Manual merge with Linus.

Conflicts:
	arch/powerpc/kernel/setup-common.c
	drivers/input/keyboard/hil_kbd.c
	drivers/input/mouse/hil_ptr.c

13 files changed, 466 insertions, 379 deletions

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 8a6e097..841eb4e 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
 int cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
 {
 	/* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
-	if (!cap_issubset (child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
-	    !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+	if (!cap_issubset(child->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted) &&
+	    !__capable(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
 		return -EPERM;
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index f1a5bd9..fd99429 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static int dummy_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int dummy_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
+static int dummy_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
@@ -393,6 +393,11 @@ static int dummy_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t bu
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static const char *dummy_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 static int dummy_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -558,6 +563,11 @@ static int dummy_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int dummy_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 static int dummy_msg_msg_alloc_security (struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -763,8 +773,14 @@ static int dummy_socket_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int dummy_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
-				   int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int dummy_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
+					  int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+{
+	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+}
+
+static int dummy_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata,
+					 u32 *seclen)
 {
 	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
 }
@@ -925,6 +941,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getxattr);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listxattr);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_removexattr);
+	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_xattr_getsuffix);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecurity);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity);
@@ -959,6 +976,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_reparent_to_init);
  	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_to_inode);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_permission);
+	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecurity);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security);
@@ -1002,7 +1020,8 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getsockopt);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_shutdown);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_sock_rcv_skb);
-	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec);
+	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_stream);
+	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_dgram);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_alloc_security);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_free_security);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_getsid);
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 99781b7..a057e33 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* key.c: basic authentication token and access key management
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-6 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 	 * its description */
 	if (!not_in_quota) {
 		spin_lock(&user->lock);
-		if (user->qnkeys + 1 >= KEYQUOTA_MAX_KEYS &&
+		if (user->qnkeys + 1 >= KEYQUOTA_MAX_KEYS ||
 		    user->qnbytes + quotalen >= KEYQUOTA_MAX_BYTES
 		    )
 			goto no_quota;
@@ -795,12 +795,16 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 		goto error_3;
 	}
 
-	/* search for an existing key of the same type and description in the
-	 * destination keyring
+	/* if it's possible to update this type of key, search for an existing
+	 * key of the same type and description in the destination keyring and
+	 * update that instead if possible
 	 */
-	key_ref = __keyring_search_one(keyring_ref, ktype, description, 0);
-	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
-		goto found_matching_key;
+	if (ktype->update) {
+		key_ref = __keyring_search_one(keyring_ref, ktype, description,
+					       0);
+		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
+			goto found_matching_key;
+	}
 
 	/* decide on the permissions we want */
 	perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 0c62798..ed71d86 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -17,10 +17,33 @@
 #include <linux/keyctl.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
+static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type,
+				  const char __user *_type,
+				  unsigned len)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = strncpy_from_user(type, _type, len);
+
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (ret == 0 || ret >= len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (type[0] == '.')
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	type[len - 1] = '\0';
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*****************************************************************************/
 /*
  * extract the description of a new key from userspace and either add it as a
@@ -38,40 +61,22 @@ asmlinkage long sys_add_key(const char __user *_type,
 	key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
 	char type[32], *description;
 	void *payload;
-	long dlen, ret;
+	long ret;
 
 	ret = -EINVAL;
 	if (plen > 32767)
 		goto error;
 
 	/* draw all the data into kernel space */
-	ret = strncpy_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type) - 1);
+	ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error;
-	type[31] = '\0';
-
-	ret = -EPERM;
-	if (type[0] == '.')
-		goto error;
-
-	ret = -EFAULT;
-	dlen = strnlen_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE - 1);
-	if (dlen <= 0)
-		goto error;
 
-	ret = -EINVAL;
-	if (dlen > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
-		goto error;
-
-	ret = -ENOMEM;
-	description = kmalloc(dlen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!description)
+	description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (IS_ERR(description)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(description);
 		goto error;
-	description[dlen] = '\0';
-
-	ret = -EFAULT;
-	if (copy_from_user(description, _description, dlen) != 0)
-		goto error2;
+	}
 
 	/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
 	payload = NULL;
@@ -136,59 +141,28 @@ asmlinkage long sys_request_key(const char __user *_type,
 	struct key *key;
 	key_ref_t dest_ref;
 	char type[32], *description, *callout_info;
-	long dlen, ret;
+	long ret;
 
 	/* pull the type into kernel space */
-	ret = strncpy_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type) - 1);
+	ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error;
-	type[31] = '\0';
-
-	ret = -EPERM;
-	if (type[0] == '.')
-		goto error;
 
