_known); return 0; } @@ -3338,11 +3649,11 @@ static void smack_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) */ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { - char *sp = smack_from_secid(secid); + struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid); if (secdata) - *secdata = sp; - *seclen = strlen(sp); + *secdata = skp->smk_known; + *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known); return 0; } @@ -3498,6 +3809,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = { .unix_may_send = smack_unix_may_send, .socket_post_create = smack_socket_post_create, + .socket_bind = smack_socket_bind, .socket_connect = smack_socket_connect, .socket_sendmsg = smack_socket_sendmsg, .socket_sock_rcv_skb = smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb, @@ -3577,8 +3889,8 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) return 0; - tsp = new_task_smack(smack_known_floor.smk_known, - smack_known_floor.smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); + tsp = new_task_smack(&smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor, + GFP_KERNEL); if (tsp == NULL) return -ENOMEM; diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index 53a08b8..ab16703 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock); * If it isn't somehow marked, use this. * It can be reset via smackfs/ambient */ -char *smack_net_ambient; +struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient; /* * This is the level in a CIPSO header that indicates a @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct smack_master_list { LIST_HEAD(smack_rule_list); struct smack_parsed_rule { - char *smk_subject; + struct smack_known *smk_subject; char *smk_object; int smk_access1; int smk_access2; @@ -163,9 +163,11 @@ static inline void smack_catset_bit(unsigned int cat, char *catsetp) */ static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap) { + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); + nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); - nap->secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_current()); + nap->secid = skp->smk_secid; } /* @@ -306,7 +308,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object, struct smack_known *skp; if (import) { - rule->smk_subject = smk_import(subject, len); + rule->smk_subject = smk_import_entry(subject, len); if (rule->smk_subject == NULL) return -1; @@ -321,7 +323,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object, kfree(cp); if (skp == NULL) return -1; - rule->smk_subject = skp->smk_known; + rule->smk_subject = skp; cp = smk_parse_smack(object, len); if (cp == NULL) @@ -445,7 +447,6 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_rules_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, struct list_head *rule_list, struct mutex *rule_lock, int format) { - struct smack_known *skp; struct smack_parsed_rule *rule; char *data; int datalen; @@ -505,12 +506,10 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_rules_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, goto out_free_rule; } - if (rule_list == NULL) { load = 1; - skp = smk_find_entry(rule->smk_subject); - rule_list = &skp->smk_rules; - rule_lock = &skp->smk_rules_lock; + rule_list = &rule->smk_subject->smk_rules; + rule_lock = &rule->smk_subject->smk_rules_lock; } rc = smk_set_access(rule, rule_list, rule_lock, load); @@ -579,13 +578,14 @@ static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max) * because you should expect to be able to write * anything you read back. */ - if (strlen(srp->smk_subject) >= max || strlen(srp->smk_object) >= max) + if (strlen(srp->smk_subject->smk_known) >= max || + strlen(srp->smk_object) >= max) return; if (srp->smk_access == 0) return; - seq_printf(s, "%s %s", srp->smk_subject, srp->smk_object); + seq_printf(s, "%s %s", srp->smk_subject->smk_known, srp->smk_object); seq_putc(s, ' '); @@ -738,9 +738,9 @@ static void smk_unlbl_ambient(char *oldambient) __func__, __LINE__, rc); } if (smack_net_ambient == NULL) - smack_net_ambient = smack_known_floor.smk_known; + smack_net_ambient = &smack_known_floor; - rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(smack_net_ambient, PF_INET, + rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(smack_net_ambient->smk_known, PF_INET, NULL, NULL, &nai); if (rc != 0) printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d add rc = %d\n", @@ -881,7 +881,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT) rule += SMK_LABELLEN; else - rule += strlen(skp->smk_known); + rule += strlen(skp->smk_known) + 1; ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &maplevel); if (ret != 1 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL) @@ -1535,11 +1535,12 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_ambient(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, */ mutex_lock(&smack_ambient_lock); - asize = strlen(smack_net_ambient) + 1; + asize = strlen(smack_net_ambient->smk_known) + 1; if (cn >= asize) rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos, - smack_net_ambient, asize); + smack_net_ambient->smk_known, + asize); else rc = -EINVAL; @@ -1560,8 +1561,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_ambient(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { + struct smack_known *skp; char *oldambient; - char *smack = NULL; char *data; int rc = count; @@ -1577,16 +1578,16 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, goto out; } - smack = smk_import(data, count); - if (smack == NULL) { + skp = smk_import_entry(data, count); + if (skp == NULL) { rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } mutex_lock(&smack_ambient_lock); - oldambient = smack_net_ambient; - smack_net_ambient = smack; + oldambient = smack_net_ambient->smk_known; + smack_net_ambient = skp; smk_unlbl_ambient(oldambient); mutex_unlock(&smack_ambient_lock); @@ -1645,7 +1646,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { char *data; - char *sp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security); + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security); int rc = count; if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) @@ -1656,7 +1657,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, * explicitly for clarity. The smk_access() implementation * would use smk_access(smack_onlycap, MAY_WRITE) */ - if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != sp) + if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != skp->smk_known) return -EPERM; data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1866,8 +1867,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_user_access(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (res) return -EINVAL; - res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object, rule.smk_access1, - NULL); + res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object, + rule.smk_access1, NULL); data[0] = res == 0 ? '1' : '0'; data[1] = '\0'; |
