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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-04-07 16:53:59 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-04-07 16:53:59 -0700 |
commit | f8cf2f16a7c95acce497bfafa90e7c6d8397d653 (patch) | |
tree | 6451abed2025593015cde6fdc6edd54844eb15d3 /security/selinux | |
parent | 4b3f1a151571985f7c9964260db1c31e056a67e4 (diff) | |
parent | ab60368ab6a452466885ef4edf0cefd089465132 (diff) | |
download | op-kernel-dev-f8cf2f16a7c95acce497bfafa90e7c6d8397d653.zip op-kernel-dev-f8cf2f16a7c95acce497bfafa90e7c6d8397d653.tar.gz |
Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"A mixture of bug fixes, code cleanup, and continues to close
IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal, and IMA-audit gaps.
Also note the addition of a new cred_getsecid LSM hook by Matthew
Garrett:
For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid
in the bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a
cred_getsecid hook that makes this possible.
which is used by a new CREDS_CHECK target in IMA:
In ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process
credentials and the credentials that will be committed when the new
process is started. This will not change behaviour unless the
system policy is extended to include CREDS_CHECK targets -
BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same credentials that it did
previously"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithm
ima: Add smackfs to the default appraise/measure list
evm: check for remount ro in progress before writing
ima: Improvements in ima_appraise_measurement()
ima: Simplify ima_eventsig_init()
integrity: Remove unused macro IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS
ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement()
ima: Fix Kconfig to select TPM 2.0 CRB interface
evm: Constify *integrity_status_msg[]
evm: Move evm_hmac and evm_hash from evm_main.c to evm_crypto.c
fuse: define the filesystem as untrusted
ima: fail signature verification based on policy
ima: clear IMA_HASH
ima: re-evaluate files on privileged mounted filesystems
ima: fail file signature verification on non-init mounted filesystems
IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy
security: Add a cred_getsecid hook
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 2b8c55e..1eeb70e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3947,6 +3947,11 @@ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) *tsec = *old_tsec; } +static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = cred_sid(c); +} + /* * set the security data for a kernel service * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled @@ -6926,6 +6931,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), |