 	/* pull the description into kernel space */
-	ret = -EFAULT;
-	dlen = strnlen_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE - 1);
-	if (dlen <= 0)
-		goto error;
-
-	ret = -EINVAL;
-	if (dlen > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
-		goto error;
-
-	ret = -ENOMEM;
-	description = kmalloc(dlen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!description)
+	description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (IS_ERR(description)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(description);
 		goto error;
-	description[dlen] = '\0';
-
-	ret = -EFAULT;
-	if (copy_from_user(description, _description, dlen) != 0)
-		goto error2;
+	}
 
 	/* pull the callout info into kernel space */
 	callout_info = NULL;
 	if (_callout_info) {
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-		dlen = strnlen_user(_callout_info, PAGE_SIZE - 1);
-		if (dlen <= 0)
-			goto error2;
-
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-		if (dlen > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
-			goto error2;
-
-		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		callout_info = kmalloc(dlen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!callout_info)
+		callout_info = strndup_user(_callout_info, PAGE_SIZE);
+		if (IS_ERR(callout_info)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(callout_info);
 			goto error2;
-		callout_info[dlen] = '\0';
-
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-		if (copy_from_user(callout_info, _callout_info, dlen) != 0)
-			goto error3;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/* get the destination keyring if specified */
@@ -264,36 +238,21 @@ long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id, int create)
 long keyctl_join_session_keyring(const char __user *_name)
 {
 	char *name;
-	long nlen, ret;
+	long ret;
 
 	/* fetch the name from userspace */
 	name = NULL;
 	if (_name) {
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-		nlen = strnlen_user(_name, PAGE_SIZE - 1);
-		if (nlen <= 0)
-			goto error;
-
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-		if (nlen > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
+		name = strndup_user(_name, PAGE_SIZE);
+		if (IS_ERR(name)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(name);
 			goto error;
-
-		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		name = kmalloc(nlen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!name)
-			goto error;
-		name[nlen] = '\0';
-
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-		if (copy_from_user(name, _name, nlen) != 0)
-			goto error2;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/* join the session */
 	ret = join_session_keyring(name);
 
- error2:
-	kfree(name);
  error:
 	return ret;
 
@@ -566,32 +525,18 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
 	struct key_type *ktype;
 	key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref, dest_ref;
 	char type[32], *description;
-	long dlen, ret;
+	long ret;
 
 	/* pull the type and description into kernel space */
-	ret = strncpy_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type) - 1);
+	ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error;
-	type[31] = '\0';
 
-	ret = -EFAULT;
-	dlen = strnlen_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE - 1);
-	if (dlen <= 0)
+	description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (IS_ERR(description)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(description);
 		goto error;
-
-	ret = -EINVAL;
-	if (dlen > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
-		goto error;
-
-	ret = -ENOMEM;
-	description = kmalloc(dlen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!description)
-		goto error;
-	description[dlen] = '\0';
-
-	ret = -EFAULT;
-	if (copy_from_user(description, _description, dlen) != 0)
-		goto error2;
+	}
 
 	/* get the keyring at which to begin the search */
 	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, ringid, 0, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 74cb79e..f6940618 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -16,11 +16,12 @@
 #include <linux/keyctl.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 /* session keyring create vs join semaphore */
-static DECLARE_MUTEX(key_session_sem);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(key_session_mutex);
 
 /* the root user's tracking struct */
 struct key_user root_key_user = {
@@ -711,7 +712,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
 	}
 
 	/* allow the user to join or create a named keyring */
-	down(&key_session_sem);
+	mutex_lock(&key_session_mutex);
 
 	/* look for an existing keyring of this name */
 	keyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, 0);
@@ -737,7 +738,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
 	key_put(keyring);
 
 error2:
-	up(&key_session_sem);
+	mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
 error:
 	return ret;
 
diff --git a/security/seclvl.c b/security/seclvl.c
index 8529ea6..441beaf 100644
--- a/security/seclvl.c
+++ b/security/seclvl.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
  * Copyright (c) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com>
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
  * Copyright (c) 2002 International Business Machines <robb@austin.ibm.com>
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Davi E. M. Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com>
  *
  *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <linux/kobject.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <asm/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <linux/gfp.h>
 #include <linux/sysfs.h>
 
