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| author | Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> | 2015-10-08 05:01:55 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2015-10-11 05:05:06 -0700 |
| commit | e446f9dfe17bbaa76a1fe22912636f38be1e1af8 (patch) | |
| tree | 8709e6157fe0a20b75dd88340f76f991cd3ae863 /security/selinux | |
| parent | 21d11bd6f0f15c9c782d1f09557bb71f582a3f53 (diff) | |
| download | op-kernel-dev-e446f9dfe17bbaa76a1fe22912636f38be1e1af8.zip op-kernel-dev-e446f9dfe17bbaa76a1fe22912636f38be1e1af8.tar.gz | |
net: synack packets can be attached to request sockets
selinux needs few changes to accommodate fact that SYNACK messages
can be attached to a request socket, lacking sk_security pointer
(Only syncookies are still attached to a TCP_LISTEN socket)
Adds a new sk_listener() helper, and use it in selinux and sch_fq
Fixes: ca6fb0651883 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported by: kernel test robot <ying.huang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 6434016..6e50841 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4898,7 +4898,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb, if (sk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec; - if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) + if (sk_listener(sk)) /* if the socket is the listening state then this * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and @@ -5005,7 +5005,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per * connection. */ if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL && - !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)) + !(sk && sk_listener(sk))) return NF_ACCEPT; #endif @@ -5022,7 +5022,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; } - } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) { + } else if (sk_listener(sk)) { /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In * this particular case the correct security label is assigned @@ -5033,7 +5033,11 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output() * for similar problems. */ u32 skb_sid; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec; + + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) + sk = inet_reqsk(sk)->rsk_listener; + sksec = sk->sk_security; if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid)) return NF_DROP; /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL |
