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authorJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>2011-04-26 10:22:15 +0200
committerJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>2011-04-26 10:22:59 +0200
commit07f9479a40cc778bc1462ada11f95b01360ae4ff (patch)
tree0676cf38df3844004bb3ebfd99dfa67a4a8998f5 /security/selinux
parent9d5e6bdb3013acfb311ab407eeca0b6a6a3dedbf (diff)
parentcd2e49e90f1cae7726c9a2c54488d881d7f1cd1c (diff)
downloadop-kernel-dev-07f9479a40cc778bc1462ada11f95b01360ae4ff.zip
op-kernel-dev-07f9479a40cc778bc1462ada11f95b01360ae4ff.tar.gz
Merge branch 'master' into for-next
Fast-forwarded to current state of Linus' tree as there are patches to be applied for files that didn't exist on the old branch.
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c36
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c39
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/avc.h18
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlabel.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c6
5 files changed, 69 insertions, 32 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 9da6420..1d027e2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -471,6 +471,7 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
* @avd: access vector decisions
* @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit
* @a: auxiliary audit data
+ * @flags: VFS walk flags
*
* Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
* with the policy. This function is typically called by
@@ -481,9 +482,10 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
* be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
* before calling the auditing code.
*/
-void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a)
+ struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a,
+ unsigned flags)
{
struct common_audit_data stack_data;
u32 denied, audited;
@@ -515,11 +517,24 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
else
audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
if (!audited)
- return;
+ return 0;
+
if (!a) {
a = &stack_data;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE);
}
+
+ /*
+ * When in a RCU walk do the audit on the RCU retry. This is because
+ * the collection of the dname in an inode audit message is not RCU
+ * safe. Note this may drop some audits when the situation changes
+ * during retry. However this is logically just as if the operation
+ * happened a little later.
+ */
+ if ((a->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS) &&
+ (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU))
+ return -ECHILD;
+
a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass;
a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested;
a->selinux_audit_data.ssid = ssid;
@@ -529,6 +544,7 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback;
a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback;
common_lsm_audit(a);
+ return 0;
}
/**
@@ -793,6 +809,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
* @tclass: target security class
* @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
* @auditdata: auxiliary audit data
+ * @flags: VFS walk flags
*
* Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
* for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
@@ -802,14 +819,19 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
* permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or
* another -errno upon other errors.
*/
-int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
- u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
+int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
+ unsigned flags)
{
struct av_decision avd;
- int rc;
+ int rc, rc2;
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
- avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata);
+
+ rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata,
+ flags);
+ if (rc2)
+ return rc2;
return rc;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 6475e1f..f7cf0ea 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
#include <linux/syslog.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
@@ -1445,8 +1446,11 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
}
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
- if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
- avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
+ if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
+ int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
+ if (rc2)
+ return rc2;
+ }
return rc;
}
@@ -1466,7 +1470,8 @@ static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
struct inode *inode,
u32 perms,
- struct common_audit_data *adp)
+ struct common_audit_data *adp,
+ unsigned flags)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -1486,7 +1491,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
}
- return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
+ return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
}
/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
@@ -1503,7 +1508,7 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
- return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+ return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
}
/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
@@ -1539,7 +1544,7 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
/* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
rc = 0;
if (av)
- rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+ rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
out:
return rc;
@@ -1846,11 +1851,11 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
*/
static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
- int cap, int audit)
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
{
int rc;
- rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
+ rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -1931,7 +1936,8 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
- rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+ rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
+ &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (rc == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -2101,7 +2107,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
file = file_priv->file;
inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
- FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
+ FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL, 0)) {
drop_tty = 1;
}
}
@@ -2633,7 +2639,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *na
return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
}
-static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flags)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -2655,7 +2661,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
- return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad);
+ return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
}
static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
@@ -2723,7 +2729,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
+ if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
return -EPERM;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
@@ -2834,7 +2840,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
* in-core context value, not a denial.
*/
- error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+ error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
+ &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (!error)
error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
@@ -2968,7 +2975,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
case KDSKBENT:
case KDSKBSENT:
error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
- SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
break;
/* default case assumes that the command will go
@@ -3202,7 +3209,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
* new inode label or new policy.
* This check is not redundant - do not remove.
*/
- return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
+ return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL, 0);
}
/* task security operations */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 5615081..e77b2ac 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -54,11 +54,11 @@ struct avc_cache_stats {
void __init avc_init(void);
-void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct av_decision *avd,
int result,
- struct common_audit_data *a);
+ struct common_audit_data *a, unsigned flags);
#define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
@@ -66,9 +66,17 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
unsigned flags,
struct av_decision *avd);
-int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
+int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
+ unsigned);
+
+static inline int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm_flags(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, auditdata, 0);
+}
u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 1c2fc46..c3bf3ed 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
*
* Description:
* Called when the NetLabel state of a sk_security_struct needs to be reset.
- * The caller is responsibile for all the NetLabel sk_security_struct locking.
+ * The caller is responsible for all the NetLabel sk_security_struct locking.
*
*/
void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 3e7544d..6ef4af4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static u16 map_class(u16 pol_value)
return i;
}
- return pol_value;
+ return SECCLASS_NULL;
}
static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
@@ -2806,7 +2806,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
+ /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presence of '-' */
if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
return -EINVAL;
break;
@@ -3075,7 +3075,7 @@ static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
* Description:
* Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
* SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
- * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possibile the
+ * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possible the
* 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
* allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
* conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on
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