@@ -194,35 +196,27 @@ static unsigned char hashedPassword[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
  * people...
  */
 static int
-plaintext_to_sha1(unsigned char *hash, const char *plaintext, int len)
+plaintext_to_sha1(unsigned char *hash, const char *plaintext, unsigned int len)
 {
-	char *pgVirtAddr;
 	struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
-	struct scatterlist sg[1];
+	struct scatterlist sg;
 	if (len > PAGE_SIZE) {
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Plaintext password too large (%d "
 			      "characters).  Largest possible is %lu "
 			      "bytes.\n", len, PAGE_SIZE);
-		return -ENOMEM;
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("sha1", CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
 	if (tfm == NULL) {
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR,
 			      "Failed to load transform for SHA1\n");
-		return -ENOSYS;
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	// Just get a new page; don't play around with page boundaries
-	// and scatterlists.
-	pgVirtAddr = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-	sg[0].page = virt_to_page(pgVirtAddr);
-	sg[0].offset = 0;
-	sg[0].length = len;
-	strncpy(pgVirtAddr, plaintext, len);
+	sg_init_one(&sg, (u8 *)plaintext, len);
 	crypto_digest_init(tfm);
-	crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1);
+	crypto_digest_update(tfm, &sg, 1);
 	crypto_digest_final(tfm, hash);
 	crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
-	free_page((unsigned long)pgVirtAddr);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -234,11 +228,9 @@ static ssize_t
 passwd_write_file(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	int i;
-	unsigned char tmp[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-	char *page;
-	int rc;
+	char *p;
 	int len;
+	unsigned char tmp[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
 
 	if (!*passwd && !*sha1_passwd) {
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Attempt to password-unlock the "
@@ -251,38 +243,39 @@ passwd_write_file(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (count < 0 || count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (*ppos != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!page)
+	p = kmalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!p)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	len = -EFAULT;
-	if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+	if (copy_from_user(p, buf, count))
 		goto out;
 	
-	len = strlen(page);
+	len = count;
 	/* ``echo "secret" > seclvl/passwd'' includes a newline */
-	if (page[len - 1] == '\n')
+	if (p[len - 1] == '\n')
 		len--;
 	/* Hash the password, then compare the hashed values */
-	if ((rc = plaintext_to_sha1(tmp, page, len))) {
+	if ((len = plaintext_to_sha1(tmp, p, len))) {
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error hashing password: rc = "
-			      "[%d]\n", rc);
-		return rc;
-	}
-	for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; i++) {
-		if (hashedPassword[i] != tmp[i])
-			return -EPERM;
+			      "[%d]\n", len);
+		goto out;
 	}
+
+	len = -EPERM;
+	if (memcmp(hashedPassword, tmp, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+		goto out;
+
 	seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO,
 		      "Password accepted; seclvl reduced to 0.\n");
 	seclvl = 0;
 	len = count;
 
 out:
-	free_page((unsigned long)page);
+	kfree (p);
 	return len;
 }
 
@@ -295,13 +288,11 @@ static struct file_operations passwd_file_ops = {
  */
 static int seclvl_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
 {
-	if (seclvl >= 0) {
-		if (child->pid == 1) {
-			seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to ptrace "
-				      "the init process dissallowed in "
-				      "secure level %d\n", seclvl);
-			return -EPERM;
-		}
+	if (seclvl >= 0 && child->pid == 1) {
+		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to ptrace "
+			      "the init process dissallowed in "
+			      "secure level %d\n", seclvl);
+		return -EPERM;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -312,55 +303,54 @@ static int seclvl_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
  */
 static int seclvl_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
 {
+	int rc = 0;
+
 	/* init can do anything it wants */
 	if (tsk->pid == 1)
 		return 0;
 
