diff options
author | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2012-04-04 15:01:42 -0400 |
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committer | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2012-04-09 12:22:59 -0400 |
commit | 2e33405785d3eaec303c54b4a10afdebf3729da7 (patch) | |
tree | f4c0d114503796e9f958341393e336f76a7eb6dd /security/selinux/avc.c | |
parent | 154c50ca4eb9ae472f50b6a481213e21ead4457d (diff) | |
download | op-kernel-dev-2e33405785d3eaec303c54b4a10afdebf3729da7.zip op-kernel-dev-2e33405785d3eaec303c54b4a10afdebf3729da7.tar.gz |
SELinux: delay initialization of audit data in selinux_inode_permission
We pay a rather large overhead initializing the common_audit_data.
Since we only need this information if we actually emit an audit
message there is little need to set it up in the hot path. This patch
splits the functionality of avc_has_perm() into avc_has_perm_noaudit(),
avc_audit_required() and slow_avc_audit(). But we take care of setting
up to audit between required() and the actual audit call. Thus saving
measurable time in a hot path.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/avc.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/avc.c | 63 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 62 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index 8ee42b2..1a04247 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) } /* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */ -static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, +noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, struct common_audit_data *a, unsigned flags) @@ -497,67 +497,6 @@ static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, } /** - * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions. - * @ssid: source security identifier - * @tsid: target security identifier - * @tclass: target security class - * @requested: requested permissions - * @avd: access vector decisions - * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit - * @a: auxiliary audit data - * @flags: VFS walk flags - * - * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance - * with the policy. This function is typically called by - * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be - * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit() - * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing. - * For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must - * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released - * before calling the auditing code. - */ -inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 requested, - struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a, - unsigned flags) -{ - u32 denied, audited; - denied = requested & ~avd->allowed; - if (unlikely(denied)) { - audited = denied & avd->auditdeny; - /* - * a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny is TRICKY! Setting a bit in - * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if - * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that - * permission. Take notice that this is unrelated to the - * actual permissions that were denied. As an example lets - * assume: - * - * denied == READ - * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule) - * selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & ACCESS == 1 - * - * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied - * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for - * ACCESS - */ - if (a && - a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny && - !(a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & avd->auditdeny)) - audited = 0; - } else if (result) - audited = denied = requested; - else - audited = requested & avd->auditallow; - if (likely(!audited)) - return 0; - - return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, - requested, audited, denied, - a, flags); -} - -/** * avc_add_callback - Register a callback for security events. * @callback: callback function * @events: security events |