Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

  IMA:
   - provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules

  KEYS:
   - add a system blacklist keyring

   - add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, exposes keyring link restriction
     functionality to userland via keyctl()

  LSM:
   - harden LSM API with __ro_after_init

   - add prlmit security hook, implement for SELinux

   - revive security_task_alloc hook

  TPM:
   - implement contextual TPM command 'spaces'"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (98 commits)
  tpm: Fix reference count to main device
  tpm_tis: convert to using locality callbacks
  tpm: fix handling of the TPM 2.0 event logs
  tpm_crb: remove a cruft constant
  keys: select CONFIG_CRYPTO when selecting DH / KDF
  apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly
  apparmor: fix parameters so that the permission test is bypassed at boot
  apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836
  apparmor: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK
  security/apparmor/lsm.c: set debug messages
  apparmor: fix boolreturn.cocci warnings
  Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls().
  smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str()
  KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
  KEYS: Keyring asymmetric key restrict method with chaining
  KEYS: Restrict asymmetric key linkage using a specific keychain
  KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type
  KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
  KEYS: Consistent ordering for __key_link_begin and restrict check
  KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_type
  ...

1 files changed, 25 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 0c2ac31..e67a526 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3920,6 +3920,21 @@ static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
 			    PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
 }
 
+int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
+			 unsigned int flags)
+{
+	u32 av = 0;
+
+	if (!flags)
+		return 0;
+	if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
+		av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
+	if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
+		av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
+	return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
+			    SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
+}
+
 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
 		struct rlimit *new_rlim)
 {
@@ -4352,10 +4367,18 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		u32 sid, node_perm;
 
 		if (family == PF_INET) {
+			if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) {
+				err = -EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
 			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
 			snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
 			addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
 		} else {
+			if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) {
+				err = -EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
 			addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
 			snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
 			addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
@@ -6108,7 +6131,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 
 #endif
 
-static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
+static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
@@ -6206,6 +6229,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),