-	switch (seclvl) {
-	case 2:
-		/* fall through */
-	case 1:
-		if (cap == CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) {
+	if (seclvl > 0) {
+		rc = -EPERM;
+
+		if (cap == CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE)
 			seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to modify "
 				      "the IMMUTABLE and/or APPEND extended "
 				      "attribute on a file with the IMMUTABLE "
 				      "and/or APPEND extended attribute set "
 				      "denied in seclvl [%d]\n", seclvl);
-			return -EPERM;
-		} else if (cap == CAP_SYS_RAWIO) {	// Somewhat broad...
+		else if (cap == CAP_SYS_RAWIO)
 			seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to perform "
 				      "raw I/O while in secure level [%d] "
 				      "denied\n", seclvl);
-			return -EPERM;
-		} else if (cap == CAP_NET_ADMIN) {
+		else if (cap == CAP_NET_ADMIN)
 			seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to perform "
 				      "network administrative task while "
 				      "in secure level [%d] denied\n", seclvl);
-			return -EPERM;
-		} else if (cap == CAP_SETUID) {
+		else if (cap == CAP_SETUID)
 			seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to setuid "
 				      "while in secure level [%d] denied\n",
 				      seclvl);
-			return -EPERM;
-		} else if (cap == CAP_SETGID) {
+		else if (cap == CAP_SETGID)
 			seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to setgid "
 				      "while in secure level [%d] denied\n",
 				      seclvl);
-		} else if (cap == CAP_SYS_MODULE) {
+		else if (cap == CAP_SYS_MODULE)
 			seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to perform "
 				      "a module operation while in secure "
 				      "level [%d] denied\n", seclvl);
-			return -EPERM;
-		}
-		break;
-	default:
-		break;
+		else
+			rc = 0;
 	}
-	/* from dummy.c */
-	if (cap_is_fs_cap(cap) ? tsk->fsuid == 0 : tsk->euid == 0)
-		return 0;	/* capability granted */
-	seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Capability denied\n");
-	return -EPERM;		/* capability denied */
+
+	if (!rc) {
+		if (!(cap_is_fs_cap(cap) ? tsk->fsuid == 0 : tsk->euid == 0))
+			rc = -EPERM;
+	}
+
+	if (rc)
+		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Capability denied\n");
+
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -466,12 +456,9 @@ static int seclvl_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 static void seclvl_file_free_security(struct file *filp)
 {
 	struct dentry *dentry = filp->f_dentry;
-	struct inode *inode = NULL;
 
-	if (dentry) {
-		inode = dentry->d_inode;
-		seclvl_bd_release(inode);
-	}
+	if (dentry)
+		seclvl_bd_release(dentry->d_inode);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -479,9 +466,7 @@ static void seclvl_file_free_security(struct file *filp)
  */
 static int seclvl_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 {
-	if (current->pid == 1)
-		return 0;
-	if (seclvl == 2) {
+	if (current->pid != 1 && seclvl == 2) {
 		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to unmount in secure "
 			      "level %d\n", seclvl);
 		return -EPERM;
@@ -505,8 +490,9 @@ static struct security_operations seclvl_ops = {
 static int processPassword(void)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
-	hashedPassword[0] = '\0';
 	if (*passwd) {
+		char *p;
+
 		if (*sha1_passwd) {
 			seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error: Both "
 				      "passwd and sha1_passwd "
@@ -514,12 +500,16 @@ static int processPassword(void)
 				      "exclusive.\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
-		if ((rc = plaintext_to_sha1(hashedPassword, passwd,
-					    strlen(passwd)))) {
+
+		p = kstrdup(passwd, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (p == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		if ((rc = plaintext_to_sha1(hashedPassword, p, strlen(p))))
 			seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error: SHA1 support not "
 				      "in kernel\n");
-			return rc;
-		}
+
+		kfree (p);
 		/* All static data goes to the BSS, which zero's the
 		 * plaintext password out for us. */
 	} else if (*sha1_passwd) {	// Base 16
@@ -542,7 +532,7 @@ static int processPassword(void)
 			sha1_passwd[i + 2] = tmp;
 		}
 	}
-	return 0;
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -552,28 +542,46 @@ struct dentry *dir_ino, *seclvl_ino, *passwd_ino;
 
 static int seclvlfs_register(void)
 {
+	int rc = 0;
+
 	dir_ino = securityfs_create_dir("seclvl", NULL);
-	if (!dir_ino)
-		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (IS_ERR(dir_ino))
+		return PTR_ERR(dir_ino);
 
 	seclvl_ino = securityfs_create_file("seclvl", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
 				dir_ino, &seclvl, &seclvl_file_ops);
-	if (!seclvl_ino)
+	if (IS_ERR(seclvl_ino)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(seclvl_ino);
 		goto out_deldir;
+	}
 	if (*passwd || *sha1_passwd) {
 		passwd_ino = securityfs_create_file("passwd", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
 				dir_ino, NULL, &passwd_file_ops);
-		if (!passwd_ino)
+		if (IS_ERR(passwd_ino)) {
+			rc = PTR_ERR(passwd_ino);
 			goto out_delf;
+		}
 	}
-	return 0;
+	return rc;
+
+out_delf:
+	securityfs_remove(seclvl_ino);
 
 out_deldir:
 	securityfs_remove(dir_ino);
-out_delf:
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void seclvlfs_unregister(void)
+{
 	securityfs_remove(seclvl_ino);
 
-	return -EFAULT;
+	if (*passwd || *sha1_passwd)
+		securityfs_remove(passwd_ino);
+
+	securityfs_remove(dir_ino);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -582,6 +590,8 @@ out_delf:
 static int __init seclvl_init(void)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
+	static char once;
+
 	if (verbosity < 0 || verbosity > 1) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "Error: bad verbosity [%d]; only 0 or 1 "
 		       "are valid values\n", verbosity);
@@ -600,6 +610,11 @@ static int __init seclvl_init(void)
 			      "module parameter(s): rc = [%d]\n", rc);
 		goto exit;
 	}
+
+	if ((rc = seclvlfs_register())) {
+		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error registering with sysfs\n");
+		goto exit;
+	}
 	/* register ourselves with the security framework */
 	if (register_security(&seclvl_ops)) {
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR,
@@ -611,20 +626,24 @@ static int __init seclvl_init(void)
 			seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "seclvl: Failure "
 				      "registering with primary security "
 				      "module.\n");
+			seclvlfs_unregister();
 			goto exit;
 		}		/* if primary module registered */
 		secondary = 1;
 	}			/* if we registered ourselves with the security framework */
-	if ((rc = seclvlfs_register())) {
-		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error registering with sysfs\n");
-		goto exit;
-	}
+
 	seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO, "seclvl: Successfully initialized.\n");
+
+	if (once) {
+		once = 1;
+		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO, "seclvl is going away. It has been "
+				"buggy for ages. Also, be warned that "
+				"Securelevels are useless.");
+	}
  exit:
-	if (rc) {
+	if (rc)
 		printk(KERN_ERR "seclvl: Error during initialization: rc = "
 		       "[%d]\n", rc);
-	}
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -633,17 +652,14 @@ static int __init seclvl_init(void)
  */
 static void __exit seclvl_exit(void)
 {
-	securityfs_remove(seclvl_ino);
-	if (*passwd || *sha1_passwd)
-		securityfs_remove(passwd_ino);
-	securityfs_remove(dir_ino);
-	if (secondary == 1) {
+	seclvlfs_unregister();
+
+	if (secondary)
 		mod_unreg_security(MY_NAME, &seclvl_ops);
-	} else if (unregister_security(&seclvl_ops)) {
+	else if (unregister_security(&seclvl_ops))
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO,
 			      "seclvl: Failure unregistering with the "
 			      "kernel\n");
-	}
 }
 
 module_init(seclvl_init);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f693e1f..51ef509 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -174,31 +174,8 @@ int mod_unreg_security(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
 	return security_ops->unregister_security(name, ops);
 }
 
-/**
- * capable - calls the currently loaded security module's capable() function with the specified capability
- * @cap: the requested capability level.
- *
- * This function calls the currently loaded security module's capable()
- * function with a pointer to the current task and the specified @cap value.
- *
- * This allows the security module to implement the capable function call
- * however it chooses to.
- */
-int capable(int cap)
-{
-	if (security_ops->capable(current, cap)) {
-		/* capability denied */
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	/* capability granted */
-	current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
-	return 1;
-}
-
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_security);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_security);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mod_reg_security);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mod_unreg_security);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ops);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b65c201..b61b9554 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -117,6 +117,34 @@ static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
 
+static kmem_cache_t *sel_inode_cache;
+
+/* Return security context for a given sid or just the context 
+   length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
+static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+	char *context;
+	unsigned len;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (!buffer || !size)
+		goto getsecurity_exit;
+
+	if (size < len) {
+		len = -ERANGE;
+		goto getsecurity_exit;
+	}
+	memcpy(buffer, context, len);
+
+getsecurity_exit:
+	kfree(context);
+	return len;
+}
+
 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
 
 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -146,10 +174,11 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 
-	isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	isec = kmem_cache_alloc(sel_inode_cache, SLAB_KERNEL);
 	if (!isec)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	memset(isec, 0, sizeof(*isec));
 	init_MUTEX(&isec->sem);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
 	isec->inode = inode;
@@ -172,7 +201,7 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 	spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 
 	inode->i_security = NULL;
-	kfree(isec);
+	kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
 }
 
 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
@@ -1929,7 +1958,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	u32 newsid, clen;
 	int rc;
 	char *namep = NULL, *context;
@@ -1937,7 +1965,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	tsec = current->security;
 	dsec = dir->i_security;
 	sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
-	isec = inode->i_security;
 
 	if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
 		newsid = tsec->create_sid;
@@ -1957,7 +1984,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 
 	inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid);
 
-	if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+	if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	if (name) {
@@ -2209,6 +2236,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
+static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
+{
+      return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
+}
+
 /*
  * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user.  If the
  * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
@@ -2216,47 +2248,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
  *
  * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
  */
-static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
+static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
-	char *context;
-	unsigned len;
-	int rc;
 
-	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) {
-		rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
-	if (rc)
-		goto out;
-
-	/* Probe for required buffer size */
-	if (!buffer || !size) {
-		rc = len;
-		goto out_free;
-	}
-
-	if (size < len) {
-		rc = -ERANGE;
-		goto out_free;
-	}
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-	if (err > 0) {
-		if ((len == err) && !(memcmp(context, buffer, len))) {
-			/* Don't need to canonicalize value */
-			rc = err;
-			goto out_free;
-		}
-		memset(buffer, 0, size);
-	}
-	memcpy(buffer, context, len);
-	rc = len;
-out_free:
-	kfree(context);
-out:
-	return rc;
+	return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
@@ -3318,24 +3317,38 @@ out:
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
-				     int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
+					    int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
 {
 	int err = 0;
 	char *scontext;
 	u32 scontext_len;
 	struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	u32 peer_sid = 0;
 
 	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
-	if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
+
+	/* if UNIX_STREAM check peer_sid, if TCP check dst for labelled sa */
+	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
+		ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
+	}
+	else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
+		peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(sock->sk);
+
+		if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+			err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	else {
 		err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
-	
-	err = security_sid_to_context(ssec->peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -3356,6 +3369,23 @@ out:
 	return err;
 }
 
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+	u32 peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
+
+	if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, secdata, seclen);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+
 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 {
 	return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
@@ -4022,6 +4052,13 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 	return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
 }
 
+static int selinux_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+
+	return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
+}
+
 /* module stacking operations */
 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
 {
@@ -4063,8 +4100,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 			       char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-	u32 sid, len;
-	char *context;
+	u32 sid;
 	int error;
 
 	if (current != p) {
@@ -4073,9 +4109,6 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 			return error;
 	}
 
-	if (!size)
-		return -ERANGE;
-
 	tsec = p->security;
 
 	if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
@@ -4092,16 +4125,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 	if (!sid)
 		return 0;
 
-	error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
-	if (len > size) {
-		kfree(context);
-		return -ERANGE;
-	}
-	memcpy(value, context, len);
-	kfree(context);
-	return len;
+	return selinux_getsecurity(sid, value, size);
 }
 
 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
@@ -4259,6 +4283,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.inode_getxattr =		selinux_inode_getxattr,
 	.inode_listxattr =		selinux_inode_listxattr,
 	.inode_removexattr =		selinux_inode_removexattr,
+	.inode_xattr_getsuffix =        selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix,
 	.inode_getsecurity =            selinux_inode_getsecurity,
 	.inode_setsecurity =            selinux_inode_setsecurity,
 	.inode_listsecurity =           selinux_inode_listsecurity,
@@ -4296,6 +4321,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.task_to_inode =                selinux_task_to_inode,
 
 	.ipc_permission =		selinux_ipc_permission,
+	.ipc_getsecurity =		selinux_ipc_getsecurity,
 
 	.msg_msg_alloc_security =	selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
 	.msg_msg_free_security =	selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
@@ -4344,7 +4370,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.socket_setsockopt =		selinux_socket_setsockopt,
 	.socket_shutdown =		selinux_socket_shutdown,
 	.socket_sock_rcv_skb =		selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
-	.socket_getpeersec =		selinux_socket_getpeersec,
+	.socket_getpeersec_stream =	selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
+	.socket_getpeersec_dgram =	selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
 	.sk_alloc_security =		selinux_sk_alloc_security,
 	.sk_free_security =		selinux_sk_free_security,
 	.sk_getsid = 			selinux_sk_getsid_security,
@@ -4376,6 +4403,9 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
 	tsec = current->security;
 	tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
 
+	sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
+					    sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
+					    0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
 	avc_init();
 
 	original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 8e87996..c10f1fc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ static inline u32 selinux_no_sk_sid(struct flowi *fl)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
+u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk);
+u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb);
 #else
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
@@ -49,6 +51,16 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	return NF_ACCEPT;
 }
+
+static inline int selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return SECSID_NULL;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return SECSID_NULL;
+}
 #endif
 
 #endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index 69b9329..b8f4d25 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -88,8 +88,15 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] =
 	{ XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
 	{ XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
 	{ XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
 	{ XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
 	{ XFRM_MSG_UPDSA,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_FLUSHSA,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_FLUSHPOLICY,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_NEWAE,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_GETAE,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
 };
 
 static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] =
@@ -99,6 +106,9 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] =
 	{ AUDIT_LIST,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV },
 	{ AUDIT_ADD,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
 	{ AUDIT_DEL,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
+	{ AUDIT_LIST_RULES,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV },
+	{ AUDIT_ADD_RULE,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
+	{ AUDIT_DEL_RULE,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
 	{ AUDIT_USER,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY    },
 	{ AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ     },
 };
@@ -145,8 +155,10 @@ int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm)
 		break;
 
 	case SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET:
-		if (nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG &&
-		    nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG) {
+		if ((nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG &&
+		     nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG) ||
+		    (nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 &&
+                     nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2)) {
 			*perm = NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY;
 		} else {
 			err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_audit_perms,
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index b5fa02d..a4efc96 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -15,12 +15,14 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/major.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
 
@@ -44,7 +46,7 @@ static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
 __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
 
 
-static DECLARE_MUTEX(sel_sem);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(sel_mutex);
 
 /* global data for booleans */
 static struct dentry *bool_dir = NULL;
@@ -126,6 +128,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 		length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETENFORCE);
 		if (length)
 			goto out;
+		audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+			"enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u", new_value, 
+			selinux_enforcing,
+			audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
 		selinux_enforcing = new_value;
 		if (selinux_enforcing)
 			avc_ss_reset(0);
@@ -176,6 +182,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 		length = selinux_disable();
 		if (length < 0)
 			goto out;
+		audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+			"selinux=0 auid=%u",
+			audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
 	}
 
 	length = count;
@@ -230,7 +239,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 	ssize_t length;
 	void *data = NULL;
 
-	down(&sel_sem);
+	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
 
 	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY);
 	if (length)
@@ -261,8 +270,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 		length = ret;
 	else
 		length = count;
+	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
+		"policy loaded auid=%u",
+		audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
 out:
-	up(&sel_sem);
+	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
 	vfree(data);
 	return length;
 }
@@ -709,12 +721,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
 {
 	char *page = NULL;
 	ssize_t length;
-	ssize_t end;
 	ssize_t ret;
 	int cur_enforcing;
 	struct inode *inode;
 
-	down(&sel_sem);
+	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
 
 	ret = -EFAULT;
 
@@ -740,26 +751,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
 
 	length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing,
 			  bool_pending_values[inode->i_ino - BOOL_INO_OFFSET]);
-	if (length < 0) {
-		ret = length;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	if (*ppos >= length) {
-		ret = 0;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (count + *ppos > length)
-		count = length - *ppos;
-	end = count + *ppos;
-	if (copy_to_user(buf, (char *) page + *ppos, count)) {
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	*ppos = end;
-	ret = count;
+	ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
 out:
-	up(&sel_sem);
+	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
 	if (page)
 		free_page((unsigned long)page);
 	return ret;
@@ -773,7 +767,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
 	int new_value;
 	struct inode *inode;
 
-	down(&sel_sem);
+	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
 
 	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETBOOL);
 	if (length)
@@ -812,7 +806,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
 	length = count;
 
 out:
-	up(&sel_sem);
+	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
 	if (page)
 		free_page((unsigned long) page);
 	return length;
@@ -831,7 +825,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
 	ssize_t length = -EFAULT;
 	int new_value;
 
-	down(&sel_sem);
+	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
 
 	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETBOOL);
 	if (length)
@@ -869,7 +863,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
 	length = count;
 
 out:
-	up(&sel_sem);
+	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
 	if (page)
 		free_page((unsigned long) page);
 	return length;
@@ -987,7 +981,7 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 err:
 	kfree(values);
-	d_genocide(dir);
+	sel_remove_bools(dir);
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
 	goto out;
 }
@@ -1168,37 +1162,38 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
 		dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, files[i].name);
 		if (!dentry) {
 			ret = -ENOMEM;
-			goto err;
+			goto out;
 		}
 
 		inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|files[i].mode);
 		if (!inode) {
 			ret = -ENOMEM;
-			goto err;
+			goto out;
 		}
 		inode->i_fop = files[i].ops;
 		d_add(dentry, inode);
 	}
 out:
 	return ret;
-err:
-	d_genocide(dir);
-	goto out;
 }
 
-static int sel_make_dir(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *dentry)
+static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 	struct inode *inode;
 
-	inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
+	inode = sel_make_inode(dir->i_sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
 	if (!inode) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
 	inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
+	/* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
+	inode->i_nlink++;
 	d_add(dentry, inode);
+	/* bump link count on parent directory, too */
+	dir->i_nlink++;
 out:
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -1207,7 +1202,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
 {
 	int ret;
 	struct dentry *dentry;
-	struct inode *inode;
+	struct inode *inode, *root_inode;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 
 	static struct tree_descr selinux_files[] = {
@@ -1228,30 +1223,33 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
 	};
 	ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto err;
+
+	root_inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
 
 	dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, BOOL_DIR_NAME);
-	if (!dentry)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (!dentry) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
 
-	inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
-	if (!inode)
-		goto out;
-	inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
-	inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
-	d_add(dentry, inode);
-	bool_dir = dentry;
-	ret = sel_make_bools();
+	ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry);
 	if (ret)
-		goto out;
+		goto err;
+
+	bool_dir = dentry;
 
 	dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, NULL_FILE_NAME);
-	if (!dentry)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (!dentry) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
 
 	inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO);
-	if (!inode)
-		goto out;
+	if (!inode) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
 	isec = (struct inode_security_struct*)inode->i_security;
 	isec->sid = SECINITSID_DEVNULL;
 	isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
@@ -1262,22 +1260,23 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
 	selinux_null = dentry;
 
 	dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, "avc");
-	if (!dentry)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (!dentry) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
 
-	ret = sel_make_dir(sb, dentry);
+	ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry);
 	if (ret)
-		goto out;
+		goto err;
 
 	ret = sel_make_avc_files(dentry);
 	if (ret)
-		goto out;
-
-	return 0;
+		goto err;
 out:
-	dput(dentry);
+	return ret;
+err:
 	printk(KERN_ERR "%s:  failed while creating inodes\n", __FUNCTION__);
-	return -ENOMEM;
+	goto out;
 }
 
 static struct super_block *sel_get_sb(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 8a76492..6149248 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
 #include <linux/in.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
-#include <asm/semaphore.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+
 #include "flask.h"
 #include "avc.h"
 #include "avc_ss.h"
@@ -48,9 +49,9 @@ static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
 #define POLICY_RDUNLOCK read_unlock(&policy_rwlock)
 #define POLICY_WRUNLOCK write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
 
-static DECLARE_MUTEX(load_sem);
-#define LOAD_LOCK down(&load_sem)
-#define LOAD_UNLOCK up(&load_sem)
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(load_mutex);
+#define LOAD_LOCK mutex_lock(&load_mutex)
+#define LOAD_UNLOCK mutex_unlock(&load_mutex)
 
 static struct sidtab sidtab;
 struct policydb policydb;
@@ -1758,19 +1759,22 @@ int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	printk(KERN_INFO "security: committed booleans { ");
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
+			audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
+				AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+				"bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u",
+				policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
+				!!values[i],
+				policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
+				audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
+		}
 		if (values[i]) {
 			policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
 		} else {
 			policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
 		}
-		if (i != 0)
-			printk(", ");
-		printk("%s:%d", policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
-		       policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state);
 	}
-	printk(" }\n");
 
 	for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
 		rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index b2af7ca..dfab6c8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -225,6 +225,74 @@ void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
 }
 
 /*
+ * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a connected
+ * (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket based on its security
+ * association used to connect to the remote socket.
+ *
+ * Retrieve via getsockopt SO_PEERSEC.
+ */
+u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct dst_entry *dst, *dst_test;
+	u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
+		goto out;
+
+	dst = sk_dst_get(sk);
+	if (!dst)
+		goto out;
+
+ 	for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
+      	     dst_test = dst_test->child) {
+		struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
+
+ 		if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+	 	 	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+			peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	dst_release(dst);
+
+out:
+	return peer_sid;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a UDP packet
+ * based on its security association used to connect to the remote socket.
+ *
+ * Retrieve via setsockopt IP_PASSSEC and recvmsg with control message
+ * type SCM_SECURITY.
+ */
+u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct sec_path *sp;
+
+	if (skb == NULL)
+		return SECSID_NULL;
+
+	if (skb->sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP)
+		return SECSID_NULL;
+
+	sp = skb->sp;
+	if (sp) {
+		int i;
+
+		for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
+			struct xfrm_state *x = sp->x[i].xvec;
+			if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+				struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+				return ctx->ctx_sid;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return SECSID_NULL;
+}
+
+/*
  * LSM hook that controls access to unlabelled packets.  If
  * a xfrm_state is authorizable (defined by macro) then it was
  * already authorized by the IPSec process.  If not, then